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ABSTRACT 
The subject matter of this thesis is that of a series of reforms 
undertaken by the newly elected Whig coalition of 1830, culminating in the 
abolition of two of the navy's civilian administrative bodies: the Navy 
and Victualling Boards. Since the 17th century, these two boards had been 
responsible for governing all Royal Navy dock and victualling yards, with 
the latter having more recently acquired responsibility for the care of 
sick and wounded seamen. As shown in the thesis, responsibility for these 
various undertakings was not an inconsiderable task, the two boards each 
managing large numbers of civilian employees. Indeed, those employed in 
the various naval dockyards (of which there were seven home yards) 
exceeded that of any other civilian employer in the world. 
The opening chapter is primarily descriptive. Little research has 
previously been undertaken into the workings of the civilian departments 
during this period, it being necessary to clearly state how the boards 
operated and the extent of their powers. In addition, attention is given 
to the Navy Pay office and the Ordnance Board, two other bodies that were 
charged with ensuring that the Fleet could put to sea. A further element 
of the first chapter is the relationship of these four administrative 
bodies with that of the Admiralty, the board charged with responsibility 
for all warships once they were at sea. 
The factors directly leading to the abolition of the navy's two civilian 
boards is considered in the second chapter. Here, reference is made to 
some of the problems that resulted from having a permanently appointed 
group of civilian commissioners (those appointed to the Navy and 
Victualling Boards) having to take instructions from a politically 
appointed and usually short-lived superior board (the Admiralty). At the 
heart of the problem was the developed expertise of the naval 
commissioners (with which those at the Admiralty were rarely able to 
compete) and the occasional inability of the various boards to understand 
the particular viewpoint of the other. 
Chapters 3 and 4 examine the reforms themselves. While much attention is 
devoted to the abolition of the two civilian boards and the administrative 
structure that replaced them, some attention is also given to a series of 
other reforms that were instituted by the Whigs upon their return to 
power. These included a reduction in the number of civilian officers 
employed, classifying the annual estimates under more distinct heads and 
the laying before the house of actual expenditure following completion of 
the financial year. 
Chapter 5 gives consideration to the outcome of the reforms. It is 
contended that the entire reform package was an unmitigated disaster and 
one that caused the British Navy problems which were not to be rectified 
until the latter part of World War One. Yet, this has to be offset by the 
stated belief of most 19th and early 20th century commentators that the 
reforms were generally considered to be a huge success. The reasons 
leading to this particular assumption, combined with a general appraisal 
of the reforms, are the central subject matter of this, the penultimate 
chapter. 
The thesis is rounded off with a concluding sixth chapter and a full 
bibliography. 
INMODUCTION 
The British navy, throughout the 18th and 19th centuries 
played a key role in the furtherance of national ambitions. Without a 
powerful seagoing force that could be put to sea whenever need demanded, 
the British empire wculd not have come into existence and British merchant 
traders would have been threatened wherever they attempted to impose 
themselves. Indeed, the very idea of a small nation state becoming a 
world power would have been simply impossible unless Britain had been in 
a position to control sea lanes that eventually extended around the entire 
globe. However, no admiral, captain nor matelot could actually put to sea 
without his ships having first been built, equipped and subsequently 
maintained. This was wcrk perfcrmed by those employed within a massive 
administrative structure that embraced both the large-scale dock and 
victualling yards, together with government owned gun-manufacturing 
facilities, ordnance wharfs, shore-based hospitals and a complex of 
off ices. 
Yet, despite the integral importance of these facilities for the 
pursuit of national policy, the civilian side of naval administration is a 
much neglected area of historical research. Whereas, numerous 
historians have given attention to naval strategy, battlefleets and 
individual ships, few have considered the immensity of organisation that 
allowed the British navy to put to sea in the first place. For John 
Brewer, the financial arrangements necessary for the creation and 
upkeep of the British fleet forms a central part of the 'fiscal-military 
state which he recognises as having emerged during the years that 
followed the 'Glorious Revolution- of 1688. In 'The Sinews of Power" he 
refers to the state, in these years, as becoming 'the largest single actor 
i 
in the economy' while indicating that the fixed capital assets of the 
dockyards alone dwarfed all other national industrial enterprises. 
[11 
in fact, with the excePtion of Oppenheim's study of the 
administration of the navy under the Tudors and early Stuarts, most 
academic forays into this area have been of fairly recent vintage. [21 Of 
these, Ehrmaes study of the navy under William III proved particularly 
important, treating the civil side of the navy as an important element in 
the acquisition of seapower. [31 In turn, Ehrmans study was followed by 
those of Herriman and Baugh, both of whom examined the administrative side 
of naval affairs during the early 18th century. [41 As for the later 
years of this same century, this has been much better served than any 
other period with several historians directing themselves to the 
American Revolutionary War. [ 51 At the same time a number of more 
general studies of the Admiralty have been made by Hurray, a former second 
secretaryt and Rodger. However, in both cases, their interest is 
primarily upon the Admiralty rather than the navy's civilian 
administrators. Prior to 1832, so it is worth mentioning, control of the 
dock and victualling yards, together with naval hospitals, were in the 
hands of separate boards. [6] 
In addition, more precise studies of naval administration have also 
been undertaken. Several, for instance, have concentrated upon the 
dockyards. These have either looked at one particular dockyard or the 
workings of all of the yards during one period of time. [71 Less well 
served, and an equally important facet of keeping a fleet at sea, 
concerns the supply of provisions, caring for the sick and wounded and the 
supply cf ordnance. As fcr the first two, apart from inclusion within 
the Beneral works upon naval administration which have already been 
mentioned, there is only one specific study. This is Paula Watson-s 
consideration of the work of the victualling and sick and wcunded boards 
during the reign of Queen Anne. [8] As for the supply of naval ordnance, 
there is a similar lack of research, that which has been produced 
restricted in its entirety to the period 1660 to 1714. [9] 
Putting all these various works together, it is not only clear that 
the amount of research has been extremely limited, but that immense gaps 
exist. In particular, little thought has been given to naval 
administration in the years that followed the ending of the wars with 
Napoleon. Admittedly Lambert directed some attention to the work of 
the Navy Board and the subsequently appointed Surveyor-General, but he 
gave no attention to a range of other important administrative 
matters. [101 Furthermore, this neglect of naval administration in the 
19th century continues right up to the 1860s and beyondL[Ill Only with 
Marder's f ive volume history of the navy during the f irst two decades of 
the present century is there an attempt at stemming this apparent short 
coming. As regards the civil side of the navy at a more local level, this 
neglect is even more apparent. Of the various studies made of the 
dockyards, most concentrate upon the 18th century, with Waters' study of 
19th century Chatham proving the exception. [12] As for the victualling 
and ordnance yards together with naval hospitals, these are a more or 
less closed book. 
This need to give a greater emphasis to the civil side of naval 
affairs becomes even more apparent when consideration is given to other 
linked areas. Those responsible for administering the civil affairs of 
the navy handled immense sums of government money, employed a larger 
workforce than any other industrial concern prior to the beginning of the 
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2Dth century and were responsible fcr a huge number of tuildings fcc use 
as offices, manufacturing units and storage. As a result, it becomes 
clear that those researching the emergence of financial acccuntabili ty, 
labcur history and architecture would be well served by a more thcrcugh 
treatment of the civilian side of naval affairs. Reference to most 
studies carried out within these linked branches of history show little or 
no reference to matters falling within the province of the navy's civilian 
departments. Roseveare, for instance, devotes a few paragraphs to the 
important financial reforms imposed by Graham upon the Admiralty during 
the 1830s, but fails to give attention to their limited saccess both in 
the long and short term. [131 Similarly, while recognising the office of 
Treasurer of the Navy, Roseveare f ails to make any real sense of this 
ancient off ice. [141 In the work of Rule and Dobson upon 18th century 
labour, only passing reference is made to those employed within the dock 
and victualling yards. This, indeed, is a serious shortcoming. In 
fact, the artisans and labcurers employed within these two groups of yards 
were much better organised than any other group of workers during this 
period and showed every sign of acquiring a degree of class consciousness 
that was not to be achieved by other groups until the following 
century. [151 Finally, in her study of Victorian and early 20th century 
office buildings, Locker makes not a single reference to the many such 
buildings used by the navy departments. In particular, she fails to 
recognise the importance of Somerset House as the earliest purpose-built 
office complex, bestowing this accolade upon a much later London 
tuilding. [161 
In part, much of this needs to be said in order to demonstrate not 
Only the necessity of further research 1but of the claims to the 
criginality of the present thesis. It has already been shown that the 
iv 
navy's civilian administration, despite its importance for the well-being 
of the nation state, is a much neglected topic. Furthermore, the period 
1830 to 1834 lies mid-way in a span cf years that are, in themselves, 
totally untreated. As with matters pertaining to the three linked 
branches of history already mentioned - labour history, financial 
accounting and architecture - this neglect is even more noticeable. Those 
compiling biographies and collected letters of statesmen and politicians 
who were once connected with the administration of the navy during this 
period, usually ignore this particular facet in their lives. [17] Even 
with regard to Graham, whose reputation as an administrator heavily 
depended upon the perceived success cf the reforms he imposed on the 
Admiralty during his first period in government office, a recent 
biographer chooses to devote only a page to a discussion of these 
refcrms. [181 Even less well served are Croker, Hardy and Cockburn. With 
regard to Hardy, his appointment to the Admiralty and subsequent 
importance with regard to civil matters is barely recognised by his only 
20th century bicgrapher. [191 As f or J. W. Croker, who was first secretary 
at the Admiralty for twenty-one years, the compiler of his collected 
letters chooses to include only two letters that primarily deal with naval 
administration. Furthermore, there is not even a reference to Crokers 
uncompromising opposition to the abolition of the civilian boards. [2D] 
Finally Cockburn, had also had a lengthy period of service at the 
Admiralty, serving from 1818 to 1830, yet his biographer devotes only f ive 
pages to this period, uncovers nothing new and only re-iterates that which 
can be found in the memoirs cf Second Secretary John Barrow. [21] 
As for the time span of the thesis, no more than four years, this is 
simply explained. The arrival in office of a new coalition government, 
headed by a Whig premier, was to prove a watershed for the civil 
V 
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administration of the navy. In appointing Graham to the off ice of First 
Lord, the second Earl Grey made it clear that he wished for the abolition 
of the navy and victualling boards with the duties previously undertaken 
by the navy and victualling commissioners to be absorbed by the Lords of 
the Admiralty. In carrying out this task, Graham not only created an 
entirely new infrastructure at Somerset House but also oversaw a range of 
financial reforms that were supposedly designed to make the navy 
departments more accountable before the House of Commons. 
Much attention throughout the thesis will be given to the nature of 
these reforms. However, several of the chapters will pass beyond the 
tight four year period of the title. In particular, the second chapter 
will discuss why the Whigs were so opposed to an administrative system 
that had been in place since the reign of Charles II. To achieve this, it 
will be necessary to examine some of the problems that had beset naval 
administrators in the preceding thirty years. Similarly, in the final 
chapter, with consideration given to the appropriateness of these changes, 
an analysis of their long and short term success will be undertaken. To 
facilitate this latter aim, it will be necessary to extend the terms of 
reference into the mid-19th century and beyond. In particular, given that 
these reforms had to work for a navy both at peace and at war, 
consideration will be given to the operation of Graham's reforms during 
his second tenure of office at the Admiralty (1853-4) in the Aberdeen 
coalition. This, as it happens, coincided with the outbreak of the 
Russian War. First, however, in order to establish the scope of the 
thesis and explain some of the complexities involved, it has been felt 
necessary to devote the opening chapter to the organisation of naval 
administration as it existed immediately prior to Graham-s elevation to 
the post of First Lord. In doing so, this chapter will also encompass a 
discussion of the perceived need for such changes, together with an 
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Fig. I 
Naval Expenditure, 1830 
In February 1830, estimates presented to Parliament required the following 
sues (before deduction of 1112,896 received for the sale of old 
stores) to be set aside for the needs of the Navy, 
Source: Parliamentary Papers, Estimates of the Navy, for the year 1830, MS. 
For vages and victuals of those serving 
in the Navy and reckoned on 29000 men. 
For the salaries, expenses of the 
public departments in London and other 
naval establishments; wages of artificers 
and labourers employed in the dock and 
victualling yards; materials for building, 
fitting and repair of warships; charge for 
pilotage and other contingencies; wages 
and victuals to officers, shipkeepers and 
men serving on vessels in ordinary. 
For those on half pay, superannuation 
and pensions, 
For the superannuition and pensions of 
those formerly employed in the dock, 
vittualling yards ind hospitals, 
For repair and improvement of dockyards, 
victualling yards and naval hospitals. 
For hire of store, army and convict 
transports and related matters. 
For the purchase of provisions for troops 
on foreign stations, 
Totil 
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Fig. I Major areas of government expenditure (including the Navy and its 
civil departments) as a percentage of all government expenditure for the 
year 1830. 
Scurce: Mitchell (1962), 396 
Debt charges 54.27. 
Army and Ordnance 17.3% 
Navy 11.0% 
Cost of collecting 07.4% 
Works and buildings 01.3% 
Colonial, consular 00.7% 
and foreign 
Salaries of public 
departments (other 
than Army and Navy) 01.0% 
The total net government expenditure in that year was 53.7m. 
%J 1V 
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appreciation of why such a powerful resistance to these refcmns also 
emerýrad. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
NAVAL ADMINISTRATION ON THE EVE OF REFORM 
The subject matter of this opening chapter is an examination of the navy's 
civil administration as it existed in November 1830 when a Whir-led 
coalition under Earl Grey assumed office. Consideration of the 
administrative structure at that time would seem essential. IE nothing 
else, it allows for a full appreciation of the nature of the changes 
subsequently introduced. In carrying cut this examination, attention will 
initially be given to naval dockyards, victua3ling yards and hospitals - 
collectively referred to as the outstations. Here was the end product. 
These, together with a number of clerical branches working in London 
offices, were the units actually manaaad. For this reason, it becomes 
readily apparent why a consideration of these outstations should appear at 
such an early stage. Without an appreciation of their size and 
complexity, much that follows will prove exceptionally difficult to 
explain. 
1.1 The Navyýs Civilian Support Facilities 
A major factor in the costing of any seagoing marine force is the civilian 
suppcrt services necessary fcr keeping a variety cf warships either at sea 
or in a near state of constant readiness. Such duties can include the 
building and repair of all vessels considered to be part of the fleet, 
together with the construction and maintenance of all items of equipment 
held on board. In addition, attention needs to be given to those who 
serve on board. These same ships will have to be provisioned, their crews 
paid and shore-based f acili ties established for the care of those who are 
either injured cr become sick during the course of their duties. 
Of course the precise nature and extent of civilian involvement will 
not be the same for each and every national state that chooses to provide 
itself with a fleet of seagoing warships. A small and relatively 
unsophisticated navy might require only a minimal amount of civilian 
assistance. Many of the small galley fleets that were once owned by the 
former city states located on the shores of the Mediterranean relied upon 
crews of these same vessels undertaking much routine maintenance work. 
In fact, it was quite normal for these galleys to be hauled onto a 
suitable beach, with the assembled crew devoting themselves to the task of 
cleaning or repairing the exposed hull. As galleys grew in size and their 
numbers increased, most of these city states directed part of their 
marine budget to the employment of specialist civilian labcur while going 
on to construct a complex galley arsenal. [11 
It was from similar beginnings that the civilian work force employed 
by the Royal Navy also emerged. During the early years of Henry VII-s 
reign a dockyard was established at Portsmouth, with employment given to a 
small number of civilian wcrkers. Mostly, these were shipwrights, with 
other less skilled individuals employed only on a temporary basis. To 
give assistance, particularly when a ship was brought into dry dock, both 
additional labcurers and members of the shirs company would be given the 
task of digging cut the mud gates. [2] However, as the Royal Navy grew in 
size, so did its civilian work fcrce. Further dockyards were 
established by Henry VIII and Elizabeth I, sited at Deptford, Woolwich and 
Chatham. As for the provisioning and equipping of ships, the 16th century 
IL 
also saw a victualling yard with a bakery located on Tower Hill while 
victualling storehouses were acquired at Portsmouth and Chatham. In 
addition, ordnance facilities were developed at the Tower and alongside 
existing dockyards. During the following century, further dock, ordnance 
and victualling yards were positioned at Harwich, Sheerness and Plymouth 
with facilities at existing centres expanded. While all this was going 
ahead, very little attention was given to the care of the sick and 
wounded. Surgeons on board ship were the primary instrument of care with 
sick quarters occasionally hired at the major ports. Matters 
substantially improved in the 18th century, with specialist naval 
hospitals built at Gosport (Haslar) and Plymouth (Stonehouse). In 
addition, a hospital at Greenwich (the Royal Hospital) was founded in 1705 
for the care of naval seamen who were either aged or infirm. Predictably, 
the 18th century also saw a continued expansion of facilities already 
established, with Portsmouth and Plymouth, the designated fleet bases, 
receiving the largest slice of all capital expenditure. It was the 18th 
century that also saw the creation of a number of foreign outstations, 
these acting as repair and replenishment centres for warships operating in 
more distant waters. 
With the continued growth of sham-based naval support facilities, 
the number of civilian workers also grew. Each of the various 
outstations employed a not inconsiderable workforce, whose numbers varied 
according to whether the nation was at war or at peace. In addition, the 
London offices of the various administrative bodies that oversaw the 
progress of these outstations also employed numerous clerks. Their 
duties not only entailed corresponding with the principal officers 
of the outstations, together with contractors and naval officers, but 
3 
Workforce mployed in the Royal Dockyards, Narch 1814 
Source: KKM ADM BP/34A, 2 Apr 1814; Morriss (1983), 188-9 
Deptford Woolvith Chatham Sheerness Portsmouth Plymouth Total 
Bed makers 018 010 coo coo coo coo 028 
Blockmakers 004 003 004 004 007 006 028 
Braziers Go] BOB 002 coo 002 000 005 
Bricklayers 012 023 028 013 038 057 182 
--- labourers Die 
I'D 09 027 009 042 022 130 
Carvers 002 coo 001 000 coo coo 003 
Coopers coo 0 001 0.00 001 000 003 
Engine repairers coo 002 000 coo 000 000 001:  
Founders coo 000 000 coo 002 000 002 
Glaziers 001 Cal 001 coo 00-0 000 003 
Housecarpenters 089 021 110 078 24S 245 Sao 
Joiners 047 033 076 039 ISO 107 46S 
Labourers 640 4VO6 520 153 656 606 29161 
Locksmiths 001 002 002 001 002 004 012 
Masons 002 003 CBS 002 021 029 062 
Millwrights shop 000 coo coo Goo 072 000 072 
tiessengers M 009 DID 010 010 ale oil 066 
Metal mills Coo coo coo coo 066 coo 066 
Oakum Boys 013 013 021 017 044 045 153 
Car makers Cal 001 001 Cal coo Cal Cos 
Painters 013 als GIs 010 047 029 129 
--- labourers 
coo 012 000 005 014 000 031 
Paviers 002 001 Goo 000 000 000 003 
Pitch Heaters 001 Cal 001 001 002 002 008 
Plumbers 002 002 004 003 007 Cos 023 
Riggers 075 ass lea 033 lal 141 596 
Sailtakers 047 029 OS2 026 077 068 299 
Sawyers 140 13S 167 044 240 2@8 934 
Scavelmen 040 040 630 040 120 178 500 
Shipwrights 553 S84 783 267 1433 1316 4936 
Saiths 099 086 120 049 182 '14 2ý 770 
Teams 019 021 022 009 040 031 142 
Tinmen coo 001 000 Goo 001 Cal 003 
Treenail Mooters coo 002 coo 000 coo 000 002 
Warders 012 013 020 013 036 026 130 
Waterman Go] coo coo coo coo coo 0 
Wheelwrights OD2 002 002 002 003 003 014 
WoOdMillS coo coo coo Goo 094 coo 094 
ROPEYARDS 
Foremen 003 004 003 Gas Ols 
overseers Gal coo 000 coo Gal 
Spinners 124 210 183 189 M 
Cordage takers 019 000 Goo 000 019 
Hemp dressers 006 013 016 014 049 
Layers 004 004 005 004 017 
Twine spinners 003 006 00.5 016 030 
Messengers Dal 001 000 Gal 003 
Porters 002 000 coo 000 002 
Wheelboys 007 013 010 Ole 048 
Yarn knotters 001 019 DU 013 063 
Total 1886 2026 2672 888 4257 3869 15598 
FS-q ý 
Workforce employed in the Royal Dockyards, March 1832 
Source: NMr, 04 BP/52c 
Deptford Voolvich Chatham Sheerness Portsmouth Plymouth Pembroke Total 
Blockmakers 1 2 4 5 5 17 
Boys House 17 19 20 58 
Braziers 2 (1) 3 (1) A (4) 3 9 (1) 9 (1) 1: 10 (8) v Bricklayers 8 1@ 4 17 22 61 
--- 
labourers 4 3 1 8 9 25 
Ciulkers 41 (6) 42 (4) 25 (2) 76 (11) 63 (6) 2 249 (29) 
Coopers I 1 1 4 1 1 9 
Engine repairers 6 (4) 3 2 11 
6rinders I 1 1 1 1 5 
Housecarpenters 53 (1) 12 68 8 is 148 
Joiners 38 (1) 36 12 79 73 13 1,51 (1) Labourers 16 23 156 35 170 268 100 7608 
Locksmiths 1 2 1 2 3 (1) 9 (1) 
Plasons I 1 (1) 11 16 13 42 
Millwrights 3 4 1 14 
Millvrights shop so so 
Messengers 3 6 6 7 7 4 41 
Metal mills 51 51 
Oakum Boys A 5 4 6 8 2 29 
Car makers I 1 1 3 
Painters/Glaziers 1 6 (1) is 9 24 21 1 77 (2) 
--- 
labourers 3 3 
Paviers 1 1 
Pitch Heaters I I I I 1 1 6 
Riggers 3 17 33 38 54 61 ') 6 I. e 
--- 
labourers 2 7 9 16 14 55 
Sailmakers 27 (2) 22 (1) 13 (2) 44 (1) 42 (1) 1 149 (17) 
Sawyers 71 77 28 96 28 48 348 
Scavelmen 1 7 40 7 fil 116 
"hipwrights 0 3 V "A] (37) 465 (41) 179 (13) 708 (66) 861 (46) 188 (13) 2745 (216) 
0 Aiths 1 85 (2e) 77 (15) 28 (4) 126 (24) 171 (32) 20 (1) 508 (96) 
Teaas 2 4 8 11 25 
Treenail Mocters 2 2 
Turners 1 1 2 
Warders 4 7 is 22 16 14 6 84 
Whee1wrights 1 1 2 1 3 2 1 11 
Woodmi I Is 24 )4 IL 
ROPEYARDS 
Spinners 111 (11) 
Twine spinners 13 
Key bearers 1 
96 (4) 131 (6) 338 (21) 
is 31 
113 
Total worksen 39 788 1310 477 
Apprentices to various trades in parenthesis, 
1961 1989 429 6993 
A 
4a 
Deptford Woolvich Chatham Sheerness Fortsmouth Plymouth Pembroke Total 
INFERIOR FFICERS 
Assist. converters 1 2 1 2 2 1 9 
Cabin keepers 4 1 5 
Civil engineers 1 1 I Conduct lead mills I 
Engine repairer I I 
Foremen of yard A 8 3 10 9 2 36 
Foremen of ropery 
' 
1 1 2 
Foremen, line spinn 
Foremen, smiths 1 1 2 2 3 1 H 
Layers: ropery 4 3 3 le 
Leadingmen: Stores 3 1 2 2 1 3 12 
Leadingien: bricklay I I 
Leau4ingmen: sailmaker I I 
Under Storekeeper 2 3 5 
Measurers 6 9 6 17 3 56 
Purveyors 1 1 
Super'd bricklayers 1 2 
,; uper'd metal mills 0 
I I 
Super'd millwright 1 1 
Super'd of painters I I 1 4 
Super'd steam engine I I 
Super'd voodmill I I 
Superior shipwrights 2 2 4 1 10 
Total: Inferior off, 4 20 32 is 48 44 9 172 
Numbers employed in 1832 vere similar to those of 1830 vith the exception of Deptford yard, 
also the keeping of accounts and the paying of ships' crews. Indeed, by 
the end (f the Napoleonic Wars, the civilian workforce directly employed 
in servicing the navy stood in excess of 16,000. [31 
By the 1830s post-war retrenchment had considerably reduced the 
scale of operations. The dockyards were particularly affected, numbers 
in each yard generally reduced by about 50%. Nevertheless, despite plans 
to close some of the yards, the navy could still call upon the services of 
seven operational home yards (Portsmouth, Plymouth, Chatham, Woolwich, 
Deptford, Sheerness and Pembroke). [41 In 1830, these yards combined 
employed a workforce numbering approximately 7000 while their total value 
was not less than twenty million pounds. [51 Despite the recent and 
somwhat dramatic reduction in numbers employed, the royal dockyards 
remained, as they had been throughout the previous two centuries, the 
largest and most complex industrial enterprises in the world. ' Within 
each of these yards, facilities included a range of dry docks (necessary 
for the docking of ships so that work might be undertaken upon the 
underside of the hull), numerous storehouses and a great range of 
workshops. 
However, the work of the various royal dockyards was not simply 
restricted to that of repairing and maintaining warships. The primary 
role of Pembroke yard and a secondary role for each of the other yards was 
that of constructing ships. For this reason each dockyard possessed a 
number of specialised building slips, although it was equally possible to 
utilize the existing dry docks for this same purpose. 
A third task undertaken within the royal dockyards, and helping to 
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explain the wide range of skills on offer in each yard, was that of the 
manufacture of most of the products necessary for completion of a warship. 
While it might seem obvious for shipwrights and sawyers to be engaged in 
the cutting, shaping and bending of timbers necessary for a ship held 
either in dry dock or upon a building slip, it was not so essential that a 
dockyard should also manufacture anchors, flags and hammocks. most of the 
yards, for instance, possessed extensive sail lofts (for the cutting, 
shaping and repairing of sail canvas), smitheries: (for the production of 
numerous iron products including the huge bower anchors that could weigh 
up to 4.5 tons) and mast houses (for the cutting and shaping of mast 
timbers). 
In addition, a number of the larger dockyards specialised in the 
production and subsequent supply of other yards with certain mass produced 
items. This was particular so with rope (the use of which on board ship 
encompassed everything from rigging and anchor cables through to bucket 
handles and the infamous cat or nine tails), supplied by the extensive 
rcperies at Chatham, Plymouth and Portsmouth. Similarly, flags were 
supplied by women workers employed in the colcur lofts at Chatham and 
Plymouth, while lead and paint were supplied from a purpose built mill at 
Chatham. Indeed, the only major item which, as yet, was not produced in 
one or the other royal dockyards, were the steam engines fitted to the 
small paddle steamers then being introduced into naval service. [61 
Apart from the royal dockyards there also existed naval yards at 
Deal and Haulbowline (Ccrk Harbcur), these acting as supply centres. Mcre 
important were six overseas dockyards, located at Malta, Gibraltar, 
Halifax, Antigua (English Harbour), Jamaica (Port Royal) and Bermuda 
(Imland Island), these having the task of supplying ships and providing 
facilities for the cleaning of hulls beneath the waterline. This latter 
function was of particular importance as seaweed and other accretions 
could seriously impair a fast sailing performance. None of the overseas 
yards of this period possessed dry docks but they were equipped with 
speci al wharves fit ted wi th caps tans and rope tackles for a process known 
as careening. In order to careen a ship, the rope tackle was f it ted from 
the capstan to the upper masts. The ship was hauled down by the capstan 
pulling on the rope and forcing the vessel to heel until the hull was 
sufficiently exposed to be cleaned. 
Attached to the home yards of Portsmouth, Plymouth, Chatham and 
Sheerness were large stretches of water that were utilized as harbcurs. 
During periods of peace, especially those years that followed the 
cessation of hostilities in 1815, these harbcurs generated much of the 
work performed by those four naval dockyards. It was within these 
adjacent areas of water, known as the ordinary, that large numbers of 
de-commissioned ships were held for future need. Stripped of most of 
their equipment, with items such as masts, rigging, sails, armament and 
gunpowder taken ashore for safe storage, these vessels were under the 
strict care of the dockyard. On board each vessel would be a small number 
of individuals known as shipkeepers, employed to carry cut any minor 
repairs and keep the bilges free of water. Additional and more 
complicated repair work, together with regular inspection of the ship, 
were performed either in the dockyard or by a gang of civilian artisans 
and labourers employed 'afloat' and regularly directing their attention to 
each of the vessels held in ordinary. 
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The commissioning of a vessel, either from the ordinary or one newly 
launched, would involve the vessel having first to be dry docked. An 
initial inspection would be undertaken and, if all was found to be in 
order, then sheets of copper plate would be fastened over the entire 
underwater area. This latter task was necessary as uncoppered ships were 
easy prey to ship worm (a boring mollusc that could eat its way through 
timber) while the unprotected timber hulls rapidly collected various 
accretions that would affect sailing perfcrmance. [7] once the vessel had 
been inspected, any necessary repairs completed and the vessel coppered, 
she would be returned to the harbour where she would take on board 
additional ballast, upper masts, sails, rigging, guns, powder, stores and 
comestibles. The majority of these items were supplied from dockyard 
stores and might be either newly assembled or previously taken from the 
vessel when she first entered the ordinary. However, neither weapons nor 
comestible products were within the province of the dockyards, brought to 
the vessel from the nearest ordnance wharf or victualling yard. 
Turning to the ordnance wharves, the primary role of the civilian 
workforce was that of maintaining and storing all weapons and associated 
items used on board warships that had entered dockyard care. Such items 
not only included the guns themselves but also extended to boarding pikes 
and cutlasses. In order that this function be performed properly it was 
necessary that each dockyard should have an ordnance wharf with the 
facilities to take off and return these guns as and when required. 
Normally, such a task involved the particular vessel about to enter 
either a dry dock or the ordinary having f Irst to anchor close to the 
wharf and her guns, gun carriages and other items of armament lowered into 
a series of small boats for relaying to the ordnance wharf. 
q 
Figure 5. The Combined Costs of the Civil Departments of 
the Navy, 1830. 
EFigures based upon estimates presented to Parliament in 
1830 but not necessarily representing actual expenditure. ] 
Source: Estimates of the Navy, for the year 1830. House of 
Lords Library (62) XVIII. 327. 
Salaries paid to officers and principal 
officers of yards E137,460 
Wages to-artificers and labourers employed 
in dockyards and victualling yards ; E458,720 
Salaries and contingent expenses of those 
employed in the London offices C180,017 
For repair and improvement of yards both 
home and overseas f 99,000 
Charge for material employed in the 
building, fitting and repair of warships E680,000 
Wages, allowances and victualling of officers 
and men belonging to ships in ordinary E105,834 
Medical establishment; salaries and 
contingencies E 64,026 
For victualling yards f 61,038 
For dockyards E137,460 
Superannuities and pensions to those formerly 
employed in the dockyards and the London 
offices of the civil boards E174,584 
Greenwich Hospital E270,000 
TOTAL E2,368,139 
(Representing 42.3% of the total naval budget. ) 
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The main ordnance wharves, not surprisingly, were those at Chatham 
(sited immediately up river from the dockyard), Plymouth (Morice yard, 
also immediately up river from the dockyard), Portsmouth (immediately 
South of the dockyard) and Sheerness (adjoining the northern side of the 
dockyard). However, this was far from being the complete list of ordnance 
facilities associated with the navy. Apart from anything else, because of 
the dangers of an explosion, it had become customary for large stocks of 
gunpowder to be stored in areas further away from the busy dockyard and 
ordnance wharf. As a result, separate powder stores were sited at Keyham 
(for Devonport dockyard), Priddy's Hard, Gosport (for Portsmouth) and, up 
until 1827, at Upnor (for Sheerness and Chatham). Finally, a much more 
extensive store of gunpowder was held at Purfleet and distributed to these 
locally sited stores as and when necessary. [81 
Unlike the royal dockyards, the vast majority of items distributed 
to warships from the ordnance wharves were not manufactured on site. 
Instead, the heavy iron barrels were produced either at the government 
foundry at Woolwich or in one of several private foundries. Similarly, 
the lead shot, cutlesses, boarding pikes, hand guns and items of gunners' 
equipment were supplied in this way. The only exception to this was the 
gun trucks for, although large numbers were brought to the ordnance 
wharves ready made, it was also the case that a number of these were 
locally produced within the work shops located within each of the ordnance 
wharves. 
The main work tasks undertaken by the civilian wcrkfcrce belonging 
to the ordnance wharves was that of inspecting or repairing equipment that 
had been removed from vessels entrusted to dockyard care. For this 
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reason, the four listed ordnance wharves all contained a blacksmith's 
shop, armourers- workshop, carpenters' shop (for yhe wooden gun carriages) 
a carriage painters' shop and various storehouses. In addition, each gun 
Wharf also possessed a range of offices and accommodation for officers 
employed in the supervision of the workforce. 
Directing attention to the supply of comestible products, a number 
of victualling yards were located close to the home dockyards while others 
were to be found in the vicinity of fleet assembly points. In size, they 
differed considerably. Some were little more than a couple of 
conveniently sited storehouses, while others were vast centres; for the 
processing and manufacturing of foodstuffs. Most important of these yards 
was the one at Deptford. Immediately adjoining the dockyard, its 
facilities included a slaughterhouse, bakery, cooperage, flour mill, 
distillery and buildings for the manufacture of cocoa and biscuits. 
Conveniently located for the supply of ships fitting and refitting at 
Deptford (when this particular yard was cperational) and Woolwich it also 
directly supplied ships assembling in the Downs, Thames and Dover area. 
By comparison, the victualling yard at Sheerness was fairly small. 
Indeed, this was no more than a collection of storehouses, with most of 
the held food stocks also sent from Deptfcrd. [9] 
Chatham, which once possessed large victualling facilities, had 
ceased to be a main centre either for the processing or storage of food. 
Since 1826, facilities here had been closed, with ships refitting in the 
Medway taking on supplies either direct from Deptford or from stocks held 
at Sheerness. Ar the immediate needs of the adjacent ordinary, one or 
two hulks had been converted to the purpose of storing a three month 
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Numbers eaployed in the home victualling yards, Nov 1830. These figures drawn 
from the agreed establishment of 24 DeE 1827 (with allowances made for subs- 
sequent reductions, Source PRO AW/31302 and 3733, 
JOB DESCRIPTION DEPTFORD PLYMOUTH FORTSIMOUTH SHEERNESS 
(Weevil) (Cremill) 
PRINCIPAL OFFICERS 
Commissioner 01 a] a] 
Faster Attendant 0) 01 
Storekeeper 01 01 01 Ol At Sheerness the 
Clerk of the Check al 01 a] storekeeper was 
Supt'd of wharf 01 01 01 the senior office 
holder 
CLERKS 
Ist class 03 03 03 
2nd class as 62 04 a] 
3rd Class 11 G5 03 
INFERIER OFFICERS 
masters of trades U 64 02 a] 
inspector of works a] a] 
porters al 01 
foremen of stores 03 02 a] 
leadingmen 13 02 
Supt'd of, watering 01 The Portsmouth 
Boatswain a] watering place 
Coxswain all was sited at 
Haddon 
ARTIsMS&ABOURERS 
Coopers 14 12 01 
apprentice Coopers 03 04 
sawyers 02 02 
millers 04 
apprentice millers a] 
engineers 01 
bakers 11 
apprentice bakers as 
stokers 01 
breadweighers 01 
carpenters a] 01, 
plumbers 01 
warders al a] as a] 
painters 01 
bricklayers , 01 01 
blacksmiths 01 as 
brewers 03 
labourers 55 46 04 
hoymen 20 22 04 
boy-, 03 a] 
messengers 03 01 
TOTALS 29 165 129 17 
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supply of comestible items. [101 
Portsmouth and Plymouth, because of their distance from Deptford 
had, by 1830, acquired separate manufacturing and processing facilities. 
In fact, both the Weevil yard at Gosport (responsible for provisioning 
ships based at Portsmouth) and the Cremill Yard at Plymouth (which 
took the name of Royal Clarence Victualling Yard in July 1832) were 
undergoing extensive improvements by this date. New tidal basins, 
cornmills, bakeries, flour mills, storehouses and wharves had either been 
built or were in the process of construction. [ 11] 
Arrangements for the victualling of ships overseas were sometimes 
left to a local merchant who would supply the necessary comestibles as and 
when required. This was particularly the case with anchorages attached to 
the very small yards. However, Gibraltar, which was taking on increased 
importance during this period, and which had a very limited hinterland for 
the supply of sufficient quantities, took most of its food supplies from 
the Cremill yard at Plymouth. To a lesser extent this was also the case 
with Malta, although facilities here did include a bakery. 
Combined, the home and overseas victual-ling yards employed, in 1830, 
a workforce of approximately 2000. Included were millers brewers, packers 
and labourers together with a large number of clerks. Mainly, this latter 
group of individuals were involved in work connected with ensuring that 
appointed contractors both fulfilled their obligations and were paid. As 
for the value of the various victualling yards, this could not have been 
less than a million pounds. It was certainly the case that the new 
victualling facilities of the Royal William Yard were to be finally valued 
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at three hundred thousand pounds while those of the Royal Clarence Yard 
were reconstructed at a cost of two hundred thousand pounds. 
Civilian involvement in keeping the navy at sea did not end with the 
Wilding, repairing, maintenance and supply of warships. A further shore 
based facility, primarily involving a civilian workforce, was that of 
caring for the sick and wounded. Hospitals for those wounded or taken ill 
while serving on warships existed at Portsmouth (Haslar), Plymouth 
(Stonehouse), Chatham (Melville) and Malta. Largest of these hospitals 
was that of Haslar, this having the ability to accommodate over 2DOO 
patients in 84 general medical and surgical wards while that of 
Stonehouse could accommodate about 1,250 patients. The hospital at 
Chatham, on the other hand, was much smaller, able to accommodate only 2DO 
patients. It was the most recent of the hospitals, having had been 
completed in July 1828 at a cost of thirty-f ive thousand pounds. [ 12] 
Combined, the ordnance wharves, victualling yards, hospitals and 
dockyards served the fleet. Theoretically, co-operation between these 
differing bodies would have been best served by the existence of a single 
administrative authority. However, prior to 1832, there existed several 
separate controlling bodies, each with a distinct area of authority. 
These were the Navy Board (responsible for dockyards, design of warships 
and the payment of ships' crews), the Victual-ling Board (responsible for 
victualling yards and hospitals), the Navy Pay Office (which carried cut 
all financial transactions) and the Ordnance Board (responsible for the 
arming of warships). Between them existed only limited lines of 
communication, these of ten passing through a fourth body, the Board of 
Admiralty while for ordnance demands, there was also the War Department. 
1.2 The Board of Admiralty 
At the pinnacle of naval administration was the Board of Admiralty, 
more corectly 'the Commissioners constituted to Execute the Office of Lord 
high Admiral'. At the beginning of 1830, with the Whigs still firmly in 
opposition, this Board consisted of five members of whom Robert Dundas, 
2nd Viscount Melville, as First Lord, chaired all meetings. The other 
four members were Sir George Cockburn and the Hon Henry Hotham, both 
former naval. officers, together with Sir George Clerk and 
Frederick 2nd Viscount Castlereagh, the civilian members of the Board. [13] 
All were political appointees, holding office so long as the Tory 
administration that had appointed them continued in office. At other 
times, therefore, the continuity of holding office would be singularly 
lacking, but in a situation where different factions of the Tory party had 
continued to maintain control of the government for approximately 
twenty-five years, an appearence of near-permanence had descended upon 
the Board. Thus Melville had held off ice, with one short break, for 
eighteen years, while Cockburn, the senior naval lord, had been at the 
Admiralty since 1818. In addition, Sir George Clerk, the senior civil 
lard, had held office since 1819. Unlike other members of the Board, his 
membership did not cease upon the change of government in November, Clerk 
having chosen to retire three months earlier. The subsequent vacancy was 
filled by Charles Ross. [ 141 
Those appointed to the Admiralty were members of a small, closely 
knit group, who had much in common. Apart from anything else, they were 
either members of the House of Lords or the unrefcrmed Commons. Regular 
in attending one or other of these institutions, their nomination to the 
Admiralty was part of a system by which early 19th century government 
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rewarded those upon whom it could rely. But the homogeneity of the 
Board's membership did not cease at this point, those who held office were 
of ten related to former off ice holders or freely mixed in the same groups. 
Melville (1771-1851) was a classic example, his father, Henry lst Viscount 
Melville, apart from twice holding the off ice of Treasurer of the Navy 
(1782-3 and 1783-1800) and serving under Pitt as both Secretary of State 
for Home Affairs (1791-4) and Secretary of State for War (1794-1801) had 
also himself been First Lord (May 1804 - May 1805). [151 Indeed, the Dundas 
family, of whom he was a member, had its own special relationship with 
naval administration at this time, for his second son, the Hon Robert 
Dundas was a past and future member of the Navy Board (Feb 1825 - May 
1829 and Oct 1830 - Jun 1832) while his fourth son, the Hon G. H. L. Dundas 
was to become a future member of the Board of Admiralty (Nov 1830 - 
Oct 1834). [161 Furthermore, Sir George Clerk-was in the patronaga. of the 
Melville family while Charles Ross had family connections. 
Of the other naval lards, George Cockburn (1772-1853) was 
undoubtedly the most famous. As a naval off icer he had gained enduring 
fame as the man who burnt the White House, leading the military attack 
upon Washington during the year 1812. [17] He was the second son of Sir 
James Cockburn Bart. and related, through marriage, to Lord Littlejohn. 
Early naval promotion had come through the patronage of Lord Hood while he 
had also been favoured by Nelson and St Vincent. At that time he had 
been M. P. for Wedbly in Hertfordshire for ten years. [181 The second naval 
lord, Hon Sir Henry Hotham (1777-1833), was the youngest son of Beaumont, 
2nd Lord Hotham, who had succeeded to the title upon the death of his 
brother, Rear Admiral Sir William Hotham. [191 
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The civilian lords, Sir George Clerk (1787-1867) and Viscount 
Frederick Castlereagh, were also members of influential families. Sir 
George Clerk, the sixth baronet, was a legal advocate by profession, 
holding a Doctorate of Civil Law (Oxford). In May 1827 he had been 
appointed Clerk of the Ordnance while he had held the Melville 
controlled seat of Midlothian since 1811. [20] Viscount Castlereagh was 
the nephew of the Ist Viscount Castlereagh (the former Foreign Secretary 
who had represented Britain at the Congress of Vienna) and son of Charles 
William, Lord Stewart (a former ambassador to Venice) and close colleamm 
of his half brother, the lst Viscount Castlereagh). [ 21] As the youngest 
member of the Board, the twenty-five year old Viscount Castlereagh would 
have had very little real say in naval affairs and was present merely to 
sign documents and perform certain given assignments. From this, so it 
might be inferred, his presense on the Board was a further example of 
political sinecure due to family connection. 
The existence of a Board of Admiralty had been, more or less, a 
permanent feature of naval administration since 1689. However, there had 
been two brief intervals when the Board had been disbanded and the earlier 
office of Lord High Admiral re-instituted. This had been the case between 
1702 and 1708 when the Earl of Pembroke and Prince Georip of Denmark had 
successively held this office. More relevant to the present period was 
the holding of this same office, between May 1827 and September 1828, by 
the Duke of Clarence (later King William IV). [221 This was an intriguing 
political experiment prompted by the refusal of Melville to serve under a 
new administration fcrmed by Canning. In his recent biography of William 
IV, Tom Pocock explains, 
The following month [February 1827], the Prime 
Minister, Lord Liverpool died and a new 
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administration was formed by the former foreign 
secretary, George Canning. In the political 
upheaval that this brought, one of those who 
refused to serve in the Cabinet was Lord Melville 
and a replacement as First Lord of the Admiralty 
had to be found. Canning and the King, casting 
about for a successor, seemed to have passed over 
the lone-standing claim of the Duke of Clarence 
on the grounds that he was not suitable as a Cabinet 
minister. Then they had second thoughts. An idea 
struck them, which Canning knew wculd appeal to 
the King's love of mock-historical pageantry and the 
Dukes longing for recognition, and would also 
dispose of any attempted return to off ice by 
Melville. The archaic and extinct title of Lord 
High Admiral would be reviveI[231 
However, it had been assumed at the time that the Duke would act as a mere 
figurehead and that he would accept the advice of a specially created 
council whose members eventually included both Sir George Cockburn, as 
head of the council, and Sir George Clerk. [24] In the event, the Duke 
adopted a less than passive role, introducing a number of worthwhile 
reforms but failing to consider their financial implications. 
Furthermore, he did not always believe in consultation, clashing with 
Cockburn over an attempt to set up a gunnery committee. Cockburn, who was 
considered an expert in the f ield of gunnery, had simply not been 
consulted and felt much aggrieved. An angry exchange of letters followed, 
with Clarence demanding Cockburn's resignation. The matter was eventually 
brought to the attention of the Duke of Wellington, Prime Minister since 
the beginning of 1828. Wellington, in turn, referred the matter to George 
IV, indicating that it should be Clarence who should resign. In suporting 
his prime minister, the king subsequently wrote to Clarence, pointing out 
a few essential facts relating to the position of Cockburn. 
it is with feelings of deepest regret ýha*t 'I 
observe the embarrassing situation in 
which you have placed yourself. You are in error 
from the beginning to the end. You must not 
forget, my dear William, that Sir George Cockh= 
is the King's Privy Councillor, and so made by 
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the King, to advise the Lard High Admiral. 
What becomes of Sir Georgers oath, his duty, 
towards me, his Sovereign, if he fails to offer 
such advice as he thinks necessary to the Lord 
High Admiral? Am I, then, to be called upon to 
dismiss the most useful, perhaps the most 
impcrtant naval off icer in my service for 
conscientiously acting up to the letter and 
spirit of his oath and his duty? The thing is 
impossible ... [251 
Following Clarence's resignation a new Board of Adiniralty was established, 
Melville returning to the office he had held since 1812 and Cockburn 
returning to the post of First Naval Lord. [261 
It was at the Admiralty building in Whitehall that Board meetings 
were held on a near daily basis. The room reserved fcr these is still in 
existence, much famed for its Gibbons' carvings and weather vane over the 
f ireplace. The building, itself, was constructed in 1725 with an 
extension added in the 1780s. Apart from Musing the Board room, the 
Whitehall building also provided accommodation fcr each Board member 
together with the necessary space for the 55 clerks employed in carrying 
cut the business of the office. 
At the head of this office were John Wilson Croker and John Barrow, 
respectively first and second secretaries. It was their business to lay 
before the Board all memorials, letters and papers transmitted to the 
office while minuting any orders and seeing that they were properly 
executed. At one time the two posts had been fairly indistinguishable, 
with both secretaries not only members of parliament but also largely 
unaffected by political change. Since 1807 however, it had become 
accepted that only the First Secretary shculd hold a parliamentary seat 
and that his tenure shculd be on a similar basis to that of members 
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of the Board. [ 271 For this reason, Croker, who was also a major 
literary figure and friend of Wellington, wielded infinitely more power 
than Barrow, using his position to oppose ýeverything in the shape of 
reform and improvement'J 28] 
The actual business of the Board of Admiralty was that of taking 
responsibility for the ships, men and facilities of the Royal Navy. A 
printed repcrt of December 1787 and addressed to Gecrge III described the 
wcrk of the Admiralty in the following terms: 
The Business of the Board of Admiralty is to 
consider and determine upon all Matters 
relative to Ycur Majesty's Navy, and Depart- 
ments thereunto belonging; to give direction 
fcr the Perfcrmance of all Services, all Orders 
necessary fcr carrying their Directions into 
Execution; and generally to superintend and 
direct the whole Naval and Marine Establishment 
of Great Britain. [29] 
As regards the civil departments of the navy, much of this power was 
exercised through two subordinate bodies: the Navy and Victualling Boards. 
A detailed examination of the wcrk and orgnisation of these two Boards 
will follow; all that is necessary to say here is that the former was 
primarily responsible for the dockyards and payment of seamen and the 
latter for all matters associated with the supply of provisions and the 
health of seamen. 
Relationships between the supericr Board of Admiralty and the two 
inferior Boards was, to say the least, somewhat complex. It was not 
simply a matter of the Admiralty issuing instructions and the Navy and 
Victualling Boards ensuring that they were effectively carried out. Often 
these two Boards, who communicated both between themselves and directly 
with the Admiraltyp might choose to question such instructions or 
20 
deliberately delay their introduction. 
A major problem was the very different perspective from which the 
superior and inferior boards might view the same problem. Both were 
concerned with ensuring that an efficient seagoing fleet was always 
available in times of national emergency. For the Admiralty however, the 
main concern of the Board was directed towards the fighting ability of 
such ships once they were at sea. Members of the Navy and Victualling 
boards, on the other hand, had to direct all their attention to the 
preparation of such ships, giving considerable thought to the costs and 
difficulties involved. An Admiralty instruction for the introduction of a 
slightly lengthened or re-designed warship might, initially, appear to be 
a relatively easy task. After all, the dockyards were constantly producing 
a variety of vessels. However, if it turned cut that such a vessel 
exceeded the length of most dry docks, or that its masts were of a 
different dimension from those standard to its class, then a massive 
increase in expenditure would result. At whatever dockyard such a vessel 
was to be maintained, dry docks would have to be lengthened, while a 
collection of suitable masts would have to be assembled at not just the 
building yard, but at all fleet bases, both home and abroad. 
A factor that exacerbated the sometimes difficult relationship 
between the superior and inferior boards was the limited contact between 
members. This applied both socially and professionally. Although the 
Admiralty building at Whitehall and the Navy and Victualling offices at 
Somerset House were within easy walking distance of one another, the 
boards rarely gathered together for a discussion of problems in hand. 
Any difference of opinion normally appears to have been conducted by means 
of written communication, with such arguments spanning months or even 
years. [ 301 
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Socially, there was a similar lack of contact between the boards. 
Whereas all five members of the Board of Admiralty were drawn from either 
the upper or lower chambers of Parliament, only one navy commissioner, Sir 
T. Byam Martin, Comptroller of the Navy Board, was so connected. Indeed, 
Martin was the only member of either inferior board who could have been 
usefully deployed at the Admiralty. In common with all three navy lords 
he had served at sea, having risen to the rank of admiral. [311 
Furthermore, Martin was also aware of his own value, frequently pushing 
the point that he should serve on both the Admiralty and Navy Boards, an 
arrangement that would have the advantage of overcoming the many problems 
that emerged from the lack of direct contact between the two boards. As 
for the other commissioners on the two inferior boards, they had all been 
appointed as a result of their clerical abilities or experience in the 
fields of shipbuilding, food processing or medicine. 
In fact, when it came to administering the civil affairs of the 
navy, those appointed to the Board of Admiralty were at a very serious 
disadvantage. No member of the Board, upon first appointment, had any 
real knowledge of the mechanics involved in running either a dock or 
victualling yard, while the ability of the naval lords to manage was 
founded primarily upon military discipline Furthermore, the political 
nature of their appointment, combined with the uncertainty of tenure that 
frequently accompanied membership of the Board of Admiralty, meant that it 
was diff icult for those who made up the superior board to gain the 
experience they lacked. For this reason, the permanently appointed 
navy and victualling commissioners frequently resented being told what to 
do by a group aE I amateurs' whose term of off ice was uncertain. To 
minimise any damage created by an Admiralty decision that they felt to be 
ill-advised, the inferior boards would of ten delay carrying out such 
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instructions, hoping that the personnel of the superior Board would be 
altered as a result of changing political fortunes. 
Of course, it was not every Admiralty request or instruction that 
was questioned or delayed. In fact, the vast majority of Admiralty orders 
were carried out to the best ability of the board to which such 
instructions were directed. Mostly, these involved routine duties 
relating to the preparation of particular vessels. Under such 
circumstances, a letter signed by one of the two secretaries at the 
Admiraltyl would simply direct the Navy Board to have a particular vessel 
prepared for sea service. As for the choice of vessel, this would have 
been drawn from a list of suitable ships previously submitted to the 
Admiralty by the Navy Board. Similar instructions, such as the laying 
down of a new ship to a proven design, requests for information on the 
quantities of stores held at particular yards and the price of such 
commodities, were also subject to immediate compliance. The difficulty, 
however, was with regard to non7-rcutine matters or in areas of naval 
administration that one or other of the boards considered to be an 
infringement of a customary authority that had emerged over 170 years. 
A particularly difficult area was that which revolved around 
occasional Admiralty requests to reduce expenditure through a reduction of 
the numbers employed within the dock and victualling yards or in the 
offices at Somerset Place. Normally, such requests were made at the end 
of a period of hostility when the Admiralty, itself, was under government 
pressure to economise. For its part, the Navy Board rarely proved in 
the least bit sympathetic or co-operative, especially when it came to the 
dockyards. A large proportion of those employed in the yards possessed 
skills that were always in short supply. A decision to shed such artisans 
would only result, so the inferior Board normally argued, in creating 
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difficulties upon the outset of any future period of mobilization. To 
protect its policy of retaining an inflated number of artisans (and the 
necessary unskilled workers to assist them in any tasks they had to 
perform) the Navy Board would either agree to make such reductions as the 
Admiralty requested, but at some vague point in the future (part of the 
well established tactic of delay) or actually begin making reductions, but 
at such a minimal level as not to undermine the basic policy of retaining 
sufficient numbers to meet a future emerýpncy. 
If necessary, it was not impossible for the Admiralty simply to 
deny the inferior Board the necessary funds for the employment of the 
additional number of workmen. Here, if in few other areas, the Admiralty 
had some direct control, for it was the task of the superior Board to 
prepare and then present before Parliament the annual naval estimates. 
if, therefore, the Admiralty determined that money required by the Navy 
Board was too much, then a substantial reduction could be made in any 
chosen areas of expenditure. However, even if such policy was pursued, 
there was no guarantee that the hoped for outcome would be achieved. 
While the Navy Board could be asked to specify how it intended to spend 
such sums once the vote had been sanctioned by Parliament, there was no 
requirement that there should be an adherence to such statements once the 
money was available. In other words, the Navy Board had complete 
authority over the use of this money once Parliament had approved the 
overall sum. Furthermore, given the Admiralty's lack of expertise on such 
matters, then it was perfectly possible for a request to be made for 
inflated sums to meet areas of expenditure approved by the Admiralty, with 
this excess actually directed elswhere. In fact, it was only as a result 
of the close scrutiny of the civil departments during the period leading 
up to the abolition of the inferior boards that such ploys were fully 
brought to light. 
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Because of such diff iaLlties, the Admiralty preferred to adopt 
alternative strategies for bringing about a reduction of numbers within 
the royal dockyards. Rarely, however, were these completely successful. 
In 1829, as one example of how the Admiralty actually did approach this 
problem, the Navy Board was instructed to reduce those employed in the 
home yards from 7,716 to 6,000. To encourage compliance, the inferior 
Board was informed that when the number had been reduced to 7,000 then an 
earlier Admiralty order that no work was to be carried out on Wednesdays 
would be rescinded. Furthermore, when the number employed was f inally 
reduced to 6,000, then a further restriction on Saturday working would 
also be lif ted. However, to the superior Board's annoyance, the number 
reduced in the dockyards, by the end of January 1832, had been little 
more than 2DO, with the numbers employed in the dockyards by that date 
standing at 7,493. As it happens, the target of 6,000 was eventually 
reached, but only after the Admiralty itself, upon the abolition of the 
Navy Board, had taken direct control of the dockyards. [321 
Exactly the same problem had, as already intimated, occurred on 
previous occasions. While in 1832 the Admiralty had finally solved this 
particular problem through the abolition of inferior boards, in earlier 
times a different strategy had to be adopted. In the spring of 1749 the 
numbers employed in the different home yards was approximately 7000, a 
total, so the Admiralty noted, that was greater than that employed during 
the War of Spanish Succession (1701-171ý). According to Richard 
middleton, in a recently published paper: 
The ministry of Henry Pelham had adopted an 
ambitious programme to reduce the national 
debt, which all parties agreed was too high. 
Hence every department was being asked to make 
economies and the navy was no exception. 
Naturally Lord Sandwich, who had become First 
Lord of the Admiralty in February 1748, hoped 
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to do this by cutting cut waste. Like naval 
administrators more recently, he and his 
colleagues wanted value for money. Reducing 
the labcur force seemed the answer. [331 
An order for reducing numbers employed within the dockyards was duly 
sent to the Navy Office, but the inferior Board chose to reject the idea, 
informing the superior Board that the fleet was in need of considerable 
repair. On this occasion, members of the Board of Admiralty decided that 
the only way it could achieve its objective would be through the use of 
the strategy of inspecting each of the dockyards in turn and informing the 
Navy Board just where the reductions might be made. The decision was 
taken on 9 June 1749 and minuted accordingly: 
The Lords, taking into their consideration the 
number of men borne in the several Dock and 
Ropeyards, the great expense attending the same 
and that the works are not parried an with 
Expedition that might be expected from them 
[had determined] forthwith to visit all His 
Majesty's Dock and Rcpeyards to examine into the 
Ability and Conduct of the officers, the 
sufficiency of the workmen, the condition of the 
ships and Magazines, together with what works 
are carrying on, that such Reformation may be 
made as shall be found needful. [34] 
The inspection of the various dockyards occupied a period of 
approximately seven weeks and resulted in the Admiralty making a number of 
specific recommendations for a general reduction of the work force. In 
particular it was concerned at the number of elderly and infirm workers to 
be found within the yards, &Wsting that many of these could be 
dismissed. In addition, it also felt that many workers appeared to be 
generally indolent and that they, too, should be dismissed. Somewhat more 
radical however, was the proposal that the Navy Board should introduce a 
method of payment by results. This, if properly instituted, so members of 
the Board of Admiralty believed, would result in greater work output, so 
allowing a reduction in numbers without harming the work to be undertaken 
in each yard-[351 
26 
The Navy Board, however, was having none of it. They simply delayed 
on the matter of reducing numbers employed while pointing out that payment 
by results (known as task work) would probably create a good many 
problems. In particular, they predicted that if task work was 
introduced, it would result in a general'lowering of standards while the 
work force would be inclined to 'mutiny'. But time was working in the 
Admiralty's favour. By mid-1750 the numbers employed within the dockyards 
had dwindled to a figure below that which the Navy Board found acceptable. 
Many shipwrights, in particular, were being lost through retirement and 
death or because some of them were choosing to seek employment in the 
merchant yards: 
The commissioners knew that shipwrights 
were especially hard to recruit in wartime 
when competition from the merchant yards 
raised wages beyond the navy's means. 
Consequently they argued in f avour of a fixed 
establishment of abcut 6,500 persons, 
including 2,810 shipwrights, whose loyalty 
would be assured because their employment 
wculd be secure. The Admiralty, however, 
rejected the idea. They argued that the 
number of men must be determined by the 
work in hand and the availability of funds. 
No replacements were to be hired. By the 
end of the year the work fcree had shrunk to 
6,007, including 2,698 shipwrights. [361 
The continued persistence of the Admiralty finally broke the Navy 
Boardýs resolve. Af ter three years of f ighting the issue 
through the use of both reasoned argument and delay, the Navy Board 
failed to alter the Admiraltyýs stance. Constantly the supericir Board 
returreA to the matter of numbers employed in the dockyards, highlighting 
levels of expenditure and extolling the virtues of task work. Against 
such pressures the Navy Board felt forced to agree. In January 1753 it 
began a programme of dismissals that wculd eventually include 442 
shipwrights and 448 additional artisans and labourers. By March, the 
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numbers employed in all of the yards had been reduced to 4,834. [371 
An inspection of the dockyards, always referred to as a visitation 
in contemporary documents, proved to be a particularly useful strategy for 
the Board of Admiralty when it entered into periods of conflict with the 
Navy Board. By actually visiting the dockyards, members of the Admiralty 
were not only in a position to gain some understanding of how these 
complex industrial centres operated, but would sometimes place themselves 
in a position completely to refute given reasons as to why the Navy Board 
shculd not comply with a particular instruction. Perhaps the best example 
of this comes from a visitation conducted in 1771 by the then First Lord, 
the Earl of Sandwich. At that time he was particularly concerned that the 
dockyards should make the best use of timber stocks at a time when this 
essential commodity was becoming increasingly difficult to obtain. At 
Chatham, Sandwich and other members of the Board of Admiralty, 'took a 
view of the timber, plank and thick stuff in the yard, observing all the 
plank to be laid on the flat and in high piles which is the worst method 
fcr seasoning and preserving it; that great part of the rough timber is 
laid in two and three tiers high; althcugh there are many vacant spaces in 
the yard'. [381 
It was as a result of those visits to the various dockyards in 1771 
that the Board of Admiralty insisted upon the erection of specially 
designed sheds that could be used to accommodate oak timber in the most 
advantaSeous manner. With plans drawn up and dated 23 May 1771, these 
sheds were to be grouped In multiples, with each separate unit to have a 
depth of Of t and a length of 25f t. Within each shed there was to be a 
series of internal racks for the proper stacking of the timber, while 
louvred gables would allow free circulation of air. [391 The Navy Board, 
unhappy with the Admiralty-s interference in the direct running of the 
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dockyards, chose not to co-operate. Instead of welcoming the sheds, it 
was claimed that there was insufficient space in the various dockyards for 
the addition of these new buildings. Sandwich, for his part, drawing upon 
the experience of that recent visitation, countered such claims by 
pointing out the most obvious area in each yard. At Chatham, for 
instance, a relatively empty space was located in front of the general 
timber storage area. However, in order to construct the requisite number 
of sheds, they had to be, built in four separate groups. [40] 
While the visitation was clearly cf some value in providing members 
of the Board of Admiralty some control over the Navy Board, a far more 
valuable tool was the use of patronage. The appointment of all naval and 
victualling commissioners, together with the principal officers in both 
the dock and victualling yards, was in the hands of the First Lord. 
Although, once appointed, so it should be pointed out, these same 
Individuals could not be dismissed, continuing to remain in office until 
removed by death or voluntary retirement. Effectively, this meant that 
given a sufficient length of time, the First Lord could create reasonably 
compliant inferior boards. On the other hand, it also meant that a newly 
appointed First Lord might well be faced with a group of potentially 
hostile civil commissioners. In fact, the entire history of the Board of 
Admiralty's relationships with the inferior boards is littered with 
examples of short periods of hostility, matters only resolved upon the 
appointment of either a new comptroller or other key members of one or 
other of the inferior boards. 
Lcrd Anson, who was First Lcrd on two separate occasions during the 
mid-18th century, went one stage fu-ther during his first tenure of 
office. Particularly keen to see the introduction of warships of greater 
length per number of guns carried, he found his ideas were initially 
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opposed by Jacob Acworth, the navy surveyor. Acworth, who had f irst been 
appointed in 1715, was the commissioner appointed to the Navy Board to 
oversee the design of warships. Unfortunately, when Acworth was 
eventually replaced, his successor was no more sympathetic to Anson: s 
plans. The outcome was that Anson appears to have earmarked Thomas Slade, 
a fairly junior dockyard shipwright, as the man most likely to introdiice 
the warships that Anson felt the navy required. From 1749 onwards Anson 
ensured that Slade was promoted on every possible occasion, moving him 
from one post to another until his f inal appointment to the Navy Board in 
1755. [411 
A further point that needs to be considered when it comes to any 
discussion on the relationship between the Board of Admiralty and the 
inferior Boards is that of changing government attitudes in the 
1780s. [421 The move towards 'economical' reform that had, as one of its 
aims, 'the saving of money'[431 meant that, inevitably, the naval 
departments, with their high levels of expenditure, would eventually come 
under off icial scrutiny. Not surprisingly, therefore, a number of the 
reports undertaken by the Commission of Fees were directed towards both 
the Admiralty and the inferior boards. [44] In undertaking this w(rk, the 
commissioners not only produced a series of reports that would eventually 
lead to the total abolition of 'fees, gratuities, perquisites and 
emoluments' paid to those employed within these departments, but would 
also devote much of their time to a further brief, that of reporting ýsuch 
Observations as shall occur to them, for the better conducting and 
managing the Business transacted in the said Offices' into which they were 
inquiring. [451 
The completion of these reports, combined with a general desire on 
the part of Pitt's ministry to impose refams that would result in a 
30 
reduction in levels of inefficiency and waste within the various 
government departments, placed the Board of Admiralty in a better 
position to establish a more effective form of control over the inferior 
boards. This is a point which Roger Morriss highlights in his study of 
the dockyards during the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars period: 
e.. such was the pressure 
for government 
reform that the Admiralty could also avail 
itself of the constitutional powers of Crown 
and Parliament to impose its will on the 
Navy Boardj 461 
In fact, a great number of the reforms proposed by the Commission. of Fees, 
after having first gained Admiralty approval, were brought before the 
Privy Council and passed by Order in Council. Such reforms included a 
re-structuring of the internal organisation of the Navy Board [47] and the 
introduction of specific regulations for dockyard officers. [481 
This momentum for reform was to be used far more effectively by the 
Earl of St Vincent who was appointed First Lord in February 1801. Whereas 
his predecessor, Lord Spencer, had been content simply to accept the 
findings of the fee commissioners, St Vincent chose to go a great deal 
further. Instead of relying upon a group of individuals to look into 
every major government department, St Vincent obtained parliamentary 
legislation that allowed him to establish a new commission, with 
commissioners appointed by himself, to concentrate entirely upon the civil 
departments of the navy. Their particular brief was to uncover all abuses 
and frauds within these departments, a task which proved particularly 
difficult due to a clause added to the original bill that a1lowed 
individuals ýthe right to refuse to answer when their answer was likely to 
incriminate them". [491 As a result, many of the reports concentrated upon 
abuses already uncovered by the inferior boards themselves. Nevertheless, 
there were a number of undoubted benefits that resulted from the work of 
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this second group of commissioners, not least of which were further 
reforms of the administrative arrangements of the inferior boards and a 
better understanding of how similar abuses to those reported upon might 
best be avoided in future years. [50] 
Although the Commission of Naval Inquiry may have been generally 
beneficial in collecting detailed information relating to the various 
civil departments of the Navy, St VincenCs period at the Board of 
Admiralty must be considered as distinctly harmful. As First Lord, he had 
a typical naval officer's view of the civil departments, believing them to 
be Orotten to the core-. For this reason, he refused to place any 
confidence in the commissioners of the various inferior boards. 
Admittedly, as several enquiries showed, the civil departments of the navy 
were free neither of corrupt officers nor a degree of inefficiency, St 
Vincent for his part was prone to much exaggeration. Middleton, who 
uniquely served both as Navy Comptroller (1778-90) and First Lord 
(1805-06), was probably directing his thoughts to St Vincent when he wrote 
that 'sea officers are very seldom judges of the civil branches of the 
navy. They view it only in parts [and] ... imbibe prejudices 
against the civil boards and overturn in ignorance what has cost ages and 
long experience to establish. ' Given, therefore, that St Vincent held 
such views and that he arrived at the Admiralty to be confronted by 
commissioners appointed entirely by groups now cut of government, clashes 
were certain to occur. [511 
As part of a subsequent campaign against the civil board, it is 
clear that St Vincent coveted the possibility of dismissing some of those 
who administered the civil departments. However, as such power was not in 
his possession, he appears to have used every means to encourage the 
individual commissioners to resign. Among tactics he resorted to were 
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those of constant criticism and occasional insult. In Parliament he 
accused members of the Navy Board to be guilty of permitting the 
government 'to be defrauded to a very considerable amount'. [52] Even the 
successful Commission of Naval Enquiry was designed to secure those sought 
after resignations. According to William Marsdenp Second Secretary at the 
Admiralty during this period, 'to crush them was the object of the bill 
[establishing the Commission of Inquiry] and the frauds in the dockyards 
(which we are daily detecting and punishing) are only a pretext-. [53] 
The arrival of St Vincent at the Admiralty was shcrtly followed by 
the negotiations leading to the Treaty of Amiens. This brief period of 
peace was completely mis-read by the First Lord, St Vincent appearing to 
assume that it would have a degree of permanency. Only this explains why 
he allowed such a serious deterioration in the relationship between the 
various boards at a time when Britain might once again be threatened by 
invasion. Ncr were matters helped by his decision to dismiss, against the 
advice of the Navy Board, many of those involved in a massive strike of 
dockyard workers that took place during the summer of 1801. This had the 
unfortunate effect of depriving the yards of many of the skilled workers 
upon whom the Navy Board was usually so diligent at retaining. Murray, a 
20th century Admiralty secretary, in commenting upon this period makes the 
observation that: 
on the renewal of the war in 1803 his 
[St Vincent] error recoiled on his own 
head. He had started his administration 
... by weakening the Navy. He was 
now called upon to increase its strength 
again, but have estranged the Navy Board 
and embittered the Dockyards, he found that 
he had rendened the old machinery of 
administration almost unworkable and had 
devised nothing to take its place. [541 
Politically, it might be added, St Vincent's period in office did much 
to undermine the ability of Addington to remain in power. InitiaUy, the 
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First Lord-s reputation as a great naval commander had provided the 
administration with a degree of strength. However, his subsequent 
dealings with the dockyards were used by Pitt to mount a stinging attack 
upon the situation as it then existed. According to Murray, St Vincent 
'from being the stronýpst hdwark of the Addington Ministry he rapidly 
became its most vulnerable point and not only shared but precipitated 
its fall in 1804. '[551 Perhaps, indeed, McCahill in a paper which looks 
at the role of the House of Lords in the' collapse of the Addington 
administration, might have 'made more of these perceived failings on the 
part of St Vincent. While the attacks upon the First Lord were primarily 
directed by Pitt in the lower house, it did result in St Vincent becoming 
increasingly isolated. As a result, he was unable to use his influence to 
prevent an erosion of support in the upper chamber. [561 
one further commission looking into the affairs of the Navy might be 
usefully considered at this point. Styled the Commission for Revising and 
Digesting the Civil Affairs of His Majesty's Navy, it began its work in 
1806. Unlike the former Commission of Inquiry it was established not for 
the pin-pose, of criticism but for the purpose of creating an efficient 
machine that was capable of more effectively running the vast complex of 
naval support facilities. That it was established at all, however, was a 
direct result of St Vincent's commission. The newly installed 
administration under Pitt, aware of the good work of that earlier 
commission, was not in a position to simply terminate its powers. The 
criticism would have been too intense. Instead, an alternative had to be 
created. The result was the Commission of Revision that proceeded to 
build upon the work of the earlier body, laying down detailed instructions 
for each and every naval commissioner, dock and victualling yard off icer 
while reviewing the organisation of the various off ices and institutions 
involved in keeping the navy at sea. 
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That the f if teen year period following the end of the Napoleonic 
Wars was to prove a time of relative calm for those involved in the 
administration of the Navy was due to two separate factors. First of 
these was the work of the two specialised commissions discussed in the 
foregoing paragraphs. Between them they ensured that the dock and 
victualling yards were not only free of atuses that they had previously 
harboured but that they were much more efficient in undertaking the work 
they performed. As a result, those selected to join the Board of 
Admiralty had fewer grounds upon which to base a complaint. 
Secondly, there was the matter of patronage. With Melville 
holding the office of First Lord for approximately seventeen years, he 
found himself in a unique position to ensure that all of those 
commissioners appointed to the Navy and Victua. 11ing Boards, were 
sympathetic to any ideas he might wish to pursue. of particular advantage 
to Melville was that the all important post of comptroller had become 
available within only four years of his arrival in office. As a result, 
he was in a position to make a suitable appointment to replace Sir T. B. 
Thompson who, as a Whig appointee, might have proved a most difficult 
individual with whom to wark. That events could well have turned full 
circle upon the removal of the Tory administration in 1830 was averted 
partly by the early resignation of the Navy Canptroller and the clear 
intent of the new Whig administration to bring about some form of radical 
change in the civil affairs of the navy. 
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1.3 The Navy Board 
The Navy Board, which had a continuous existence of 172 years and 
which had originally been founded by Henry VIII, was concerned, until its 
abolition in 1832, fcr most matters connected with the civil affairs of 
the British navy. [571 In particular, it took responsibility for the 
material condition of the fleet and control of naval expenditure. The 
fcrmer was undertaken through either the Boards direct control of the 
royal dockyards or the issuing of contracts for building and repair of 
ships in private yards. Control of expenditure, on the other hand, was 
more wideranging, involving not only the purchase of stores and 
fcrmulating various contractual arrangements, but also that of paying both 
seamen's wages and that of the civilian work force employed within the 
dockyards. 
By the year 1830 membership of the Board was confined to seven 
principal officers who were known as navy commissioners, these were: the 
Comptroller, Deputy Comptroller, two surveyors, the Accountant-General, 
the Storekeeper-General and the Superintendant of Transports. Each was 
expected to attend, on a regular basis, the daily meetings of the Board, 
during which all non-routine in-coming correspondence was considered and a 
wide range of decisions taken. A typical Board meeting, in that year of 
1830, might consider anything up to f if teen distinct items of business, 
with the average number of minuted points per meeting that of eight. [581 
These, from a glance at the existing minute books, ranged from expenses 
incurred in supporting the on-going coastal blockadet construction of the 
Plymouth breakwaterg examination of various accounts and discussion of any 
noted discrepanciesq the carriage of naval stores by merchant shipping and 
completion of a scheme to re-build Sheerness dockyard. [591 In an, that 
particular year resulted in the Board considering a total of 1,966 
separate minuted items. [601 
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Also in attendance at Board meetings was the Secretary. This was a 
clerical post, with the holder only present for the purpose of offering 
advice and the recording of minutes. As secretary to the Board however, 
the holder was the most senior member of the office attached to the Navy 
Board and which was always referred to as the Navy Office. Divided into 
seven distinct branches, the one hundred clerks (not including the 
Secretary) who formed the Navy Office, were responsible for the 
day-to-day running of its affairs together with the implementation of any 
decisions taken by the Board at their daily meetings. In addition to the 
Secretary's office, which was headed by the Secretary, the six other 
branches of the Navy Board were the Ticket and Wages Branch (headed by the 
Comptroller), Contracts Office (Deputy Comptroller), Office for Bills and 
Accounts (Accountant-General), Office for Stores (Stcrekeeper-General), 
Surveyor's Office (the two surveyors) and Transport Branch (Superintendant 
of Transport). 
To provide sufficient room for the running of these various branches 
of business the Navy Office had, in 1786, taken up accommodation in an 
expansive range of off ices known as Somerset Place, now Somerset 
House-[611 The Navy Office itself, took up the largest single area within 
the complex but it was not the only occupant. In addition, this large 
office complex was also shared with the Victualling Office and various 
unrelated government bodies such as those offices responsible for 
taxation, auditing and the licencing of hackney carriages, lotteries and 
hawkers. [62] For the Navy Office, which occupied in common with the 
Victualling office and Treasurer of the Navy, the west side of Somerset 
Place, accommodation existed not only for the essential offices and 
meeting rooms but also provided living quarters for those principal 
officers finding It necessary to remain In London. 
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Most senior of the navy commissioners was the Comptroller. This 
office, since 1816, had been in the hands of Sir Thomas Byam Martin. [631 
A post only available to those who had considerable naval experience, 
Martin had been an active commander throughout the entire period of the 
French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars. His service in the Baltic, 
commanding a small squadron with the task of cutting French sea lines had 
resulted in Tsar Alexander proclaiming Martin the saviour of Russia. [641 
In 1811, Martin had been raised to the rank of Rear Admiral, having 
gained his captaincy in 1793. [651 
As Navy Comptroller, it was Martin's task both to co-ordinate and 
regulate the work of the Board. To undertake these duties, he not only 
had the right of access to all financial accounts, but chaired all 
meetings of the Board. This gave him the opportunity of drawing out 
verbal reports from fellow commissioners but also gave him the opportunity 
to question them as to progress of work within their respective 
departments. His status was further enhanced by the Comptroller being the 
only member of the Board allowed a seat in Parliament. Martin, since 
first taking office, held one of the two Plymouth seats for the 
cut-going administrationj 661 
According to Sir Charles Middleton, later Lord Barham, holder of 
this particular office from 1778 to 1790, the Comptroller's duties were: 
to superintend the offices belonging ýo Oh; 
s department, to attend the great officers 
and offices of state, and, on some occasions, 
the cabinet council; to carry their orders, which 
are frequently secret, into execution, and in 
short to see every part of the tusiness of the 
office properly executed. It is also his duty to 
control the payment of haU--pay at the pay office; 
the payment of the dockyards of Deptford and 
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Woolwich, and of such ships as are paid at these 
ports. But the tusiness of the board having increased 
to such a degree as to require his daily attendance, 
he has been obliged to call for the help of the 
commissioners who attend payments in Broad Street to 
assist him in this part of his duty. The comptrolle 
also visits Deptford and Woolwich yards weekly, when 
in his power, and the more distant yards occasionally, 
when duty requires it. [671 
As originally laid down in 1662, the terms of appointment given to 
the Comptroller had more or less placed him oa an equal standing to the 
other commissioners who made up the Board. [681 However, the general 
nature of the business the Comptroller was expected to attend and the 
authority he exercised over the auditing of accounts had made it 
inevitable that any holder of the post would take pre-eminence over all 
other commissioners. Yet, it was not until June 1796 that recognition of 
this authority was officially given. In that month an Order in Council 
off iciaUy sanctioned a number of radical changes to the organisation of 
the Navy Office while going on to indicate that, upon the shoulders of the 
Comptroller should -be lodged a general superintending and directing power 
for the regular management of the business and controlling the expense of 
every branch of the office'. This same Order in Council further bestowed 
upon the Comptroller a second vote 'when matters of disputer were brought 
before the whole Board while any letters or orders sent out should be 
signed by the ComptroUer, or his deputy, this being 'necessary to give 
effect'. [69] 
The post of Navy Comptroller was, therefore, a key one within terms 
of naval administration. Held, as it was, by one who had been appointed 
by an outSDing First Lord, a strong possibility existed that Martin and 
the new First Lord would be unable to forge a harmonious working 
relationship. Given, also, that Martin had held office for fourteen 
years, acquiring a fixed viewpoint as to how matters should be arranged, 
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then the liklihood of such a relationship was even more remote. Finally, 
and most certainly guaranteeing that some sort of clash would occur, was 
the desire on the part of the new First Lord to uncover any failings on 
the part of the civil boards. Martin, of course, who would be seen as 
directly responsible for such failings, was equally determined to defend 
both himself and his own Board as a whole. Ill-prepared to give Graham 
full access to important documents relating to the financial arrangements 
of the Navy Board, the situation was made considerably more complicated by 
a variety of political manouvres associated with government attempts to 
secure passage of the controversial electoral reform bill. As a Member of 
Parliament who now held office under a government headed by Earl Grey, the 
Whigs expected Martin to give them his full support. The Navy 
Comptroller, far from agreeing, chose on one occasion to ignore an 
important three-line whip, the consequence of which was his eventual 
removal from office. [701 
The choice of Robert Dundas as Martin's successor might, on the 
face of it, appear somewhat bizarre. After all, he was the son of the 2nd 
Lord Melville, Graham's predecessor in office. However, as will be 
subsequently demonstrated, some sort of rapprochement appears to have 
taken place between Graham and Melville. At the heart of this 
understanding appears to have been a desire on the part of the former to 
secure a number of Scottish parliamentary votes for the Whig cause, while 
for the other it ensured a continued connection with naval administration. 
on this point, it could also be added that another of Melville's sons, the 
Hon G. H. L. Dundas, was also serving on the Navy Board. Providing further 
evidence of the likely rapprochement was that this last named Dundas 
survived the final abolition of the civilian boards, appointed by Graham 
to the newly created post of Storekeeper General. [711 
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The branch of business for which the Navy Comptrdler was 
personally responsible was that of the Ticket and Wages branch. This 
department concerned itself with verifying any payments to be made to 
seamen and those employed within the civilian departments. This work also 
extended to the overseeing of partial payments made for the support of 
wives and the payment of entire sums owing in the event of death. Shculd 
the latter take place, then 'Tickets' were made cut and transmitted to 
the Ticket and Wages branch. once verified, relatives of the deceased 
wculd be in a position to immediately receive wages due to those who had 
died in service. 
To undertake this work, two chief clerks and twenty-six junior 
clerks were employed within the branch. They did not, however, make 
the actual payments or handle cash sums. once the amounts to be paid cut 
had been confirmed, this information was passed to the Navy Pay Office, 
where a separate group of clerks oversaw the actual payment of cash 
sums. [721 Normallyp this necessitated the dispatch of large sums of ready 
money to the dockyards where Navy Pay Office clerks would ensure that the 
seamen of the ordinary, dockyard workers and crews from returning ships 
received the amounts due to them. When so doing, these clerks, of which 
a number were permanently stationed at the dockyards, came under the 
direct authority of the resident commissioners stationed at Chatham, 
Plymouth, Sheerness or Portsmouth. [73] 
Given that the work of the Navy Office was so immense, it wculd 
have been quite impossible fcr any one Comptroller to carry cut all of 
the wcrk expected of him. Unable, therefore to effectively direct and 
supervise much of the work of his colleagues were expected to undertake, 
most of those appointed to the post tended to specialise in certain areas 
of business. The previously quoted Charles Middleton, a particularly 
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forthright and outspoken individual, concentrated much of his time upon 
the rooting cut of general inefficiencies and codifying the duties of the 
various principal officers and senior clerks employed by the Board. [741 
Sir Thomas Byam Martin, for his part, chose to direct himself to the more 
specific issues of shipbuilding and dockyards. Previous Comptrollers 
rarely inspected the yards, relying instead upon reports from the Naval 
Surveyor or yard officers. In fact Middleton, despite including visits to 
the yards as one of the stated duties of the Comptroller, only conducted 
two official inspections (known as Visitations), during the twelve years 
he held office. Martin, on the other hand, embarked upon thirteen, more 
or less one for every year he held off ice. [751 On some occasions only the 
yards to the east of London were visited, while in other years it might be 
only Portsmouth and Plymouth. Usually, however, his visitations included 
a thorough inspection of all seven home yards. [761 
of course, in this day and age, it is easy to underestimate the 
immensity of such a task. While Woolwich and Deptford, using the Navy 
office barge, might be reached, from Somerset Place, in only a matter of 
hours, the yards of Plymouth and Pembroke could only be reached after 
several days of journeying. In all, something like three months in the 
year had to be put aside for the conducting of these visits. During 
such times, the inspecting commissioners, over a period of four or five 
days at each yard, mustered the workforce, boarded ships in ordinary and 
entered all the dockyard storehouses, work shops and manufacturing 
centres. Although visitations doubtless had some value, knowledge of the 
Comptroller's imminent arrival naturally resulted in the yard officers 
expending a great deal of time and effort in minor cosmetic improvements 
for the purpose of hiding those things that were generally amiss. 
The Comptroller, as a reflection of his -supervisory role, received 
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a salary of two thousand pounds per annum, this amount being at least 60% 
above that received by any of his colleagues. In fact, as will shortly be 
noted, the majority of commissioners received an annual salary of one 
thousand pounds. [ 771 
Little really need be said about the Deputy Comptroller. A post 
first introduced in 1793, it was created simply to support the increasing 
work load that was devolving upon the Comptroller. Unlike the Comptroller 
however, the appointed deputy was not always a former naval officer. The 
holder of the post at the beginning of 1830, the Hon Henry Legge-, who had 
first taken up this office in May 1829, had no seagoing experience, being 
an administrator who first joined the Board in 1804. In fact, his 
promotion to the office of Deputy Comptroller resulted entirely from his 
lengthy experience of the Board-s work and was, consequently, the most 
suitable person to replace Martin during any period of absence. For this 
reason, of course, the Deputy Comptroller would not accompany the 
Comptroller during the official dockyard visitations, remaining at 
Somerset Place to oversee the progress of business. [781 
on occasions, assuming he had adequate seagoing experience, the 
Deputy Comptroller might rise to the rank of Comptroller. This had 
happened in 1794 when Sir Andrew Snape Hamond, having held the post of 
Deputy Comptroller for six months, was promoted Comptroller. In addition, 
it might be noted, Martin himself was to have been Deputy Comptroller, 
tut this appointment remained unconfirmed at the time of his actual 
accession to the post of Comptroller. Legge, through his lack of naval 
experience, could never have entertained any hopes of succeeding Martin. 
In fact, Legge retired before the end of the year, replaced by the Hon 
Robert Dundas. 
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This new Deputy Comptroller, who as the son of the out-going 
First Lord has already been mentioned, was a former member of the Navy 
Board whose patent, as a result of widesweeping changes to the general 
arrangements operating within the Navy Office, had been revoked in May 
1829. At the time of this revocation of his authority, Robert Dundas had 
been promised a return to the Board once a vacancy had occurred. Thus, on 
Legge's retirement, Dundas automatically succeeded him in office. [791 
The particular branch of the Navy Off ice for which the Deputy 
Comptroller was responsible was that of Contracts. This department 
employed one chief clerk and two junior clerks. In remuneration for the 
wack he undertook, the Deputy Comptroller received an annual salary of 
P, 2DO. [801 
As for the two Navy Surveyors they were, between them, the Board's 
experts on matters relating both to the design of warships and the running 
of the dockyards. Although it was not always the case that the Board 
would have two Surveyors, this natural division of work allowed each 
to specialise in a particular area. Thus Seppings concentrated on design 
while Tucker gave greater attention to the dockyards. However, neither 
duty was exclusive of the other. Indeed, during official visitations, 
when the Surveyor was expected to accompany the Comptroller in his tour of 
inspection, either might be delegated to undertake this duty. In 
addition, one or other Surveyor might, when necessary, undertake 
inspections on his own account, but no visits or orders were to be made 
without ýthe concurrence and by the direction of the Board at largeo. As 
fcr the background of those appointed to the post of Surveycr, this was 
always firmly entrenched within the dockyards. In fact, the appointee was 
always chosen from the ranks of Master Shipwrights currently serving in 
the yards. [811 
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At one time it also fell within the remit of the Navy Surveyor to 
lay down the design for dockyard buildings. This doubtless explains why 
many existing 18th century yard buildings have many features, including 
the use of internal strengthening knees, that have much in common with the 
warships of the period. [82] However, this task of designing buildings 
had been taken away from the Surveyor's department by the employment of a 
specialised architect who carried the title Surveyor of Buildings. [831 
The annual salary received by the two individuals holding the post of Navy 
Surveyor in 1830 was one thousand pounds per annum each, while the 
Surveyor of Buildings, who was not a member of the Board, received eight 
hundred pounds per annum. [841 
The existence of two Navy Surveycrs, as already pointed out, was not 
a regular constituted feature of the Navy Board. An Order in Council of 
1829, which introduced varicus changes both to the Board and its office, 
had indicated that there should be only one Surveyor. [85] Prior to this 
order in Ccuncil it had been quite common to appoint two Surveycrs. 
Indeed, between 1813 and 1822 there had actually been three Surveyors, 
while assistant surveycrs had also been appointed during the recent war. 
However, by 1829 the pressure of work, as a result of peacetime 
retrenchment, had been much reduced, with the decision taken that only one 
Surveyor was necessary. But rather than dismiss one of the post-holders, 
it was decided to retain them until one should retire. 
Both Robert Seppings and Joseph Tucker had daly served their 
apprenticeships in the royal dockyards and both had been Master 
shipwrights immediately before they joined the Board. Joseph Tucker 
however, who had become a commissioner in June 1813, was something of an 
exception as regards his general working experience. Having completed his 
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indentures at Woolwich, he remained at the yard for only seven years. In 
1784 he joined the East India Company as an overseer of shipbuilding and 
repair wcrk before becoming an assistant surveycr with the company. 
Eventually he was appointed, by St Vincent, to Plymouth dockyard as an 
Assistant Master Shipwright and, eight months later, a Master 
Shipwright. [871 
Robert Seppings' rise to Navy Surveyor was far more typical. 
Serving both his apprenticeship and most of his working life in the 
dockyards, he was appointed Master Shipwright at Chatham in 1803. It was 
as a result of pioneering work carried out at that yard that he was 
eventually appointed to the Navy Board, his warrant also dated June 
1813. [861 The work in which he had become involved was that of giving 
ships-of-the-line increased strength when at sea. Most important was the 
"Seppings System" of diagonal bracing which was first incorporated into 
-Kent', a large 74-gun third rate which had been brought to Chatham for 
docking. Since this vessel was noted for her tendency to warp along the 
keel, it was considered that the new system would help solve this 
particular problem. Later, in 1810, Seppings was given permission to use 
the same system in 'Tremendous', but this time he also included cross 
pieces between the various gan ports and additional timbers in the spaces 
between the lower frames. A second improvement that was pioneered by 
Seppings while at Chatham was that of giving large ships a round bow. 
This had the double advantage of providing greater strength, while 
providing more room for this traditionally under-ganned area of a warship. 
Both innovations, it should be noted, were eventually to be 
incorporated into all new warships. [88] 
unlike other members of the Navy Board, those appointed to the 
office of surveyor were drawn fran very restricted backgrounds. While 
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there were a number of possible candida tes to f ill the maj ori ty of 
commissionerships, this was not so with regard to the post of Surveyor. 
Given that the holders of this post had to be drawn from among the ranks 
of serving Master Shipwrights in the royal dockyards, then the potential 
number of candidates was automatically restricted. Indeed, given that 
there were only seven yards, with one Master Shipwright in each, then the 
number of possible candidates to fill a vacancy never totalled more than 
seven. This probably goes some way to explain why Melville, as the 
appointing First Lord, should select Joseph Tucker as one of the 
Surveyors. Already it has been noted that Tucker's return to the royal 
dockyards, together with his appointment to the rank of Master Shipwright, 
were brought about by St Vincent. Seemingly, the Tuckers were a good Whig 
family, St Vincent having already appointed Benjamin Tucker, Joseph's 
brother, his private secretary. [89] Upon St Vincent leaving office, 
Tucker received no further promotion until his elevation to the Navy 
Board. Perhaps, during the short-lived Talents administration, both Grey 
and Grenville, who both served in the capacity of First Lord, believed 
Joseph Tucker to have been too recently employed at Plymouth to merit 
further promotion. However, by June 1813, the date of his appointment to 
the Board, no other possible candidate could claim a comprobable amount of 
experience. As a result, Melville felt forced to permit this known Whig 
to join one of the inferior boards. [90] Not surprisingly, given these 
earlier connections with St Vincent, Tucker was not to be fully trusted by 
some of his colleagues. In 1818, he was suspected by Martin of having 
passed some politically sensitive papers to his brother, these 
subsequently used in an attack upon the workings of the navy at that time. 
The evidence, as it happens, points against the Surveyor having been the 
guilty party. [911 
The remaining three members of the Navy Board were John Deas 
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Thomson, Robert Gambler Middleton and the Hon Courtenay Boyle. Between 
them, they respectively held the posts of Accountant General, Storekeeper 
General and Superintendent of Transpcrts. All had been appointed to those 
posts on 4 May 1829, following the same general re-organisation of the 
Navy office that had led to the revoking of the Hon Robert Dundas's 
earlier commission. Each had previously served on the Board, but in 
differing capacities, with only Boyle appointed by Melville. The other 
two, the longest serving members were appointed by earlier Pittite First 
Lcrds. Boyle, as a prerequisite of the post he held, had seagoing 
experience. The third son of the 7th Earl of Cork and Orrey, he first 
entered the navy in 1781 gaining the rank of Captain in 1797. 
Subsequently he served as resident commissioner at Sheerness before 
joining the Navy Board. As fcr Thomson and Middleton, they were strictly 
administrators and acquired their respective posts through family 
connection. While Thomson's family cannot be traced, Middleton was the 
nephew of Lord Barham. In common with the Navy Surveyor, all three of 
these commissioners received an annual salary of one thousand pounds. [92] 
The work oE the Accountant General and Stcrekeeper General can be 
summarised by reference to Orders in Ccuncil which laid down the duties of 
these two commissioners. It was the responsibility of the Accountant 
General 'to superintend, examine and pass all accounts; subject to the 
approbation of the Board at large'. [931 Similarly, the Storekeeper 
General was 'to consider the proper quantity of stores necessary to be 
provided for the service in general; to direct their distribution and to 
take cognizance of the receipt, issue, remains and returns of all stcres 
of every kind and every service-. Both commissioners were in charge of 
their own off ices, with the Bill and Accounts Office employing two chief 
clerks and twenty junior clerks while the Store Office had two chief 
clerks and nine junicr clerks. [941 
48 
The Superintendent of Transports was responsible for all matter 
connected with the transport of troops and stores by sea. In particular, 
it involved negotiating all contracts with the ship-owners, to cause 
surveys to be made of vessels under hire, to adjust the accounts and pay 
the balance. [95] These were matters not strictly connected with the navy 
and were performed on behalf of the War Office. However, the fact that it 
involved shipping, albeit hired merchant vessels, meant that such a 
service fell more naturally into the hands of the navy. In particular, 
these hired vessels, when undergoing survey, were of ten brought into one 
of the royal dockyards. As a result, there was a certain advantage in 
having both the Navy Surveyor and Superintendent of Transports sitting on 
the same board. [961 
During peace time, the work of the Transport Branch was f airly 
limited. However, in war time, the work of this department grew ten fold. 
In previous wars it had become normal for a separate Transport Board to be 
formed which, during the latter years of the Napoleonic Wars had consisted 
of six commissioners, a secretary and nine clerks. Subordinate to the 
secretary of state, the Transport Board"s offices had been -in Dorset 
Square. Shortly after the culmination of hostilities, in 1817, the 
Transport Board had been abolished and its duties taken over by the Navy 
Board. The number of clerks employed within the Transport Branch of the 
Navy off ice was ten temporary junior clerks and two permanently 
established chief clerks. The Transport Branch was a distinct entity from 
other branches of the Navy Office. This a1lowed for easy separation, and 
the establishment of a separate board, in the event of a future war. [971 
Althcugh the Board, as described, consisted of as many as three 
naval officers (of which the Comptroller was one) these individuals never 
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dominated the decision making process. Instead, a consensus approach was 
adopted. This was very different from the Admiralty, where the First Lord 
could, and frequently did, overrule his colleagues. However, in having 
said this, it should also be recognised that the Navy Board was 
subordinate to the Admiralty. Frequently, points brought before the 
Board had to be referred to the Admiralty before a decision could be 
taken. Thi s was especi ally so when it came to f inanci al expendi ture or 
major alterations to the dockyards. However, as already shown, it was not 
impossible for the commissioners of this inferior Board, using a variety 
of differ ing ploys, to undermine the authority of the Admiralty. Only 
with regard to the appointment of commissioners did the superior board 
possess an undisputed degree of authority. [981 
Having dealt with the seven commissioners, it would seem apposite to 
give attention to the eighth individual who was always in attendance at 
Board meetings: the Secretary. Since September 1820, this post had been 
held by George Smith, an employee of the Navy Board who had first entered 
the Navy Office as a temporary clerk in 1791. Having subsequently teen 
raised to the establishment, he was appointed to the secretary's branch in 
1796 rising to chief clerk in July 1804. Later, in 1807, he became 
Assistant Secretary. His salary, in 1820, stood atll, 200. [991 
There seems every indication that George Smith was an able and 
conscientious secretary to the Navy Board. Responsible for the basic 
organisation and running of day to day business, he produced numerous 
reports, all of them undertaken upon his own volition, on how the Navy 
off ice and dockyards could be be t ter organi sed. [ 1001 The off ice which he 
was responsible for running and on the same basis as those directly headed 
by a principal officer, consisted of two chief clerks and nineteen junior 
clerks. [101] A further clerk, the Petitions Clerk, was also loosely 
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attached to the off ice. The Petitions Clerk in 1830 was Samuel F. Ray, 
and his duty was that of receiving all individuals making inquiry at the 
Navy Office and fcr the preparation of petitions from seamen fcr the 
Board's considerationj 1021 
That the Secretary should be in such a powerful position, and 
allowed to run his own branch of the Navy Office, relates to the cutgrowh 
of this post from the earlier Clerkship of the Acts. This had, pricr to 
1796, been a further office held in commission with Samuel Pepys the most 
famous incumbent. In common with the later secretaryship, the Clerk of 
the Acts was also expected to take responsibility for correspondence, 
general running of the Navy Office and the keeping of minutes. However, 
as a commissioner he also shared in the decision making process. In fact, 
as his diaries make clear, Pepys was a particularly active member of the 
Board, frequently visiting the dockyards and uncovering a number of 
abuses. It was the Commission on Fees which deemed it 'absolutely 
necessaryý to separate the office of Secretary from the Clerk of the Acts, 
this being officially sanctioned in 1796. The, then, existing Clerk of 
the Acts, George Marsh, was re-appointed to an alternative post on the 
Board while the Assistant Clerk of the Acts was re-designated secretary: 
That the Office of Assistant to the Clerk of 
the Acts shculd be converted into that of 
Secretary who should attend the Board, take 
minutes, see to the execution of the Board-s 
orders, carry on the correspondence, take 
care of the Board's papers, see that the whole 
be duly registered and be responsible for the 
secret and due execution of business of that 
departmentj 1031 
Regarding clerks employed within the Navy Office, their salaries 
were dependent upon a combination of ability, application and length of 
service. At one time, all clerks were guaranteed the opportunity of 
attaining the highest salary echelons merely by their own longevity. As 
one clerk retired, or lef t the service, those clerks below him in 
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seniority and employed within the same branch, merely moved up a rung. 
However, as such a system clearly discouraged the most able, a completely 
new system of regulating the clerks was introduced in 1816. [104] This 
created a more developed career structure that divided the established 
clerks into three distinct classes. ý All new entrants were placed on the 
lowest echelon, that of third class, with promotion to the second class 
dependent only upon application and ability. Within each class a separate 
pay structure existed, providing all clerks with an annual increment of 
ten pounds annum until the upper limit, permitted for that class, was 
reached. [ 105] In the case of third class clerks, this allowed, in 1830, 
for a continued increase of annual salary for thirty-one years while for 
second and first class clerks it was twenty and twenty-five years 
respectively. Those selected for promotion would enter the next class on 
the lower limit available to that class (but equivalent to the highest 
limit of the previous class). [1061 The reasons for the Admiralty choosing 
to introduce this system were set down in the preamble to the Order in 
council responsible for the division of clerks into three classes. This 
stated that, in the past, salaries given to clerks had not always 
reflected their responsibilities. The result was that great irregularity 
had 'been produced between the remuneration paid to officers whose Duties 
were nearly equal. ' To correct this, it was hoped that the new system 
would result in payments 'really proportional (as far as may be possible) 
to the responsibility and weight of the Duties which are to be performed-. 
At the same time, by allowing annual incremental increases within each 
class, some rewards would exist 'for long and faithful service'. [107] 
As indicated by several references to various orders in ccuncil, the 
Navy Office was in the midst of considerable chanae. During the months 
leading up to its abolition, one addition to its responsibilities was that, 
of paying the Marines, this resulting from the abolition of the Marine Pay 
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Department. To undertake this wcrk a Paymaster of Marines was appointed 
to the Navy Office, the holder of this post a clerk who had fcrmerly been 
employed within the abolished department. [108] 'In addition, and 
representing a further change to the structure of the Navy Office, was the 
treaking up of the Transpcrt Branch towards the end of 1830, with the 
clerks of this department re-distributed to other offices. [1091 Finally, 
the Surveycr's Office, by October 1831, had been reduced to one chief 
clerk and a junior clerk. [1101 
However, these alterations to the Navy Office were relatively minor 
when compared to changes witnessed in the years immediately prior to 1830. 
only a few months earlier, in January 1829, the entire organisation of the 
Board, and its various branches, had been completely re-vamped in order to 
create the structure which has just been described. In particular, the 
order in Council which sanctioned these changes, introduced the idea of 
individual responsibility, with each commissioner taking charge of a 
specific department. For this reason, the Order in Council also created 
the posts of Accountant General, Storekeeper General and Superintendent of 
Transports, the work of these individuals previously shared by several 
commissioners. 
The organisational system in existence prior to the more recent 
changes of January 1829 was one that centred around four committees: the 
Canmittee of Corr spondence, Accounts, Stores and Transports. Individual 
commissioners, instead of jointly meeting as an entire group, were 
allocated to these committees, with each made up of three different 
commissioners. The work of three of these committees, those of 
correspondence, Accounts and Stores, were set out by the Order in Council 
of June 1796 that was responsible for their implementation: 
Under this idea We [the Lcrds Commissioners 
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of the Admiralty] propose that the [Navy] 
Board shall be divided into the following 
committees. vizt. A Committee of Carr spond2nce; 
a Committee of Accounts and a Committee of 
Stores. 
The Comptroller to belong to and preside 
over every committee. The Committee of 
Correspondence to consist of the Deputy 
Comptroller, one Surveyor, the present 
Clerk of the Acts and the Secretary. 
The Committee of Accounts to consist of the 
present Comptroller of Treastmees Accounts, 
the present Comptroller of Victualling 
Accounts, one Commissioner and Secretary 
(to be the Comptrdler's first clerk for the 
time being). 
The Committee of Stores to consist of one 
Surveyor or Sea Officer, the present Comptroller 
of Storekeeper's Accounts, the present Sea 
Commissioner and secretary (to be the chief 
clerk and Accountant of Stores for the time 
being. 
The several duties attached to the various 
committees are to be as follows. The Committee 
of Correspondence to conduct correspondence of 
the Board. Committee of Accounts. To superint- 
tend, examine and pass all accounts; subject 
however to the approbation of the Board at large. 
Committee for Stores. To consider the proper 
quantity of stores necessary to be provided for 
the service in general; to direct their 
distribution and to take cognizance of the 
receipt, issue, remains and return of stores 
of every kind and every service depending on 
this branch. [1111 
The progenitors of this particular administrative arrang2ment, which 
placed an emphasis on the value of collective responsibility, were the 
Commissioners looking into fees and other emoluments. Having, in their 
fifth report, made a study of the workings of the Navy Office, taking 
copious evidence from Lord Barham., they proposed that the committee system 
would ease the problems of an overworked single governing Board. In 
addition, and also sanctioned by the same Order in Council, the post of 
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secretary was introduced while fees among Navy Board clerks were 
completely abolishedL[1121 
In time, several more changes and minor alterations to the basic 
system were introduced. Much of this concerned the appointment of an 
increased number of commissioners, some of them with new specialist 
expertise. [113] Of perhaps greater significance however, was a 
recommendation by the Commissioa of Naval Revision, and its acceptance by 
the Admiralty, that the general 'superintendence and direction of 
business' of each committee should be placed in the hands of the most 
senior commissioner appointed to each committee. The Comptroller, who had 
been unable to make anything but an infrequent appearence at meetings of 
the various committees, was allowed a more general superintending role. 
That an Order in Council of 1829 should subsequently dissolve the 
committee system and replace it with a system that was, in some ways, not 
toodissimilar from that in force prior to 1796, results from a failure to 
successfully operate a system of collective responsibility. Instead, and 
this is where the new system differed entirely from anything previously 
attempted, an emphasis was placed on individual responsibility - each 
commissioner totally responsible for one area of Navy Office business. It 
was a style of government that was to be perpetuated in the civilian 
departments of the Admiralty once the Navy Board, itself, had been 
abolished. However, further discussion of this point will appear 
elsewhere. 
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1.4 The Victualling and Sick and Wounded Departments 
The Navy Board had a general responsibility fw all matters 
connected with the civilian branches that assisted in keeping the British 
Navy at sea. As warships grew, both in size and quantity, the Admiralty 
concluded that it wculd be better if a number of additional and 
specialised boards were created, each subject to the overall 
administration of the Navy Board. Of particular importance were those 
concerned with responsibility for medical needs (the Sick and Hurt 
Board), [1141 the hire of ships for the transport of troops and stores (the 
Transport Board) [1151 and the procuring and supply of provisions for seamen 
(the Victualling Board). [1161 By the autumn of 1830 only the Victualling 
Board continued to exist in anything like its original farm, the other two 
boards having been abolished. For the Sick and Hurt Board, abolition 
occurred in 1806 when its duties were absorbed into the Transport Board. 
Later, in 1817, the Transport Board was abolished, the hire of transports 
taken over by the Navy Board through the creation of a Transport 
Committee, while responsibility for sick and wounded seamen was placed in 
the hands of a reformed Victualling Board. [117] 
As a result of this remaining the situation at the end of 1830, the 
present section of this thesis will briefly examine the administrative 
framewcrk of the Victualling Board in its amalgamated state. Attention 
will be given to those departments concerned with the supply and 
accounting of provisions, the supply of medicines, upkeep of hospitals and 
the appointment, by warrant, of ship-s surgeons and physicians. 
The Victualling Board had originally been created on 1 Jamiary 
1684. Prior to that date, the work of Provisioning British warships had 
fallen, more or less entirely, into the hands of merchants placed under 
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contract. [1181 The Navy Board, upon its formation, took responsibility 
for the examination of accounts belonging to both merchant contractors and 
ship's pursers. Later, with the establishment of the Victualling Board, 
the Navy Board gained a new appointee, the Comptroller for Victualling 
Board Accounts, a commissioner responsible for examining the financial 
aspects of the work of the new Board. This post of Comptroller for 
Victualling Board Accounts was abolished in 1794, the task of examining 
victualling accounts taken over by the Committee of Accounts and then, in 
1829, by the Accountant General. [1191 
Although the creation of a separate board responsible for the 
provisioning of warships was to bring about greater efficiency, the 
Commissioners of Naval Victualling were to come under much criticism for 
their inability to liquidate long outstanding accountancy arrears. This 
was the focal point of attention in two Admiralty investigations into the 
work of the Board and both conducted during the early part of the 18th 
century. In the first of these reports, that of April 1711, they 
discovered numerous examples of unpassed acccunts. [1201 In the words of 
the Board of Admiralty, 
--* upon their [the Board of Admiralty] 
examination into the Victualling Office in 
the year 1710, [they discovered] that there 
had not only been very great but very many 
neglects and omissions in all parts thereof, 
but more especially in not obliging the 
several officers who had for many years been 
entrusted with provisions and stores, which 
cost the Public some millions of money, to pass 
any regular account for the same, and for near 
eight hundred thousand pounds impressed, 
notwithstanding some of the said officers had 
been removed many years from their employment, 
and that others were dead ... [121] 
orders were given for these arrears, without obstructing current 
business, to be immediately brought up to date. At the same time, 
instructions were also given for each commissioner to be given 
57 
responsibility for a particular branch of the Board's work. Prior to this 
date, all commissioners had only a general responsibility. As a result of 
these instructions, two commissioners were denominated as responsible for 
the accounts, these being the Accountant for Cash and the Accountant for 
Stcres. [122] Of the other commissioners, four acted as overseers of the 
manufacturing departments managed by the Victualling Board, with one of 
them to inspect the 'Cooperage at Tower Hill, a second the 'affairs of the 
bakehouse and mills', the third the 'Cutting house and Master Butchee and 
the fourth the 'brewhouse at Hatshorne'., The seventh commissioner 
was to inspect into the business of the hoytaker and was concerned with 
the hire of transports for the movement of provisions and the work of the 
hoys employed by the various victualling yards for carrying provisions to 
ships in harbour. [12.31 At that time, according to these instructions, all 
commissioners were considered to be of equal standing, with chairmanship 
of Board meetings rotating between them. [1241 Eventually, in November 
1784, the Board of Admiralty directed that the Accountant for Cash would 
preside ab all Board meetings with the Accountant for Stores acting as 
Deputy Chairman. [1251 
It was hoped that these new arrangements, together with the 
accompanying order concerning the upkeep of accounts, would result in a 
much improved situation. However, this was not to be. A second 
inspection of the work of the Victualling Board was undertaken in 1714 
when the Admiralty noted that few advances had been made. According to 
their own preface to this report, 
.*. great part of the old accounts 
remain still unadjusted and many of the 
imprest uncleared but several accounts 
which have since occurred as well as great 
sums of money which have been granted by 
them [the Admiralty] by way of imprest, 
remain likewise unadjusted and uncleared 
... [1261 
As a result, the Admiralty further directed that all accounts in arrears 
should be adjusted and any imprest 'standing ouC should also be cleared. 
At the same time, the commissioners of the Victualling Board were 
instructed to inform the Admiralty how this was to be done. [1271 
The Victualling Board was to remain free of any further scrutiny of 
its affairs until the appointment of the Commissioners inquiring into 
fees. It was their 8th report that was directed towards an examination of 
the Victualling Office, with their findings printed and dated 17 April 
1788. Before looking at some of the recommendations made by this 
particular commission, it is worth noting the general duties of the 
Victualling Board at this time as defined by the Fees Commission, 
The business of the Victualling Off Ice 
is, to provide, either by Contract or 
otherwise, all the Provisions, and also 
certain Stores required for Your Majesty0s 
Navy; arranging and distributing the whole 
to the several ports and places at home and 
abroad, as the service may require; to take 
care that the different Provisions and Stores, 
when so issued, be properly charged to the 
Agents, Storekeepers, Pursers, Masters of 
Transports or others, to whom they were 
issued; and to compel the respective parties 
to pass timely and regular Accounts; also to 
take care that all offal arising from articles 
manufactured be properly disposed of, all old 
Stores be sold to best advantage, and the 
proceeds duly accounted for; to attend to the 
various Checks, &c. which have been 
instituted for the security of the Public, 
with other and numerous objects, which are 
constantly and necessarily attached to this 
off ice. [ 1281 
In keeping with the Act of Parliament that had set this inquiry 
into motion, much of the attention of the commissioners was directed 
towards an examination of the -fees, gratuities, perquisites and 
emoluments' received by the clerks and officers of this department. As 
with their f if th report that had looked into the Navy Office, they made a 
general recommendation that all such extra payments should be abolished 
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and replaced by a general increase in salaries paid. [1291 However, as 
already noted, the Act had also indicated that the appointed commissioners 
shculd make 'sach observations as shall occur to them for the better 
conducting and managing the Business' of the offices they were 
investigating. [DO] For this reason a number of additional reforms were 
proposed, the most far reaching of these directed towards the solving of 
two particular problems noted by the Commission. The f irst of these was 
the inability of the victualling commissioners responsible for inspecting 
areas of manufacture adequately to perform this task. It was noted that 
they were not trained in the skills of the department they oversaw, being 
ýGentlemeno. Furthermore, the commissioners apprehended: 
.*. that to direct with Effect the 
Process of Manufacture, requires a regular, 
daily and unremitting Attendance, which no 
Commissioner can possibly bestow ... [131] 
A further problem resulted from placing a single individual at the 
head of each department. It was felt that this provided an inadequate 
check, with an individual, so placed, more able to defraud the system 
and avoid detection. Although the Commissioners did not uncover any 
considerable frauds, they did draw attention to one particular former 
commissioner: 
When the late Hoy Taker was in Office, 
we find, that many Transports were 
hired by the Board which belonýpd to 
himself, and to other Persons in Your 
Majesty's Victualling Service. At the 
same Time that we do in the strongest 
Terms express cur Disapprobation of 
such Conduct on the Part of the Persons 
in Question, we cannot avoid testifying 
cur Surprize, that such improper 
Proceedings should have escaped the Censure 
and Correction of the Board ... [1321 
A final problem was that of the continuing failure of the Board's 
cash and store departments to liquidate long outstanding acccunts: 
In the course of cur investigtion into the 
60 
Modes of keeping Accounts, and of passing 
them through the various Departments of the 
Victualling Establishment, we naturally 
directed a Part of cur Attention to such 
Accounts as were in Arrear, and to Outstanding 
Debts due to the Public: With respect to the 
former the Arrear in Question had been 
disregarded, as well from Neglect, as from 
other Causes which no longer exist ... 
and consequently the several Debts in 
Question have continued to accumulate, between 
the lst January 1750 and the 31st December 
1786, till they amount collectively to the 
Sum of One hundred Seventy-five thousand 
Two hundred Seventy-fcur Pounds, Five Shillings 
and Eight Pence ... 
[1331 
However, the Commissioners noted in their report on the Victualling Board 
that, since March 1786, 'the Board, alarmed it should seem at the state of 
the Account' employed a Chief Clerk to direct himself to the collection of 
outstanding debts. Within eighteen months he had successfully collected 
arrears amcunting tof3l, 606. [1341 
To solve these various problems it was felt that the work of the Board 
should be managed by committees with individual commissioners ceasing to 
have responsibility for separate departments. It was a means of managing 
Board affairs that had much in common with that previously proposed (and 
subsequently adopted) in their f if th report which had looked into the 
affairs of the Navy Office [135]: 
We have already adverted to the 
Impropriety of allowing the Superintendance 
and Direction of each of the Principal 
Departments to separate Members of the 
Board: To rectify this therefore we 
recommend, That the respective 
Commissioners be exempted forthwith from 
all superintendance of separate Departments: 
That the chairman should continue to 
preside over the whole Establishment, 
and, That the remaining six commissioners 
be formed into Two Committees, under 
regulations as nearly correspondent to 
those recommended for the Navy Office, 
as the nature of the two services will 
admi t. 
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Under this Arrangement the Chairman will 
of course preside over the Board, and 
likewise be a member of, and preside at, 
each Committee. In case of his absence 
the like powers shall devolve upon the 
Deputy Chairman ... 
One of these committees, We propose, 
shall by stiled the Committee of 
Cart spondence and Cash, and the other 
the Committee of Stores. [1361 
When this repcrt was submitted to the Admiralty, in January 1792 fcr 
their consideration and comment [1371, it is interesting to note that, 
despite the acoeptance of this same proposal fcr the Navy Board, they 
rejected it for the Victualling Board: 
This Proposal, extending to a complete 
and entire Change of a System under which 
the very extensive and complicated 
Business of the Victualling Department 
has for a long Series of Years been 
conducted, has undergone cur serious 
Consideration: And after weighing all 
the Reasons assigned by the Commissioners 
of Enquiry in Favour of the Plan, and 
those which have been stated by the 
Commissioners of Victualling ... 
we have no hesitation in giving cur 
decided Opinion, that the Change proposed 
would not be attended with any Advantage 
to the Public Service, nor tend to 
remedy the defects of the Establishment 
which the Commissioners of Enquiry represent 
to exist. [138] 
Addressing themselves more particularly to the matter of having 
inspectorial commissioners the Admiralty report declared: 
*. that if the Commissioners of 
the Victualling were well acquainted with 
the Mode of conducting the Manufactures 
which they are appointed to superintend, 
they wculd be more competent to the 
Execution of the Duties of their respective 
Situations; but, assisted as they always 
have been by skilful Men, we have no 
Reason to think that any Inconvenience has 
arisen in the ManaErement of these 
Departments. [1391 
And then turning to the matter of establishing committees: 
Supposing, however, some Inconvenience 
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to have arisen, we do not perceive how 
the forming of Committees would remove 
it; for each Member of the Committee 
would be less likely to exert himself in 
acquiring infamation in any Business 
which was to be executed by the Whole, 
than in that which he alone should be 
appointed to execute. [140] 
Fundamentally, the Fee Commissioners had failed to put forward a 
strong enough case for reforming the Victualling Board in the ways they 
had recommended. Unlike the arguments they had put forward with regard to 
the Navy Board, they had said nothing about the increased amounts of work 
undertaken by the Victualling Board -a factor that played an obvious part 
in the hor ndous backlog of unliquidated accounts. It was a point to 
which the Commission for Revising and Digesting the Civil Affairs of the 
Navy was to direct itself in an equally thorough report produced in 
1807. [1411 
By that date, the argument for adopting the committee system was 
much strengthenedL The Navy had more than doubled in size while 
expenditure on victualling, since 1788, had increased eleven-fold. [142] 
Furthermore, the Victualling Board had also taken on the duty of supplying 
-to the different stations atroad all provisions necessary for the 
Armyý*[1431 Finally, as the Revision Commission also noted: 
To this growing increase of duty is now 
to be added, the vast body of accounts of 
cash and stores, which have been gradaally 
falling into arrear, for more than the 
last twenty years, and which, still 
remaining unliquidated, require to be 
examined without further delay. [1441 
The result of the increased work load trought abcut by the intensity of 
war and the task of provisioning the Army, was that Victualling Board 
meetings were increasingly lengthy affairs, with individual commissioners 
constantly dragged away from the essential work of overseeing and 
inspecting their own departments. As with the Navy Office, a decade 
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earlier, a goodly proportion of managerial decisions were having to be 
taken by employees. [1451 
In common with the Fees Commission report, the Commission of Naval 
Revision also proposed the introduction of committees: 
We shall, in the first place, recommend 
that the seven Members be divided into 
two Committees, [if] it shall be found 
that the arrears of accounts cannot be 
liquidated, that growing arrears cannot 
be prevented, and that the increased 
scale of the service requires that further 
aid should be given by the addition of 
another Committee, Government must 
take such further measures as experience 
may then shew to be necessary; but, 
without the test of trial, we feel it 
is proper caution on cur part, to avoid 
recommending so great an increase in the 
establishment as a third Committee would 
render necessary. [146] 
The two committees, so it was proposed were to be styled the Committee fcr 
Cash and Stores and the Committee for General Business. The first of 
these was to be responsible for the f inancial affairs of the Victualling 
office, directing itself to the management and direction of clerks 
involved in the examination of accounts submitted by contract(rs. It was 
also to be the work of this committee to keep a charge upon stores held at 
the varicus victualling points or in transit. Three commissioners, two 
civilians and a fcrmer naval purser, were to make up this committee. The 
second committee, that for conducting general business, was to be the 
Victualling Board's equivalent to the Navy Boards Committee of 
Ccrrespondence. It was to deal with all incoming letters, directing these 
to the commissioner most able to deal with their contents. In addition, 
the members of this committee were to look into the quantity of 
stores required and the quality of provisions manufactured at the 
victualling establishments, giving thcught to how improvements might be 
made either to existing buildings or methods used. Membership of this 
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committee was to be made up of four commissioners, two of whom were to be 
civilians and two former naval personnel, one to have been a captain and 
the other a purser. [1471 Having considered the reasons given by members 
of the Commission for Revising the Civil Affairs of the Navy in this, 
their tenth report, the Admiraltyv through an Order in Council, gave its 
approval to the scheme in 1808. [1481 
A further alteration to the administrative arrangements of the 
Victualling Board was necessitated in 1817 with the abolition of the Sick 
and Hurt and Transport Board. Resulting in the need to establish a 
medical section within the Victualling Office, immediate continuity and 
expertise was provided by the transfer from the defunct Board a number of 
clerks and two medical commissioners. Although this initially meant an 
expansion in the total of commissioners, the number was eventually 
returned to its original seven, with two cutgoing commissioners failing to 
be replaced. [149] To accommodate the addition of a medical department, 
the committee system, as laid down in 1808, was placed under review, 
resulting in a decision to make a number of fundamental reforms. From the 
beginning of April 1822 the Victualling Board was to consist of two 
specialist committees for the examination of accounts, these designated 
the Committee for Stores and Pursers Accounts and the Committee for 
Medical and Cash Accounts, while all general business was to be considered 
by the Board collectively. 
This was mcre or less the situation that was to continue until the 
abolition of the Board in June 1832. However, one important alteration 
was subsequently to be made to this new system when the work of the 
Medical and Cash Committee was divided into two separate committees: the 
Cash committee and Medical Committee. Upon the introduction of this 
change, the work of the Victualling Board fell into the hands of three 
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committees, with general board meetings also continuing. Each committee, 
instead of consisting of three members, was composed of two members, with 
the chairman of the Board able to attend any of these committees as 
occasion arose. [1501 
This re-styled committee system, in its original and expanded 
state, had been devised by members of the Victualling Board, with details 
sent to the Admiralty for approval. The resulting correspondence throws a 
good deal of light upon the workings of the Board during the final decade 
of its existence. According to a lengthy report submitted to the Admiralty 
on 15 March 1822 it was to be the task of the Committee for Store and 
Pursers Accounts to: 
take cognizance of the receipt, issue, and 
remains of all stores and provisions (excepting 
medical stcres) examine and pass all accounts 
of stores and provisions (except medical 
stcres) including pursery and transpcrt 
accounts, and transact the current tusiness 
relating thereto ... 
[1511 
Regarding the Committee for Medical and Cash Accounts this was to: 
take cognizance of the receipt and disbursement 
of the monies, adopt measures for the speedy 
recovery of all outstanding balances and money 
due to the public, examine and pass all accounts 
of cash, including pursers accounts as far as 
they relate to cash, and also the medical store 
as well as cash accounts, and transact the 
current business relating thereto [152] 
With the subsequent introduction of the Cash Committee, the work primarily 
itemised was to be taken over by that committee, with only matters 
directly relating to medical affairs taken away. This was a logical move, 
as by placing cash and medical matters together, it meant that the Board-s 
two medical commissioners (who had been automatic members of the Cash and 
Medical Committee) were forced to acquire a greater zeal for general 
accountancy matters than they might otherwise have felt inclined. 
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Instead, by allowing the two medical commissioners to form a separate 
committee, they could concentrate upon the work upon which they were best 
at performing. As a result, the new Medical Committee examined -all 
Medical Accounts, SurEreons Journals2 and executed other professional 
duties', [1531 
As for the duties to be undertaken by members of the Board, when 
meeting together collectively, these were detailed as follows: 
They shall consider the proper quantities of 
provisions and medicines and victualling and 
medical stores to be provided at both home 
and abroad, and cause the same to be timely 
provided, and direct the distribution thereof; 
And attend to the economy of manual labor, and 
all matters in the civil victualling and medical 
establishments at home and abroad. 
They shall decide upon all such questions of 
importance, difficulty or doubt, as either of 
the two committees shall after having had 
recourse to the advice and assistance of the 
chairman refer to the Board at large. 
All contracts and agreements ... shall 
be made by the Board at large. 
On two days each week, viz., Tuesdays and 
Fridays the Board shall, before they separate, 
hear the minutes of the committees read over in 
order that every individual member may know what 
has been done in each committee, and may, if 
necessary, bring under discussion or further 
consideration any transaction which may appear 
objectionable, and if no objection occurs, the 
Board shall confer. [1561 
Board meetings, it was further pointed cut, were to be undertaken on a 
daily basis, with commissioners to 'repair from the Committee Rooms to the 
Board Room' at mid day. [157] 
The details of the wcrk to be undertaken by the committees and Board 
collectively, having been submitted to the Admiralty, the new procedure 
was subsequently introduced at the beginning of April 1822. Although, the 
committee system underwent a final alteration that led to the creation of 
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a third committee, it did not, as shown, constitute a major change, only 
a logical redistribution of duties. Furthermore, with the retention of the 
committee system, right up to the final abolition of the Board, it meant 
that collective decision making was still at the heart of Victualling 
Board affairs. This was markedly different from the Navy Board, where 
the move to individual responsibility had necessitated the abandonment of 
its own similar committee system. In view of this, it must be supposed, 
if the Victualling Board had not itself been abolished, considerable 
thought would have been given to the introduction of a similar 
organisational framework as that practised by the Navy Board. 
Moving away from the detailed wcrkings of the Board itself, 
attention should be given to the individual commissioners who constituted 
the Board during the final months of its existence. Once again, this 
survey will begin in the Autumn of 1830, allowing consideration to be 
given to membership of the Board as inherited by the Whigs upon their 
return to office in November. 
Chairman of the Victualling Board since February 1822, and 
continuing in office until abolition of the Board, was the Hon Granville 
Anson Chetwynd Stapylton. Appointed to the post by the then First Lord, 
the 2nd Lord Melville, he had previously been Paymaster of Marines 
(1815-1819) and a Navy Commissioner (1819-1822). Stapyltoa had been one of 
the civilian members of the Victualling Board, it having previously been 
laid down by the Commissioners of Naval Revision, that the person 
appointed to the chairmanship of this Board should be selected for his 
administrative experience. [1561 Chetwynd Stapylton's annual salary 
wasyl, 200. As chairman, his duties had been laid down by the Commission 
for Naval Revision and, with a few minor amendments to allow for changes 
in the committee system, retained in the Victualling Board's 
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recommendations to the Admiralty of March 1822. Most important of these 
duties were those of presiding at all general Board meetings and 
attending Board committees when it was deemed necessary. It was also 
one of Stapyltonýs duties to 'superintend, direct and controul [sic] all 
the departments and business of the Victualling Office; attend the 
Treasury, Admiralty and great offices of state when required and obtain 
information from the Admiralty and Treasury as to the amounts of 
provisions that would be required, passing this information on to the 
respective committees. [157] Finally, in the wcrds of the Revision 
Commission, but also repeated in the later report: 
He shall never be absent from his duty without 
. leave first obtained from the First Lord of the Admiralty; and, in case of necessary absence 
from sickness, he shall make the same known to 
the First Lord. He shall have authority to grant 
to the commissioners occasional leave of absence, 
when the public service will admit of it. He 
shall have authority to call the whole of the 
Members together whenever any matter shall 
arise, which, in his Judgement, or that of 
either of the Committees, as the case may be, 
shall require the consideration and determination 
of the Board at large. [158] 
The Depu ty Chairman in the Autumn of 1830 was Isaac Wodley. 
He had also been a Melville appointment, his patent dating to July 1823 
[1591. A brother of Admiral Thomas Woolley he had, himself, reached the 
naval rank of post-captain. During the French Revolutionary War he had 
served as a lieutenant on Sir John Jervis' flagship before going on to 
command the Nonsuch (64) and several third rates. Later, he had taken up 
the post of Superintendent of Jamaica Naval Yard (1808-13) followed by the 
resident commissionerships of Gibraltar (1813-18) and Malta (1818-23) 
dockyards. Apart from his annual salary of $1000, Wool-ley also received a 
pension of 
1250 for wounds received at Guadaloupe in 1795. [1601 
As Deputy Chairman, Woolley had few sPecif ied tasks other than that 
of performing the duties of the Chairman Whenever Chetwynd Stapylton was 
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absent. Additionally, however, it was the Deputy Chairman's duty to 
preside over meetings of the Committee for Medical and Cash Accounts. 
Indeed, since May 1829, he bad been the only member of that committee. 
This had come about as the result of a retirement from the Board, with the 
Board of Admiralty deciding that the retiring member, Commissioner 
Bathurst, should not be replaced. Thus, in a rather unplanned and 
haphazard manner, the Victualling Board had already taken a step towards 
individual responsibility, althcugh it was not codified or officially 
recognised in any form. Woolley remained a member of the Victualling 
Board until February 1831 when the post of Deputy Chairman was 
abolished. [1611 
Chairman of the Store and Pursers Committee was Frederick Edgecumbe. 
He had been appointed to this position upon the retirement of Nicholas 
Brown daring the Summer of that same year. Prior to his elevation to the 
chairmanship of that committee, he had acted under Brown as second member. 
Edgecumbe, who had begun his working life as a naval midshipman in 
1779, had subsequently become a ship's purser and then Admiral's 
Secretary. In 1796 he transferred to the civilian departments, becoming a 
naval storekeeper and later Comptroller of the Sixpenny Office. That 
he should join the Victualling Board in May 1811 was due to his 
also serving as Secretary to First Lord Charles Yorke. A traditional 
reward, holders of such posts were usually rewarded with a transfer to 
one of the civilian boards. Edgecumbe remained Chairman of the Store and 
pursers Committee until his death on 2 June 1832. With the Board already 
in its last days of existence, he was not to be replacedL As a 
Victualling Board commissioner, Meek received an annual salary of eight 
hundred pounds. [1621 
Serving under Edgecumbe as the newly appointed second member of the 
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Store and Pursers Committee was James Meek. He was, in fact, the newest 
member of the Board, having been appointed in July 1832 upon the 
retirement of Commissioner Brown. Prior to his joining the Board, Meek 
had been a member of the Commissariat department before going on to serve 
as secretary under several flag officers in the Mediterranean. He 
remained on the Victualling Board until June 1832, retained by James 
Graham as the newly appointed Comptroller of Victualling and Transport 
Services. This, in fact, was one of five principal officer posts that 
were introduoed for the purposes of undertaking the former duties of 
the civilian boards. In common with Edgecumbe, Meek also received a 
salary of -f8OO per annum. [1631 
Saving on the Medical Committee were the two final members of the 
Board, Dr John Weir and Dr William Burnett. The former had been a 
member of the Sick and Hurt department of the Transport Board while 
Burnett had been appointed directly to the Victualling Board in February 
1822. [1641 Both received a salary of P300 per annum. As the Board's two 
medical members, and apart from their particular committee duties, they 
gave attention to the running of hospitals and sick quarters established 
for the care of sick and wounded seamen. In addition, they oversaw the 
supply of all necessary victuals, clothing and medicine to these same 
institutions as well as medicines to surgeons on board naval ships. It 
also fell within the province of the two medical commissioners, but only 
with the consent of the Board as a whole, to appoint officers to hospitals 
(with the exception of governors, chaplains and lieutenants as these were 
within the patronage of the Admiralty) and surgeons to naval ships. 
The commissioners of the Victualling Board, in carrying out their 
work, had the assistance of a fairly sizeable office, known as the 
victualling office. Since 1822 this had been divided into seven distinct 
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branches. At one time these branches, with the exception of the more 
recently created Medical Stores Department, would have been supervised by 
either the Accountant for Cash or the Accountant for Stores. Since the 
abolition of individual responsibility, and the emergence of the committee 
system, all branches were directly responsible to the Board at large or 
one or other of the committees. Within the Victualling Office, there were 
71 clerks, this being the number allowed by the establishment for clerks 
that had been fixed by the Admiralty and enforced, in January 1822, by 
order in Ccuncil. [1651 As with the Navy Office, these clerks were 
appointed by the principal officers and commissioners under which they 
served. Terms of service were also similar, with clerks divided into 
three classes and receiving the same rates of pay. [1661 However, this 
having been said, it was nevertheless the case that promotion within the 
Navy office was undoubtedly easier. Quite simply, the latter had been 
permitted a greater proportion of senior clerks than that allowed to the 
victualling Office. Whereas, in the Victualling Office there were 6 
first class, 14 second class and 51 third class clerks, the Navy Office 
had lo first class, 21 second class and 61 third class. This, in effect, 
meant that 34% of Navy Office clerks were ranked in the two superior 
classes while only 28% of Victualling Office clerks were so placedL[167] 
It was doubtless this disparity which prompted the commissioners of the 
victualling Board to indicate, in February 1831, the limited chances of 
promotion available to the clerks that they employed, 
the establishment of cur office comprises so 
few clerkships of the first and second class 
with reference to the total number of clerks, 
that the promotion to the higher classes is 
very rare, and can only be obtained by a very 
few of the clerks. Indeed, on this point we 
may observe that the limited number of 
clerkships of the second class obliges us, in 
some instances, to assign to third class 
clerks the execution of Duties which ought 
properly to be entrusted only to clerks of the 
second class. [ 1681 
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General supervision of all the clerks employed in the Victualling Office 
was in the hands of the Board Secretary. This arrangement had been 
teen adopted in February 1822, 
We do hereby crder and direct the several 
clerks in all the departments in our 
office in Somerset House to consider 
themselves as subcrdinate to our secretary 
so far as their official conduct and 
attendance and are at all times to obey 
strict obedience to his directions. [169] 
Holder of the Secretar3rs post during the final years of the Board's 
existence was Marshal Waller Clifton. Farmerly an Admiralty clerk for 
seventeen years, he had been appointed to the secretaryship of the 
Victualling Board in February 1822. Apart from supervising the clerks, 
his duties also included overseeing the general running of the 
Victualling Office and attending all Board meetings. With regard to this 
latter task, it was his responsibili ty to carry cut much of the 
related paper work. Such tasks Included the reading of letters, receipt 
and execution of instructions and the keeping of minutes. In addition, he 
was to ensure that the minutes were properly entered into the official 
book and indexed, transmit attested contracts to the proper 
departments and to personally prepare all letters on matters of 
importance, laying these before the commissioners for signing. The 
secretary, because of his paramount importance and supervisory powers, was 
not paid according to the scale allowed for clerks, awarded a separate 
salary of flOOO per annum. As for the three committees, each had a clerk 
attached to them and paid as first class clerks of the second section. 
Their duties were similar to those of the secretary, but were restricted 
only to their respective committees. [1701 
As well as his general responsibilities fcr the running of the 
Victualling Office, the secretary also had special responsibilities fcr a 
separate branch of clerks within the Victualling Office and denominated 
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the Secretaryýs Department. It consisted of one chief clerk, who was 
responsible for the day-to-day running of this office, together with 3 
second class clerks and ten third class clerks. The chief clerk was paid 
as a first class clerk of the first section. Apart from assisting the 
secretary in the duties already described, the Secretary's Department 
wrote up all letters from the minutes (other than those to be written by 
the secretary personally), entered them into the Letters Book, sent out 
all necessary instructions, prepared all sea contracts and agreements, 
drew up instructions fcr victualling agents and kept a list of medical 
cfficers. [171] 
The largest single branch of the Victualling Off ice was the Pursery 
office. It consisted of I first class clerk of the first section, 
responsible for the running of this office and designated a chief clerk, 3 
second and 11 third class clerks. Primarily, this branch dealt with 
ship's pursers, the officers appointed by Admiralty warrant to take charge 
of the victualling stores issued to each warship. It was the purser's 
duty to provision the ship to which he was attached, ensure that they were 
correctly stored and to see that the correct daily amounts, as laid down 
by the Admiralty, were Issued. At the end of each voyage the purser-s 
daily accounts had to be submitted to the Pursery Office where they were 
examined and checked against the muster books. If any shor tf all was 
discovered, the particular purser would be called upon to make an 
explanation. [1721 
A further branch of sane size was that of the Medical Store 
Department which consisted of I Chief Clerk, 2 second class and 11 third 
class clerks. The duties of this department were to examine avast 
number of hospital accounts that ranged from general provisions thrcugh to 
surgeods implements and bedding. In addition, this branch made cut 
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certificates for surgeons allowing them to be paid, reported on the 
eligibility of injured seamen who were making claims for compensatory 
payment (known as 'smart money) and examined muster books as to the 
correctness of men who had entered sick quarters or hospital. [1731 
The Imprest Office, which consisted of a chief clerk, 2 second and 
7 third class clerks, was responsible for the examining, arranging and 
stating the accounts and payment vouchers presented by those merchants who 
had supplied various food items either to the victualling yards or 
directly to naval warships. It was the work of the clerks of this 
department to ensure that vouchers issued to merchants tallied with 
received accounts from victualling yards or naval vessels and the 
merchanCs own submitted bill. Once proven, this submitted bin could be 
passed on to the Cash Office for payment. [174] 
The Cash Office consisted of 1 chief clerk and 2 second and 7 third 
class clerks. Whereas the Impres t Office was only concerned with the 
certification of bil-1s, this department directed itself both to the making 
of payments and the issuing of certain bills. Clerks from this 
office were not only responsible for overseeing the payment of merchants 
but also those employed within the Victualling Office and those at the 
various outports. It was also the work of this department to keep a close 
check on provisions supplied to foreign garrisons so that the 
appropriate amcunts could be collected for payment. Additionally, the Cash 
office was responsible for the examination of accounts of sales of old 
stores, the calculation of tenders made to the Board for the supply of 
provisions on standing contracts and the keeping of accounts of all claims 
outstanding against pursers. Finally, the clerks of the Cash Office had 
to be aware of the likely levels of all future payments likely to be made, 
transmitting this information to the Navy Board so that they could make 
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demands on the Treasury for payment. [175] 
The sixth branch was the Agency Department. The smaUest of a3l the 
Victualling Office branches, it was made up of 1 chief clerk, 2 second and 
5 third class clerks. Among the tasks undertaken by the Agency Department 
was that of ensuring all storekeepers - both home and abroad - sent to the 
Victualling Off ice regular accounts of all stores received and issued. 
once in possession of this information, statements could be made as to the 
quality of stores and the amounts wasted or lost. In turn, this 
would allow for estimates to be made of future amounts of provisions that 
need be ordered. It was also the responsibility of the clerks of this 
department to keep a careful account of all stores and provisions supplied 
to non-naval. departments such as those issued to the Customs and Excise 
and for the victualling of convicts. [176] 
In concluding this section on the wcrk of the Victual-ling Board and 
its attached office, all that need be added is that since 1783, all these 
various departments described were housed in that complex of offices which 
made up Somerset Place. Indeed, the Victualling Board shared the west wing 
in common with the Navy Office. Doubtless this was an aid to general 
co-operation and an improvement on the pre-1783 period when the 
Victualling Office had been based at Tower Hill, the Navy Office at 
Crutched Friars while the Transport Office, prior to its abolition, had 
been at Dorset Square. However, communications with the Board of 
Admiralty still remained problematic as their offices were situated in 
Whitehall, a mile to the west of Somerset House. This particular problem, 
however, was not to be solved for a good many years. Even after the 
abolition of the Victualling and Navy Boards, the civil departments of the 
Navy were to remain at Somerset Place while the operational side continued 
at Admiralty House. 
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1.5 The Navy Pay Office 
The Navy Pay Office, which since 1782 had also been situated in 
Somerset Place, had duties closely linked with those of the Navy and 
Victualling Boards. In fact, it acted very much like a private bank, 
receiving and disbming all cash sums for and on behalf of the civilian 
boards. Whether it was seamen's wages, officers' pensions or cash demands 
by contractors, all payments were handled by the cashiers and clerks of 
the Navy Pay Office. As for the various ledgers that recorded these 
payments, they were eventually forwarded to the relevant branch in either 
the Navy and Victualling Board where they were audited and then filedL 
At the head of the Navy Pay Office was the Treasurer of the Navy. 
originally, he had not only been a member of the Navy Board but had been 
considered the principal commissioner of that board and once had authority 
in excess of the C(nptroller. However, even by the time of the 
Restorationo he was rarely attending Board meetings, having already 
established a separate office for the disbursement of cash. Prior to the 
move to Somerset Place, this had been in Broad Street. [177] 
Although, when originally established as an office of state, the 
Treasurer of the Navy had very real duties, these had slowly been 
discarded. In fact, by the end of the 18th century, the post was 
considered little more than a sinecure, with the former duties of the 
Treasurer undertaken by a senior clerk of the off ice and carrying the 
title Paymaster of the Navy. On occasions, the Treasurer might confer with 
the Paymaster, but little else was now expected of him. For this reason, 
and the fact that the Treasurer of the Navy was drawing, by the end of the 
18th century, an annual salary of A000, it was a much sought after post. 
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Yet, sinecure or not, serious problems could sometimes arise for the 
postholder. For Henry Dundas, the First Viscount Melville, who held the 
post from 1783 to 1801, failure to curb a series of questionable 
transactions carried out by Alexander Trotter, the Navy Paymaster, 
resulted in his having to defend himself against impeachment by the House 
of Commons. Trotter's activities were first revealed by the Commissioners 
of Naval Enquiry in their tenth report. This showed that the Paymaster, 
who had family connections with Coutts Bank, had opened a series of 
accounts in his own name, placing large sums of navy money into these 
accounts and profiting from the accrued interest. On one occasion, so the 
commissioners reported, a sum of Ilm was deposited into these accounts. 
While the Navy had, at no time, suffered a loss, such speculation was 
deemed unacceptable. That Henry Dundas, as Treasurer of the Navy, was 
drawn into the controversy, resulted from the possibility of his being 
aware of these transactions. Furthermore, the fact that Dundas had 
borrowed money from Trotter, money that might well have been drawn from 
public funds, did little to strengthen his position. With the 
opposition baying for his blood, he was forced to resign from his recently 
acquired post of First Lord but his impeachment ended with his 
acquittaL[1781 
The most accessible breakdown of the duties and internal organisation 
of the Navy Pay Office exists in the form of the 4th Report of the 
Commissioners on Fees. Examining the workings of the Navy Pay Office 
between February and May 1788, the report showed that the Pay Office was 
then divided into five separate areas of administration. These were the 
pay Branch, Navy Branch, Victualling Branch, Accountants Branch and 
Inspectors Branch. [1791 
Largest of theseo consisting of seven clerks at Somerset Place 
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and six additional clerks at the cut ports, was the Pay Branch. Adding 
to its importance was the fact that It was headed by the Deputy Paymaster, 
the second most senior effective off icer employed within the Pay Office. 
This branch was responsible for paying the wages both of seamen and 
dockyard workers. For the purpose of paying seamen, this was carried cut 
at Portsmouth, Plymouth or Chatham, by those clerks stationed at these cut 
ports, or at Somerset Place. At the latter, seamen would present 
themselves on one of four days of the week set aside for this purpose. 
To draw their wages they had to produce signed vouchers that confirmed 
their eligibility for payment. This voucher would then be checked against 
the ship's pay book which had previously been sent to Somerset Place from 
the ship upon which they had once served. [180] 
As for the Navy and Victualling branches these were really 
extensions of the two civilian boards. Both branches were headed by a 
cashier and, between them, employed an additional ten clerks. These two 
branches were responsible for the payment of all bills assigned by the 
Navy and Victualling Boards with money to be paid released by the cashier 
of the relevant department. [ 1811 
The Accountants Branch was responsible for bringing up the accounts 
of former Treasurers while going on to make up the accounts of the 
Treasurer in off ice. Over the years, this was a task that had fallen 
behindhand, with the clerks of the Accountant's branch in 1788 still 
working on the books of Treasurers who had held office some twenty years 
earlier. [1821 That this should occur was partly a result of the 
peculiarities of naval accounting procedures. When a Treasurer left 
office all ship's books had to be transcribed anew. However, the process 
of clearing the accounts of an earlier Treasurer could not begin until the 
last ship was paid off. To take one example, that of Lord Grenville, it 
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was not until 1771 - nine years after he resigned the Treasurership - that 
the last shirs books from his period of off ice, were ready for 
clearing. [183] While a Treasurer's books lay uncleared, his cash balance 
invariably remained within the hands of that Treasurer. In 1780, for 
instance, the heirs of Lord Falkland, who had lef t off ice in 1689, were 
held accountable for the truly staggering sum of 
127,61le However, 
attempts were underway to bring the accounts of former Treasurers more up 
to date, with the Accountants Branch temporarily expanded for this 
purpose. [ 18 41 
The final branch, the Inspectcrs, consisted of only an inspectcr and 
his assistant. It was the business of this branch to inspect and examine 
all wills and powers of attcrney made by seaman, ensuring that they were 
cometly executed. [1851 
of the recommendations made by the commissioners for improvements in 
the running of the Navy Pay Office, the most important related to the 
anomaly of having the Treasurer of the Navy as a sinecurial post while 
most of the work was undertaken by the Paymaster. At the time of 
presenting their report the commissioners were unaware that the Paymaster, 
Alexander Trotter, was beginning his nefarious practice of investing large 
sums of public money. Deeming him, and his office, to be one of trust, 
they reommended that his salary be increased from 
t5OO to fBCO per annum. 
As for the Treasurer of the Navy, they indicated that he might I)e 
otherwise usefully employed in the service of the state-. In other words, 
the office should either be abolished or the holder of the post, in 
receipt, as he was, of such an exalted salary, be required to perform 
duties elsewhere. [1861 
Apart from an eventual reduction in the size of the Accountant's 
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Branch as a result of it having brought accounts more up to date, few 
changes occured within the Navy Pay Office until the wars with France had 
finally been brought to an end. Then, with the, emphasis on economy, 
further thought was given to the huge salary paid to the Treasurer. The 
Finance Committee of 1817 recommended that this should be decreased to 
t3OOO. The government, in agreement with the principle, not only accepted 
the recommendation, but reduced this salary to t2DOO. In order to 
produce further savings, the government also permitted the office of 
Treasurer to be held conjointly with the Presidency of the Board of Trade. 
However, this was not considered a permanent arrangement. Graham, in 
March 1829, put forward the motion that, as the Treasurership of the navy 
was then vacant, the entire salary might be saved, 'without violatioa of 
any existing engagements' ' if the post was permanently amalgamated. Among 
those who opposed the motion was Robert Peel. He claimed, on the 
same occasion, that Vesey Fitzgerald, who then held both posts, was 
unable to undertake the immensity of work thrown upon him, and had fallen 
ill as a result. [1871 
The Tories, under Wellington, during their final months of office, 
did make one significant change to the office of Treasurer. Rather than 
carry forward the Whig suggestion of amalgamation they 'abolished the 
effective office of Psymaster". [ 1881 As a result, the Treasurer was 
forced to perform those same duties, some of which were deemed, to be 
-below the rank of the officer holding such a position'. [1891 Leastways, 
that was the view of Charles Pailett-Thomson, the Whig appointee to the 
post of Treasurer of the Navy, expressed to the House in February 1831. 
paLlett-Thomsoa also went on to observe that the Tories had taken the 
worm possible course of action, blaming it upon their 'anxious desire' to 
retain patronage. However, once the Whigs had gained office, they 
undertook the change which they had sought when in opposition, appointing 
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Pculett-Thomson both Treawrer of the Navy and Vice Presi&nt of the Board 
of Tradej 1901 
Of course, given that the Treasurer of the Navy now had expanded 
duties and that one of his predecessors, Fitzgerald, had been unable to 
handle two posts combined, it is interesting to note that Poulett-Thomson 
had no reservations in this area. In answering Peel's claims in that 
earlier debate, Poulett-Thomson informed the House that ýit was within the 
power of one individual competently to discharge the duties of those 
offices', [191] At the same time, Poulett-Thomson also presented a useful 
summary of the duties of the Treasurer as they existed in 1831. These, so 
he indicated, consisted of 
general supervision of all that passed in 
his office - of an examination into the 
accounts, and of the warrants ... His 
duty was also to examine the balances, and 
to check the mode In which the accounts were 
kep, t. [ 1921 
The Whigs, themselves, took responsibility for expanding the duties 
of the Navy Pay Office when, in January 1831, they consolidated the Marine 
Pay office with the Navy Pay Office. Both these branches of the Admiralty 
service, prior to this change, had carried out very similar duties, with 
the marine Pay Office simply disbursing wages to another branch of the sea 
service. [1931 As a result, consolidation led to considerable saving of 
time and effort, with the clerks of the combined departments not only 
paying the seamen of a particular vessel, but also the marines who 
served alongside them. Under this re-arrangement, the combined office of 
Paymaster and Deputy Adjutant of Royal Marines was dispensed with, the 
then holder, Sir James Cockbnm, appointed to a new post of Inspector 
General. [1941 This, in effect, was the military side of his previous 
post, with Cockburn ceasing to have any further connection with the 
disbursement of cash. However, in order to secure proper auditing of cash 
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payments a new post, that of Paymaster of Marines, was established. 
Designated as an appointment within the Navy Office, the appointee, 
William Robinson, a former chief clerk in the Marine Pay Office, received 
a fixed annual salary of 
1400. [1951 
As fcr the Navy Civil Departments Act of 1832, both the Treasurer 
of the Navy and the Navy Pay Office were retained. However, the latter 
was considerably re-structured, allowing ten clerks to be retired and 
fourteen transferred to the new Acccuntant-Generars department. [ 196] The 
Pay Off ice continued to disburse payments to contractors, dockyard 
workers, seamen and marines but the work of inspecting wills, letters of 
attorney and other documents was transferred to the newly 
created Acccuntant-Generars office. In addition, for the purpose of 
alleviating the Treasurer of the Navy of some of his more tedious duties, 
a Treasurexýs Assistant was appointed. Placed on an annual fixed salary 
of 1800, this appointment fulfilled that earlier Whig desire of having 
both a Paymaster and a dual office Treasurer. [1971 
1.6 The Ordnance Board 
Althcugh, technically, the means by which the Royal Navy received 
its military stores was not part of the civil administration of the navy, 
frequent reference throughout the rest of this thesis will, of necessity, 
be made to the Ordnance Board and its attached office. This particular 
Board was responsible for the supply of guns and other weapons to the 
Navy. As such, it was an independent administrative authority that could 
trace its origins back to the 14th century and the Wardrobe of Arms. [1981 
Apart from an overall responsibility for the supply and upkeep of the 
83 
familiar smooth bore cannons and carronades carried by each and every 
warship as it left harbcur, the Ordnance Board also took similar 
responsibility for the carriages, upon which these pieces of ordnance were 
mounted, together with the shot and shell that they fired and the powder 
used to f ire these same missiles. Finally, it was the function of the 
Board to supply all gun crew implements as well as pistols, swords, 
muskets and boarding pikes used by sailors and marines alike. 
However, simply to dwell upon stores issued to naval warships would 
be to give a very incomplete picture of the duties of the Ordnance Board 
as they existed in 1830. In fact, the Board had a much wider range of 
activities which, when taken as a whole, completely overshadowed these 
purely naval duties. First, and foremost, the Board was responsible for 
the supply and maintenance of a similar range of military stores for 
use by the Army. Furthermore, and here it is useful to borrow a few 
sentences from the select committee on f inance that scrutinised the 
activities of the Board towards the end of the 18th century, the Board 
defrayed 'the Expense of the Corps of Artillery, Corps of Engineers, and 
other Military Corps attached to the Ordnance Service; and also the Charge 
of repairing and building Fcrtif ications., at Home and Abroad; excepting 
Field Works Abroa(r. In addition, so the report continues, the Board 
oversaw the payment of 'all contingoent expenses attending Ordnance Stores, 
as well as Camp Equipage for the Artilleryý. [1991 While these various 
duties continued to be performed in 1830 the Board had, since the 
publication of that report in 1797, also acquired responsibility for the 
maintenance and upkeep of Army barracks and for the supply of stores to 
convict establishments in the various penal colonies. [2DO] 
Given that the Board of Ordnance had a distinct military and civil 
role, it is not surprising that this was reflected in the way that the 
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department was crganised. The Board, itself, was made up of fcur members 
and had, at its head, the Master-General of Ordnance. The holder of this 
post was frequently of cabinet rank and always an illustricus soldier, 
with this ofice held by the Duke of Wellington between 1826 and 1828. The 
Master General in 1830, following the formation of Lord Grey's government 
in November, was the Rt Hon Sir James Kempt. [2011 
Despite his taking precedence at Board meetings, the Master General 
was rarely to be found in attendance. This was as a result of his duties 
being entirely directed towards the military aspects of the Boards work 
while his three colleagues concentrated on civil matters. To make up for 
the Master General's non-attendance at these meetings, a considerable 
corr spondence ensued, with the Master General having to be informed of 
all decisions taken. According to Sir James Kempt, when examined by the 
Commissioners Appointed to Inquire into the Civil Affairs of the Army in 
February 1836: 
The Master-general may preside at the Board 
if he pleases, but his office is distinct 
from that of the Board ... The Board is 
only executive in conjunction with the Master- 
general; all letters and orders are issued in 
the name of "The Master-Veneral and Board; " and 
as the supreme power is placed in the Master- 
general: 's hands, I certainly considered myself 
responsible for the department. [2021 
However, the cacrespondence between the Board and its head was very 
much'a one way prooess. While the Board had to keep the Master-General 
informed of all its decisions and alter these in the light of any comments 
he might make, this did not apply in reverse. matters of a military 
nature were not discussed or commented upon at Board meetings: 
the Master-General attends the Board 
only on special and very rare occasions, but 
all its proceedings in the form of minutes are 
regularly submitted to him for his approval, 
and are subject to his control. His authority 
is supreme in all matters, both civil and 
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military, and he is considered responsible for 
the manner in which the department is generally 
conducted. [ 2031 
The Board of ordnance, exclusive of the Master-General was, at 
the beginning of 1830, composed of five principal officers: the 
Lieutenant-Genera. It the Surveyor-General, the Clerk of the Ordnance, the 
Clerk of Deliveries and the Principal Storekeeperj 2041 However, in 
November, with the change of ministry and the appointment of Sir James 
Kempt, the posts of Lieutenant-General and Clerk of Deliveries were 
abolished. Meeting, usually three times a week, in their London 
office, which was situated in the Tower, the re-constituted Board 
continued to be responsible for civil business. According to the 
Commissioners inquiring into the civil administration of the Army, the 
class of business for which they had particular responsibility was 
reported in 1837 to be: 
.. of very great extent and importance; 
t comprehends in the first place, with 
regard to the Ordnance corps, the greater 
part of that business which, as relates 
to the rest of the Army, is transacted in the 
War Office; as for instance, the examination of 
pay lists and accounts, the decision of all 
claims by Officers to pensions for wounds, to 
compensate for the loss of horses or baggage, 
to command money, and to allowances for passages, 
and in lieu of lodgings and servants, &c. But 
by far the larger part of the civil duties of 
the Board of Ordnance have reference to matters 
concerning not merely their own particular 
branch of the military service, but the whole 
Army and even the Navy. Arms, ammunition, and 
military stores of every description (including 
Sans and carriages for the Navy) are supplied 
by them to both services ... The construction 
and repair of fortifications, military works and 
barracks, is another large branch of the business 
of the department ... [205] 
of course, it was not the principal officers themselves who 
undertook all this work. They merely took, after written consultation 
with the Master--Generalp the necessary executive decisions. As with the 
Admiralty and Navy Boards, the Ordnance Board also had a large office of 
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clerks at its disposal, this office headed by a secretary who also 
attended Board meetings in a non-executive capacity. The Ordnance office, 
in 1830, consisted of a little over TO clerks, each of them serving 
one of the various departments into which the Ordnance Board was dividedL 
The principal officers themselves, apart from their executive role 
at Board meetings were also responsible for the running of these 
individual departments. This organisational framework was to prove of 
particular significance during the period in which thought was given to 
the Admiralty reforms of 1832. The Finance Committee, set up in 1827 
reported favourably on this method of governing the Ordnance Board: 
jt. 
e 
. and considered that the system 
mployed might well be followed in other 
branches of the administration. [2D61 
In referring to this, Hogg, in his study of Woolwich Arsenal, notes that, 
this proposal did not pass unnoticed by 
Earl Grey's cabinet in 1831, and the 
scheme for consolidating the varicus 
departments of the Admiralty adopted by 
Parliament followed the Ordnance model. [237] 
Despite Hoges pronouncement, it should be remembered that the Navy Board 
had already -adopted a similar system of individual departmental 
responsibility in 1829. It seems just as likely, therefore, that the 
successful introduction of this same system within the soon defunct Navy 
Board would also have had some bearing upon reforms eventually introduced. 
In terms of handling naval ordnance, each of the principal officers, 
together with the branches that they headed, became involved during 
different stages of the overall process. The Surveyar-General, who was 
responsible for the surveying of stores, and ensuring that all labouxers 
and artificers employed by the Board, undertook their wark efficiently, 
had a general responsibility for the manufacture of ordnance. This was a 
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facet of the Board's work that has so far gone unmentioned. By 1830, the 
31 acre site of the Woolwich Arsenal, developed for the manufacture of 
ordnance in the early 18th century, had become a massive centre for the 
production of items of ordnance that included gun carriages and cannons 
for use on board warships. Althcughv at the beginning of 1830, the number 
of workers employed at Woolwich stood at only 700, this number had been 
dramatically reduced from the 5,000 that had been employed within the 
Arsenal in 1814. [2081 
As well as the Arsenal at Woolwich, further centres of manufacture, 
and overseen by the Surveycr-General, existed at Enfield Lock and Waltham 
Abbey. Established in 1811, the Enfield f actcry concentrated upon the 
production of small arms, some of these eventually destined for use at 
sea. At Waltham Abbey, the Ordnance Department had a factacy fcr the 
manufacture of gunpowder. Since the end of the Napoleonic Wars, other 
manufacturing sites had been closed, these including a gunpowder mill at 
Faversham and a second small arms establishment at Lewisham. 
However, not all military supplies were produced within the Ordnance 
manufacturing departments. Large numbers of naval guns and other items 
were also purchased directly from private manufacturers. The advertising 
of tenders, issuing of contracts and final payment was the responsibility 
of the Clerk of the Ordnance. This office holder was also responsible 
for drawing up all estimates for the supply of stores to warships and he 
assisted in stocktaking in relation to ships. Finally, he kept receipts 
for all payments made in connection with the naval gun wharves. 
The Principal Stcrekeeper had overall responsibility for ordnance 
when in store. His main concern was directed towards the arsenal at 
Woolwich, tut additional arms were also stored in the ordnance wharves at 
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at Portsmouth, Plymouth, Chatham and Sheerness. At one time the Principal 
Storekeeper had, together with the Clerk of Delivery (who had been 
responsible for inspecting new stores) been jointly respobsible for the 
receipt of stores. However, upon the abolition of the latter office the 
principal storekeeper had gained greater responsibility within this 
area. [2091 
Undoubtedly there were considerable advantages in having one 
organisational body responsible for the supply of military equipment to 
both the Army and the Navy. Most important, perhaps, was that of economy. 
At this time, the large pieces of ordnance used on board warships 
were identical to those used on land. A 32-pcunder smooth bore cannon, 
the gan upon which the Admiralty had determined to standardize, was 
exactly the same product whether on board ship and mounted on a sea 
carriage or taken to a fcrt and mounted on a land carriage. This allowed 
such guns to be manufactured on the same site and by the same group of 
skilled workmen. It was certainly a situation that existed within the 
arsenal at Woolwich, the Ordnance Board not having to employ a duplicate 
set of artisans for the needs of the two services. This same advantage of 
economy also worked for the manufacture of gunpowder at Waltham Abbey and 
small arms at Enfield. Although with regard to the latter, it should be 
noted that seamen were usually issued with a different pattern of musket, 
generally shorter, while that issued to the Marines was of an identical 
pattern to that received by the Army. [210] 
The saving of costs did not just end with the advantages to be 
seen within the manufacturing departments of the Ordnance service. Guns, 
and other military stores, when acquired under terms of contract, were 
also likely to be cheaper with the existence of just one board. The Clerk 
of the Ordnance, when tenders were requested by advertisement, was 
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undoubtedly offered materials at lower prices because of the great number 
of items required. Furthermore, it seems likely that a system which 
encourag-, d separate tendering for both Navy and Army ordnance might have 
resulted in a degree of competition with one of these organisations 
probably forced to pay a higher price than the other in order to fulfil 
their requisite needs. An example of this had certainly ocan-red during 
the American Revolutionary War. During that period the costs of hiring 
ships for transport had been artificially inflated by the Navy and 
ordnance boards and Treasury competing against one another for the limited 
number of transports then available. This problem was eventually solved 
by the formation, in 1794, of a separate Transport Board responsible for 
the hire of all shipping regardless of whether it was required for the 
transport of troops, guns or victuals. [2111 
However, despite the considerable advantage of economy, the 
disadvantage for the Admiralty appears overwhelming. In particular, the 
Navy was reliant for its supply of guns upon an organisation more or less 
totally dominated by the Army. All Board members, from the Master-General 
down, were selected only from among serving Army officers and rarely had 
any seagDing experience. As regards the basic gun, this was not a problem 
until the later years of the 19th century. [212] The difficulties that 
arose concerned various associated items such as the carriage and 
flintlocks. 
The most appropriate method for mounting a gun on a seagoing warship 
waild appear to be some fcrm of slide mount as used by the 
carronade. [213] This had the advantage of providing a controlled recoil 
rather than the unpredictable movement of the gun when mcunted on the 
standard sea carriage with trucks (or small wheels). [214] Referring to 
the latter type of sea carriage, Lavery states that, 
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because it was mounted on wheels, it could 
be highly dangerous if it broke loose. There 
was no effective way of bringing it slowly 
to a halt, and it tended to stop with a sharp 
jerk when the breech ropes were fully 
extended. The direction of its recoil was 
unpredictable, especially on a rolling and 
heaving deck, and this could be dangerous 
to the unwary seaman. It was not very 
efficient mechanically, for it was 
restrained too near its rear, and this probably 
caused it to jerk violently near the end 
of its recoil. [215] 
Lavery, for one, believes that the failure to introduce a better carriage 
was a possible reflection of this division between the Admiralty and 
Ordnance Board. He goes on to state: 
.. any other type of carriage would have been a permanent fitting in the ship, 
but the truck carriage was easily removable, 
and could be taken into the Ordnance stcres 
when the ship paid off. [2161 
However, Lavery does further add: 
Perhaps it is not safe to make too much of 
this last advantage [the carriage being easily 
removable], for other naval powers used the 
truck carriage as much as the British, and 
only in Sweden, where the innovating genius 
of Chapman was applied to the task, was 
there any real movement towards its 
replacement on the main deck guns of ships 
of war. [2171 
It also seems likely that this division of responsibility between 
the two boards also held up other developments. The flintlock 
is, perhaps, one further example. Although officially introduced into the 
Royal Navy in 1790, its adoption was partly delayed by the lack of 
importance attached to the device. The flintlock was the means by which 
powder in the vent of the gun could be more systematically ignited than by 
the use of the more traditional quick match. That the Ordnance Board 
would not have considered the flintock to be of overwhelming importance 
would have resulted from Board members having a lack of experience in the 
rolling of a ship when at sea and the effect of this movement upon the 
elevation of a gun and its subsequent accu acy. However, it must also be 
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pointed out that the device, as originally recommended by Sir Charles 
Douglas of the Royal Navy in 1778, was initially rejected by the Admiralty 
itself. The argument regarding the disadvantage of divided responsibility 
still holds true however. Divorced, as they were, from guns and gunnery 
on board warships, the Admiralty had, as a result, less interest than it 
should have done in the development of the naval gun. 
Other disadvantaEr-s in the existence of a system in which one group 
was responsible for the supplying gans to another were highlighted by Sir 
John Barrow, second secretary to the Admiralty, when giving evidence 
before the Committee appointed to Inquire into the Civil Departments of 
the Army. On being asked, 'How are the ships armed? ' he replied: 
After a ship (built for a particular class, 
to carry so many guns) is to be commissioned, 
we desire the Board of ordnance to put so 
many guns on board for the lower, upper and 
quarter decks, according to her intended 
armament; their orders are accordingly sent 
down to their off icers at the port where the 
ship may be, and they are in time put on 
board; but it happens very frequently that 
when they come on board the carriages will 
not fit the ports, or something is amiss 
with them, and we are obliged to write again; 
probably they have to be taken cut of the 
ship and sent back to the gun-wharf; all 
this occasions great delay. There is a vast 
deal of correspondence carried on with the 
Ordnance Office on trifling subjects; for 
instance, if a bolt or hinge happens to be 
wrong in one of the carriages, our people 
on board must not alter it, but we must 
write to the Ordnance to desire them to 
write down to their officer at the gun-wharf 
to have it put right, which also adds to the 
delay. [2181 
A further problem was brought to the attention of this same Commission by 
Captain the Hon George Elliottp a member of the Board of Admiralty and a 
former first secretaryg when he was examined: 
The complaint in the Navy is that the 
Ordnance department are not so well aware 
of the fittings that are required for 
guns, and more particularly for slide 
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carriages, which require great nicety, as 
naval men would be; and for not understanding 
the exact reason for wishing to have 
altertions, or wishing to have them fitted 
in a peculiar manner, they are apt to 
disaprove of those things; Lut they never 
show their disapprobation by ultimately 
resisting in any way ... [2191 
To the question 'Then you do not find that there is any great practical 
inconvenience from the present system? ', Captain Elliott went on to state: 
It causes delay, certainly, as will be 
easily understood when I explain, that if 
anything is required, if a naval officer 
applies for any peculiar mode for fitting 
his guns, or for any other thing that has 
to do with the ordnance department, he 
makes his application to the Admiralty; 
the Admiralty send that letter to the 
Ordnance, requesting that it may be 
complied with; the Ordnance write down 
to their officer to carry it into 
execution, who is not always aware of the 
exact manner in which it should be done, 
and that frequently causes a correspondence 
back and forwards four or five times before 
it is set to rights. Then another thing is, 
that the the gun-carriages entirely depend 
upon the Ordnance, whereas the fitting of the 
ports, and of every other part of the ship 
connected with the gun, depends upon the 
dock-yard; so there are two sets of people 
working with opposite plans or upon opposite 
ideas, and that frequently leads to trouble 
and difficulty. [220] 
A possible separation of ordnance administration between the Amy 
and Navy was clearly on the minds of the commissioners when they further 
asked Elliott for his views on allowing the Admiralty responsibility for 
the 'fabrication' of sea carriages. Acccrding to Elliott: 
It would remove a great portion of the 
difficulty, tut not the whole ... 
the mode of fitting locks, powder cases, 
and a variety of things, in which a great 
many alterations and improvements have 
been made of late years; and when all these 
things are undergoing improvement in the 
Army, they are more apt to think that the 
same things would suit us than we are. [221] 
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As for the Admiralty entirely gaining responsibility for its own 
ordnance, this question was directed to Henry Duncan, naval member of the 
Board of Ordnance, by the commissioners sitting in 1833. His reply, 
similar to that given by a number of ordnance personnel more directly 
associated with the Army, was damning in its rejection of such a notion: 
I think it would be a very injurious 
thing to the economy of the country and 
to the benefit of the service if the 
separation were made, because the supplies 
of naval ordnance stores, being in a great 
degree similar to what we use, it would 
involve two sets of stores, and two sets 
of persons to take care of them, and more 
would be kept up than requisite; for 
example - at present, at Gibraltar, a 
ship may be supplied from the guns of the 
place, for they are exactly of the same 
construction as those used for the sea 
service. The separation, therefore, would 
involve a much greater quantity of stores 
to carry it on in a regular manner, and the 
services would always be borrowing and 
lending. [222] 
In the end, the commissioners in this same repcrt, decided to skate over 
the entire issue: 
Upon the whole we are inclined to 
believe that it will be better 
.. to leave this matter to be 
settled between the two departments 
[Admiralty and Ordnance Board]; as 
we think that if there is good 
understanding between them, there 
can be no difficulty in coming to 
such an arranEpment as will best 
suit their mutual convenience, 
taking as the principle to be 
observed., that each should afford 
as much assistance to the other, so 
as to avoid the creation of double 
establishments and double stores 
for an object common to both, and 
that in all cases the expense of 
arms or stores required by either 
service should be borne upon its 
own estimates even when supplied by 
the other. [223] 
The difficulties in having a separate Organisation responsible for 
the supply of naval guns were not entirely restricted to matters presented 
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by those giving evidence to the above Commission. A particular problem 
was generated by the necessity of siting the ordnance wharves (necessary 
for the storage- of guns) immediately adjacent to the dockyards themselves. 
As a result, later expansion of these dockyards was frequently hindered by 
the need to acquire or build around the ordnance wharf. Admittedly, this 
would have been a problem even if these facilities had been supervised by 
the Admiralty. However, the fact that they came under the authority of a 
distinct and separate body often prevented the easiest pathway to 
expansion being followed. 
ý -At Devonport, the construction of a steam yard, between the years 
1846 'and 1853, was greatly hindered by the Ordnance department. In 
particular, the steam yard itself had to be built some distance from the 
main yard, due to the Board of Ordnance wishing to retain those facilities 
already in existence. Furthermore, although the Ordnance did agree to 
re-position some of its gun powder magazines, so creating the site for a 
new basin, the agreement was so long in being reached that the entire 
project for a steam yard was subsequently delayed. 
Matters were even worse at Sheerness. Here, the Ordnance Board 
possessed one of the few areas of land upon which the dockyard could 
expand. As a result, the strategic value of Sheerness was to remain 
somewhat limited throughout much of the 18th century. Eventually, a 
determined effort to expand the yard, during the f irst three decades of 
the following century, resulted in an agreement by which the gun wharf 
would be re-located on land owned by the Admiralty at the northern end of 
the dockyard. Even so, this did not prove to be an end to the entire 
matter. Lengthy correspondence, between the Ordnance and Navy boards 
subsequently develcped over the exact boundary that would divide the 
dockyard from the gun wharf. In fact, so protracted was this later 
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difficulty that it even threatened to delay completion of the massive 
project to rebuild the dockyard at Sheerness. Indeed, this was the point 
raised by Sir T. Byam Martin in a letter written to the Ordnance Board in 
March 1825: 
It is of great impcrtance that these points 
(the setting of a boundary and the Wilding 
of a wall for partition purposes) shculd be 
speedily decided on by the Board of Ordnance, 
in order that the contractors may not have 
just cause to complain of being delayed in the 
execution of a wcrk which they are bound to 
complete in a given time. [2241 
An eventual termination to such difficulties were only trcught about 
towards the end of the 19th century when the Admiralty gained eventual 
control of its own ordnance. That such a move was f inally deemed 
essential was because of the changing nature of naval and army ordnance, 
with such weapons no longer of sufficient similarity as to be 
interchangeable between the two services. Prior to that move however, the 
ordnance Board, itself, had been abolished in 1855. The immediate result, 
much to the annoyance of the Admiralty, was that procurement of all guns 
was placed under Army supervision. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
THE BACKGROUND TO REFORM 
one useful point of entry for undertaking an analysis of the events 
that resulted in abolition of the navys civilian boards is that of giving 
consideration to the individuals primarily responsible for bringing about 
this change: John Jervis, Earl St Vincent (1725-1823) and Charles, 2nd 
Earl Grey (1764-1845). Outwardly, these two men appear to have had little 
in common. While St Vincent was of relatively humble background, 
eventually achieving fame as a naval commander, Grey was born into the 
riches of a landholding family and pursued an entirely political career. 
However, there were points of important similarity. For a start, they 
were both faithful to the Whig cause, supporting certain selected 
principles through both thick and thin. While St Vincent had endangered 
his naval career, refusing to take arms against those who sought 
independence for North America, Grey had stuck rigidly to the issue of 
reform at a time when desertion of the cause appeared to be expedient for 
the majority. Furthermore, and of gceat importance for the future of the 
civilian boards, both served in the capacity of First Lord of the 
Admiralty. [11 
In bringing to a conclusion the long established tradition of having 
boards separately responsible for procurement and strategy, St Vincent was 
to prove himself the instigator and Grey the man who carried it through. 
The formert a man of strong views and autocratic temperament, trought to 
the Admiraltyl during his term of office, an excessive dislike of all 
those associated with the management of the navy's civil affairs. This 
hostilitYp combined with heavy handed efforts to impose a series of 
reforms, eventually led to a complete breakdown in communication between 
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himself and the naval comptroller Sir Andrew Snape Hamond. Of such 
gravity was this breach, occurring at a time when the navy was being held 
in readiness for a likely renewal of hostilities following the Treaty of 
Amiens, that it was not only brought to the attention of parliament, but 
became a central plank in Pitt's attack upon Addington's ailing Ministry. 
Although Fox, and his fellow-Whigs, held no particular brief to support 
Addington, such increasingly vitriolic attacks ensured their entry into 
the battle, the cause of naval reform consequently becoming part of the 
Whig political armoury. 
Having entered the political arena, the whole future of the navy's 
civilian boards was to depend entirely upon the declared persuasion of 
those groups holding office at any point in time. Upon the f all of 
Addington and the return of Pitt, the future of these boards was 
temporarily secured. Any thoughts directed towards abolition, to which St 
Vincent had certainly given attention, were beyond the realms of 
feasibility under such circumstances. However, the eventual demise of 
those civilians boards was ensured by the appointment in 1806 of 
Grey to the office of First Lord. This took place during the short-lived 
administration of the 'Talents', with Grey also having his share of 
difficulties with the inferior boards. That experience, according to at 
least one biographer, was the reason for his decision, upon the emergence 
of a Whig administration in 1830, to oversee, through his appointee, the 
amalgamation of the civilian boards into that of the Admiralty. [21 
At the heart of the problem was the differing terms under which 
members of the superior and inferior boards were nominated. While those 
appointed to the Admiralty only held office at the behest of the prime 
ministery those selected to sit on the civilian boards had the security of 
a life time tenure. Further explanation of this point howeverp appears 
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unnecessary as it has already been dealt with in an earlier section of 
this thesis. For St Vincent, this arrangement was to prove disastrous. 
Upon his arrival at the Admiralty, in February 1801, his own hostility 
towards those who controlled the workings of the inferior boards was not 
eased by most of them having been appointed by Pitt and only removable if 
proved to be incompetent. [31 On the other hand, as a result of 
Addingtonýs compliance, St Vincent was able to bring to the Admiralty a 
devoted team of supporters. His sea lords, both of whom had served under 
him during the blockade of Brest, were Sir Thomas Troubridge and John 
Markham, while the civilian lords were Sir Philip Stephens, the Hon 
William Eliot and Wil-liam Garthshcre. Of later signif icance, was the 
appointment of Benjamin Tucker as his private secretary. Tucker having 
also served under St Vincent, for many years his clerk while at sea. [41 
St Vincent, as newly appointed First Lord, had already shown 
himself to be concerned with the need for economy within the civil sphere 
of naval operations. Additionally, he had a fervent desire to bring about 
improvements in the general operational efficiency of the dock and 
victualling yards. In a series of letters to Lord Spencer, his predecessor 
as First Lcrd, he had indicated numerous areas of inefficiency and how 
they might be alleviated. These letters were written while St Vincent was 
cff icer in command of the Mediterranean Fleet and indicated a belief that 
failures within the civil departments were hindering the speed with which 
ships were returned to the Fleet. At the heart of this failure, so he 
frequently declared, was the existence of widespread corruption within 
these same departments. During the Summer of 1797, St Vincent infcrmed 
Lcrd Spencer that considerable changes were necessary and that, 
IE all the clerks in the Dock-Yards were 
dismissed, with annuities, payable on one 
condition only, 'that they resich f if ty miles 
from any Dock-Yard', the public would benefit 
exceedingly. [51 
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To this he added, just a few weeks later, 
Ycu may rest assured, the Civil Branch of 
the Navy is rotten to the core. [61 
Upon first taking up the appointment of First Lord, St Vincent went on to 
infcrm Filmer Honeywood, soon to be elected member for Kent, that 
.. *I will endeavcur by the exertion of all 
my faculties to eradicate the numberless abuses 
which have crept into every department of the Navy, 
civil and military, and to prove myself a faithful 
servant to the Nblic ... [7] 
At this same point in time, St Vincent intimated to Collingwood the 
difficulties that lay ahead, 
In my endeavours to restore the Navy, In all 
its branches, to that vigour which can alone 
maintain cur superiority at sea, both in arms 
and commerce, it is no small encouragement that 
I can safely calculate upon your support and 
that of all honest men like you. There is much 
to do, and a late attempt of my great Predecessor 
[Spencer] meets with every species of opposition 
and obloquy, I mean 'a partial reform in our Dock- 
Yards' and comparing small things with great 
(which must come or we are all ruined) I shall 
have a very difficult task to perform, if I 
preside at the Board in time of Peace ... [8] 
At the outset of his campaign, which coincided with the Treaty 
of Amiens, so making his task possible, St Vincent took the correct and 
proper course of instituting a full inspection of the civilian-run 
facilities. Among reasons for this move was that of allowing both himself 
and other members of his newly appointed Board of Admiralty a more 
detailed understanding of the workings of these facilities. 
Furthermore, it also allowed them to confront many of the perceived 
failings first hand. However, this planned 'visitation' was to be unlike 
any of those witnessed during the preceding decades. Whereas Sandwich, in 
particular, had attempted to wock with the civilian boards, often seeking 
to gain their confidence, St Vincent pursued a course that could only 
lead to confrontation. Instead of formally seeking approval, he 
merely informed the commissioners of the inferior boards, that the 
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hospitals, dock and victual-ling yards waild be inspected. Additionally, he 
took the most unusual step of directly communicating with the dockyard 
commissioners at Chatham, Portsmouth, Plymouth and Sheerness, informing 
them that they should have various accounts laid cut and ready for the 
visiting committee to inspect: 
Secret and confidential. I desire you will 
take immediate measures for securing all the 
Books of the Checque, Survey, Storekeeper and 
Master Shipwright's Offices, containing the 
accounts of Timber and Stores of every 
description received, converted and issued, 
between the lst January 1793, and 30 June, 
1801; all Books or Papers containg the 
Measurements of Works performed by Contract: 
all Job and Task Notes: the Master Smiths' 
Books, stating the Works performed by the 
Smiths, the quantities of rough Iron 
received from the Storekeeper, and wrought 
Iron delivered; the receipts of Hemp to be 
included and the clerk of the Rope Yard's 
accounts of the Work performed by the 
Rcpemakers, &c., and the Cable and Cordage 
delivered to the Storekeeper; also all the 
Books kept by the Master Attendant 
containing accounts of Sails received and 
issued, or any other matters in their 
depar; ment. [9] 
Although it was not unusual for the Admiralty to open a line of 
correspondence with the dockyard commissioners, the nature of such 
communication was frequently of a routine nature and rarely involved a 
direct instruction. After all, the yard commissioners were Navy Board 
appointees and directly responsible to the inferior Board. [ 10] 
Instructions of this nature, by long established tradition, were 
communicated first to the Navy Board, from whence the instruction would be 
re-issued to the yard commissioners. In choosing to write diretly to the 
yards, and prefacing the letter ýsecret and conf idential', St Vincent was 
clearly gailty of giving insult. Apart from the suggestion that he did 
not wish the navy commissioners to know of his instructions, it also 
implied that had he used the normal channels of communication, the 
instruction wculd have been delayed, altered or simply ignored4 
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As for the visitation itself, this was originally planned for May 
1802. However, the holding of a coinciding general election resulted in a 
deferring of this date. Apparently, St Vincent was concerned that many of 
those connected with the yards might turn against the government if his 
reform plans were given undue publicity at that particular point in 
time. [10] In a letter to his former flagship captain and fellow Whig 
George Grey, St Vincent explained with referne6e to the civilian facilities k 
that 'the reforms which must take place in them would have operated 
powerfully against the interest of Government in all Western 
Borcughs. '[11] As a result, the long awaited inspection of the yards did 
not take place until late-Summer, with the following explanation of its 
purpose set cut in an Admiralty Board minute that was written on the day 
of the visiting committees departure: 
The Lards taking into their consideration the 
extraordinary Expences in the several Dock 
and Rope Yards, beyond what was known in any 
former period of War, in proportion to the 
number of ships employed; and having received 
Reports from various quarters of flagrant 
abuses and mismangement existing in the several 
departments, which there is reason to believe 
is but too well founded: and being determined, 
as far as in them lies, to discover and remedy 
the same, do judge it expedient forthwith to 
visit all His Majesty's Dock and Rope Yards, to 
examine into the conduct and ability of the 
officers, the sufficiency of the Workmen, the 
condition of the Ships and Magazines, together 
with the Works carrying on, in order that such 
Reforms and Improvements may be made as shall be 
found advisable to prevent an unecessary expend- 
iture of the Public Money; to see that the 
several rules and orders for the government of 
the Yards are duly enforced, that the ships 
and vessels of the Royal Navy are kept In constant 
readiness for service, and that the money granted 
by Parliament for keeping up the same is wisely 
and frugally expended; and they think proper to 
direct that the Comptroller and 3 other members 
of the Navy Board do attend them in their 
visitation. [121 
The members of the committee of inspection left London on 20 AuEpst 
1802, returning to the capital at the end of September. During a period 
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of Just over five weeks they visited all six royal dockyards together with 
the nearby victualling yards, hospitals and marine barracks. As can be 
easily imagined, this was an immense undertaking, resulting in many of 
these huge complexes receiving only a cursory glance. Indeed, fatigue 
would have been a further factcr militating against overall thoroughness, 
with committee members missing far more than they would have seen. 
However, St Vincent and his fellow Board members had already determined 
upon certain priority areas with a reduction in the size of the work force 
at these establishments a major target that could be fulfilled on the 
spot. 
Upon arrival at the various naval facilities, the civilian work 
force was mustered and those who gave the appearance of being too frail to 
perform work tasks were selected for dismissal. Those who had been 
employed for a suitable length of time, or had been injured while in the 
service of the civilian boards, were allowed superannuation but sane, 
inevitably, were thrown on to the parish. At the inspection of the naval 
hospital at Plymouth on 30 August it was noted that several of the nurses, 
"though not many years in the Hospital, appear to be aged. [ The 
committee] Gave directions that the regulation, which orders that none 
should be entered above the aEp of forty-five years, be strictly attended 
to, and that a preference be given to Widows of Seamen. '[13] A separate 
group of dismissals was also undertaken at Sheerness, this being a group 
of caulkers who had failed to comply with an earlier Admiralty instruction 
to remove themselves to the Thames-side merchant yards for the purpose of 
f J. Uing the places of striking caulkers. [14] The issuing of instructions 
for the dismissal of workmen was an important aspect of the aggressive 
policy now being pursued by St Vincent. While Sandwich and Anson, in 
their time, had used the visitation to achieve reductions in the civilian 
workforce, they had only submitted recommendations to the Navy Board. St 
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Vincent, for his part, was going much further, with members of the 
visiting committee themselves validating the dismissals. 
In matters other than that of numbers employed, members of the 
inspecting committee tended to restrict themselves to making a variety of 
observations that were later forwarded to the respective boards. At 
Chatham, for instance, it was noted of the victualling yard 'that no 
Commissioner of Victualling has visited the Yard since December 1799' 
while the poor state of cleanliness of the slaughterhouse was considered 
'offensive'. [15] As always however, St Vincent's venom was sharpest when 
it was directed towards the Navy Board. In particular, he was concerned 
that the Board should strengthen the role of the yard commissioners, 
ensuring that the holder of this post was given greater responsibility for 
overseeing the activities of the principal yard officers. To this end the 
visiting committee expressed concern at the treatment of Commissioner 
Fanshawe at Plymouth: 
The Canmissioner having stated some Orders 
which had been given to the Navy Board, 
which tended to lower him in the eyes of 
the Officers of the Yard, and to weaken 
his authcrity: the Navy Board are directed 
to communicate all Orders and Instructions, 
and Regulations, for the internal. management 
of the Dock Yard, to the Commissioner only, 
by whom they are to be made known to the 
infericr Officers, and on all occasions they 
are to strengthen his authcrity, by which 
alone a proper subcrdination in the department 
can be preserved, and responsibility made to 
attach. [161 
At Sheerness, Admiralty members of the visiting committee showed 
themselves to be impressed with Isaac Coffin, the resident commissioner of 
the dockyard. They appeared to have viewed him as an ideal, going on to 
highlight some of the corrupt practices which he had uncovered since his 
appointment in 1797. The report indictated that prior to his arrival at 
the yard 'every irregularity ... was committed and connived 
ill 
at. '[17] In particular, Coff in had obtained the dismissal of both the 
Master Smith and the Master Shipwright. The former, so Coffin soon 
realised, had not been in the yard for many years although he had 
continued 'to draw his pay. As for the Master Shipwright, he had been 
receiving large sums of money for allowing repairs to be carried out 
within the yard upon private vessels. [181 Of equal importance, was 
Coff in's discovery that many of the artisans and labourers were receiving 
overtime payments, known as 'extra' for work that was never performed. 
It is clear that St Vincent already had in mind something much 
greater than the correction of the various shortcomings uncovered during 
this cursory five week inspection. From Plymouth, during that August, he 
had written to Addington on the need for an investigative commission: 
my time has been fully occupied ; 
ince'my arrival at this place where we 
f Ind abuses to such an extent as would 
require many months to go thoroughly into, 
and the absolute necessity of a Carimission 
of Enquiry to expose them appears to the 
Admiralty Board here in much stronger light 
than ever. [191 
In addition, it also appears that St Vincent was giving thought to 
the creation of an intermediaery body that would exist between the 
Admiralty and the civilian boards, its purpose being that of providing 
greater control over the latter. It was an issue highlighted, in 
November 1802, by the London 'Times', 
A new Board of Control is, it seems, 
likely to be established as a kind of 
medium between the Board of Admiralty 
and the Navy, Victualling, and Sick 
& Hurt Offices. The new Board of Control, 
it is said, is to consist of two Naval 
Oficers, two Gentlemen of acknowledged 
experience in public business, and two 
Gentlemen of the Law. The measure, it 
is understood, has been particularly 
recommended by Earl St. Vincent. [201 
Howeverg this proposed scheme came to nothing, with attention only 
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given to the establishment of the Commission of Enquiry. 
The setting up of such a commission which was to look, in detail, at 
matters connected with naval administration was not, in itself, something 
entirely new. In fact, this particular commission could be seen as a 
natural outgrowth of the earlier Commission on Fees. As a body, this 
earlier commission had given its attention to the various gratuities paid 
to those holding public office, with separate reports devoted to the 
Admiralty Office, Navy Board, Dockyards, Treasurer of the Navy, Sick and 
Hurt office, Transport Board, the Victualling Office and its various out 
departments. Furthermore, the same commission had not simply been 
restricted to the payment of such fees, but had also been directed to 
report 'such observations as shall occur to them fcr the better conducting 
and managing the business transacted' in the various offices examined. [211 
Subsequently, in 1797, Pitt had suppcrted the establishment of a 
parliamentary Select Committee, known as the Select Committee on 
Finance, to look into public finance. Once again various naval 
departments were subjected to examination, with the select committee, 
finally producing thirty-six reports, of which three of them were directed 
towards naval administration. [ 221 
Markham, when introducing into the House of Commons the bill that 
would eventually see the establishment of the Commission of Enquiry, 
referred to both the Commission on Fees and the 'Select Committee on 
Finance. Of the first, he stated that the new Commission was simply a 
revival of that earlier body while he made a point of quoting a passage in 
the 31st Report of the Select Committee in which pledges were made that, 
upon the return to peace, the Board of Admiralty wculd inquire into 
albuses in the civil departments of the navy. However, as the report of 
his speech indicates, the Board of Admiralty could not, at that moment: 
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... undertake the matter them- 
selves because they had sufficient 
business on their hands to occupy their 
time entirely; and this matter would 
require a very laborious investigation. [231 
As to the need for this commission, Markham was further repcrted to have 
said that, 
He had been with the present First Lord of 
the Admiralty in his late visitation of the 
several Dockyards of the Kingdom; and they 
had witnessed such scenes of plunder and 
Ibusiness on their hands to occupy their 
time entirely; and this matter would 
require a very laborious investigation. [241 
The bill was to receive royal assent on 29 December 1802, with the 
appointed commissioners undertaking their enquiries from the begining of 
the new year. Within parliament, opposition to the establishment of the 
commission had mainly centred upon the extensive legal powers with 
which the commissioners had been armed. However, some of this criticism 
was assauged by adoption of a clause, inserted by Lord Chancellor Eldon, 
that permitted those called to give evidence, 'the right to refuse to 
answer when their answer was likely to incriminate them. ý It was an 
amendment with which St Vincent was less than happy. In his later account 
of this period of off ice at the Admiralty he strongly condemned this 
weakening of the commissioners' powers, indicating it to be entirely 
inconsistent with the way in which such matters were handed elsewhere: 
whereas it is not only the practice, but the 
distinctive qualifying feature and character 
of equity, and of its administration in the 
Court of Chancery in particular, that every 
man can be examined in his own cause, and 
compelled, upon his oath, and under the 
penalties of perjury, to disclose and account 
for whatever he may have in his possession, 
without a just title to retain it. [251 
Between May 1803 and June 1806, the commission was to produce a 
total of fourteen highly critical reports that encompassed a wide area Of 
naval administration. [261 The first report, for instance, looked at 
accounts belonging to the naval storekeeper at Jamaica while the last was 
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directed towards an examination of the affairs of the Royal Naval Hospital 
at Greenwich. Among the most important however, was their third report 
which examined a series of glaring abuses long undetected by the Navy 
Board, committed by the holder of the coopers' contract at Woolwich 
dockyard. As a result of the investigation, those perpetrating the frauds 
were prosecuted, receiving a combination of fines and various terms of 
imprisonment. Of even greater signif icanoe perhaps, was the commission's 
second report which looked at the administration of the Chatham Chest. 
Again, past frauds were investigated, while for the better administration 
of Chest funds it was recommended that it should be amalgamated into 
monies held by the Greenwich Hospital. This recommendation was to be put 
into effect by the Chatham Chest Act of 1803. [27] 
In Parliament, the new year witnessed even gceater attention 
directed towards the activities of St Vincent at the Admiralty and the 
deteriorating relationship between the superior and inferior boards. In 
particular it was noticed that the Admiralty was frequently overriding the 
advice of the civilian boards. Over the matter of dockyard reductions, 
the Navy Board, fearing that the period of peace might only be temporary, 
had strongly opposed the pruning of numbers that had occurred during the 
previous years visitation. In January 1803 however, official relations 
between the Navy Board and Admiralty broke down altogether. The issue, on 
this occasion, was that of the Admiralty's insistence that, for the 
purpose of economy, no orders should be given to merchant yards for the 
building of third rate ships. Instead, they were all to be built in the 
royal dockyards, St Vincent wishing to reduce the power and strength of 
the merchant yards: 
Were there a fair competition between the 
Merchant Builder and the Kin& Yards; 
were there anything like honesty, either 
in the terms or the performance of these 
contracts - there would exist no objectioa 
to having recourse to them as of ten as the 
royal slips should prove insufficient to 
the demand of shipping which the Admiralty 
might make upon them: but, if recourse be 
had wantonly to them, without necessity, 
and for the mere motive of conciliating a 
great body of interest to the political 
measures of the day, it is impossible for 
any system to be invented more corrupt, 
and prejudicial to the state; more pernic- 
ious to the royal Dock-Yards; more fatal to 
the safety and independence of the Navy. [281 
While Hamond at the Navy Board might have agreed with the principle 
he could certainly not agree with the reason which was used to provide 
justification. Once again it implied gross negligence on the part of the 
Navy Board. On this occasion commissioners were not only accused of 
a1lowing such contracts to be signed but also of providing an insufficient 
check upon government work subsequently performed within these yards. An 
attempt by the Navy Board to circumvent St Vincentýs decision, which had 
been communicated to them verbally, resulted in his insistence that, for 
purposes of preventing 'any further misconceptions' on this and other 
subjects, all future communications would have to be undertaken in 
writing. [291 
Such problems between the Admiralty and Navy Board could certainly 
have been minimised during any period of guaranteed peace. However, the 
rapidly deteriorating situation with France, leading to a re-cpening of 
hostilities in May, meant that the ability of the dockyards to work with 
maximum efficiency, and reliance upon merchant yards, were of paramount 
importance. Nevertheless, Addington continued to support his colleagues 
at the Admiralty, while the 'Old Opposition, led by FOX and Grey, also 
came to the defence of the First Lord. On 19 May 1803, the future First 
Lord and Prime Minister, Charles Grey, in making a motion for 
supplementary papers deemed necessary for a forthcoming debate on defence, 
paid great tribute to the work of St Vincent. -The Times' In reporting 
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the speech, quoted Grey as saying: 
Such was his opinion of the Noble Lord, that 
he had no hesitation in saying, if he did 
not procure for the British Naval Force a 
decided superiority in all quarters of the 
world, over the face of cur enemies, he would 
deserve every punishment that could be inflicted 
upon him. When he spoke thus much, he spoke 
with a perfect conviction of what the Noble 
Lord was capable of doing. [301 
In replying, Addington stated himself 
as ready as the Honble. Gentleman [Grey] to 
vindicate the Noble Lord, who presides 
with so much honcur to himself, and advantage 
to the country, at the Admiralty Board. He 
should ever feel himself happy in paying every 
tribute of respect and praise due to the 
great, aspersed, and injured character, against 
the falsehoods and calumnies that had of late 
been so industriously raised and circulated 
against that great and excellent man, who would 
soon be able to prove to the world that, 
instead of the penurious system with which he 
was stated to be starving cur marine, we shall 
have a naval force that was never so great an 
overmatch for all the world as it is at the 
present moment. [311 
A particularly f ierce debate erupted in mid-June 1803 as a 
consequence of Whitbread's motion that the minutes of the 1802 dockyard 
visitation shaild be laid before the Hcuse. Designed to give St Vincent 
every chance to defend his tenure of office at the Admiralty, it merely 
extended the debate with Hamond demanding the right of the civilian boards 
to defend themselves against the various accusations that were being made 
against them. According to the 'Times': 
Sir Andrew Hammond (sic) said that the Board 
of Admiralty deserved great praise for the 
attention with which they made the investigation 
[into the dock and victualling yards]: and 
they had sat no less than six or seven hours 
every day fcr that purpose. But he was 
sorry to inform the House, that from the 
moment they came into power there had been so 
strong a prejudice, that it was impossible to 
go on as things now stood. Many matters were 
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changed from what they were fcrmerly ... The Navy Board and Victualling Board were 
desirous of the matter being tried. These 
Boards shculd be heard in their justification. 
It was surely fair to do so, and fcr them to 
have a copy cf the Report [cf the Visitation]; 
then let them be called on to make their answer 
to it. [321 
With increased liklihood of the war with France being renewed, the 
debate over St VincenCs crusade against the civilian departments took on 
a new significance at the beginning of 1804. Members of both Lord 
Grenvillers 'New Opposition' and the supporters of former premier William 
Pitt were in agreement that the ability of the navy to retain supremacy at 
sea was now severely jeopardized. In particular, they viewed with alarm 
developments in the dockyards, noting that severe reductions in the size 
of the workforce had undermined the ability of these yards to keep pace 
with the demands of mobilization. [33] In addition, the embargo upon 
merchant yards undertaking new construction work had resulted in few new 
vessels joining the fleet. At the same time, separate attempts to improve 
the quality of materials delivered into the yards had resulted in conflict 
with some of the suppliers. Of marked importance was the rejection of 
large amounts of timber as sub-standard while elsewhere supply contracts 
were cancelled. [341 Although the actual objectives were difficult to 
criticise, it did result in a general depletion of stores, causing further 
problems for the repair and refitting of warships. 
Among those drawn into the debate was Pitt himself. For a time, 
following his departure from office, he had remained aloof from party 
politics, only returning to the Commons in May 1803. Even then, this 
opposition to the gc)verning administration was less than total, Pitt 
refusing to condemn the government during a vote of censure in 
june. However, by the beginning of the new year his attitude had altered. 
No more was he prepared to tolerate the continuance of the Addington 
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administration, mounting a series of blistering attacks upon the 
government. In particular, he chose to dwell upon the situation at the 
Admiralty, turning this into a major political issue. At the end of 
February, for instance, Pitt threatened that should he subsequently gain 
office then be would 'institute an enquiry into the conduct of the 
Admiralty'. [351 This, however, was nothing when compared with a far more 
personal attack, conducted in March, upon the character of St Vincent, 
indicating him to be -less brilliant and less able in a civil capacity 
than in that of a warlike one. [361 
It is significant that in the second of these two debates, Pitt 
chose to emphasize both the composition and strategic positioning of the 
fleet rather than that of problems associated with the dock and 
victualling yards. Such a change of direction would appear to suggest 
that the former premier was now less concerned with specific issues and 
wished to use St Vincent as a means of bringing down the government. 
Certainly, J. S. Tucker, the nephew of St Vincent's private secretary, 
believed that an ulterior motive existed. In putting his thoughts down on 
paper, Tucker indicated that party warfare had selected St Vincent's 
ýnaval administration for the point of assault upon Mr Addington's 
cabinet; because Lord St Vincent was its chief support. ' In the event, 
PiWs condemnation of the Admiralty on that latter occasion proved 
unsuccessful, the government securing a majority of 71 votes. That Pitt 
was able to achieve power only six weeks later was not a result of such 
deep laid plans, but of Addington's indecisiveness. 
With the debate over naval administration having clearly entered 
the political arena, it now became an issue that wculd not disappear. The 
-()Id opposition' under Fox and Grey had given considerable support to the 
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principles espoused by St Vincent and would not lightly neglect the issue 
if given further opportunity. Pitt, on the other hand, might not wish to 
see it remain on the agenda, but was in no position to terminate the 
debate. Primarily, this was because of the continuing work of the 
Commission of Enquiry, Pitt not daring to bring the wcrk of the 
commissioners to an immediate end. Such a decision would have weakened 
his own newly installed administration with accusations made that he was 
fearful of what they might yet uncover. However, the existence of such 
a body was not altogether healthy, designed as it was to search cut only 
maladministration and the existence of corrupt practice. From this point 
of view, it lacked a positive aspect, unable to replace that found to be 
at fault with something more efficient and less open to corruption. Only 
with the establishment, in January 1805, of the Commission for Revising 
and Digesting the Civil Affairs of the Navy, was this put to rights. 
Inaugurated by Pitt, this was a much more positive body that worked on 
implementing reforms rather than criticising that which was already in 
existence. In essence, this new body was to revise the directives for the 
management of the civil departments, giving special attention to ýthe 
system and mode of accounting for the receipt and expenditure of monies 
and stcres'. [371 Completing its work some three years later, the 
vast majority of its recommendations were adopted, bringing a degree of 
reform that was only to be matched by the Whigs upon their return to power 
in 1830. 
However, it was not simply the continuance of St Vincent's 
Commission of Enquiry together with the setting up of this new commission 
that ensured the civil departments of the navy remained an important 
political issue. Frequent attacks continued to be made upon St Vincent's 
handling of the civil departments with an interesting letter to be fcund 
among the helvi1le papers, in which a correspondent to the new 
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First Lord claims that if St Vincent had remained in office 'six months 
longer, cur navy would have been ruined. '[38] Melville, for his part, was 
also keen on keeping the debate going. In May 1805 he expressed surprise 
at how 'the Noble Lord could think of dropping all communication with Sir 
Andrew Hamond, and yet retain him as Comptroller of the Navy. ý St 
Vincent, for his part, was not slow to rise to his own defence, 
participating in several parliamentary debates and finally producing his 
own 'Memoirs- of his period in office. [39] 
The debate had far from settled when, in January 1806, following the 
death of Pitt, the 'Ministry of All the Talents' arrived in office. No 
attempt was made to re-appoint St Vincent to his former post, although he 
was provided with a vote of thanks for his work as First Lord and 
appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Channel Fleet. Instead, the post of 
First Lord was given to Grey, a man who had already shown interest in 
improving the efficiency of the civil boards of the Navy while counting 
himself one of St Vincentýs friends. [401 Also appointed to the Board 
of Admiralty at this time were Admiral John Markham, Sir Charles Morice 
Pole and Sir Harry Burrard Neale, all of whom had been closely associated 
with St Vincent's campaign against the civil boards. A31 three continued 
to serve on the Board following Grey's removal to the Foreign Office with 
the new First Lord, Thomas Grenville, brother of Prime Minister Lord 
Grenville, hesitant over the retention of Markham. On 4 October 1806, 
while in the process of selecting his new Board he wrote, 'I am still 
quite at a loss for a sheet anchor, and wish Markham had not made so many 
enemies, for in zeal and quickness of resource he seems to me to have 
great merit ý. [411 
As for Grey, he was to hold the post of First Lord for no mcre than 
seven months, a re-shuffle of the Cabinet being fcrced as a result of the 
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death of Charles Fox in September 1806. Fcr this reason, combined with 
his time in office coinciding with an unremitting war, he was unable to 
biring about changes in the running of the civilian administration. on the 
other hand, he was still confronted by many of the problems that had 
confounded St Vincent, not least was the existence of an unco-operative 
Navy Board. As a result of this brief experience, so it is generally 
agreed, Grey gave considerable attention to the civil departments of the 
navy, eventually determining that reform of the administrative 
infrastructure wculd result in only limited improvements. Ins tead, Grey 
turned his attention to the future abolition of the civil boards, 
possibly utilizing a plan that was suggested to him by St Vincent. [421 
Returning, for a manent, to the years in which St Vincent held 
office as First Lord, it is wacth considering some of the possible motives 
that he might have had for setting up the Commission of Enquiry. There 
is, of course, the liklihood. that he simply wished to highlight and remove 
I- various shortcomings that he perceived to exist within the civil 
departments. Alternatively, having come to see the Naval Comptroller, Sir 
Andrew Hamond, as a bulwark of conservatism and opposed to the kind of 
reforms that St Vincent favoured, then he might have been seeking an 
indirect way to force him from office. But this seems a most 
improbable scenario. As well as seeing Hamond as an opponent, St 
Vincent also appears to have believed him to have been both unreliable 
and inefficient. If this was the case then Charles Fox, in parliamentary 
statement, indicated an easier pathway that might well have been trodden, 
that of removing Hamond directly from office: 
There might be many cases where the Lords 
of the Admiraltyt or any person in high 
situations, might discover a total 
incompetency in those they employed, and 
might even have strong suspicions of 
their integrity ... [in such cases] 
it was the duty of the Lords of the Admiralty 
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not to employ in the public service persons 
who were unf it to be employed. This was a 
principle which delicacy to Individuals 
should never allow them to depart from; 
otherwise they might go on with unfit 
persons, squander the public money in 
injudicious contracts, and place even the 
security of the country in greatest 
hazard ... 
[ 411 
A final possibility, and one that appears most likely, is that St 
Vincent, having ensured that the commission consisted of those with 
similar views to his own, expected it to reveal the civil board in such 
bad light as tofocus attention on possible abolition. [42] For 
evidence of such a possibility, reference may be made to a statement by 
William Marsden, Second Secretary in the Admiralty during this period. 
According to him 'to crush them [the inferior boards] was the object of 
the bill and the frauds in the dockyards was only a pretext. ý[43] if St 
Vincent did wish to see an end to the Navy Board, then he was not the only 
member of the Admiralty to be so inclined. His own appointee, Markham 
also favoured. such a course of actionj 431 
Regardless of St Vincentos real motives, his term of off ice clearly 
paved the way for future abolition of the civil boards. By turning the 
whole issue into a political maelstrom, he ensured that any future Whig 
government would have to consider the precise future of the civil boards. 
Not only had mainstream Whigs, in supporting St Vincent, had been forced 
to turn themselves against the Navy Board, but those on the other side of 
the House had been provided with a similar need to defend i t. 
Furthermcrep coming to power, as they eventually did in 1830, af ter a 
period of two decades in opposition, the Whigs found themselves confronted 
by civilian boards appointed in full, by administrations to which they had 
been opposed. For this reason, regardless of Crey's experience in 1806, 
extensive changes to the organisatioa of the civil departments would need 
to be high on the political agenda. 
123 
Following the downfall of the 'Talents' in 1807 the long absence of 
any form of Whig government provided the necessary infrastructure for the 
Admiralty and the infericr boards to develop a more harmonious working 
relationship. Primarily this resulted from the lone-term 
hegemony of one political group, so presenting Portland, Spencer, 
Liverpool and Wellington, with commissioners favourable to policies 
pursued by each of those successive administrations. However, it would 
be wrong to assume that, even given this important factor, those who 
composed the civilian boards were in complete agreement with all 
instructions presented to them. Despite one group having political 
dominance, the Whigs in opposition were not without impact. In 
particular, they brought about a degree of discontinuity between the 
Admiralty and civilian boards as a result of a series of well orchestrated 
campaigns to enforce government economy measures. Such attacks not only 
galvanized their own supporters but also drew considerable sympathy from 
those who normally voted with the government. To blunt these attacks, the 
ruling administration was forced to review its own future spending 
programmes, with the navy among those departments that bore the brunt of 
any resulting economies. Predictably, this created a degree of 
dissension, with the commissioners of the civilian boards using many of 
the traditional ploys that had been used in the past to prevent the 
Admiralty from successfully enforcing such demands. 
Potentially, however, the period most likely to see controversy 
was that which followed the 'Talents' losing office. Although this 
particular administration held power fcc only fourteen months, the two 
successively apppointed First Lords, Grey and Grenville, were In a 
position to appoint several navy and victualling commissioners, including 
the Navy Comptroller# Sir Thomas Boulden Thompsonj 44] Appointed in June 
1806, Thompson could easily have introduced a policy of non-co-cperation 
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or have used his position to malign those currently in power. That he did 
not choose to do so was due, in part, to his having been drawn from those 
least committed to the Talents, while showing an overwhelming concern to 
ensure that the nation was in a fit state to combat the French upon the 
high seas. In addition, however, Thompson was aware that those holding 
power still possessed a good deal of patronage that might benefit him. In 
particular, as Navy Comptroller, he had been removed from the list of 
sea officers. This was quite normal; Comptrollers being drawn from the 
navy lists had, upon appointment, to forego both the opportunity of 
further naval promotion and the right to claim half pay. This, for 
Thompson, must have been particularly irksome. He had not only served 
successfully at sea, but had reached a position of considerable seniority 
on the captains' list and was eligible for early promotion to flag rank. 
As a result, and through his own desire to cD-operate with Mulgrave, the 
First Lord, Thompson, while continuing as Comptroller, was not only 
returned to the list of sea officers but was also allowed promotion to 
Rear Admiral in 1809. [451 
Another likely source of friction between the superior and inferior 
boards was that of a personality clash between the Comptrolle and First 
Lord. This, of course, might be totally unrelated to politics, with the 
Comptroller appointed by one First Lord on bad personal terms with his 
successor, even though all of the individuals concerned were committed to 
the same political cause. While the potential for such a situation 
existed prior to the return of the Whigs in 1830, it was offset by the 
arrival at the Admiralty of the 2nd Viscount Melville in March 1812. He 
was to remain First Lord until May 1827, returning to office for a second 
period that lasted from September 1828 until Grey took office as Prime 
Minister in November 1830. During those seventeen years, the longest 
period of service of any First Lord, he was in a position to ensure that 
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the personnel who made up the Victualling and Navy Boards were entirely to 
his liking. Indeed, by 1822, he had personally overseen the appointment 
of all the professional officers of the Navy and Victualling Boards, 
leaving only a few commissioners of a clerical or business background 
pre-dating his own appointment. 
Most important was the selection of Sir Thomas Byam Martin for the 
post of Navy Comptroller. He was to hold office for thirteen years under 
Melville, taking up the appointment upon the retirement of Thompson in 
February 1816. The choice of Martin as Comptroller was to prove most 
fortuitous. The two were apparently able to co-cperate on most issues and 
there was never a sign of a major break or serious conflict. This is not 
to say however, that the two men were always In agreement. Areas existed 
that would almost certainly produce problems. They included the differing 
attitudes normally held by a government minister and a civilian 
comptroller. While the former had to take Into account existing economic 
constraints, the latter was only concerned with the precise needs of the 
fleet. Given, then, that the main issue of that period was one of economy, 
then it was inevitable that the two men would disagree as to the 
appropriateness of planned cuts, with Martin unrelenting in his efforts 
to see the Navy estimates held at the highest possible level. 
one of the earliest discussions with Melville over the issue 
appears to have taken place at the beginning of 1817. During a private 
conversation, Martin indicated that he was discontented with the sum 
proposed to be made available in the forthcoming estimates to be submitted 
to Parliament. He indicated that on his figures this amount woLad be 
exceeded by 1464,592, despite purchases excluding 'any article of Store 
except Timber". [461 
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At the beginning of the following year, with a further round of 
naval cuts under consideration, Lord Liverpool chose to make a direct 
approach to Martin. He suggested that the most appropriate means to 
reduce expenditure might be that of cutting the number of ships scheduled 
to be repaired. This Martin was not prepared to accept. In reply, he 
pointed out, quite correctly, that large numbers of ships had recently 
returned from the war and any delays in carrying cut necessary repairs 
would only result in their rapid deterioration and mounting costs for the 
fu ture. [ 471 It was a point to which Martin had made reference in the 
previous years 'Annual Report on the State of the Navy, indicating that 
many of the returning ships so far taken into dock 'were found much more 
defective than could be ascertained while they were afloat. -[48) 
An alternative suggestion put forward by Liverpool was that of 
cutting back on the pace of work on large scale building projects at 
Chatham and Sheerness dockyards. This was also rejected by Martin: 
The new docks at Sheerness and Chatham cannot 
be stopped or even delayed without great 
disadvantage and considerable remuneration to 
the contractors who have undertaken the work - 
it would therefore be necessary to grant an equal 
sum for the works in 1819 as in the present 
year. [ 491 
Alternative areas for making economies were, however, suggested by Martin, 
the Comptroller proposing that all work might be brought to a temporary 
standstill with regard to the construction of new ships. In addition, he 
also suggested the ordering of fewer naval stores during the forthcoming 
year. [501 
A further area of disagreement centred upon the numbers Of workmen 
employed within the dockyards. While Martin did give his approval to some 
very considerable reductions, he still wished to retain as many skilled 
artisans as possible. Given that it was of particular importance to 
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curtail the wage bill, he chose to limit possible earnings by reducing the 
number of hours permitted to be worked. This allowed Martin to retain 
many of those who might otherwise have been dismissed, the Comptroller 
believing that it would be better in the event of war to have these 
skilled artisans on hand, rather than conduct an urgent recruiting 
campaign. However, this did not prove to Melville's liking. Following an 
enquiry into the state of the dockyards that was undertaken in 1822, 
members of the Board of Admiralty became very concerned at the degree of 
over-inanning. Martin was called upon to correct the situation, with 
the Board of Admiralty no longer believing itself to be in a position to 
ýsanction longer continuance of the existing system' and requested that 
the yards q)e placed on a footing agreeable to the public interest-. [511 
In the event, it was one of the few disagreements between the two boards 
that was to enter into the public domain, with the ageing Earl St Vincent 
among those who chose to comment. He, as always, took a very independent 
view of the issue. In a private letter to his former secretary, Joseph 
Tucker, he attacked the administrators in a similar fashion to his ýif 
all the clerks were dismissed' letter of June 1797: 
I agree with you in toto as to the rapid ruin 
of the British Navy; instead of discharging 
valuable and experienced men, of all descriptions 
from the dockyards, the Commissioners and 
Secretaries of all the boards ought to be 
reduced to the lowest number they ever stood at, 
and the old system resorted to: one of the 
projectors of the present diabolical measures 
should be gibbeted opposite the Deptford 
Yard and the other opposite the Woolwich 
Yard, on the Isle of Sad Dogs. [521 
Melville made several attempts to persuade Martin to reduce numbers 
emnloyed in the dockyards. In May 1818, he su&r-sted a 20% reduction in 
dockyard wage levels. At the time of making this proposal, the First Lord 
not only wrote to Martin, but also to Sir Robert Barlow, the commissioner 
at Chatham Yard. In doing so he seems to have received some support, with 
Barlow both accepting the necessity for a reduced day wage while also 
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suggesting the introduction of lower levels of remuneration for those 
working at piece rates (known in the dockyards as 'task' and -job; ' work). 
Martin chose to oppose both ideas, believing that any cuts in the level of 
wages would prove, in the long run, quite disastrous. As he explained to 
Melville, the result wculd be dissension among the wark-force, the men 
seeing it as a 'breach of faith'. While nothing immediate might 
transpire, it was likely that the yard employees would 'retaliate when war 
shall again make us sensible of their consequence to the stateý. [531 As 
for the alternative proposal put forward by the Commissioner at Chatham: 
Our friend Barlow seems to think that if 
we have the right to keep the men in the 
yard ten hours we have an equal right to 
demand ten hcurs active hard labour on a 
scheme of Task, when the very report of 
the Commission of Naval Revision admits 
that the exertion of the men working by 
Task shall entitle them to earn half as 
much again, and in the merchant yards 
dcuble. [541 
Although these various differences in opinion have been 
highlighted, it must be made clear that at all times, there was no spirit 
of true animosity in these disagreements. Both the First Lcrd and Navy 
Comptroller were doing little more than protecting their respective 
preserves, each primarily concerned with the interests of the nation. As 
such, Martin was certainly not against all economies, he merely wished 
them to be appropriate to the situation. Fcr this reason, he devised a 
number of long-term schemes that were designed to create fairly sizeable 
future savings. Among these was a plan to standardize the design of 
warships, so making it unnecessary for dockyards to carry such a wide 
range of ships' fittings. It was a scheme put fcrward at the very 
begining of his entry into office, with first, second and third rates to 
be respectively built on the lines of Caledonia (120), 
_Canopus 
(90) and 
y22teux (74). [551 As for ship construction work, Martin believed that 
future savings might also be made if ships were built and repaired under 
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cover. This necessitated the construction of timber roofs over both 
existing slips and some docks, so providing protection for vessels when 
lying in frame. These huge coverings, which can still be seen at 
Chatham and Deptford, were expensive to build but did result in the 
construction of more durable ships. 
By far and away Martin's most imaginative scheme, and one that was 
not actually pursued until the present century, was that of allowing each 
dockyard to specialise in the wcrk to which it was best suited. Up to 
then, only Pembroke had a purely specialist role, the other yards 
varicusly sharing in the building, repairing refitting and fitting of 
ships. It was a system that had many drawbacks. For one thing, it was 
necessary for each of the dockyards to possess a complete range of st(res 
and specialised buildings together with a diversely skilled work-force. 
In the concluding paragraph of a lengthy submission to Melville, Martin 
indicated the particular specialism that he considered appropriate to each 
of the seven dockyards, 
Deptford is proposed as the great depot 
for stores, and for the Transport Service, 
Woolwich, Chatham & Pembroke as the principal 
building Yards & Sheerness, Portsmouth, & 
Plymouth as the great ports for the equipment 
of the Fleet, and their establishment be 
regulated accordingly. [561 
As well as proposing these schemes, Martin also approved various 
immediate economies. Of particular importance was an extensive cut in 
numbers employed, although as indicated, Melville wculd like to have seen 
something more drastic, with these cuts coming mainly from among the 
unskilled and those of the lesser trades. In addition, Martin also agreed 
to considerable reductions in the amcunt of materials held in the yards 
while ensuring that the stcrehcuses were better crdered. This was cf 
particular importance as, during the previous century, huge quantities of 
rope, sail cloth and timber were never used because of poor starage and 
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subsequent deterioration. 
Despite these various economy-seeking schemes that Martin willingly 
imposed upon the dockyards, the ruling administration continued to press 
for even greater reductions in financial outlay. Where possible, as 
already demonstrated, Martin would endeavour to co-operate. But there 
were other times when the demands, to his thinking, appeared so excessive, 
that it drove him to anger. one such occasion was in 1830 when the Duke 
of Wellington, fighting against an increasingly buoyant opposition in 
Parliament, wished to impose a further 10% cut on the overall naval 
budget. On this subject Martin wrote candidly to an old friend, Admiral 
Malcolm: 
We yield much too easily to a set of noisy, 
ignorant blockheads who make no discrimination 
between foolish and needless extravagance, & 
objects of vital importance to the interest and 
credit of the country: - but the thing, of all 
others, to me the most annoying is that they seem 
to forget that the safety & glory of England 
depends upon her naval strength, & her constant 
& ample state of naval preparation; & we shall 
perhaps (at no distant time) rue the day that such 
mischievious opinions prevailed. I shall, however, 
have the consolation to know that I am no party 
to such views or measures. [57] 
In selecting Martin as Comptroller of the Navy Board, Melville had 
made an extremely wise choice. That he was in a position to make the 
choice in the first place was no coincidence. Upon first taking up the 
reins of office in March 1812, Melville was confronted by a 
comptroller originally appointed by a Whig. This, for Melville, must have 
appeared extremely threatening. While the two might have been able to 
work harmoniously during war time, this might not be the case once the 
nation had settled into a peace time routine. Fortunately however, 
Thompson was both ageing and open to the possibility of retirement. In 
1816, therefore, he was persuaded to accept the less demanding post of 
Treasurer at Greenwich Hospital. In the meantime, Melville had already 
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looked around for a replacement. Having determined on Martin, he 
introduced him to the Board in December 1815. At that time Thompson had 
still to take retirement, eventually leaving the post in February of 
the following year. Martin, therefore, took the post of Deputy 
Comptroller, sharing this with the existing post-holder, William Shield. 
It was an arrangement that Martin appears to have accepted only with a 
great deal of reluctance. In a letter to Melville, and written in the 
third person, he indicated that 
Rear Admiral Martin feels highly grateful 
by Lord Melvilles desire to place him at the 
head of the Navy Board, and it is a situation 
he will look forward to with great satisfaction- 
and with an earnest wish to render himself 
useful to the public service, by an increasing 
application to the Duties of that Office. 
In respect to the situation of Deputy Comptroller 
which Lord Melville has been good enough to 
offer to Admiral Martin, until the other becomes 
vacant, he cannot but feel the strongest 
repugnance to the acceptance of an inferior 
station, and one which seems to lose its consideration 
in time of peace, when the duties of the 
Comptroller appear so much within the compass of 
one persons Executions. [581 
It was in this same letter that Martin raised a further point that 
was causing difficulty, this was the desire on the part of members of the 
Navy Board to remove Admiral Fanshawe, Martin's father-in-law, from the 
post of resident commissioner at Plymouth. Fanshawe, in earlier years, 
had been a friend and supporter of St Vincent, informing him of many of 
the abuses that he had found at Plymouth upon his appointment to that yard 
in 1790. It appears that those who made up the an'rent Board, including 
those appointed to the 'Talents' administration, did not really trust him. 
According to Fanshawe he was 'badly treated' although he 'endeavoured to 
discharge the duties- of his position in an efficient manner. [59] Over 
the years a fairly vitriolic correspondence had ensued, with Melville 
eventually called in to arbitrate. The situation codd not be allowed to 
continue, with Fanshawes retirement considered the only possible 
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option. [60] Although Martin did not hold the same political views as his 
father-in-law, he was concerned that certain assumptions might be made in 
the eyes of the public: 
Rear Admiral Martin has if possible a still 
stronger objection to the situation of Deputy 
Comptroller namely - that the arranEr-ment now 
in progress to give effect to the wishes of 
the Admiralty respecting Canmissioner Fanshawes 
retirement, wculd appear to the world as founded 
upon an agreement that Admiral Martin should. 
obtain the situation of Deputy Comptroller. 
And althcugh the Commissioners retirement, and Lcrd 
Melvilles obliging proposals to Admiral Martin 
have never been coupled or spoken of in any 
relative way, yet it would not be withcut much 
hesitation that Admiral Martin wculd take any 
step that could give ccuntenance to suspicion that 
he had gained an advantage to himself at the 
expense of one to whom he owes every feeling of 
attachment and affection; and under such 
circumstances he leaves himself in Lcrd Melvilles 
hands. [611 
In the event, the whole matter was to be resolved quite amicably with 
Fanshawe agreeing to retire upon the receipt of both a generous pension 
and the promise that his son, a commander in the navy, would receive 
favourable promotion. [621 
In view of these efforts in 1815 to remove the politically tainted 
Thompson and Fanshawe, it seems strange that, only two years earlier, in 
June 1813, Joseph Tucker had been appointed Assistant Surveyor with a seat 
on the Navy Board. As an individual, Tucker had once been favoured by St 
Vincent, his rapid promotion to Master Shipwright at Plymouth the result 
of this patronage. [631 Even more compromising, should Melville have been 
entertaining doubts as to the appointment of iroseph Tucker, was that his 
younger brotherv Benjamin, had been St Vincent-s -private secretary. 
Almost certainly, Joseph Tucker's appointment to the Navy Board during 
those first years of Melville's tenure , resulted from his undoubted 
abilities. Tucker had proved a most efficient Master Shipwright and to 
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pass him over fcr promotion would have been unfcrgiveable. Yet, in an age 
of patronage, the choice still appears surprising. Furthermcre, Martin 
was certainly to doubt the advisability of that original appointment when 
later political machinations by Whig supporters were to leave certain 
unanswered questions as to the trustwcrthiness of the Board's surveycr. 
In 1818, and coinciding with an aggressive Whig attack upon the 
government's ability to effectively reduce spending, members of the Board 
of Admiralty were presented with an apparently carefully researched and 
highly detailed document that questioned recent claims by the Navy Board 
as to the degree of readiness of many ships held in the dockyard 
'ordinary'. Although the actual writer of this document was Benjamin 
Tucker, the Surveyor's younger brother, it appears from subsequent 
evidence that St Vincent was also invclved. [641 In particular, he would 
have seen this as a good opportunity to discredit current members of the 
Navy Board while furthering his cherished ambition of exterminating the 
civilian boards. According to the submitted document, and based on 
material that Martin later claimed to have been removed from Somerset 
Place, many ships listed as seaworthy did, in fact require 'great' 
repairs. [65] Among vessels specifically listed was the appropriately 
named St Vincent. This was a 120--gun first rate warship that had been 
launched at Plymouth in 1814. According to Navy Board representations 
already made to the Admiralty, this vessel was fit for immediate and 
permanent service. However, Benjamin Tucker seemed to be in a position to 
claim that 
it is as notorious as that the Sun 
is abo; e the Horizons at noon, that she cannot 
go to Sea before she has undergone a very 
considerable repair: that in fact, the fastenings 
of her Deck have given way; - that the Beams are 
twisted from the Clamp, and the Clamps wrung from 
the sides; - in short that she is in such a state 
as no Ship of her class was ever seen before. [66] 
As for Joseph Tucker, he was seen as the individual who had supplied the 
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necessary details which appeared to show the inferior board in such bad 
light. Although he denied such involvement, his position became somewhat 
less tenable as a result of a statement he made to Melville fully 
supporting his brother's accusations. According to Comptroller Martin, 
Very soon after the receipt of the letter 
alluded to, Lord Melville sent for Mr 
Surveyor Tucker, and informed him of the 
representation that had been made by his 
Brother in the expectation that the 
Surveyor would, upon his Official knowledge 
at once satisfy his Lordship of the 
incorrectness of the report, but to his 
Lcrdship's disappointment, the Surveyor 
said "it is all very true and that he 
would send his Lordship some papers to 
convince him of it", and immediately 
forwarded to Lord Melville ... [various papers including] a list of 
thirteen sail of the line, which he declared 
to be unfit fot service. [67] 
While an attack upon the Navy Board by someone outside the system 
might easily be ignored, the apparent accuracy of the information combined 
with Joseph Tucker's supportive stance resulted in both Melville and 
Liverpool taking it all very seriously. Not surprisingly Martin felt it 
essential that all of Tucker's claims should be refuted and established a 
special committee for the purpose. Consisting of himself, together with 
Surveyor Robert Seppings and Navy Commissioner Percy Fraser, this 
committee began its task by summoning 'the three Master Shipwrights of the 
principal yards [Chatham, Plymouth and Portsmouth] to survey and report 
upon the condition of the Ships, except at their own Ports, when one of 
the other Master Shipwrights were to be called in. [681 They were given 
permission to open any ships they chose, 'to any extent they pleased' and 
to produce a full and frank report on their findings. [691 Although some 
problems were noted, especially with ships that had been hurriedly built 
at the tail end of the recent war, the three Master Shipwrights could f ind 
nothing that was in the least damning. As for the first rate St Vincent, 
one of the few ships specif ically named, the committee went to great 
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lengths to demonstrate the inaccuracies of Tucker-s allegations. Apart 
from the report of the Master Shipwrights, which showed her to be in scund 
condition, Admiral Lord Exmouth, the Commander-in-Chief at Plymouth was 
also asked to examine the vessel. Finally 
While the Ship was undergoing examination 
by the Shipwright officers the Earl of 
Liverpool, being then in the neighbourhood, 
desired to visit her, and accompanied by 
Lord Exmouth, We [Martin, Seppings and 
Fraser] had the honour to be present, when 
his Lordship looked very attentively at 
the part that had been opened, and expressed 
himself highly gratified by the evident 
soundness of the fabric . [701 
A second line of attack taken by Tucker and which the committee had to 
fend off concerned the approved naval estimates and how money voted for 
the repair and construction of certain ships had been transferred to other 
ships without seeking further approval. This is of particular interest 
as, in later years, and in a more developed form, it was to prove a 
central plank in Sir James Graham's attack upon the civilian boards 
shortly before their abolition. Whereas Graham was to be concerned with 
much greater capital sums, in particular amounts connected with building 
works within the naval dock and victualling yards, Tucker concentrated on 
this much narrower issue. In reply, the committee declared: 
Mr Tucker might have known that the Navy 
Estimates cannot possibly afford proof of 
the actual sum laid out upon any one Ship, 
because without departing from the Spirit 
of the Grant by Parliament the sums voted 
for particular ships must in many cases be 
applied to others; fcr instance, in the,, 
first vote for the Stirling Castle, of 7,180 
it was no doubt believed at the time of 
making cut the Navy Estimates, that such a 
sum wwld be expended upon her; but it might, 
and very probably did happen that the Ship 
which preceded her in Dock was delayed longer 
than was expected, and consequently that there 
was not time in the first year to expend so 
much, or any money upon that particular Ship, 
though the money voted was laid cut in an equal 
quantity of a similar description of work, and 
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therefcre in a manner conformaUe to the Spirit 
of the Grant ... 
[711 
Furthermore, so they added, it might sometimes be necessary to expend 
monies in emergencies when a vessel was found to be in need of repair and 
lilely ýto sink at her mooringso. [721 
The committee of enquiry did not merely restrict itself to the 
accusations of Benjamin Tucker but also with the extent to which Joseph 
Tucker, the Surveyor, might have been involved. The committee felt that 
much of the information upon which Benjamin Tucker drew was confidential 
and must have been passed to him by someone in the Navy Office. To this 
end they attempted to prove that the Surveyor had deliberately acquired 
papers for the purpose of passing them on to his brother. Referring to 
information respecting Agincourt, a third rate launched at Plymouth in 
march 1817, which Benjamin Tucker claimed to have been subject to 
unnecessarily rising costs, 
We must also remark that the document from 
which Mr Tucker must have collected his 
information respecting the Agincourt was 
one procured from Plymouth Yard, at the 
particular desire, and in consequence of a 
minute which Mr Surveyor Tucker presented to 
the Comptroller for his initials, who signed 
the minute, supposing that the statement was 
required fcr the Public Service, cr Mr. 
Surveyor Tucker's own infamation. [73] 
Elsewhere it was noted that Benjamin Tucker had been given access to 
documents that indicated the current capacity of the yards for Wilding 
and repairing ships. When Tucker indicated that the yards on average 
cculd ýtuild and give repair to Eight sail of the line a year", the 
committee felt itself in a position to conclude that, 
this statement of Mr. Tucker's accords with 
the Navy Board's report, which, from its 
subject, is of ccurse considered secret, and 
in the progress of our remarks, it wi. U be 
evident that in other instances, as weU as 
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this, he must have had direct reference to 
secret documents. [74] 
In consequence of this conclusion, Martin demanded of Melville, that 
Tucker should be dismissed. However, for his part, Melville appears to 
have been less than convinced of Joseph Tucker's involvement, althcugh he 
did establish an Admiralty enquiry into the matter. In later years, 
Tucker's son, also named Joseph, chose to write an account of his father's 
dealings with the Admiralty on this matter: 
At the end of 1818 terminated some communications 
which my father ... had, by Lord St. 
Vincent's command, with Lcrd Melville, respecting 
the progress of work in cur dockyards; when some 
of my father-s statements were ascertained to be 
so very accurate, that he was supposed to have 
obtained sight of an official document, which 
ought to have been considered confidential. 
To remove that impression, he attended at the 
Board of Admiralty, and he did so to the "entire 
conviction" of Lcrd Melville and the Board ... 
"You have stated, Mr Tucker, " said Lord 
Melville, "that eight sail of the line is the 
average annual produce of the yards. How did you 
get -that infocmation? " 
"From the Navy Estimates. " 
"How so? " asked a Sea Lord. 
"How? why thus: -The Navy Estimates show every 
line-of-battle ship building and repairing, and when 
she is expected to be finished, and by comparing the 
estimates of one year with another, it will be seen 
when any ship had been launched or put out of 
dock. "[751 
While the sanve for this conversation is, of cairse, highly partisan, it 
is, nevertheless, the case that Joseph Tucker was not dismissed from the 
post of Surveycr. Furthermore, there is evidence that the First Lord was 
secretly delighted with the attack mcunted by Benjamin Tucker. on this 
point he was fairly candid, writing to Lord Liverpool in the following 
terms: 
Privately however I by no means regcet that 
Mr Tucker has thus stepped forward, as these 
occasional little incidents do no harm at 
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the Navy Board or the Dock Yards and I think 
that the very minute enquiry which that 
circumstance as well as other considerations 
at the present moment have induced us to 
institute will be productive of considerable 
permanent benefit. [761 
Althcugh it was the Whigs who were to be responsible fcr the 
eventual abolition of the civilian boards, their future under the Tories 
was not completely secure. Whig concern with excessive goverment 
expenditure had brought the opposition a number of successes, not least of 
which was the near overturning of the Navy Estimates for 1815 and the 
forcing of changes upon later naval votes. Such pressure forced the 
government to consider how further economies might be obtained, with some 
attention given to the creation of a more efficient management of the 
civilian departments. In 1817 the two wartime created boards, those 
responsible for the hiring of transports and for the care of sick and 
wounded seamen, had been amalgamated into the Navy and Victualling Boards 
respectively. This, as it happens, was little more than would have 
happened under any other administration entering into a period of peacep 
with a certain amount of contraction the recognised norm. However, the 
logical next move, that of uniting the Navy and Victual-ling Boards was 
also to be given an airing in the later years of this -lengthy period of 
Tory administration. 
In 1828, with the Duke of Clarence installed as Lcrd High Admiral, 
Melville was approached by the Chancellor of the Exchequert Henry 
Goulburno to draw up such a scheme. It is interesting to note that 
Melville not only went ahead with this project, but enthusiastically 
produced a plan that wculd have seen the emergence of an entirely new 
board. According to Melville's own account, the scheme had rimercus 
advantages and wculd 'undoubtedly simplify by concentrating the business 
of the Navy'. [771 
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A further aspect of the scheme was the ending of the existing 
committee system. It was a move that has already been considered in an 
earlier section, with this refcrm also fcrced by cpposition pressure. 
The government needed to show that it was economising where possible and 
creating greater efficiency within the varicus departments of state. 
According to Melville, on his own admission, the principle of individual 
responsibility, which was introduced to the civil departments of the navy 
in 1829, was based upon methods already operating within the Board of 
ordnance: 
I drew up at Goulturn's request a project 
for uniting the Navy & Victualling Boards, 
& conducting the business of the Navy on 
the same principle as the Ordnance which 
Board was then the f avouri te hobby of the 
House of Commons, or at least the Finance 
Committee. [781 
A somewhat more radical scheme for combining the navy's civil 
boards was also proposed during this same period by Sir George Cockburn. 
He was not simply interested in amalgamating the Navy and Victualling 
Boards but actually bringing them under the control of the Admiralty. [791 
This would not only have resulted in a desired reduction of running costs 
but would have had the additional benefit of ensuring that any economies 
demanded of the civilian boards would have been fully carried into effect. 
Although they were not a regular occurrence, the superior Board was more 
than aware of the Navy Board's efforts to subvert certain planned 
economies, with monies designated for naval purchases occasionally 
transferred to areas not sanctioned by either Admiralty or Parliament. 
However, this will be dealt with as a separate issue. [801 As for 
Cockturn's plans for the Navy and Victualling Boards, these were placed in 
abeyance until the arrival of the Whigs and the announcement of their 
decision to abolish the two boards. As a result, he moved an amendment, 
rejected by 115 votes to 50, which stated: 
140 
That an adequate number of persons shall be appointed to superintend respectively 
one cut of the several branches into which 
the Civil Department of the Navy may be 
divided; and that such persons shall form 
together, assisted by a Chairman, a Board 
for conducting and duties hitherto entrusted 
to the Commissioners of the Navy and Victualling 
Board, as the Commissioners for executing the 
office of Lord High Admiral may direct, subject 
to such regulations and arrangements as the 
Commissioners for the office of Lord High 
Admiral may think proper to establish. [811 
When the Whigs came to power in November 1830, the strong 
probability of the civilian boards undergoing extensive reform became an 
absdute certainty. Under Grey, the Whigs were not only pledged to refcrm 
parliament, but were determined upon economic retrenchment. A majcr 
target, and one that had featured in a good many parliamentary assaults, 
was that of naval expenditure. Sir James Graham, a leading critic of 
administrative inefficiencies, was appointed First Lcrd and given no 
doubts that he was there for the purpose of refcrm: 
When Lord Grey appointed me to the office, 
having himself been First Lord of the Admiralty, 
he expressed to me a strong opinion that I 
should have, as part of my duty, to look narrowly 
at the working of the three Boards - the Board 
of Admiralty, the Navy Board and the Victualling 
Board - and he expressed his belief that 
experience would lead me to the conclusion that 
concentration was necessary; and, guided by that 
opinion, from the very first I did direct my 
attention to the conjoint wcrking of those three 
Boards and, after having formed my plan, I submitted 
to the Cabinet the view which I took of the 
expediency, by legislation, of abolishing those 
three Boards, and uniting in the Board of Admiralty 
concentrated power; and in consequence of the 
adoption by the Cabinet of the view which I ventured 
to open to them, affirmed by much higher authority 
of Lord Grey, I framed the measure with their 
consent, which I subsequently submitted to 
parliament, and which became law. [82] 
A programme of reform was not however, immediately embarked upon. 
Instead, Graham inaugurated an inquiry into the civilian boards, its 
apparent purposes being to seek information and to discredit the civilian 
boards. In particular, attention was given to the actual employment of 
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the naval estimates once they had been voted by Parliament. It was an 
issue that had been. raised by Benjamin Tucker in 1818, but now the 
attention centred upon much larger sums of money and, 
in particular, 
votes relating to building and rebuilding works at the various naval 
pcrts. From information uncovered, now that the Whigs had greater access 
to the acccunts of the civilian boards, it soon became apparent that sums 
voted to many of these projects were unrealistically small, with amounts 
having been taken from other, heavily underspent votes. In a lengthy 
letter to Martin, Graham outlined his principal findings: 
I must confess to you that I should have t 
less anxiety than I do with respect to the 
state of the Fleet and the supply of stores 
ready for immediate use, if I had not reason 
to know, that the entire sum voted annually 
by Parliament has been considered as a gross 
sum applicable to purposes not contemplated in 
the Estimates, and that in some Items, more, 
and in others, less, has been expended, than 
the precise sum allotted to each service under 
the appropriation act. 
In a Document now before me the Accountant 
General of the Navy Board sets forth the under- 
standing and the principle of the office in 
the following terms; "when the various items 
are voted they form one general sum at the 
credit of the Naval Service at the Exchequer". [831 
Having established the parameters within which he was to mount his attack, 
Craham then went on to itemise particular areas where Parliamentary votes 
had either been ignored or unscught in the first place. In doing so, he 
cited the expenditure of larger sums than those voted on building works at 
Woolwich while for shipbuilding at Bombay no amounts were set aside by 
Parliament, yet 
140,000 
was expended at this yard in 1830. Similarly, 
sums well in excess of those voted were spent on dockyards in Canada with 
t7.908 spent at Leith withcut the consent cf Parliament. Most worrying, 
as far as Graham was concerned, were the areas cf naval expenditure that 
were underspent in crder to subsidise these other areas: 
Accordingly I find that in the four years 
last past the gross sum of J3,217,346 has 
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been voted for Timber and Materials for 
the Navy and only 12,675,464 has been spent 
for this purpose; leaving a balance under 
this most important head of 1541,882 
applied to other purposes than those 
prescribed by the Appropriation Act. [841 
As Graham went on to point out, although he may well have been prone 
to exaggeration, as a result of this underspending on timber and other 
materials, the yards were generally deficient in these areas. [851 
Turning his attention to the Victualling Board, Graham was equally 
as critical. He indicated that the commissioners belonging to this Board 
appeared to have the same disregard for Parliament as those of the Navy 
Board. Again, he referred to the expenditure of unsanctioned 
money, included large additional sums on building works at the Cremill and 
weevil victualling yards. [861 He also, in that same letter, informed 
Martin of an admission attached to returns he had received from the 
Victualling Board: 
That the Accounts in the Department are 
not kept in the principle of applying 
the vote for the service for which it is 
granted, and the deficiencies under one 
head were paid out of the surplus under 
the other; or rather the whole expenditure 
was paid out of the whole vote, for the 
sums voted for the Victualling Department 
have not been kept under distinct heads, 
but one blended together and indeed are 
blended with all monies voted for the 
naval service. [871 
In approaching Martin, Graham soon became aware that he was not dealing 
with an ordinary administrator. Apart from having fifteen years 
experienoe as head of the Navy Board, the Comptroller was also a member of 
the House of Commons. Yet, all this paled into insignificance when 
compared with the host of allies Martin could call upon. Apart from the 
many senior members of the previous administration with whom he had 
amicably wcrked., he was also a favourite of the King. Martin had 
served under William IV, then Duke of Clarence, as a midshipman and 
retained a direct contact with the monarch. As a result, he was in a 
position to get in the 'first wcrd with HM, choosing to inform the King 
of the contents of that recent correspondence with Graham. It was a fact 
which the new First Lcrd noted in a letter written to Grey: 
He [Martin] went to Brighton with his answer 
befcre I [Graham] had a chance of trans- 
mitting it to the King ... [86] 
For a time, it looked as if the, King might choose to give his full 
support to the Comptroller. Behind such a fear was the fact 'that the 
King himself, while Lord High Admiral, had actually sanctioned the tuiding 
works at Cremill and Weevil. On 24 January 1831, Graham informed Grey of 
this turn of events: 
I send ycu a letter from the King, by which 
you will perceive he does not much like the 
close investigation of past Navy Expenditure 
without the consent of Parliament; Weevil 
and Woolwich were his own wcrks, but the line 
to be taken is, that thor he ordered the works 
to be begun he never sanctioned the subsequent 
concealment from the H[ousel of Commons. It was 
impossible to overlook this abuse; and it was much 
easier to verify at once to the King; firmly 
but respectfully, the intention of vindicating 
the large votes of the present year by an 
exposition of past abuses and of serious misapp- 
lication of public money. When I have evidence 
of the low stock of cur principle Stores in the 
Dock Yards, I will lay it befcre the King as 
conclusive proof that this neglect of the 
appropriate act has not teen harmless. [871 
This matter appears to have been amicably concluded for Graham, only a 
week later, was able to inform the Prime Minister that he received another 
letter from the King in which he admits to the necessity for this 
-'systematic attention' and greater accountability to Parliament. In 
passing the letter to Grey, Graham appended the comment that it was -a 
rare instance of good fortune to serve in Government under you with such a 
Sovereign on the Throne'. [881 
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The careful -scrutiny of the use of naval money in earlier years 
also meant that former members of the Board of Admiralty might find 
themselves coming under criticism. For them, however such parliamentary 
attacks could be fended off reasonably effectively. Unlike the civilian 
boards, where Martin was the only parliamentarian, the dismissed Board of 
Admiralty could muster former Board members Cockburn, Hotham, Croker and 
Clerk in the Commons, while Melville, if he so chose, could provide an 
adequate defence in the Lords. In preparing for this likely attack, 
Melville wrote a carefully considered letter to Sir George Clerk in 
January 1831. He seems to have had few real concerns that the Admiralty, 
under his leadership, would be found to have been at fault, 
I have no idea that Graham will attempt 
the dangerous task of picking holes in 
the conduct of his predecessors, as far 
as regards details of that description, 
& at any rate they are easily answered in 
the way you state. Even the existence of 
a larger surplus at the beginning of this 
year than of last is no proof of over- 
estimating or voting. Ships may have been, 
& in fact have been, brought home which 
have not been relieved, particularly in the 
Mediterranean; & at any rate the surplus of 
one year is either applied (as last year at 
Sheerness) to liquidate a debt incurred under 
the authority of Parliament, or it goes pro 
tanto in diminution of the Estimates for the 
following year. [891 
He did note however, the likelihood of attention being drawn to Woolwich 
and Weevil victualling yards, but he did not feel that they created any 
problems for either himself or Clerk as 'they occurred when ycu and I did 
not belong to the Admiralty'. [90] Inde4 at this stagel Melville 
appears to have seen Graham's endeavours as no more than a continuation of 
work that he had already undertaken in attempting to de-mystify the 
estimates. However, fcr Martin he did see problems ahead and there are 
signs in his letter to Clerk that he was distancing himself from the 
Comptroller, 
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I quite agree in all you say as to Sir 
Byam, the difficulty of keeping him 
within bounds in his demands, and if this 
year he has not expended the sum which 
he said was absolutely indispensable to 
replenish cur arsenals with a moderate 
proportion of Stores, he ought to be 
impeached. [911 
The f irst major parliamentary attack came during the Naval 
Estimates debate of Fetruary 1831. The main thrust of the attack was the 
suggestion that Parliament had been purposely kept in the dark as to the 
sums that would be required for naval works and that deliberately larger 
estimates than necessary were intentionally inserted elsewhere to cover 
these costs. Helville, upon hearing these claims, considered them to be a 
"flagrant untruth'. In a further letter to Clerk he stated, 
The greatest pains have been taken to 
keep down every item to the sum which 
it was believed would really be expended 
under every item. [92] 
However, he did not believe that complete accu acy was really possible, 
. until Mr Joseph Hume, or 
Sir James Graham, or some other ingenious 
gentleman, shall devise a method by which 
a previous Estimate at the beginning of 
the year shall be made to tally exactly, 
under each head of service, with the final 
account at the end of the year 
[931 
Of course, it had always been open for Melville to directly defend himself 
and the Board of Admiralty in London, something he threatened to do, 
I should be much annoyed if I were obliged 
to go to London now, and yet I cannot help 
wishing that I was there. I should move to 
have a copy of the Navy Estimates laid before 
the House of Lards, and have a thorough 
set-too. [941 
Althcugh he fails to give his reason for not going to London fcr purposes 
of initiating a debate in the Lords, one Possibility may be sumised. 
This concerns his ycungest son Robert, who was Deputy Colnptroller of the 
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Navy Board. As such, this Melville scion was totally at the mercy of the 
new administration. By attacking the government, Melville would clearly 
be jeopardizing young RoberCs future. 
Martin, on the other hand, was less than circumspect. He took up 
Graham's parliamentary attack, claiming it to be an allegation of 
misappropriation of public funds. Indeed, he wrote to Graham, demanding 
that he publicly apologise on the floor of the House. To this, Martin 
received a reply from Graham, written on 5 March, 
I have never stated that monies voted by 
Parliament in the Navy Estimates have been 
applied to other purposes than the 
Public Service: My allegation is that Monies 
voted by Parliament for one purpose have 
been applied to another: that public works 
have been began, finished, and even paid 
without the previous consent of Parliament 
and without any subsequent explanation 
... year af ter year. [ 95] 
In this same letter Graham went on to point cut, 
j. you must exercise your 
free and 
ndependent judgement with respect to any 
course which you may think necessary as a 
member of the House of Canmons. There I am 
bound to answer off ici ally all ques tions, 
but considering our relative positions as 
members of the same Government I can enter 
into no arrangement for explanation to be 
demanded of the First Lord of the Admiralty 
by the Comptroller of the Navy. [961 
By now, Graham clearly recognised Martin as a major obstacle to be 
overcome. Furthermore, Martin made it no easier for himself when he 
refused to support the Reform Bill. On 7 April 1831, Althorp sent him 
the equivalent of a three line whip which demanded his presence at the 
House of Commons for the Bill's committee stage. Martin failed to appear 
for the vote, a point of which the government took note. [971 
Unfcrtunately, for Martin, he was Member of Parliament fcc 
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the Plymouth constituency, one that was regarded by the government as 
being under Admiralty patronage. In the General Election held during that 
Summer, and in consequence of the government defeat in the vote at which 
Martin: 's presence had been requested, an attempt was made to remove Martin 
from Parliament. Initially he was asked to stand down, it being stated 
that it was not necessary for the Navy Comptroller to be a Member of 
Parliament. [98] This request was made to him in a letter from the King, 
signed by Herbert Taylor, following consultations between William IV, Grey 
and Croker. Martin however, claimed that the letter arrived when he had 
already left for Plymouth to begin his campaign. [991 
In the ensuing election, the Whigs used every means at their 
disposal to unseat him, but proved singularly unsuccessful. Over the 
years, drawing upon votes previously given to his father-in-law, Robert 
Fanshawe, who had held the seat up to 1790, Martin had acquired 
considerable support. As a result, he topped the poll with 101 votes 
while fellow Tory sympathiser Admiral Sir George Cockburn received 91 
votes. Both were elected. The government's own candidate, George Elliot, 
First Secretary to the Admiralty, came bottom of the poll. Among those 
trought out to vote far Elliot was Joseph Tucker, who was given exclusive 
use of the Admiralty yacht to take him to the constituency. [ 100] 
However, the battle was not over. Although Martin had not been 
removed from Parliament, he could at least be removed from the post of 
Ccxnptroller. Both Grey and Graham saw the King in October, with William 
reluctantly agreeing to Marties removal. No recard exists as to why the 
King should have agreed. The argument used by the premier and his First 
Lord must certainly have been persuasive. Only a month earlier, William 
Iv had spoken to Martin, concerned that he was about to resign. At this 
meeting the King indicated himself to have always been in agreement with 
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the actions of the Navy Comptroller. [1011 The first indication that 
Martin received of his dismissal came in a letter sent to him by Graham 
and received in mid-October. [1021 Martin must have been shocked at this 
rather sudden change in his fortunes. In reply, he scught to be informed 
of what had led the King to 'cancel those cherished expressions of his 
good opinion and confidence'. [1031 Graham received this letter on 17 
October and replied that same day: 
Although I am not prepared to admit the 
Right of a Public Officer to enquire into the 
circumstances, under which His Majesty may 
have been pleased to cancel his appointment, 
yet on the present occasion I have no hesitation 
in stating that His Majesty has decided in 
confarmity with the advice of his responsible 
and confidential servants. [1041 
A futher public attack upon the Navy Board came with the Naval 
Estimates debate at the beginning of the following year. Reference was 
again made to the inferior boards being able to make contracts ^*without 
the knowled* of the superior' and their ability to appropriate money to 
other pin-poses 'than those for which it was granted'. Graham indicated 
such practices to have been frequent and that it was his intention ýto 
bring forward a measure to remedy such irregularities in future'. [105] 
In answer to a question put forward by Joseph Hume, in which he 
asked if the government was to continue to erect brewing and baking 
macIiinery at Plymouth, which he pointed cut was now found to be of no use, 
Graham went into a lengthy reply that gave him a chance to criticise the 
Victualling Board. The First Lord indicated that it was his intention to 
proceed with the works as he considered them to be of future value, but 
that the Victualling Board's original decision to proceed with the works, 
taken while Melville was First Lord, had been without the knowledge of the 
Admiralty. Furthermore, so Graham pointed out, the victualling Board had 
entered 'into a private contract for the machinery with the brother, and, 
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as he believed, the partner, of the Superintendent of Works. ' Avoiding 
use of the word corruption, he did declare it a 'most irregular' 
arrangement. 
First, a private contract or bargain was 
made; next, it was made with the partner 
and brother of the Superintendent of Works; 
third, he had been misled as to the amount 
when he had first brough t forward these 
Estimates. He had called upon the Victualling 
Board to state the entire sum which would be 
necessary for these works in the ensuing 
year; the reply was, "55,0001. ", and a grant 
to that amount was, therefore, prepared. He 
was afterwards informed that a further sum 
of 42,0001 would be necessary for the 
purchase of machinery, which sum was quite 
independent of the contract. [1061 
A further parliamentary attack upon the civil boards came with the 
first reading of the Navy Civil Departments Bill, the legislation that 
would eventually bring about abolition of the civilian boards. A detailed 
assessment of its content will be considered in the next section; all that 
needed be included here is a note of some of the points raised during the 
debates that surrounded the various readings of the bill. In his preamble 
to the first reading, Graham drew attention to the limited control that 
the Board of Admiralty had over the expenditure of the inferior boards 
once that money had been voted by Parliament: 
The individual who brings forward the 
estimates is, I am well aware, responsible 
for their c7rractness; yet, when they have 
been once voted, the Admiralty has no 
control over the expenditure of those sums; 
they are issued by the Treasury on the 
requisition of the Navy and Victualling Boards; 
and it was not until very lately that the 
Admiralty had an opportunity of knowing how 
the money was expended; for even the books 
of the Navy Office would not show under what 
heads the money was laid out. [107] 
To illustrate his point, Graham proceeded to instance a few examples. 
ýmong these he included reference to large sums of unvoted money expended 
upon the newly built naval hospital at Chatham together with reference to 
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, the, victualling yard at Cremill. As regards the 
latter, so Graham pointed 
cut, construction work had begun one year prior to a request for any 
money. Furthermore, up to then, Parliament had voted a mere 
174,000 for a 
project that had almost reached the sum of 
fO. 25m. In his speech, Graham 
pointed out that 
There was no general plan or estimate 
submitted to the Admiralty, or laid before 
Parliament. A sketch was made, but it was 
not drawn up in the regular form of a plan 
or estimate. No general vote was passed by 
the Hcuse - nor one shilling more than he 
stated was voted. Yet the wcrk was all but 
completed, and an additional sum of 155p3341 
had actually been paid. [1081 
I 
As a final example, Graham mentioned work upon a new dry dock at Woolwich 
where 'no general plan cr estimate [was] submitted either to the 
Admiralty, or laid upon the Table of the Hcuse'. [109] 
Among those who spoke against Graham was Sir Thomas Byam Martin. On 
this occasion he was extremely reserved, mostly directing himself to the 
system that was to replace the civilian boards. However, he did make 
reference to naval estimates not being applied to the exact ptzposes 
intended. He claimed, correctly, that this was not a new practice, 
the custom had always existed, in ýhe*Naval Service, to appropriate the 
gross sums voted by the House to whatever 
services it was found most convenient to 
apply them. [1101 
Undoubtedly the most reasoned and eloquent defence of the Navy Board came 
from J. W. Croker. On 27 February, during the second reading of the Navy 
Civil Departments Bill, he carefully examined all of the charges made 
against the civilian boards. In a speech that must have lasted in 
excess of two hours he suggested that any deliberate attempt to 
undermine the superior board should really be placed at the feet of the 
Admiralty, 'fcr the Lcrds of the Admi, ity might, if they had thcught c- 
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proper to exercise the powers intrusted to them, have prevented or 
punished such insubordination'. As for claims that money for certain 
naval works had not been sanctioned by Parliament, this appeared to be a 
very 'fearful' charge, 
yet when examined and explained, it really 
constituted no offence on the part of the 
naval administration, tut was even some proof 
of merit and economy. In the first place 
the right hon. Baronet [Graham) expressed 
himself inaccurately, when he said 'the sums 
were not voted; ' they had been all voted, 
regularly voted; tut it was true that they 
had not always teen applied to the exact items 
of service, for which they were voted 
000 [1111 
Dirning to the matter of indequately stated estimates, Croker continued, 
The right hon. Baronet seemed to him not to 
have sufficiently distinguished between 
estimates and accounts; though certainly no 
two things could be more different. An 
estimate was in its nature uncertain - 
we estimated what we could not ascertain, 
and all the naval monies were voted on 
estimate - an account, on the contrary, 
which related to the actual expenditure, 
might be given with perfect accu acy, and 
accordingly we might have at the end of 
any one year, an accu ate and minute account 
of the actual expenditure of all those sums 
which were estimated at the commencement of 
the year. The estimate was to a certain 
extent a vote of confidence; the account 
afforded the check, and the control, and the 
proof, that the confidence was not abused. [112] 
In other words, it was quite justifiable for the estimates to be an 
inadequate statement of actual expenditure, provided that the accounts 
tallied ýto a farthingý. 
The money had been voted, and the service 
to which it was applied was also voted; 
although the exact amount spent on each 
head of service within a given time, was not 
and could not be estimated. [113] 
Indeed, and this was the real point that Croker was making, Graham 
did not pretend that any improper application 
of the money had been made - that one farthing 
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had been lost - that one farthing had not been 
accounted for. It could not be argued that 
any improper application had been made of 
surplus money in the hands of the Navy Board 
... [1141 
However, Croker"s eloquence had little chance of saving the civilian 
boards. Both the committee and third reading stages were passed with 
considerable majorities and royal assent given on 1 June 1832. 
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1. St Vincent held office as First Lord of the Admiralty from 19 
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while having a strong attachment to the Greys. In Parliament he 
consistently supported the Whigs, voting for the Repeal of the Test and 
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the parliamentary reform (May 1793). He also supported Pitt's reform 
motion (May 1783). [Fac this information I am indebted to Dr G Ditchfield 
of the UKC History Dept] St Vincentýs associations with the Grey family 
include joint leadership, with the future Ist Earl Grey, of the West 
Indies expedition of 1793-5 and the appointing of Grey's sailor son George 
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appointed George Grey to the dormant position of Adjutant-General of the 
Fleet and (in April 1804) to the post of commissioner of Sheerness 
dockyard. The two biographical accounts of St Vincentýs career, written 
by his contemporaries [Tucker (1844) and Brenton (1838)], both take a 
partisan line. A more recent assessment of his character can be found in 
Lloyd (1963), a book primarily devoted to the battle of St Vincent. 
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be administered by the commissioner at Chatham. For this reason, 
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CHAPTER THREE 
ABOLITION OF THE CIVILIAN BOARDS 
Two major causal factors are discernible in the decision taken by 
the Whigs to abolish the Navy's civilian boards in 1832. Most important 
was a dislike of the Navy Board, with the reasons for this aversion 
already outlined. Opposition to these particular boards, which began with 
St Vincent's period at the Admiralty (1801-4) and was re-infcreed by 
Grey"s own experience of this same office (1806) was singular in nature. 
It did not extend into a general. desire to overhaul the nation's wider 
administrative framework. When, for instance, radical parliamentarian 
Joseph Hume on 25 February 1831, before the Committee of Supply, declared 
that "Boards had been the ruin of this country[11, his was a lone voice. 
Neither then, nor in later years, was this statement to receive support 
from the Whigs. They, cc more particularly Primeminister Grey, had no 
broader axe to grind than that of reverqr- upon the two remaining civilian 
boards of the navy. Indeed, the Whigs themselves were creators rather 
than destroyers of administrative boards. It was in 1847, for instance, 
that their own Home Secretary, Sir George Grey, replaced the Poor Law 
Commissioners with that of the Poor Law Board while the Board of 
Health followed in 1848. Interestingly enough, among those who supported 
the move for more boards, although by that time he was a declared Peelite, 
was former First Lord Sir James Graham. Additionally, the Whigs 
themselves had great attachment to one particular administrative 
committee: the Board of ordnance. As win be seen later, this became a 
model upon which it was considered the reformed civil departments of the 
Admiralty might, in some way, be based. 
The second causal factor leading to the abolition of the Navy's 
civilian boards was that of economy. Throughout the period 1815 to 1831 
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the Whigs campaigned on this issue, f Inding It to be one of the few 
subjects that not only united a disparate opposition but also attracted a 
degree of support from those who normally voted with the government. 
Furthermore, it was the Navy vote that was often at the centre of these 
parliamentary manoeuvres. This, In itself, made sense. In reality, there 
were few areas in which any real cuts could be made, large areas of 
government expenditure, such as servicing the national debt, required 
large fixed sums. on the other hand, the Tories themselves, within a few 
months of hostilities ending, had considerably reduced another high 
spending area, that of the Army. The Navy, on the other hand, continued 
to receive large negotiable sums that could be critically examined In 
Parliament. 
As it happened the Whig opposition, before 1830, chose not to make 
any links between their campaign to reduce naval expenditure and their 
desire to abolish the civilian boards. In fact, this latter desire, as 
far as the public debate was concerned, had been effectively shelved. In 
part, no doubt, this was the result of Grey's semi-retirement. While 
others might have agreed with his thinking, it was very much a personal 
vendetta and one that Grey only chose to pursue upon acquisition of the 
premiership in November 1830. At that time however, the connection 
between the earlier retrenchment campaign and the advantage of abolishing 
the civilian boards began to be carefully fostered. 
3.1 Post-war retrenchment 
During the immediate post-war years the Whigs, and their occasional 
radical allies, mcunted a series of parliamentary attacks upon perceived 
high levels cf government expenditure. It was a campaign that proved 
Itself to be in tune with public opinion while uniting a wide range of 
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dissident opposition elements. Those attracted to the cause on such 
occasions included not only the radicals but also Tory-liberals and 
numerous waverers who, for the most part, were more frequently found to 
vote in favour of the Liverpool administration. As a result, the 
government suffered several major defeats. Yet, in the final analysis, the 
opposition, during these early post-war years, were unable to convert this 
support into anything more permanent. Even with regard to matters 
relating to taxation and government expenditure, those in opposition 
could not regard such support as either enduring or to be guaranteed. When 
the governing administration showed itself to be able and willing to 
reduce expenditure, then the size of the opposition vote dramatically 
declined. Indeed, the only direct advantage gained during the earlier 
period when they led the campaign for government economy, was a small 
increase in numbers following the election of 1818. 
Among the most ardent of government supporters there existed the 
belief that the Whigs only opposed goverment naval expenditure as a means 
of courting public support. Such an assessment however, ignores the long 
established Whig tradition of closely examining government expenditure, 
especially of a military sort. On numerous occasions, both during the 
recent war and the latter half of the 18th century, Whigs had made a point 
of highlighting ministerial extravagance, corruption. and inefficiency. 
Most notable of these earlier campaigns were the attacks on Lord 
Sandwich during the late-1770s and the economical reform movement 
initiated by the Rockingham Whigs during the 1780S. Concerned primarily 
with achieving a reduction in the number of state sponsored offices and 
sinecures, this latter campaign had as its objective the target of 
reducing the influence of the executive in the House of Commons. This 
campaign which, over the years, had proved most successful, led directly 
to the establishment of the Finance Committee and the subsequent 
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Commission on Fees. Both gave considerable attention to the Navy's civil 
departments, with the published reports of these two bodies already 
extensively drawn upon for earlier parts of this thesis. 
The post-war campaign to achieve reductions in expenditure and 
taxation had its first major success in March 1816. A prolonged campaign 
of petitioning against the property tax resulted in a government defeat 
and the ending of this universally unpopular measure. Boosted by this 
success, and concerned at the high levels of continued naval expenditure, 
the Whigs quickly turned their attention to the Admiralty and civilian 
boards. On 2D March 1816, just two days after the property tax vote, 
Methuen called for a reduction in salaries paid to the first and second 
secretaries appointed to the Board of Admiralty. Both secretaries had, in 




per annum . 
respectively. At that same point in time both salaries had also been 
augmented by special war time payments that amounted to 
$1000 and t5OO 
annually. As members of the Whig opposition pointed out, the cessation 
of hostilities had now occurred, with both secretaries experiencing a 
considerable reduction in the amount of work they were expected to 
perform. Yet, instead of having their salaries reduced, an 
Order-in-Ccuncil of 21 June 1815 had resulted in an effective increase by 
integrating the war time bonus into their permanent salaries. [2] Methuen, 
in calling for an examination of the relevant papers, went on to ask, 
if there was ever such a moment chosen, 
in the wildest infatuation of ministerial 
indiscretion, when such an alteration should 
take place; when, to say nothing of the 
reduction in labour, the great depreciation 
of every article of consumption had already 
raised the salaries to double their former 
value? [ 31 
Methuen also went on to observe,, 
the great proportion that existed between 
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the remuneration of civil and military 
services; and a comparison must arise between 
the salary of the Secretary of the Admiralty, 
and the pay of the heroes who bled at 
Trafalgar and Waterloo. At the very moment, 
too, when ministers were raising the 
perquisite of this secretary, they must 
reduce the reward of those brave men who were 
crippled in their country's service, and 
abridge the pittance of the fatherless and 
the widow. [41 
On this occasion the government triumphed, the opposition receiving 130 
votes to 159. 
A simple lack of knowledge as regards naval affairs resulted in the 
opposition suffering a further defeat when they opposed the naval estimate 
on 25 March. On the face of it, the opposition had an extremely good 
case. The war had been terminated in June 1815, with the navy effectively 
demobilizing since the beginning of 1814. Indeed, that earlier year had 
not only seen the surrender of Napoleon but the ending of the American 
conflict that had begun in 1812. Despite all this, the government, in 
1816, was still demanding from the navy estimates the staggering sum of 
116.8m. As opposition M. P. s were quick to point out, this was an amount 
well in excess of the 
f6m which had become the normal sum voted in the 
estimates during the years that had immediately preceded the declaration 
of hostilities against the French in 1793. According to George Tierney, 
leader of the Whigs in the Hcuse of Commons 'the naval estimates now 
before the House did not relate to the naval defence of the country by its 
naval officers, but solely to the civil department of the naval 
estimates'. [51 While Tierney stated that he did not wish to see the size 
of the Navy reduced beyond that level already made by the Government, he 
felt that money directed to the civil boards could be greatly reduced. To 
prove his point, he then took each department in turn, showing how 
expenditure had not only increased over those earlier peacetime years but 
also over and above that of 1814, the last year of the war. 
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However, in making these observations, Tierney failed to take one 
particular point into consideration. He ignored the difficulties of 
demobilizing the Navy as compared with the Army. While soldiers, and 
indeed sailors, could be quickly paid off upon the termination of 
hostilities, warships could not. Once brcught into the harbours at 
Chatham, Portsmcuth and Plymouth, these vessels had to be denuded of all 
their stores and ships furniture, unrigged and dismasted. Once this had 
taken place, often with the help of a retained ship's crew, these items 
had to be repaired and renovated in the dockyard workshops. At the same 
time, the vessel itself would join a long line of other vessels waiting to 
enter dry dock for examination and repair. With a massive fleet gradually 
returning to home waters, a fleet four or five times the size of that 
existing at the end of any other war, the task was not one that could be 
completed in a few months. As government supporters pointed out, it was 
quite normal for naval estimates to increase rather than diminish in the 
year that immediately followed a war. Croker, in particular, took great 
delight in tearing the opposition case to pieces, stating ýthat from the 
peace of Utrecht [17131 and the Peace of Paris [18141, not an instance had 
occurred in which the first year of peace had not swelled the Navy 
estimates beyond the amount of the last year of war'. Furthermore, in 
order to drive the point hme, Croker Proceeded laboriously to enumerate 
the comparative sums expended during the last year of war and first year 
of peace in each conflict that occurred during the period he had 
previously cited. [61 
Over the next three years the Whigs continued to use the annually 
presented naval estimates as a mainspring - for their attacks upon 
government expenditure. In addition, they kept a careful eye on 
particular areas of naval finance, initiating a range of further debates. 
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Such was the situation in June 1819 when Ridley put forward a motion 
demanding a 
10.2m 
cut in naval spending. Another area of contention was 
the continued payment of war time level salaries to the first and second 
secretaries in the Admiralty, with a second debate forced upon the 
government in February 1817. A further issue, and one that had clear 
links with the economical reform movement which had its roots in the 
1780s, was the number of commissioners appointed to the Board of 
Admiralty. This now began to be raised on an annual basis by Ridley. In 
the debate that arose from an address directed to the Prince Regent (and 
seeking him to give direction for the number of junior lords to be reduced 
by two) it is interesting to note that among those who spoke in favour 
of the motion was future First Lord, James Graham. At the time he was a 
relatively new M. P., having been elected to represent Hull one year 
earlier. 
In giving his reasons for presenting the address, Ridley stated 
before the House of Commons, on this latter occasion, that it was 
inexcusable to have the same number of junior lords as there had been in 
1797. On that former occasion, as he pointed cut, the navy had consisted 
of 1000 ships and 120,000 men, while in the current year it had declined 
to 137 ships and 2D, 000 men. [71 Graham, in entering the debate, pointed 
cut that he did not wish to diminish the just patronage of the Crown but 
contended that, of late, it had been unjustly extended. As regards the 
junior lordsp he considered that their only responsibility in war time was 
that of signing papers. As such, he did not see how they were occupied 
during a time of peace. According to Graham, the number could be easily 
reduced but that the government chose not to do so because through 
the disposal of a multitude of such offices 
only could a majority of votes in that House 
be secured by an administration that had lost 
the confidence of the country which wished to 
see these offices diminished. He wished an 
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end put to this system - he wished to see a 
government which trusted rather to public 
opinion as its strength than to the power of 
giving away such offices. [81 
The tencr of criticism changed during the 1822 parliamentary year, 
with the initiative seized by a small group of radical M. P. s. led by 
Joseph Hume. Unlike the Whigs in previous sessions of Parliament, they 
chose not to concentrate on certain specified areas of expenditure but 
chose to force a direct vote on every single item of public expenditure. 
Their objective, not unnaturally, was to bring every aspect of 
government expenditure into full public view. However, this minute 
scrutiny of every part of the estimates failed to ignite the sympathy of 
most Whigs. As for Tory waverers, who were also unhappy with the degree 
of retrenchment demanded, their enthusiasm similarly dissipated. Not 
surprisingly, those supporting Hume gave considerable attention to the 
Navy vote. On I March 1822, sufficient support was collected together to 
ensure success for a motion put forward by Ridley to cut the navy 
estimates by 
12000 
- so forcing a reduction in the number of junior lords 
at the Admiralty. Again, reference was made to the reduced amount of work 
of the Board since the end of the war, but Ridley's main objection 'was 
the undue patronagp which the Ministers of the Crown were bent upon 
retainingý. [91 
Such visible successes, whether achieved under Whig or radical 
leadership were, on the whole, few and far between. Furthermore, they were 
of only limited impcrtance when compared with changes which appear to 
have been forced upon the government as a result of concern that larger 
numbers of their own supporters might vote against them if a wider range 
of economies were not undertaken. In 1818, for instance, as a result of 
constant opposition sniping, and the fear of future defeat in Parliament, 
the salaries of the two admiralty secretaries were reduced to their 
165 
criginal peacetime levels. [101 This, as previously mentioned, had been 
an issue highlighted by the Whigs that previous year. Similarly, other 
opposition demands were also acted upon. In 1822, the establishment 
of clerks at the Admiralty was severely reduced while the Navy Board was 
stripped of two commissioners. [111 Furthermcre, the wcrkfcrce in the 
dockyards, despite a severe backlog of ships needing to be repaired, was 
not -only drastically pruned but restrictions were placed upon the number 
cf hours that might be wcrked. [121 As for the purchase of essential 
stores, these seem to have fallen well below ncrmal levels, with 
Comptroller Martin, on several occasions, pointing out that the available 
sum voted by Parliament was too small to purchase any stcre 'except 
timber'. [13] In February 1817 Martin, who appears to have been more than 
a little concerned by this state of affairs, expressed to Melville and 
Croker, his ýdcubts as to the estimates covering cur wants for the year 
even at the reduced hcurs of wcrk'. According to Martin, the current 
estimate would be exceeded by at least 
1464,592 'without purchasing any 
article of stcre except timberl. [14] It must, however, be admitted that 
Martin was adept at fighting for his corner and prone to exaggeration. 
There can, of course, be no certainty, that the government of the 
day might have introduced these cheeseparing economies unprompted. But 
such a scenario seems most unlikely. Instead, it would appear that the 
frequent parliamentary attacks, mounted by various elements of the 
opposition, were influential in forcing the government to make greater 
savings than it might otherwise have done. In the past it had been 
normal, with the exception of St Vincent's tenure at the Admiralty, for the 
government to rely heavily upon the expertise of the various professional 
boards, allowing them to spend the sums considered necessary for the 
upkeep of ships and yards. However, as noted in the foregoing chapter of 
this thesis, Lord Liverpool in January 1818, suggested to the Navy 
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Comptroller that it might be appropriate to reduce amounts then expended 
upon the improvement of dockyards. Indeed, it was this continuing 
opposition campaign, and clearly acknowledged as such, -that led one 
government department choosing to take drastic action in order to cut its 
own, expendi ture. This was the Treasury which, feeling itself under 
pressure, decided upon a cut-back in the number of clerks employed 
together with a reduction in the salaries of those who were to remain. Of 
importance for the civil branches of the Navy, was a subsequent minute, 
issued by the Treasury on 10 August 1821, and directed to the 
Admiralty and various other departments of state. This noted recent 
opposition moves to bring about a reduction in the numbers employed within 
the various civil departments and requested that careful consideration be 
given to this very matter. The Admiralty was therefore desired to 
cause to be made cut and communicated to My 
Lcrds [of the Treasury] as soon as practicable, 
and at any rate before 10th October next, such 
plan for the reduction of their respective 
establishments as they may think most expedient, 
with a view of providing for the efficient 
execution of the duties of their several depart- 
ments, at the smallest expence to the public. [16] 
As for how this might be brought about, the minute went on to suggest: 
lst. That every off ice was to be restcred to 
the situation, in respect to the number of 
persons employed and of their respective 
emoluments, in which it stood in 1797, unless 
some adequate cause continued to exist which 
rendered some alteration necessary. 
2nd. That where increase of business, or the 
more corr ct and efficient execution of the 
public service, rendered it necessary to 
preserve establishments either created or 
enlarged since 1797, the emoluments of the 
cfficers composing those establishments should 
be assimilated, as nearly as the chaNr- of 
circumstances will admit, to those received by 
persons in similar situations in 1797. 
3rd. That if any office, existing in 1797, was 
found to be no longer necessary to the public 
service, or that its emoluments might be 
properly reduced, such off ice should be 
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abolished, or reduced in value, as the case 
might admit. [171 
In his examination of this particular minute, Roseveare points cut that 
although ismed to over forty departments, it could not be seen as a 
directive. [18] Indeed, the Treasury had no real authority at that time. 
This was something that would come later. Nevertheless, it did sting 
the Admiralty into initiating a range of economies that were to be encoded 
into an Order-in-Ccuncil of 17 January 1822. Encompassing not just the 
Admiralty Office, but also the Navy and Victualling Offices, a reduction 
of nearly f if ty clerks was undertaken while salary cuts were also 
implemented. As regards the reduction in numbers, this was mainly 
achieved through amalgamation of several branches although the 
establishment itself was also trimmed 'to the very lowest scale consistent 
wi th the due execution of public business'. [191 Roseveare 
also went on to appcrtion credit to the radicals fcr prompting the 
Treasury Into the issuing cf this minute. He goes on to conclude that it 
was their persistent 'sniping combined with 'their crushing indictment 
of anomalous acccunting' which both 'stiffened the Tory resistance but 
also brought its rewards'. [201 
It is not impossible that it was this long-drawn out campaign, 
first under Whig and then radical leadership, that was responsible for 
directing the thoughts of one high ranking official within the Navy 
office. This was George Smith, the Board's secretary. Between 1817 and 
1829 he addressed a long series of memoranda to the Board, all of them 
proposing potential economies or detailing related observations. These 
ranged from improved methods of keeping the accounts to that of 
introducing a more accurate measurement of work performed within the 
dockyards. Most sweeping of his recommendations was a proposal to reduce 
the establishment cf the varicus yards by retaining only the most skilled 
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of the work force. Activities performed by those employed in the lesser 
trades, so he contended, could be undertake by contract labour, a move 
that would save the payment of continuous, and sometimes unnecessary, 
wages. on 20 June 18270 Smith noted that 'in the neighbcurhood of Dock 
Yards, there are persons of all trades to wh(xn recourse could be had for 
all minor works'. Although the Board chose not to act upon the vast 
majority of the schemes put forward by their secretary, it does indicate 
the extent of attention directed towards economising. For the Navy Board, 
this was a relatively new phenomenon, as previous attempts at reducing 
costs had gone little further than accepting the lowest tenders from 
competing contractors and the refusal to raise the wages of the work 
force. The connection between the vigorous opposition campaign in 
Parliament and the existence of this internal discussion must count as 
smething other than mere coincidencej 21] 
This sixteen-year post-war opposition campafgn may also have come 
close to forcing the government to undertake extensive changes to the 
structure of the navy's civilian administration and one only slightly less 
radical than that later carried through by the Whigs. The combination of a 
retrenchment minded opposition and a government that itself was attempting 
to economise, prompted thought to be given to even further reductions in 
the naval budget. However, the peculiar structure of the navy's 
administration meant that the body responsible for undertaking expenditure 
- the Navy Board - was sheltered from the direct gaze of parliamentary 
scrutiny by members of the Admiralty. As a result, it was fairly easy for 
the inferior Board to resist many of these demands. Despite this 
situation, the working relationship between the two boards, remained 
comparatively good, but it was clear that the infericr. Board: s continued 
expenditurep although watered down by a few less painful cuts, was 
unacceptable. However, the Navy Board, with its expertise and ability to 
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massage the accounts, could invariably squeeze larger sums cut of the 
government by various declarations of urgency and need. For this reason, 
both Melville and Cockburn mooted the, idea of a separate controlling body 
that would be in a position either to check such claims or remove those 
officers considered to be obstructing their cause. [221 
As for the continuance of the opposition campaign, the final 
onslaught was heralded by an obvicus weakening of government strength 
that was brought abcut by the death of Liverpool's liberal successcr, 
Canning. In turn, Wellington took the reins of power, rising to the 
premiership in January 1828. His efforts at achieving economies were 
deemed by the Whigs to be inadequate and, for this reason, they planned a 
well orchestrated attack upon a government already internally dividedL 
The recognised leader of this renewed opposition onslaught was Sir James 
Graham: 
The leachrs of the Whig party were overjoyed 
that Graham was willing to assume the 
leadership in a task which to many of them 
was highly onerous, and Graham, himself 
believing implicitly in retrenchment, careless 
alike of praise or blame and independent of 
party ties, was glad to bear the brunt of such 
an attack. [231 
The first round of this renewed campaign was opened on 12 February, 
with Graham using the annual Supply Bill to move fcr a reduction in the 
salaries of all officials. If successful, this wculd have had an 
automatic effect upon the various branches of the Navy. However, it was 
defeated by a small majcrity. [24] of even greater significance for the 
civil departments was a further unsuccessful resolution put forward by 
Graham, in which he called fcr the off ice of the Treasurer of the Navy to 
be combined with that of the Paymaster. This, so he claimed, would lead 
to an immediate anrwal saving of 
13000. In presenting his casep Graham 
pointed out that since 1732, there had been several occasions in which the 
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I ý' post of Treasurer of the Navy had been combined with such other off foes as 
that of the War Department, Board of Trade and President of the Board of 
Control. In such circumstances, the post-hdder had received but one 
wage. Graham then went on to point cut that the government already had 
"too many placemen in the Hcuse' and that their number constituted a 
majority on every occasion. [251 Later that same month Graham directed 
himself to the off ice of Lieutenant-General of Ordnance (which he wished 
to see abolished) while in May he was giving thought tb the pay of Privy 
Ccuncillors. [261 
3.2 The Whigs Return To Power 
The fall of Wellington's ministry in November 1830 was to 
presage a series of radical changes to the Navy"s civil branches and 
culminated in the abolition of the two inferior boards. Carried cut 
within the space of two years, such a superficial summary would appear to 
suggest that the civilian branches of the Navy had been subjected to a 
carefully planned programme that had been finalised during those earlier 
years of opposition. This, however, was by no means the real situation. 
The Whigs appear to have taken a typically pragmatic approach, 
implementing various reforms as and where the need became obvious. All 
that appears to have been planned beforehand was that the civil boards 
were to be consolidated with the superior board of Admiralty, a plan that 
might have been suggested to Grey some thirty years earlier by St Vincent. 
To ensure that these reforms were to be carried through effectively, the 
rising star, Sir James Graham, was appointed First Lord. Grey appears to 
have been assured of his competence as a result of Graham's handling of 
the attacks mcunted against Wellingtorrs government; all of his speeches 
were clearly backed by extensive research and preparation. 
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But does this really explain the reason fcr Graham's 
appointment? [ 27] In fact, there is every likelihood of a mcre important 
reason fcr Graham's appointment to the Admiralty. This was to do with 
the previously explained grudge that Grey held against the two inferior 
Boards and his own inability, through pressure of wcrk, to oversee 
their abolition. For this reason, he needed someone at the head of the 
Admiralty whom he could manipulate. How else can the appointment of the 
young and inexperienced Graham be really explained? Certainly a 
number of contemporaries were mystified. According to Graham's most 
recent biographer, 
Not everyone shared Graham-s [own] pleasure 
in his appointment: Brougham thought it 
'prematurely high' and Grenville considered 
Graham 'too inconsiderable'. Sydney Smith 
was also surprised: 'The appointment is 
excellent, ' he told Lady Grey, -but I would 
have thought that there must have been so 
many great people who would have been 
clamcrcus. 0[2B] 
The Tacy 'Quarterly Review' appears to have been mcre than usually 
pertinent when it commented, 'The parts ... seem to have been oddly 
cast ... Sir James Graham, because he had made the subject of 
finance his particular study, was made First Lord of the Admiralty; Lord 
Althorpe, who ... wculd have been a fit and acceptable person at the 
Admiralty, was selected for Chancellor of the Exchequer '[291 
Finally, if a return to Henry Brrugham is made, it is interesting to see 
that this leading Whig saw Graham as nothing more than 'a puppy'. [30] 
In this first Cabinet post to be held by Graham he was most 
certainly that previously described 'puppy'. Perhaps the word 'puppet, 
might have held even greater appropriateness, with Grey the man who pulled 
the strings. Throughout the following months that led to the abolition of 
the-'civilian boards, Graham directed a series of letters to the premier. 
Many of them dealt with matters that would clearly have been handled in 
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totality by a more experienced minister. The flavour of these letters can 
be gleaned by one that was sent to Grey in February 1831. It dealt with 
the problems that the First Lord was having with the Comptroller, Sir T. 
Byam 'Martin. Graham had earlier requested information on matters 
connected with the naval estimates, but the latter had first chosen to 
send a copy of the correspondence, together with his reply, direct to the 
king: 
I had proposed this inclosed Draft of an answer 
to the King; it contains the truth; but 
whether at this moment you may consider it 
prudent to send it, is a question, which I 
submit to your better judgement, I will alter 
this answer ... which you may direct. 
[31] 
That the civilian boards were eventually abolished undoubtedly resulted 
from Grey's promptings. If reference is made to a previously quoted 
statement by Graham, it will become clear that Grey was attempting to 
impose his own ideas. According to Graham, when standing before the 
Select Committee on the Board of Admiralty, Grey 'expressed his beliefý 
that experience would lead "to the conclusion that concentration was 
necessary'. [311 Given, therefore, that Grey had chosen to make such a 
remark and that Graham, as a newly appointed inexperienced minister leaned 
heavily upon the premier for advice, it is hardly surprising that 
"concentration' was to become the final outcome. 
However, before considering the precise nature of the 
administrative arrangements that were to replace the civilian boards, 
attention must first be given to a range of additional reforms. All of 
these preceded abolition of the civilian Boards and are, in themselves, of 
considerable importance. To simplify matters they will be broken into 
three component units for purposes of orderly consideration. First of 
these was a series of economies that Graham imposed upon the Navy as a 





examined in more detail towards the end of this present section, these 
economies were primarily a continuance of the Whig campaign, while in 
opposition, to achieve a general cut back in government expenditure. Thus 
Graham, very much working within his own area of expertise, oversaw the 
cutting of numerous official salaries (including his own) tcgether with a 
general reduction of clerks and officers. Of much greater importance, and 
forming a second component, were changes introduced to the way naval 
estimates were presented to Parliament. Finally, and forming a third 
component, was the introduction of a system of public accountability. 
Under this, actual naval expenditure had to be presented annually both to 
the House of Commons and an independent Board of Audit. 
Upon taking up the appointment of First Lord, Graham had conducted 
a careful investigation into the workings of the civil boards. Many of 
his findings, particularly the transfer of money from votes sanctioned by 
Parliament into other projects, were brought to the attention of the House 
of Commons during his speech made on 25 February 1831. At the same time 
he also informed the House exactly how the commissioners of the civilian 
Boards had cobbled together the various sums, 
his predecessors in office had reduced 
practically, the estimates for timber, 
and the materials for building ships, 
and for keeping cur arsenals in such a 
state as that war should not take us at 
a disadvantagecus surprise; that is, the 
estimates voted for these specific 
purposes by that House were not entirely 
expended under these heads, and the 
difference between the sum actually expended 
and that voted, was appropriated to other 
i tems ... the actual expenditure 
under which exceeded the sums specified in 
the voted estimate. [321 
As an example, Graham cited the estimates annually submitted to Parliament 
for timber and building. Over a period of four years, 13.7m had been 
requested by the Navy Board and voted by Parliament but actual expenditure 
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had only been '12.675m over this same period. The annual surplus 
appropriated to other items and "the general outlay under the head 'Naval 
Departments'. was thus made to square one way or another". [33] 
During this same speech Graham also chose to explain his 
understanding of the background to this misappropriation of voted sums. 
He began by referring to the Appropriation Act 'one of the first Acts that 
succeeded the Restoration'. In laying down the right of the House of 
Commons to sanction appropriate amounts to particular branches of the 
public service, Graham appears to have suggested that: 
By this Act the Commons obtained for 
themselves, not alone the right of 
fixing the whole quantum of Supplies, 
but likewise, a recognition of their 
right to appropriate it to particular 
branches of the public service. [34] 
Graham then went on to quote John Hatsell, the former clerk of the Ilouse 
of Commons whose "Precedents" had become a standard work of reference. 
But Hatsell in his Precedents says, the 
Navy was an exception to the general rule; 
and it appeared, that down to 1795, when 
his book was published, the Naval Estimates 
differed from other Supplies, and Hatsell 
assigns as a reason fcr this, that there is 
always great difficulty in forming the Naval 
Estimates, from the very nature of the 
Service, which is exposed to more casualties 
than any other. There was the difficulty in 
obtaining information respecting ships on 
fcreign stations; the quantum of repair needed 
by such vessels; and the many unforseen 
circumstances against which there cculd be no 
provision, which were continually liable to 
arise ... 
[351 
Howevert that exemption to which Hatsell referred, was actually brought to 
an end in 1798. In that year Parliament finally extended the 
Appropriation Act to encompass the Navy. From that time onwards, 
parliament began to regularly vote money to the Navy under various 
heads, with this money, theoretically, spent accordingly, 
But althcugh Parliament had declared, 
175 
I 
legislatively, that there should be 
no difference, yet practically this had 
been disregarded, and the gross sum was, 
as before, applied to the service 
generally. [ 361 
Having brought all this to the attention of Parliament, Graham was 
performing an essential task. It was his intention to ensure that the 
procedures laid down by the Appropriation Act would now be enforced and 
that the Navy would not only bring forward its estimates under separate 
heads but would also spend accordingly. As Graham stated, 
the time was arrived to give full effect 
to the change which took place in 1798; 
and that the authority of Parliament 
should be enforced, in the regulation of 
Supplies for the Naval Service, in the 
same manner as it was in other services. [371 
This ' approach which Graham took to the estimates cannot technically be 
considered a reform. He was merely correcting an abuse by bringing the 
various naval branches into line with pre-existing laws. However, he did 
make a few significant changes. Most important of these was that of 
making a clear distinction between monies allocated to the Navy and 
Victualling Boards. In addition, Graham also classified under distinct 
heads the expenditure of the several sub-branches of these two 
departments. Previously, monies voted to the various branches within the 
two Boards had been treated as a total sum that might be used by either 
Board as deemed necessary by the commissioners who composed the two Boards 
and without making further reference to Parliament. On this point, 
Graham Infcrmed members of the lower chamber, 
I 
At first this appeared to him [Sir James 
Graham] a matter of minor importance; but 
when he came to investigate the accounts and 
papers submitted to him in his own office, 
he was led to believe that it was a wise and 
salutary measure, as it prevented much 
inconvenience from the intermingling of 
accounts, and militated against the 
practice of throwing the surplus of one 
department into the deficiency of another. [38] 
In preparing this new approach to the naval estimates, Graham had 
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already met with a degree of opposition. Both Chetwynd Stapylton and Sir 
Isaac Woolley, Chairman and Deputy Chairman, respectively, of the 
Victualling Board had indicated in a report sent to Graham that the 
putting together of accurate estimates was really not possible. [39] With 
regard to this report, Graham indicated some of its content, the two 
representatives of the Victualling Board indicating it to be their belief, 
that the naval service was of that peculiar 
nature, so dependent upon contingencies, that 
it would be impossible to specify beforehand 
the actual outlay under each head, and that the 
thing must be done, in a manner, in the gross; 
the surplus of one item making good the deficit 
of another, and thus the whole expenditure 
squaring with the sum of the estimate. [40] 
Sir George Clerk, a former Commissioner on the Board of Admiralty, took a 
similar view when replying to Graham's speech on 25 February. Clerk drew 
attention to a similar attempt made by the American Congress and 
consequently 'abandoned as impracticable', 
The American Congress was even mcre jealcus 
with respect to the administration of the 
public money than was the Hcuse of Commons, 
and yet they had abandoned the schemes which 
the right hon. Baronet [Graham] was now 
abcut to try. [41] 
To ensure that sums voted were expended under the correct heads 
with only small amounts transferred between votes, Graham also turned his 
attention to the matter of accountability. In order to allow comparison 
between departments, for instance, he had moved the calculation of the 
balance from 1 January to 1 April [421, so bringing the Navy in-line with 
the majority of other departments. [ 43] Of even greater importance, was a 
decision to lay cut the naval accounts in a different way. This 
automatically prevented a direct comparison being made with naval 
expenditure under previcus administrations while outwardly appearing 
somewhat intricate. It was a point that members of the Opposition latched 
upo I n. croker, for instance, declared it to be -perfectly impossible to 
have a more complex or a worse system' believing the previous system to 
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have been 'clear, concise and accurate'. Although on this occasion, 
Graham merely stated that the new styled lay out had 'an appearance of 
Intricacy and confusion' which would disappear in future years, he had 
already answered the point in a previous speech. When first announcing 
the new system in February he had stated that if the Hcuse wculd 
insist upon this estimate being drawn in the 
same way for the future, and then, In every 
subsequent year, compare the items, and 
demand how each individual sum had been 
expended, every hon. Gentleman would be able 
henceforth to understand the Navy Estimates, 
which was more, he believed, than any hon. 
Gentleman could say he had been able to do 
in former years. [44] 
further aspect of this accountability, and faming a second 
component in the series of pre-abolition reforms was the actual laying 
before Parliament of the naval accounts at the end of each year. 
Surprisingly, this was something not previously undertaken by Parliament, 
with all departments of state merely required to submit their estimates 
for a vote. Graham himself admitted some surprise at the situation when 
announcing this important innovation: 
He [Graham] was now about to state 
something, In which, no doubt, his hon. 
friend, the Member for Middlesex 
[Joseph Hume], would fully agree with him. 
They had often together fought the 
estimates when anncunced for the current 
year, but they had omitted one thing, of 
the necessity of which their long sitting 
in Opposition cught to have convinced 
them, they had omitted to insist on the 
means of knowing what was the actual 
expendi ture. [ 45] 
To his mind therefcre, the only remedy, 
was to lay before the Hcuse annually a 
balance sheet, in which would be 
specif ically placed under each head, the 
actual expenditure of the Navy and 
Victualling Boards. [46] 
Despite the pioneering nature of this move, with naval expenditure 
received in the fashion described two years later, Parliament was slow to 
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recognise the importance of' the move. Despite the obvious increase of 
power, the lower House singularly failed to press other departments to 
make a similar voluntary gesture. Indeed, it was not until 1846 that 
further departments, in the form of the Ordnance and War Off ice, allowed 
their accounts to be so reviewedj 471 
The presentation of the Navy accounts in February 1832 not only 
allowed the House to review actual expenditure but presented Graham with 
the opportunity of showing his critics that the Navy estimates could be 
brought forward with the degree of accuracy which he claimed. on 13 
February he told the Supply Committee that, 
The Supply voted last year had been more 
than sufficient to cover the expenditure; 
and only in two particulars had the 
Estimates been exceeded. [481 
As for the two areas in which an excess of expenditure was shown to have 
occurred (victualling, timber and materials) Parliament had been asked for 
an additional vote to cover the shortfall. Previous administrations, on 
the other hand, would simply have indiscriminately transferred the money 
from any branch seen to be under-spending. Thus Graham had proved it to 
be perfectly possible to produce estimates that, in a normal year, would 
allow the various branches of the Navy to run efficiently without a 
wholesale transferral of sums. In addition, this same set of estimates 
allowed Graham to achieve a second important objective, that of beginning 
the financial year in April. Most departments, so it was realised, had, 
by the end of the normal year, sufficient sums available 'to carry on the 
navy service' for those additional three months. As a result, the Navy 
year for 1831 began on 1 April and was so continued. 
Of course, Graham gas no miracle worker. All this had been 
achieved through the simple expedient of presenting a set of deliberately 
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estimates. However, it was the constitutional approach and the one that 
Graham preferred. While it may have meant an immediate increase over the 
previous year's estimates, as presented by the soon to be ousted Tory 
administration, it at least meant that any expenditure undertaken had 
received parliamentary approval. As it happens, the accounts, once 
produced, and as might be expected when spending was overseen by a 
committed economiser, showed that actual expenditure was considerably down 
upon previous years. It just meant that during his first full year Graham 
had to endure Opposition complaints that, when the approved estimates were 
considered, he had failed to make any real savings. 
As for the actual economies that were made, and as it happens there 
were a great many, several of these resulted from changes in the running 
of the civilian branches. These fcrm the third and f inal component of 
Graham's pre-abolition reform package. As a starting point, it should be 
mentioned that the First Lcrd reduced the number of Navy Commissioners by 
two while cutting back on clerks employed with the Navy Office. The two 
commissioners removed from the Board were one of the two surveycrs and 
the Superintendent of Transports. Both were logical reductions for an 
economically minded administrator. That the Navy Board possessed two 
Surveyors was a clear extravagance, few earlier Boards possessing joint 
Surveyors during any period of extended peace. Indeed, the 
order-irr-Council of 1829, which had introduced a number of changes to the 
Boardos composition had sanctioned only one Surveyor. [491 That this had 
not been enforced resulted from an agreement that neither of the two 
Surveyors should actually be dismissed, tut that upon one of them retiring 
he should not be replaced. Graham merely speeded up the process, allowing 
Joseph Tucker to retire on a generous pension. [501 To Parliament, once 
the new arrangement had been finalised, Graham announced himself convinced 
that "all the efficient duties of the two were performed by the present 
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&irveycC. [ 511 In preparing for the retirement of one Surveyor, the 
number of clerks in the &irveyor"s office was reduced by two, leaving a 
chief clerk and one third class clerk. 
A similar process was followed with regard to the &iperintendent of 
Transports: Courtenay Boyle also retired and was not replacedL[52] He had 
been the least hard-worked of all the Navy Commissioners, because the 
government now made considerably less use of hired vessels for the 
transport of supplies, convicts and military personnel. Prior to his 
retirement, Boyle had overseen the closing down of his own particular 
branch of the service, the ten clerks employed within the branch having 
been removed, by the end of 1830, to other branches of the service. [531 
Other savings were also made at the expense of the Navy Board and 
its commissioners. The salary of the Deputy Comptroller, fixed at '1200 
per annum, in 1829, was reduced by 
f2DO in 1831. [541 In addition, the 
salary paid to the Comptroller was saved in its entirety upon the removal 
of Byam Martin from office. Although he was replaced by G. H. L. Dundas, 
the latter, already paid as a Commissioner on the Board of Admiralty, 
received no further remuneration. A point of interest here is that 
Dundas' appointment, created-a formal link between the two Boards and 
ensured Admiralty control of the inferior Board. [551 Finally, it 
shculd be noted, reductions were made in the Civil Architects branch, with 
the post of draftsman to the Civil Architect abolished and the salary of 
the second draftsman reduced by f150 per annum. 
A similar ranEre of savings was carried out within the Victualling 
off lee. As with the Navy Board, the VictuaUing Board was reduced by two 
Commissioners: the Deputy Chairman and a medical commissioner. The role 
of the Deputy Chairman had been primarily that of dealing with accounts. 
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However, as the appointment was usually given to a former naval officer, 
with the holder of the post, Isaac Woolley, no exception, Graham 
considered this a most inappropriate arrangement. For this reason he chose 
to abolish the commissionership, creating instead the office of Acccuntant 
General. This allowed him to. appoint an experienced accountant to 
undertake the work previously performed by the Deputy Chairman. The first 
and, as it turned out, the only holder of this post, was J. T. Briggs, 
Graham's own private secretary and former Assistant Secretary to the 
Victualling Board's Cash Committee. The reduction of one of the Board's 
medical commissioners was made, according to Graham, partly as a result of 
his own belief in individual responsibility. This was explained in a 
parliamentary speech: 
Now the theory for which he [Sir James 
Graham] had contended ... was, that 
the best security which the public had 
for the good conduct of its servants was 
undivided responsibility. Upon coming 
into office, he had found two Medical 
Commissioners, and, considering that 
number just the most improper one, and 
finding that one of them was ready to 
resign, it had been thought proper not to 
fill up the vacancy which this resignation 
made. [ 561 
It ý was also the case that Graham felt two medical officers to be 
superfluous. The duties performed by these two commissioners in peace 
time years were limited, with a second medical officer necessary only to 
visit the cut ports. On such occasions, the other would remain in London 
to, continue the work of the Board. However, Graham overcame this small 
problem by instructing the Victualling Board that they were to call upon 
the services of one of the two physicians at Grwnwich Hospital for 
inspection of medical facilities in the cut ports. [571 
The nature of two other off ices connected with the civilian 
administration of the Navy -was 
radically altered during this period, 
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namely those of Treasurer of the Navy and Paymaster and Deputy Adjutant 
of the Marines. Graham was able to achieve a considerable economy with 
regard to the Treasurer of the Navy when he carried out an earlier desire, 
as expressed in a parliamentary speech made in March 1830, of amalgamating 
the post of Treasurer with that of the Vio--Presidency of the Board of 
Trade. [581 In the case of the Paymaster and Deputy Adjutant of the 
Marines, a post that involved both civil and military duties, this was 
logically split into its two constituent parts. In other words, the civil 
duties, as performed under the guise of Paymaster, were taken over by a 
clerk experienced in accountancy. For this reason a new branch was 
created within the Navy Board, that of Marine Pay, with a former second 
class clerk, William Robinson, given the title Paymaster of Marines. The 
salary of the new post holder was fixed at 
1400 
per annum. [591 As for the 
purely military duties of the Deputy Adjutant, these were incorporated 
Into a new post, that of Inspector-General of Marines and at a salary of 
11000 per annum. [601 
A final economy of note was a reduction in salaries paid both to 
the First Lord and to the two secretaries belonging to the Board of 
Admiralty. Both the First Lord and Second Secretary saw a reduction in 
their salaries of 
1500 per annum, the former being announced in February 
1831 and the latter in March of that same year. Thus, during the debate 
on Naval estimates held in the House of Commons on 25 February 1831, the 
reduction in the Second Secretary's salary was known while the other was 
not, This allowed Sir George Clerk to make the following point: 
He [Clerk] recollected, that in a speech 
which the right hon. Baronet [Graham] had 
made from the Opposition side of the Hcuse 
last yearl he had said, that if there was 
one salary more than another which required 
reduction, it was the salary of the First 
Lord of the Admiralty. [61] 
Howeverv Clerk went on to point out that he was noto himself, in favour 
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of such a move. Alluding to the recently announced reduction of the 
Second Secretary's salary, Clerk intimated that the Government had done 
mcre than simply reducing it by twenty-f ive per cent -they had reduced the 
dignity of the office', [621 
In reply to Clerk's observations, Graham went on to assure 
the right hon. Baronet [Sir George Clerk] 
and the House, that his [Graham's] opinion 
on the subject had undertaken no alteration; 
and further, that it was not owing to any 
omission on his part that his salary had not 
been reduced. He had already stated, as he was 
sure the House would recollect, that the 
salaries of all the ministerial offices in 
Parliament were under the consideration of a 
Committee. Under these circumstances, and 
considering he was not the most proper 
person to fix the amount of his own salary, 
the amount of that salary remained unchanged; 
but he begged to assure the House, that he 
should consider any salary which might be 
awarded to him as larger than any humble service 
of his could deserve. [631 
The Committee to which Graham referred was the Select Committee on 
Reductions of Salaries, this body giving consideration to a wide range of 
ministerial salaries. Not only did it recommend the reduction of Graham's 
salary by 
1500, so giving the First Lord an annual salary of 
14,500 tut it 
also recommended that the First Secretary of the Admiralty should have a 
salary reduced by 11000. As with the first recommendation, this was also 
accepted, with the newly appointed First Secretary, the Hon George Elliot, 
receiving 12000 per annum tut with a provision for his receiving an 
increase of f5OO after five years service. [64] 
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3.3 The Civil Boards Abolished 
On I June 1832 the fate of the Navy and Victualling Boards was 
finally sealed when the Naval and Civil Departments Bill was officially 
placed on the statute books. This piece of legislation not only abolished 
the two remaining civilian boards but also established future arrangements 
for administering the navy's civilian facilities. In essence, the 
Admiralty was now to have direct control, with actual management of those 
areas once the responsibility of the two Boards, placed in the hands of 
five principal officers. These officers, who formed neither a separate 
board nor were members of the Board of Admiralty, consisted of the 
Surveyor General, Accountant General, Storekeeper General, Superintendent 
of the Victualling Department and Superintendent of the Medical 
Department. Each was to be appointed by warrant and superintended by one 
of the Lord Commissioners of the Admiralty. To facilitate this latter 
arrangement, the Board of Admiralty was increased by one member so that It 
would consist of the First Lord and five commissioners. [65] 
Before carrying out a more detailed examination of the new 
structure that was introduced by this legislation, it is interesting to 
speculate on just how long the plan had been in existence. It is not 
inconceivable, for instance, that such an idea had been initially posited 
by St Vincent. If so, it may have been passed on to Grey prior to his own 
tenure at the Admiralty when he might have hoped to have introduced the 
scheme some three decades earlier. The evidence for such an idea comes 
from Sir John Barrow. As a long-serving Second Secretary, for he had 
f irst taken office in 1804, Barrow must be considered a well Informed 
witness. Furthermoreq given that he was politically neutral, trusted by 
Tory and Whig ministers alike, he must also be regarded as an extremely 
reliable witness to passing events. Doubtless, then, he was calling upon 
knowledge gleaned at some earlier point in time when he declared in his 
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Iý autobiography that Grey, when himself First Lord, had hoped to introduce a 
plan suggested to him by St Vincent ýtut to accomplish which he either 
found the difficulties too strong, or could find none ready to second him 
effectually'j 661 Barrow makes no clear reference as to what Grey 
contemplated at the time but does comment as follows upon Grey's return to 
off ice in 1830, 
Lord Grey, however, it was said, had now 
come into office, as First Minister of 
the Crown, with an understanding - cc at 
least a determined resolution - that the 
changes suggested by Lcrd St Vincent 
should be accomplished. [ 671 
However, in having verified Barrow's reliability, it must be stated that 
his own recollection of events seemingly conflicts with those held by 
Graham and subsequently presented to a Parliamentary Select Committee of 
1861. This looked into the workings of the Board of Admiralty, with 
Graham informing members that upon his first appointment to the Admiralty, 
Grey had given him a free hand, with the new First Lord merely informed 
that he would probably settle upon 'concentration' as the most likely 
solution to an efficient administrative system. However, this said, it 
remains more than likely that Barrow's statement is the more correct. 
Af ter all, when he made this ststement he had no particular axe to grind, 
merely wishing to set down on paper the truth as he saw it. Graham, on 
the other hand, who by 1861 was a statesman of considerable standing, 
would have been less inclined to admit that he had once been totally 
subservient to Grey. Furthermore, by the time that he had appeared before 
that Select Committee, a period of nearly thirty years had elapsed. 
Finally, Barrow's autobiography offers one more piece of evidence. In a 
conversation with Graham, which Barrow claims took place upon the former's 
appointment to the Admiralty, Graham is quoted as having spoken in the 
following terms: 
I may mention, that the whole of the Civil 
Boards at Somerset-House are to be abolished, 
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b 
and varicus changes to be made in all the 
departments of the naval service. [681 
Barrow, himself, in continuing this conversation, went on to observe that 
fcrmer Admiralty Boards (Melvilles was an example) had mooted the 
possibility of combining the Victualling and Navy Boards. "No; that is 
not sufficient, " came Graham's reply. Barrow continues to quote him, 
Lord Grey and the Cabinet have detailed, 
that they shall all be abolished, as Boards, 
and that the Navy Board and all others shall 
merge in the Board of Admiralty. [691 
Barrow then indicates that he questioned Graham as to what provision would 
be made for the superintendence of the 'detail'. However, choosing not to 
wait for an answer he suggested that 'perhaps it is meant that each branch 
of the naval service shall have a separate superintending officer, to be 
charged with his own individual responsibility? ' 
"You have exactly it, " he [Graham] said, 
apparently pleased; "that was precisely 
Lord Grey's idea, expressed to me nearly 
in the same wcrds: - 'individual respons- 
ibility' - instead of the combined and 
often contradicting acts and opinions of a 
Board of eight or ten persons; and on this 
basis, " he added, "I must beg you to 
sketch cut the outline of a plan. "[701 
All this, of course, raises the issue of Barrow's own involvement in the 
scheme that eventually replaced the civilian boards. If the Second 
Secretary's account is to be believed, and there seems little reason to 
doubt it, then he must have produced much of the detail to the outline 
seemingly handed to Graham by the Prime Minister. Indeed, the question 
might well be asked as to whether Graham had any real involvement, other 
than that of acting as the messenger between Grey and the civil servants 
employed within the Admiralty. 
As fcr that final plan, this appears to have been completed by the 
end of the: foUowing year. 'For, in December 1831, a thirteen page 
document, outlining most oE the points subsequently incorporated into the 
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Naval Civil Departments Bill, was submitted to Lcrd Grey. In the 
accompanying letter, which was signed by Graham, the premier was asked to 
return the document 'with his opinion and suggestions' befcre it was 
submitted to the King. [711 The document begins with a simple reiteration 
of the need for the civilian Boards being 'placed under the direction and 
superintendence of one supericr and undivided authority. ' In giving 
reasons, it was stated that the existing system, 
is in direct contradiction to the 
principle of undivided responsibility; 
and the whole history of the Civil 
concerns of the Navy, from the first 
establishment of the Dock Yards to the 
present time, exhibits the fatal effects 
of clashing interests and rival powers. [72] 
References were then made to the civil Boards having disregarded orders 
which, in turn, had led to over-expenditure, wastefulness and abuse, while 
great inconvenience had been experienced 
from the Comptroller of the Navy and the 
Chairman of the Victualling Board, on a 
change of administration, not sharing the 
fate of their political friends and 
leaving cffice with them. [731 
Indeed, it was noted that members of the subordinate Boards, because of 
their appointment by Patent, were inclined to see themselves as 
independent of the Lord Commissioners of the Admiralty. 
Having established the urgent need that existed for a radical 
change in the civilian administration of the Navy, the writer went on to 
consider a number of practicalities. It was stated that a combining 
tcgether of all three naval departments would be necessary, with 'all 
three consolidated Departments' under one roof, so that ready and easy 
communication might at all times take place. It was noted that fcr such 
purposes the Admiralty, being in close proximity to Downing Street and 
Hcrse Guards, should have its office space increased. This, so it was 
felt,, could easily be achieved if the houses currently occupied by the 
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First Secretary and four naval lords were dispensed with and these 
officials given either new accommodation at Somerset House or a salary 'in 
lieu of a house provided at public expense'. [74] 
As regards the authority of those appointed to future Boards of the 
Admiralty, this would be secured in the following way: 
The patents appointing Commissioners 
of the Navy and Victualling must be 
revoked and henceforth no Commissioners 
in the Naval Service, excepting the 
Boards of Admiralty, should bear this 
ti tle. [ 751 
As a result, the Commissioners of the Admiralty wculd take responsibility 
for an duties previously performed by the two inferior Boards. 
Tackling the problem of how the Admiralty, during war time, would 
be able to perform both its normal duties and that of overseeing the 
civilian facilities, the writer indicated 'that a large portion of the 
business of each of the Boards consists in correspondence with the others 
- this interchange of correspondence has been ascertained to amount to one 
Eighth of the whole. '[761 It was also indicated that business would be 
carried out more efficiently if the division of labour was also removed 
for, 
with the division of labour arises also a 
clashing of authority, which the union would 
effectually remove, and business, now 
transacted with difficulty, would flow 
smoothly without the jar of opposing 
in teres t. [ 771 
To undertake the work once performed by the civilian Boards it was 
proposed 'to divide the whole consolidated business into five departments' 
and to be under the immediate superintendence of the Board. The f ive 
departments were listed as follows: 
1. The Department of the Surveyac of the Navy 
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2. The Department of the Accountant for Cash 
3. The Department of the Accountant for Stores 
4. The Department of the Accountant for Slops and Pursers Accounts 
5. The Medical Department 
As for the principal officers who were to be appointed to head each of 
these departments they were to be ýwithout a seat at the Board; and each 
cf them to be superintended by one Lord of the Admiralty [two was a 
suggested alternative] who will daily report to the Board most matters 
k 
arising in his department as he shall deem proper. [78] 
The document, itself, does not end at this point, going on to 
consider such detail as to who should be appointed to manaEre the various 
departments and which members of the Board of Admiralty would oversee each 
of the principal officers. However, further consideration of these points 
will be given in a later examination of the workings of the new system. 
All that needs be. added here is that the document also gave consideration 
to manaEpment of the cutports, it being considered that the various 
resident commissioners, also appointed by patent, had of ten held 
themselves to be co-equals of their own boards and inclined to question 
the orders they were given: 
It wculd be in vain, amidst such a conflict 
of passions and of interest, to expect that 
degree of zeal and asiduity in the discharge 
of public duties which can only be obtained 
from the Servants of the Crown when acting 
in due subcrdination, they are directed by 
one Supreme authcrity, which regulates their 
appointment and controls their conduct. [791 
Fcr this reason, so it was proposed, the commissioners of the dock and 
victual-ling yards were to be replaced by those holding the new rank of 
superintendent and appointed by Admiralty warrant. 
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IE Grey did make any detailed comments, these appear to be no 
lmger in existence. Certainly there is no record of correspondence on 
this matter held either among the Graham papers in the Cumbria Record 
Office nor the Howick collection held at Durham University. But given 
that there are few changes between the discussion document and the framing 
of the final bill, then Grey was presumably quite happy with Graham's 
written submission. Things, though, could hardly have been otherwise, I '- 
given that Graham was following his masters Instructions and would 
undoubtedly have recived a good deal of verbal advice and encouragement 
daring the period in which the docament was framed. 
The Navy Civil Departments Bill introduced in the Hcuse of Commons 
I" was given its first reading on 14 February 1832. In his opening speech, 
Graham directed himself to the problems that existed between the Admiralty 
and the two inferior Boards: 
Doubtless the King could revoke the patent 
of either of them, whenever the Crown was 
so advised, but it was unusual. These two 
Boards appeared to hold their existence by 
a similar tenure, though different from the 
Board of Admiralty, and they had been at all 
times held to be subordinate to that Board; 
yet, nevertheless, those subordinate Boards 
had at all times continued to divide the power 
and thwart the views of that Board presumed 
to be set in authority over them. [801 
Having, therefore, outlined the basic reason for the bill, Graham then 
went on to highlight areas in which the civilian Boards had carried out 
expenditure upon its own authority rather than that of Parliament or 
AdmiraltYs 
The individual who brings forward the 
estimates is, I am well aware, responsible 
for their correctness; yet when they have 
once been voted, the Admiralty has no 
control over the expenditure of those sums; 
they are issued by the Treasury on the 
requisition of the Navy and Victualling 
Boards. [811 
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To illustrate this point, Graham made reference to the Melville naval 
hospital at Chatham and the Cremil Victualling Yard which, between them, 
had seen unauthorised expenditure amounting to 1230,096. 
Although a few points were raised against the Bill during the first 
reading, Vhe opposition embarked upon a concerted campaign during the 
second reading which took place on 27 February. Spearheading this attack 
was former First Secretary J. W. Croker. He made a particularly eloquent 
and reasoned speech, highlighting several areas in which he thought the 
new arrangements to be weak. The mainspring of his argument however, was 
that the five principal officers would be recipients of power without 
responsibility. As Croker pointed out, all of them would be experts in 
their own field reporting to a group of senior naval officers whose own 
expertise was limited to that of strategy together with the handling of 
men and ships. In fact, it would be surprising if any of them really 
understood the principles that underlay the dockyards, contracting or 
medical matters. As a result, they would be at a distinct disadvantage 
when called upon to assess the work of their subordinates: 
If such a system was attempted, he [Croker] 
knew very well what must happen. The 
subordinate man would do all the business. 
It could not be otherwise. And then, if 
he [Croker] was ccrr ct in this position, 
might he not ask, whether it would not be 
better to give the subordinate responsibility, 
as well as the business? [821 
Additionally, however, Croker brought attention to a range of other 
shortcomings that he called upon Graham to explain. Among these was an 
apparently farcical arrangement whereby each member of the Board of 
Admiralty had absolute authority when it came to taking decisions but had 
to call upon a second member of that same Board to sign papers required 
fcr the putting of these same instructions into practice. As Croker 
explained, 
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One Lord was to be enough to decide all 
questions - to execute the whole practical 
service; but to do the fcrmal part of the 
business, in which there was no discretion 
or responsibility whatsoever, two Lords 
were to be necessary. [831 
As for an appointed member of the Board of Admiralty taking responsibility 
for f inancial affairs, Croker was particularly pertinent when he 
proclaimed, 
But the most important of the whole, was 
the accounting branch. For his own part, 
he had not been lucky enough to meet with 
many naval officers who would condescend to 
turn their attention to a thing so much 
beneath them, or at least so remote from 
their habits and their usual duties, as the 
mysteries of book-keeping; and, at all events, 
he might safely assert, that there were 
very few men of any but the mercantile 
profession, who were capable of keeping 
accounts with that accuracy and technicality 
which would be necessary for such an important 
off ice. [841 
Because of the various difficulties that he outlined, and the lil4ihood 
that real decisions, as regards the civilian facilities, would be taken by 
the principal officers, Croker felt it necessary to sugoest that these 
five subordinate individuals be formed into a distinct Board: 
If the rt. hon. Baronet [Sir James Graham] 
would constitute these inferior officers into 
a Board of five, the whole would equally come 
under the general superintendence and control 
of the Board of Admiralty. The proposition 
would make no alteration to the rt. hon. Baronet's 
plan, except the placing the responsibility where 
it really should lie. [85] 
To strengthen his case, Croker also pointed out that both France and the 
U. S. A. had recently established their own navy boards on very similar 
lines to those which Graham was now threatening to abolish, 
It was but a few years agD, that the French 
established a Board similar to our Navy 
Board, which was called the Council of 
Admiralty. It had, he believed, some of the 
duties of air Admiralty Board to perfcrm; 
but it had all of the duties of our Navy 
Board ... America had also within a 
few years established a Navy Board. He had 
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that day looked at the Act of Congress. Yet, when 
that was the case - when cur nearest neighbotir 
and more frequent enemy, and our youngest and 
greatest naval rival, were both establishing 
Navy Boards; we, rejecting their experience, 
and our own, took the first opportunity of 
pulling down that most ancient and admirable 
establishment, which those other nations were 
endeavcuring to imitate. [86] 
A second Opposition speaker on this occasion was Sir Thomas Byam 
Martin. He drew attention to the increased amount of work which fell upon 
the Admiralty under this arrangement, suggesting that the work load would 
create an impossible situation. He drew the attention of his fellow M. P. s 
to the immense amount of documentation, which he estimated to be in excess 
of 150,000 letters, papers and account books, handled by the two civilian 
Boards. Under this new arrangement, all of this would now fall on to the 
lap of the Admiralty, 
but it was absolutely impossible that they 
should use them - they must send them to 
the Navy Office before they did. To give 
an idea of the magnitude of the correspondence, 
he would merely state to the House that the 
postage had amounted to no less a sum than 
4601 in one day. [871 ' 
A further attack upon the bill was mounted during the committee 
stage, 6 April 1832. Martin once more entered the fray, returning to the 
issue of the Admiralty becoming overwhelmed with documentation: 
How the same Board could perfcrm all the 
duties of the present subordinate Boards, 
with only the addition of one Lord of the 
Admiralty, he would have Mr Barrow to 
explain, as it was said the plan of the 
rt. hon. Baronet had the sanction of that 
gentleman. [881 
A greater part of this second speech however, was also directed to the 
issue of defending the Navy Board against the numerous charges made by 
Graham but especially those concerning the use of pub3. ic money, 
Another complaint which had been raised by 
the Rt. hon. Baronet was, that wcrks had 
been undertaken without the sanction of 
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Parliament, but that was no censure on the 
Navy Board, for they were done by orders 
from the Admiralty. He challenged the 
rt. hon. Baronet to establish one instance 
of resistance or disobedience to the orders 
of the Admiralty on the part of the Navy 
Board, and he would ask the rt. hon. Baronet 
whether he or any other person at the head of 
that department would submit to any dictation 
or disobedience from the Navy Board? [89] 
Cockturn, during the committee stage, also reiterated the 
difficulties involved in members of the Board of Admiralty taking direct 
responsibility for such an increased'wcrk load. He felt that this, in 
turn, would throw much of the decision making back upon the principal 
off icers: 
Allowing, however, that the Lcrds of the 
Admiralty were most anxious to attend to 
all detail, it would be impossible for 
them to do so, and properly discharge 
their other duties, especially in war time, 
when the movements of the fleet would 
necessarily occupy so much of their 
attention. He was certain, therefore, 
that the plan must, in this case, be so far 
modified, as to place responsibility in the 
persons of the subordinate chiefs of 
departments, or the whole service would soon 
come to a standstill. [901 
Henry Goulturn, Chancellor of the Exchequer in Wellington's 
administration, raised a point that related to the frequent changes that 
took place at the Board of Admiralty. During the canmittee stage he said 
of the bill. that it stated, 
that everything should be done at the 
Admiralty. Why? The Admiralty was a 
Board necessarily changed with every 
change of Administration. What then would 
be the situation of the Medical and 
Victual-ling Departments, for instance, of 
the naval service? The Victua3ling service 
was to be intrusted to a Lord of the 
Admiralty. He had no doubt that a 
Gentleman coming into that department, and 
applying himself with zeal and assiduity to 
a knowledge of his duties, might soon master 
its details; but by the time he acquired 
that knowledge, or even before, he might, 
from official changes, be removed, and 
another individual would have to learn the 
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details of the office. [91] 
Graham, during both the second reading and committee stage produced 
a reasoned, though somewhat partial, defence of the bill. This may, of 
course, have been due to the large number of specific criticisms made 
against the new arrangements or, alternatively, through a simple lack of 
argument. Most certainly, Graham never countered a number of the very 
specific points raised by both Croker and Cockturn during the debate on 
the second reading. Instead, he tended to dwell upon the seemingly 
safer area of why the reforms were necessary in the first place, once 
again ridiculing the civilian boards for their mis-use of funds. Proving 
the rare exception however, was Graham's attempt at the seemingly 
impossible task of explaing how Admiralty commissioners would be able to 
undertake both the new tasks of overseeing the civilian facilities while 
also conducting the work that they had previously carried out. Yet, 
even with regard to this, he was less than convincing, flippantly 
declaring that much of the work that had been independently performed by 
one civilian board had simply created work for the other. In the 
committee stage, rather than expanding upon that earlier statement, he 
appears to have been carried away by his own rhetoric, when he informed 
those present that, 
fcrty clerks wculd be sufficient to do the 
business, instead of seventy, as at present, 
so that the expense of thirty clerks wculd be 
thus saved to the public, besides introducing 
a degree of promptitude into the proceedings 
which the machinery at present tended much to 
check. [921 
On a further point Graham also chose to make a replyp tackling the 
suggestion that a separate board might be created. This, so he informed 
Croker, would contain much of the present system ýand would open the door 
for an insufficiency of control on the part of the Admiralty. It would be 
the shadow of the plan he advocated, butt the substance would partake too 
much of the old arrangement'. 
[941 Yet, in making this reply Graham, 
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once again, side stepped the entire issue. Croker, of course, had not 
elaborated on the idea, but both he and Graham were aware that any new 
board could easily have been restricted as to the amount of power it 
possessed. In addition, the civilian boards, by right of long tradition, 
had heaped upon themselves a great deal of additional authority which 
could also have been stripped from this new board. Finally, if such a 
board had been created, then it would have freed the Admiralty of its 
future heavy involvement in the material side of naval affairs. That the 
period which immediately post-dated the reforms was one of peace was, for 
Graham's future reputation, markedly fortunate. Any sudden entry into a 
long drawn cut conflict, as subsequently demonstrated by the Russian War, 
would have shown the claims made by Cockburn, Croker and Martin to have 
been correct. Furthermore, given the hostility that these three felt 
towards Graham, it is unlikely that they would have held back from 
reminding him of their earlier claims. However, such a war did not break 
cut, with Grahamýs reforms surviving intact for approximately two decades. 
By that time, and for reasons to be explained, the system as instituted 
in 1832 was neither condemned nor entirely abandoned. During those 
intervening years of peace it. had been made to work, a factor for which 
Graham, an enthusiast for the minutiae of administrative detail, was 
primarily responsible. [951 
In all, Graham's parliamentary perfcrmance in defence of the Navy 
Civil Departments Bill, while eloquent and forceful, was nevertheless 
seriously flawed. He simply could not sustain a convincing argument in 
the face of so many experienced opponents to the scheme. For this reason, 
he was continually forced to return to the one issue where credibility was 
his, that of the earlier mis-use of public funds. As for the reasons 
behind this weak parliamentary stance, this arose from Graham having 
willingly agreed to the request of his mentor, the 2nd Earl Grey, to 
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accept the post of First Lord for the purpose of consolidating the navy's 
three administrative boards. In single-mindedly pursuing this task, he 
passed over a wealth of experience, not only ignoring the views of Croker, 
Cockburn and Martin, as expressed in Parliament, but also those of Lord 
Wville. [961 Between them, these four individuals possessed some 75 
years direct experience of naval administration. Clinging, instead, to 
the views of an ageing premier, he was exposed to the views of a man whose 
own experience of government office, given the position he now held, was 
unusually limited, encompassirg as it did a mere six months at the 
Admiralty - and that twenty-five years earlier. 
The Bill had yet to be brought before the Lords. Here, Lord 
Auckland was responsible for its introduction, moving the second reading 
on 23 flay. He was another who lacked experience of naval administration, 
for at that time he had. neither been, nor was currently, a member of the 
Board of Admiralty. Not surprisingly, therefore, especially in view cf 
the number of Admirals and serving naval officers who constituted the 
I upper chamber, Auckland's speech was shcrt and to the point. In fact, he 
did little more than claim that 'the advantage of this arrangement would 
be increased despatch in the business, and a considerable saving of 
expense'. Among those who spoke against the bill was Lord Ellenborougb. 
He took up the Issue of expertise, pointing cut that It was Impossible for 
ýany naval man' to be as good an accountant as those 'whose education had 
been calculated for such duties'. [97] Lord Napier, on the other hand, 
supported the bill and chose to take issue with Ellenborough. lie 
considered professional men 'to be as capable of conducting the business 
of the country as any member of the Lordships' House'. [98] 
Having, therefore, passed thrcugh the varicus stages necessary, the 
Navy Civil Departments Bill was placed on the statute books. Graham, for 
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his part, having successfully steered this piece of legislation through 
Parliament, had now to turn his attention to other matters. In 
particular, he had to attend to the practicalities of disassembling an 
organisation that could boast a continuous existence of more than 170 
years and replacing it with an untried alternative. 
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THE CIVIL DEPARTMENTS WITHIN THE ADMIRALTY 
4.1 Introduction 
Saturday 9 June 1832 gave the outward appearance of being a normal 
day for the commissioners appointed to the navy's two remaining civilian 
boards. As on any other business day, these individuals were to be seen 
making their respective ways to the west side of Somerset House where the 
two boards had their meeting rooms. But for the two groups of 
commissioners, the meeting that ensued was far from typical of the many 
thousands that had been held since the reign of Charles II. On this 
occasion, and for both boards, there was but one i tem: of any real 
importance. This was the matter of their imminent demise. 
Earlier that same day two letters, one addressed to the 
Commissioners of the Navy and the other to the Commissioners for 
Victualling, had been written and dispatched from the Admiralty Office in 
Whitehall. Both had been signed by Second Secretary John Barrow and they 
informed the members of the two long standing boards that the patents by 
which they had been appointed were now revoked with management of all 
civilian branches of the Navy to be transferred to the Board of Admiralty. 
It further pointed out that their attendance at meetings of the two 
inferior boards was no longer required and that their respective 
secretaries, George Smith for the Navy Board and Clifton Waller for the 
Victualling Board, were to take charge of all books, accounts and other 
papers. These, in turn, were to be forwarded to the new principal 
officers who were to be responsible for administering the duties formerly 
carried out by the two boards. 
These letters were, of course, a mere formality. The commissioners 
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who constituted the inferior boards were more than aware that the Navy 
Civil Departments Bill had passed through all the necessary stages in 
parliament and had, only eight days earlier, been given royal assent. As 
a result, the commissioners of the two boards, upon having the letter read 
to them, chose not to debate the matter, but only to place on record a few 
matters pertinent to the immediate extermination of the boards. In 
particular, they wished to recognise the work of their respective 
secretaries and departmental clerks, some of whom were to be retired , while 
others would be transferred to the re-arranged departments to be 
established under the aegis of the Admiralty. Most succinct was the 
wording adopted by the Commissioners of the Navy. The Board's f inal 
minute, number 1064 for that year, simply declared, 
The Board having received intimation that the 
duties of the respective Commissioners composing 
it will cease and determine this day, take the 
opportunity before they leave office to express 
the satisfaction they have always felt and do now 
feel in having observed the attention and the 
alacrity which the gentlemen In the office have 
performed their various duties and they now beg 
the gentlemen to have their best thanks, and 
acknowledgpýments for the assistance they have on all 
occasions received from the Chief Clerks and every 
clerk in the office in conducting the public 
duties of this department. [11 
Subsequently signed by Commissioners Dundas, Thompson, Middleton and 
Seppings, together with Byam Martin, who appears to have been specially 
invited to attend this final board meeting, it was circulated around the 
office and ini tialled by each chief clerk. 
The Victualling Commissioners, for their part, chose to mark their 
passing in a very similar fashion: 
The Board cannot separate without leaving 
testimony to the zeal, attention and good 
conduct generally of the officers and 
clerks of this department and they 
especially desire to record their 
approbation of the conduct of the first 
and second class clerks of this office. 
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The Board have, at all times received 
from those gentlemen the most ready 
attention to their directions and the 
most cordial co-operation in all arrangements 
that they have made with the department and 
they desire, in according this opinion of 
the gentlemen of the Victualling Office to 
wish them health and success with their 
future position whether employed within 
public service or other occupation of life. [2] 
In addition however, the secretary, Clif ton Waller, who had served in that 
cff ice since January 1822, was allowed to make his own comments, these 
also placed into the minute book, 
The off ice which I had the honour to f ill for 
between ten and eleven years of secretary to the 
Victualling Board being about to expire by the 
abolition of the department. I cannot quit the 
office without expressing to all the gentlemen 
belonging to it my deep appreciation of their 
merits as zealous and faithful public servants 
and my warmest acknowledgements for the cordial 
and alle co-operation I have received from them 
in conducting the duties of the department. [3] 
Thus the Navy and Victualling boards ceased to have any further say in 
the running of the civil departments of the Navy. Grey had achieved his 
long cherished plan of removing a group of individuals whom he 
considered as neither constructive nor particularly efficient. However, 
the Tcries had argued that the arrangement introduced for the 
replacement of these two boards could hardly prove any more satisfactory. 
To this charge, the last chapter of this thesis will be directed. 
First, however, attention must be given to the precise nature of the new 
arrangement. 
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4.2 The New Administrative ArranEr-ment 
The Board of Admiralty, in assuming its new role of directly 
managing the civil departments, itself became subject to extensive reform. 
First and foremost, changes had to be introduced for efficiently managing 
the varicus branches and sub-branches cf the former navy and victualling 
boards. At no point was it intended that any form of replication of the 
fcmer boards should be introduced. Fcr this reason, the Canmissioners of 
the Admiralty retained all decision making powers. However, it was also 
recognised. that the Admiralty had a wider remit than merely supervising 
the civilian departments and that the commissioners would be unable to 
undertake all of the tasks involved. For this reason five completely new 
offices were created; they were designated as superintending posts, with 
each holder responsible for one area of civilian naval service. To offset 
any chance that they might acquire a degree of authority similar to the 
now defunct inferior boards, it was determined that these officers should 
neither meet as a body nor acquire powers in excess of those necessary for 
overseeing the day-to-day running of their respective departments. Above 
all else, none of these officers was to be responsible for policy 
decisions, this right being retained entirely by the Board of Admiralty. 
Usually referred to as 'principal officers, the new post-holders were 
designated as follows: 
1. Surveycr of the Navy 
Accountant General 
3. S tcre-Keeper General 
Comptroller of VictuaUing and Transports 
5. Physician of the Navy 
To ensure that none of the appointed principal officers would 
-betray their trust[41, each had a naval lord placed over him and having 
authority over him. It was to this commissioner that the principal 
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officer was to report, bringing to his attention all matters either of 
importance or requiring a decision. In turn, this same commissioner, in 
attending the daily board meetings, was to 'report to the Board such 
matters arising in his Department as he shall deem proper to be brought 
before it'. [51 
The principal officers, for their part, might well be seen as 
precursors of the modem civil servant. Unlike the navy and victualling 
commissioners they were neither allowed to enter parliament nor let their 
own partisan viewpoint influence the work they performed. However, as 
with those former commissioners, they did hold office by permanent tenure. 
in doing so, it was considered that they would supply continuity when 
administrations changed and the commissioners of the Admiralty were 
superseded. [61 In Parliament, while introducing the Navy Civil 
Departments Bill, Graham alluded to this particular point, indicating that 
the principal officers would, over time, obtain ýa competent knowledge of 
their duties' that could be used with benefit under succeeding 
administrations. [ 71 Similarly, in the important policy document that was 
submitted by Graham in December 1831 to the Prime Minister it was stated 
that -the general routine of the business would never be interrupted, the 
directing control alone wculd follow the change of Administration, and be 
naturally guided, as it ought to be imperceptibly by the General Policy of 
the Government'. [81 
To accommodate the new arrangements, the number of commissioners 
composing the Board of Admiralty had to be increased from four to five 
junicr lords. This was so that one junicr lord might head each 
department, so leaving the First Lcrd to undertake a more general 
overview. This allocation of specific duties had, in the past, always 
been rather ill-defined. In fact, the only clear division of duties had 
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been between the professional and civil lords. The former, because of 
their naval background, were always given tasks relating to the Fleet 
while the latter were assigned the routine business of signing 
documents. [9] As for the Increase In the number of junior lords, this had 
to be carefully defended in Parliament. One of the Whig successes during 
their years in opposition had teen that of bringing about an overall 
reduction in the numbers appointed to the Board of Admiralty, 
reducing it to four junior lords. [10] Graham, speaking before the House 
of Commons indicated that it was necessary to appoint a further junior 
lord in order to ensure an equitable distribution of the work involved. 
It was a strong case for increasing the number of commissioners, bearing 
in mind the overall savings that would result from the dismissal of the 
various commissioners of the two inferior boards. For this reason, no 
doubt, Graham had little hesitation in going on to recollect 
when he sat on the other side of the House, that 
he and his friends fought a very hard battle, in 
order to reduce the number of Commissioners from 
six to four, and they succeeded. He now wished, 
for the reasons which he had stated [and outlined 
above] to have five officers, one at the head of 
each department, who, with the First Lord, would 
form six functionaries. [ III 
In appointing a sixth commissioner a legal nicety had also to be 
confronted. In 1822, when the number of Junior lords was reduced, it had 
been enacted that not all items of business need be brought before the 
entire Board, it only requiring two lords to execute many of the more 
routine items. However, this same Act also stated that should there be 
six or more commissioners appointed, then the execution of such business 
would have to be undertaken by a minimum of three commissioners. while 
this, undoubtedly, was considered a valuable safeguard, it was 
inappropriate for a Board that had been expanded for the adoption of 
specific additional duties. The decision to allow two commissioners to 
conduct naval business was certainly approved in the December 1831 policy 
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document when it was stated that orders appertaining to the civil 
departments should be signed by two commissioners and then countersigned 
by the respective principal officer. [12] However, no reference was made 
to the earlier Act and it may have been the case that Graham (or Barrow) 
in framing this particular document, was unaware of the legal 
ramifications of increasing the number of commissioners to six. 
Eventually, though, this difficulty was recognised and a clause inserted 
into the Civil Departments Bill which stated that as a result of the 
increased duties ýit is expedient to autharise the Execution of any of 
their [the Commissioners of the Admiralty] Duties by two commissioners 
only,, 'even when such Commissioners shall be Six or more in Number"J13] 
Despite the appointment of a sixth commissioner to assist in 
overseeing the wcrk of the principal officers, very little attention was 
given to how these duties were to be carried cut. It has already been 
noted , that, during the debates upon the Bill, Graham avoided this 
particular question. He seemed unable to explain how a group of 
individuals, frequently changed for political reasons, were to acquire the 
necessary knowledge to correct any failings on the part of the permanent 
officials placed under them. Attention, at one time, was given to the 
idea of having two lords responsible for supervising each department. [14] 
However, such a system would not have created the need for ten junior 
lords as each would also have shared responsibilities for two of the civil 
departments. While the idea would not have solved the lack of expertise 
among members of the Board, it would certainly have ensured that any 
junior lords appointed in the mid-term of an administration would not be 
solely responsible for one department. Instead, they would be in a 
position to learn from the other commissioners with whom they jointly 
worked. In addition, as Graham pointed cut, 'this arrangement wculd 
habituate the Lords to the details of a more extensive range of business 
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[and] would provide fcr occasional absences of some members of 
the Board'. [151 
This whole question of providing effective supervision does not 
really appear to have been solved even after the principal officers had 
taken office. Certainly, during the period up until 1845 members of the 
Board of Admiralty never appeared to be in a position to exert the degree 
of control for which the Whigs under Grey appear to have striven. Partly 
this was due to the immensity of experience possessed by those appointed 
to the increasingly complex tasks of managing the various civil 
departments. Additionally, a degree of lethargy might have been involved. 
This was one factor highlighted by Barrow in his autobiographical memoirs 
and published two years after his retirement. He noted that, during the 
earlier period of the new scheme it was customary for the junior lords to 
visit, perhaps once a week, the offices of the civil departments which 
were, situated in Somerset House. Barrow considered such visits extremely 
useful: 
View them in no other light than as mere inspections 
of the different offices, they would have their 
advantage. "The eye of the master" was thought in 
older time to spur the attention of the servant. [16] 
However, despite their usefulness, Barrow noted that as the years passed, 
such visits became less frequent. As a result, the departments were left 
more to their own devices, with the superintending officers also called 
less frequently to Whitehall and asked, instead, to make reports only in 
wri ti ng. [ 171 
The difficulties of supervising the civil departments when the 
commissioners, themselves, were based in a separate building, was 
recognised at an early stage. In the December 1831 policy document it 
was noted that the Admiralty building, as it stood, was too small. it I 
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simply could not accommodate the five civilian departments. On the other 
hand, the Board of Admiralty, together with its office, could not transfer 
to Somerset House, as this was too distant from Whitehall and Horse 
Guards. [ 181 In September 1832, with the scheme to consolidate the 
departments of the Navy having been in operation for three months, Barrow 
subm it ted a memorandum on the subject. He noted two alternative 
solutions: that of constructing an additional wing to the Admiralty 
building or that of moving the Board of Admiralty, without the First Lord, 
to Somerset House. Having aired both these ideas, he then went on to 
reject both. He felt that the first proposal would be both expensive and 
inconvenient while the latter would suffer from the disadvantage of having 
the First Lord frequently absent from Board meetings. [19] 
Yet Barrow was far from pessimistic. He took the view that the 
split site was a positive advantage. The decision to retain both the 
Admiralty Office and civil departments within the tuildings they had long 
occupied meant that a potentially difficult period of re-adjustment had 
gone more smoothly than might have been expected: 
Nothing indeed could be more regular, 
nothing more easy and expedient, than 
the mode in which the Civil Affairs of 
the Navy are now administered, while the 
respective localities of the Board of 
Admiralty and its subordinate Departments 
maintain their places, and the arrangement 
as to the several offices left undisturbed, 
and preserved nearly as they stood previous 
to the change. [2D] 
Secondly, and regarded by Barrow as a long term advantage, was that the 
separation of the Board from the civil departments ensured the need for 
written instructions. Barrow, was fearful that should there be too much 
personal association, then important changes to the civil affairs of the 
Navy would be carried into effect as a result of passing conversations. 
As Barrow put itt 
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... if the supreme Board was too intimately blended with the subordinate departments, and the 
intercourse too frequent and unreserved, such 
cases would more commonly occur, especially if 
there should be a disposition to act upon 
conversation or even unwillingly to issue orders, 
or adopt measures, that might appear of too trifling 
a nature to wait upon the Instructions of the 
Board. [ 211 
At the time when Barrow was writing this memorandum, the scheme was still 
in its infancy, with those responsible for its implementation still 
members of the Board of Admiralty. It was later members of the Board who 
were to cease carrying cut these regular visits to which Barrow was 
witness. Ncr did the second secretary admit to understanding why they 
should end. Indeed, he saw every reason for their continuance, believing 
the 'walk along the Strand from Charing Cross' or 'to be landed at 
Somerset House in a boat from Whitehall Stairs' as anything but a toil, 
regarding it as an interesting break from the routine duties of 
office. [211 Clearly, the later members of the Board did not agree with 
their physically active secretary! 
**** 
The actual duties of the five principal officers, which will be 
given more detailed consideration in the next section, were not dissimilar 
in some ways from the Navy and Victualling commissioners whom they 
replaced. Indeed, two of the new office holders were former commissioners 
whose responsibilities were to remain virtually identical to those held 
prior to the abolition of the boards upon which they had served. In 
another two cases, former commissioners were also retained as principal 
off icers but taking slightly different tasks. In the f if th case however, 
that of Surveyor General, the officer responsible for dockyards and ship 
repairs, the new appointee had had no former experience in this role. 
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The two former commissioners who retained similar duties were Dr 
William Burnett and John Thomas Briggs. The former had been one of two 
medical commissioners who sat on the Victua3ling Board and he became 
Physician of the Navy. As such, he continued to take responsibility for 
the appointment of naval doctors, the ordering of medical supplies and the 
running of naval hospitals. John Briggs, who had also been a member of 
the former Victualling Board, had held the post of Accountant General. 
This title he retained, although he now had a slightly more extensive 
remit, taking responsibility not just for victualling and medical accounts 
but also those relating to the purchase of dockyard stores. 
James Meek and Robert Dundas were the two commissioners retained 
but given differing responsibilities. Meek had been a member of the 
Victual-ling Board with responsibility for the pursers' department. His 
duties, upon being appointed Superintendent of Victualling and Transport, 
were now much increased. Whereas previously he had had a rather 
restricted role on the Victualling Board he was now to take responsibility 
for all victualling matters not just those associated with the pursers- 
department. The appointment of Robert Dundas to the post of Storekeeper 
General is rather intriguing. Related, as he was, to Viscount Melville, 
the fomer First Lord, he does not appear to have been an obvious choice 
for a Whig administration. Yet Dundas showed himself willing to keep 
himself aloof from party politics and was being rewarded for the 
efficiency in which he had performed the duties of Deputy Comptroller. As 
Storekeeper General, he assumed the identical duties carried out by the 
Navy Board's own Storekeeper-General. The holder of that post was John 
Deas Thomson, who had been a commissioner for thirty-three years. In line 
for retirement, Thomson had not really expected to retain that post once 
the Navy Board had been abolished. 
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The most controversial figure to be appointed was that of William 
Symonds. Given the post of Surveyor General, he assumed responsibility 
for the dockyards and ships in ordinary. It was a post similar in scope 
to that formerly held by Robert Seppings, the Navy Surveyor. The Whigs, 
however, wanted a new man in that post, being unhappy with Seppings 
approach to the design of ships. Despite the wide choice of possible 
candidates, the Whigs elected to appoint a man with only limited 
experience of ship design and absolutely no familiarity with dockyard 
administration. This explains the controversy that was associated with 
this particular appointment. 
Although actual areas of responsibility might have been similar to 
those of the former commissioners, the nature of the duties of the five 
principal officers differed markedly in two respects. First and f cremost, 
and this is a point that has already been made clear, the principal 
officers lacked the same decision making role of their predecessors. 
Secondly, they also had a much greater supervisory role and were expected 
to become fully involved with the running of their departments and the 
overseeing of clerks. The Navy and Victualling commissioners, while also 
expected to fulfil a supervisory role, were much more inclined to rely 
upon others to undertake this aspect of their work. In particular, the 
secretaries of the two boards had been heavily involved in such work while 
most of the main branches had a chief clerk. Commissioners, therefore, 
chose not to duplicate this work, believing it to be amply covered by 
senior members of their own staff. Upon abolition of the two boards, not 
only were the two secretarial posts abolished, but opportunity was taken 
to retire most of the chief clerks. It was a move that not only reduced 
the overall sum paid in salaries but also emphasized the supervisory role 
that the principal officers were expected to perform. 
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4.3 The Principal Officers and their Departments 
In June 1832 the principal officers took up their posts. on that 
occasion they were each presented with a set of 'Skeleton 
Instructions'. [ 23] These came in two sections. The first was a series of 
generalised commands that were applicable to all five officers. FCr the 
most part concentration was upon matters of routine. The second was much 
narrower in scope, outlining the duties that were specific to each of 
those appointed. Although the instructions, both specific and 
general, were somewhat slender in content, they did ensure that each 
appointee knew both the extent of his duties and the limits to his 
authority. 
To those responsible for framing the new legislation, it was 
imperative that such guidelines should be laid down. Any confusion might 
lead to these officers acquiring the same independence once accorded to 
the former Navy and Victualling commissioners. This concern is clearly 
reflected in the issued instructions. An analysis reveals that 40% of 
their content is concerned with limitations to the authority of the 
principal officers. A further area of concern reflected by the OSkeleton 
Instructionso was the need for economy. In all, 35% of the numbered 
paragraphs that make up the specific part of these instructions either 
mention the need for economy or state how the officers should achieve a 
reduction of expenditure within their departments. 
in outlining the various limitations to the authority of each of 
the principal officers, the 'Skeleton Instructions, make it clear that 
they were not to act independently of the superintending 
commissioner placed over them. To this end, they were informed that they 
were not to be allowed to issue any general instructions, order stores and 
equipment or discipline or appoint those employed within the departments. 
All this lay strictly within the province of the Board of Admiralty. In 
matters of correspondence, each was told that he was allowed to write to 
others holding posts within the various naval departments but only upon 
minor matters. The Surveyor General was informed that 
in all professional details of matters 
connected with his duties in requiring 
information or requiring explanation on 
professional points he will be at liberty to 
correspond directly with the respective 
off icers of the yards but he is not to issue 
orders of a general nature, nor to enter upon 
any part of the general correspondence with 
the superintendents of the yard ... [241 
Similarly wcrded instructions were sent to all five officers, it being 
further pointed out that any general correspondence should be conducted 
thrcugh the Board -by their secretaries'. [25] 
In the general instructions, a very specific procedure was also 
laid down for the treatment of in-coming letters relating to the civil 
departments of the navy tut not in response to correspondence initiated by 
one of the five principal officers. All such letters were to be 
addressed to Admiralty Commissioners and such 
of those relating to the civil service win 
be sent from the Admiralty, in a box, to the 
Principal Officer relative for acting upon. 
For this purpose a messenger is to be 
appropriated to each department. [261 
The replies to such letters, providing orders were not required, were 
to be dated "Admiralty" and the answers thereto 
are to be addressed to him and put under cover 
to the Secretary to the Admiralty with the name 
of the department which they belong printed or 
written on the -lower corner of the cover. Copies 
of all such letters are to be written into books 
with suitable indices, open to the inspection of 
the overseeing Lord of the Admiralty whenever he 
may think f it to call f or them and the replies to 
such letters to be registered in a convenient 
manner to be referred to if required4[27] 
As part of the duties to be performed by the Surveyor General, Physician 
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of the Navy and Comptroller of Victualling, was that of ensuring the 
dockyards, hospitals, victualling yards and various storehouses were 
functioning properly. To this end, it was expected that they would carry 
cut regular inspections. However, these same officers were not allowed to 
determine, without reference to the Board of Admiralty, when such tours of 
inspection were to be made. The reasons for this final injunction are 
unclear. It might have been to prevent more than one off icer being absent 
from Somerset House at any one time. But given that the principal 
off icers were highly competent individuals, then it seems likely that they 
would have been able to co-ordinate such a task for themselves. Far 
more likely perhaps, was that this necessity to ask permission was simply 
a means of reinforcing Admiralty authority. 
Throughout these sets of instructions issued by the Admiralty were 
a whole series of generalised statements that made it clear that all 
decisions were to be made only by the Board. Many of the areas itemised 
were those that had previously fallen into the province of the civilian 
boards and where the Admiralty, in the past, had been unable effectively 
to enforce its own will. In the case of the Surveyor General, whose 
predecessor the Navy Surveyor had once reigned supreme in matters of 
warship design, the instructions declared that he was 
to offer such remarks and explanations either 
on his own drafts or others that may be 
submitted to him as may enable the Board to 
judge of the propriety of adopting or 
rejecting them. [281 
The- comptroller of Victualling also ceased to have the same independence 
once possessed by the Victualling Commissioners. The ýSkeleton 
instructions' issued to this particular officer blandly stated: 
He is to represent in due time through the 
superintending lord the supply of provisions 
accompanying his statement with ý11 *the 
information necessary for the Board 
to decide on the propriety of ordering the 
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whole. [ 291 
Similarly, it was required of the Physician of the Navy that 
He is to prepare a statement to be laid before 
the Board previous to the annual estimates 
being made up of the state of the medical 
stores and the medicines on hand and the annual 
average consumption to establish the 
quantity that might be required. Consulting 
with the superintending lord as to the propriety 
of the quantities to be contracted. [301 
As for the Accaintant General, his fcrmer independence with regard to 
accountancy matters was now much reduced. In one clause it was stated 
that 
If in the execution of his duties it should 
appear to him that any improvement may be 
made in keeping the ledger or reduction in labor 
in the examination of accounts and vouchers he 
is to suggest the proposal to the Board thereof 
through the superintending lord. [311 
Finally, the Storekeeper General, 
In all supplies of every article fcr shipbuilding 
and more especially timber and spars he is to 
consult with the Surveycr General of the Navy 
through the superintending lord who will assign 
the proper quantities and dimensions to be 
purchased. [321 
Even with regard to the arranging of matters within their own 
departments the principal officers had surprisingly little authority. The 
clerks and messengers working immediately under them were to be neither 
appointed nor discharged by them, this power being 'vested in the Lord 
Commissioners of the Admiralty'. [331 However, the exchange of clerks 
between departments might be arranged by the principal officers, but this 
did not extend to the promotion of clerks. Such a change of status had to 
be approved by the superintending lord. However, the principal off jeers 
were allowed to grant leave of absence to their clerks, but this might not 
exceed five weeks in any one year. [341 
In general, the five princpal Officers were all of equal standing, 
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with none of them having seniority or authority over another. To 
emphasise this equality of status, each was paid the identical salary of 
11000 
per year and all were entitled to accommodation within the Somerset 
House complex. All five principal officers might claim similar amounts 
for travelling and subsistence when working away from London, these 
amounts were assessed at the rate of two shillings per mile and thirty 
shillings per day to cover board and lodging. In addition, their right 
to superannuation was the same. This was based, as with the former Navy 
Commissioners, upon the number of years served. Further, they had the 
same degree of job security, only to be dismissed if they misbehaved 
in some way. Finally, as the general section of the 'Skeleton 
Instructions- pointed out, in the case of absence from their office, 
either due to sickness or official business, 'each of them, on such or any 
other occasion, should act for the other, and sign all such papers as may 
be necessary-. [351 
Yet it is difficult to escape the conclusion that the Admiralty 
commissioners considered the Surveyor General to hold a uniquely important 
position. To begin with, his off ice was always listed first while the 
areas for which he was responsible were those that most interested the 
professional lords. Despite its importance for the running of the navy, 
few of those lords had any real interest in accountancy, victuals 
purchased or medicines but all were passionately interested in the design 
and efficiency of the warships that comprised the Fleet. As a result, the 
appointment of this individual would, at all times, be more carefully 
discussed and open to controversy than any other appointment. Whoever was 
appointed would achieve that position, not simply because of proven 
abilityp but also because his opinions clearly reflected Admiralty 
philosophy towards particular types of warship or design feature. In 
terms of controversy however, matters reached an all time peak with the 
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appointment of WiUiam, Symonds. 
Symonds, unlike any of the Surveyors who had been appointed to the 
Navy Board, was a naval off icer. Having entered the service in 1794, he 
had risen fairly slowly thrcugh the ranks. Although he had obtained his 
lieutenancy after the not excessive period of eight years, he had failed 
to f ind promotion to the rank of Captain until a further twenty-four years 
had elapsed. However, he was not without influential patrons. In 1805 he 
was promoted first lieutenant of the 36-gun frigate Inconstant through the 
influence of Lord Barham, whom Symonds later described as "a crony of his 
father'. Later, in 1819, he was posted Captain of the Port of Malta due 
to his having served under Admiral Maitland, who was then the islan(rs 
governor. 
It was while resident at Malta that Symonds began a career of 
designing warships, an interest that eventually resulted in his 
appointment as Surveyor General. His basic premise was that British 
warships sailed badly when compared with those of the French. While on 
active service he had more than once found himself in a situation when 
enemy ships had simply out-manouvred those of British construction and so 
avoided inevitable destruction. Turning his attention initially to 
yachts, he built the Nancy Dawson a craft with excellent sailing 
qualities. In his subsequent ýMemoirs') Symonds explained the conclusion 
that he reached as a result of this success: 
I was led to believe that I had hit upon a 
secret in naval architecture; and after trying 
my hand upon fcur or f ive others of smaller 
description, which answered beyond my warmest 
expectations, I was conf imed in the success of 
my principles by these experiments. Great 
breadth of beam and extracrdinary sharpness are 
the characteristics of my system. [361 
'This interest in naval architecture led him to develop his ideas in a 
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tract entitled, 'Observations Upon Naval Architecture &tc' which was 
printed upon his return to England in 1824. In it, he claimed thirty 
years of naval experience had taught him 'a theoretical and practical 
knowledge of his profession'. Choosing to compare the master shipwrights 
of England and France, he accused the former of following 'the old beaten 
paths' while the latter saw each vessel as an invention. As a result, so 
he claimed, French warships combined the most desirable properties as to 
stowage, draft of water at the best sailing trim, the situation of the 
masts in accordance with the form and nature of the vessel. Attempts by 
English shipwrights to copy French models generally failed as 
modifications, 'to bring them in line with the existing systems of 
classification, destroyed at once the principle of imitation. ' [371 
In November 1824, Symonds was invited to become First Lieutenant of 
the King's yacht and to command 'ex officior Calliope (10), an appointment 
he took up at the beginning of 1825. He also, at this time, gained an 
Admiralty promise that he should build a sloop-of-war to his own design 
and that he should command her during trials. According to Symonds, and 
not incorrectly, as it happens, the Navy Board 'exhibited feelings of 
illiberal jealousy, and were exceedingly jealous' of his tract on 'Naval 
Arch i tec ture'. [ 381 Although gaining the sympathy of both Cockburn and 
Melville, the Navy Board 
kept back my wcrk. They went so far as to 
insist on Mr. Vernonos signing a bond for 
2D, OOOL; which he indignantly refused. [391 
The Mr vernon referred to was the Hon G Vernon, an influential naval 
off icer and yachtsman who had much admired the Nancy Dawson. He was one 
of a fraternity of similarly placed individuals who was keen to improve 
the quality of British warships and wished to create every opportunity for 
the emergent Symonds. As it happens, Vernon's influence was sufficient to 
have the payment of a security pushed aside, with the sloop, named 
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Cdumbine, launched at Pcrtsmcuth in 1826. Mcce important, from the point 
of view of Symon(rs progress in the wcrld of marine architecture, was that 
Vernon was responsible for introducing him to William Cavendish-Bentinck, 
fourth Duke cf Portland. It was he who was to become Symonds's most 
influential and committed suppcrter. 
In the normal course of events it must be considered unlikely that 
Symonds would have received the post of Surveyor. During the entire 
history of the Navy Board, those appointed to this exalted position had 
always been drawn from among those with extensive dockyard experience. 
Yet, despite the similarity of titles, the task presented to the survey(v 
General was subtly different from that once performed by the Navy 
Surveyor. Whereas the latter had been primarily concerned with the 
design, building and repair of warships, this was not the case with the 
Surveyor General. Admittedly, the design of new ships might fall into his 
province, but he was no longer to consider this to be his single principal 
role. Instead, he was to evaluate the actual needs of the navyq advising 
the Admiralty commissioners as to the best ship and designs that would 
best fulfil current policy. While his own designs might be placed before 
the Board, he was expected to accept those produced by other naval 
archi tects. In addition, it is worth noting, the Surveyor General 
still had responsibility for the general running of dockyards, but he no 
longer shared this task. In the past, some of this work had been 
performed by the Comptroller, but under the Surveyor General, the old Navy 
Board post of Surveyor and Comptroller had been combined. As such, this 
goes someway to explaining why someone of naval rather than dockyard 
experience should be appointed. For, unlike the Surveycr, the Comptroller 
had always been drawn from among the ranks of serving or fcrmer naval 
officers. Such an indivicbal not only possessed the requisite knowledge 
of naval needs tut was felt to be more competent to handle the dockyard 
222 
4 
workforce. Those previously employed in the yards were simply not trusted 
effectively to enforce discipline among their former colleagues. Such a 
point however, should not be pushed too far. The 'Skeleton Instructionsý, 
as already demonstrated clearly indicated that a naval architect was 
required to fill this post while any enforcement of discipline was now 
under the direct aegis of the Board of Admiralty. For these reasons it 
would seem appropriate to look elsewhere for a more precise reason as 
to why Symonds was appointed to this particular post. 
For their part, Tory opponents to the reforms were truly aghast at 
the selection of Symonds to the post of Surveyor-General. Numerous 
attacks were mounted upon him, both in the Tory press and by various 
parliamentary spokesmen, with the appointment becoming a central issue of 
the debate. In the House of Commons, it was Byam Martin who made the most 
vehement attack, describing Symonds as -an unprofessional man, who knew 
nothing about the business. ' In elaborating upon this, Martin went on to 
point cut that 
He had a high opinion of Captain Symonds as 
an able seaman, and as good an officer as 
ever walked the quarter deck of a British ship; 
but although that gentleman was capable of 
producing the form of a vessel admirably 
calculated for fast sailing, as had been done 
by several other persons, for he himself had 
commanded a very fine frigate, the outlines of 
whose form had been designed by a watchmaker, yet 
he had no doubt, that Captain Symonds would 
himself allow that he knew nothing of the 
business of a practical shipwright. [40] 
A taste of the ensuing debate can be gleaned from the words of Lord 
Napier, a Whig supporter. During the debate on the second reading held in 
the upper chamber, he 
felt himself bound to say a few words in 
consequence Of SOMe remarks made in another 
place, deeply affecting the professional 
character of a gallant and intelliEpnt 
friend of his, who neither was ncr could be 
present to defend himself. The attack upon 
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that gallant officer's character had gone 
throughout the country, and he was, consequen- 
tly, suffering a degree of obloquy equally 
severe and unjust. He alluded to what had 
been said in the other House by that highly 
respected and gallant Admiral who conducted the 
tusiness of the Navy Board for many years. It 
had been stated by the late Comptroller of the 
Navy, in reference to his gallant friend, 
Captain Symonds, who had been lately appointed 
to the office of Surveyor of the Navy was 
altogether ignorant of the duties of his office. 
That, in this great maritime country, a reforming 
Administration should have appointed a man to 
superintend the construction of ships, upon 
which the security and honour of the country 
depended . [411 
Napier then went on to produce evidence to contradict the suggestion of 
the former Comptroller, pointing out that Vernon, a 50-gun frigate 
designed by Symonds, when she went to sea in 1827, 'was by far the beW 
of a squadron of newly launched vessels. [42] 
A prime factor in their hostlity towards Symonds was that many 
Tories felt that Sir Robert Seppings, the outgoing Surveyor, was the most 
obvious candidate for the new post. With regard to Martin, it might be 
claimed that this was simply the result of loyalty towards a colleague 
with whom he had had a long association. But there was more to it than 
that. Seppings had a quite outstanding reputation, having pioneered a 
great many innovations that had resulted in the general strengthening and 
improvement of British warships. In particular, he had introduced 
diagonal bracing, which had allowed vessels to be lengthened, while his 
round bow and stern permitted a larger number of guns in the hitherto 
poorly armed fore and af t areas. 
However, from the Whig point of view, Seppings was far from ideal. 
He was seen as one who would be less amenable to the reforms under way 
and he was recognised as an ally of those displaced by the new 
administration. In particular, he was closely associated with Byam Martin 
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and described by Grey as having governed the former Comptroller 'with 
respect to everything in his department'j 43] Moreover, Seppings: was an 
easy target. As Grey discovered shortly after his elevation to the 
premiership, the King was one of those who opposed the continuance of 
Seppings as Surveyor. William IV, in particular, was one who disliked the 
round bow and stern, feeling that they did little to enhance ships of the 
Royal Navy. Finally, it should not be forgotten that Seppings was of an 
age where retirement, in itself, was not an unreasonable move. In that 
June of 1832 he had reached his sixty-f if th year, having given f If ty years 
of service to the civil departments of the navy. Thus he was able to 
retire on a generous pension that continued to be paid until his death in 
1840. 
Yet none of this really explains the reason for 
Symonds-s appointment. While it must be admitted that he had, as well as 
Columbine, several successful designs to his name together with the 
pamphlet he had written on naval architecture, there were others who could 
make claims that were just as significant. Furthermore, there were a 
number of aspiring naval shipwrights who would be able to bring their 
experience of the royal dockyards into play. Finally, as already 
mentioned, it was not absolutely necessary that a naval man be appointed, 
especially in view of the Admiralty's more direct control over matters 
appertaining both to the dockyards and the interpretation of naval needs. 
At this point, reference could also be usefully made to the School 
of Naval Architecture Some of whose graduates had, at one time, been 
promised the very post to which Symonds had been appointed. For the most 
part, those who had graduated from the School were much younger than those 
traditionally appointed to such office, for the school had only accepted 
its first class in 1811. Nevertheless, if accelerated promotion had been 
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allowed, such candidates, who were now in their mid-thirties, might not 
have been beyond consideration. 
The actual School, which was based at Portsmouth, had been 
established as a result of a recommendation by the the Commission of 
Revision. At the time it had been strongly felt by Lord Barham, then 
First Lord, that senior dockyard shipwrights lacked a sufficient 
scientif ic background. The normal method of training was by attaching 
them to working shipwrights and allowing them to learn through observation 
and practice. Many of these shipwrights, themselves, had only limited 
reading skills and little knowleclaa- of Maths. Some apprentices, always 
referred to as servants, did go through a process of selection and were 
appointed to train under those already appointed to high office. It was 
assumed that by working under those who had already proved themselves, 
they too would acquire the necessary skills to achieve high off ice. 
However, the method of selection was most unsuited to the situation, based 
primarily on the ability of the young aspirant to find the"necessary funds 
that would ensure the patronage of an existing master shipwright. As can 
be imagined, such a haphazard method of selection and training rarely 
resulted in the country getting the best from the skilled artisans it had 
available. To correct this, the Commission of Revision had recommended 
the setting up of a special school to provide the necessary mathematical 
and scientific training for the 'superior' class of shipwright 
apprentices. The numbers admitted in any one year were carefully 
restricted and were never more than ten. Those entering the School were 
already perceived as likely to reach high office, with the prospectus of 
the new school as issued in the first year, making the declaration that 
-*from these the appointment of superior officers of HM Dockyards and 
Surveyors of the Navy shall be made. " 
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However, the school and its various graduates were to meet with a 
great deal of opposition over the years. Furthermore, with the dockyards 
locked into a system of promotion based on experience, none of the early 
graduates of the school had, by 1832, reached higher rank than that of 
foreman. Many, of course, having been promised a sparkling career, had 
chosen to leave the yards and were enjoying success elsewhere. The 
opposition referred to consisted of two distinct groups: older shipwrights 
and naval officers. The former, of course, had much to fear from these 
well trained youngsters, seeing their own future promotion jeopardized. 
On the other hand, naval officers recognised that graduates of the School 
had a good theoretical background but, in common with all shipwrights, 
lacked the experience of taking a ship to sea. Not surprisingly, Symonds 
was one who had expressed this latter point of view: 
. students became clever analysts, 
and wrote valuable papers an the theory of 
ships but, in spite of daily practice to be 
acquired in the dockyard, they wanted that 
experience in managing them at sea which is as 
essential as the test of theory and without which 
its deductions are so much waste paper. [441 
The result of such ill-feeling towards the School, combined with the 
success of the practical seaman as characterised 
by the promotion Of 
Symonds, was its closure in 1832. The graduates who remained within the 
dockyard service were, in future years, to dominate the upper levels of 
yard administration: but it took them an undue 
length of time to reach 
such heights because of this prejudice. 
As regards the post of Surveyor General the various alternative 
candidates, whether naval architects, senior shipwright officers or 
graduates of the School of Naval Architecture, lacked one particular 
advantage. Symonds possessed the patronage of the 
Fourth Duke of 
Portland. It will be remembered that Vernon was responsible for bringing 
the two together, Portland also 
having an interest in the design of naval 
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warships. Indeed, the Duke possessed his own ship yard at Troon and, 
within a short time of their first meeting, had ordered the laying down of 
two brigs designed by Symonds. 
Portland however, was much more than a titled ship yard owner. 
His father had twice held office as Prime Minister (1783 and 1807-9) while 
his own political connections were not unimportant. Unchr Canning, to whom 
Portland was related by marriage, he served as Lord Privy Seal and under 
Goderich he had served as Lord Presicbnt of the Council. By tradition 
however, Portland felt much more at home in the Whig camp. Yet his 
loyalty could not be guaranteed. In order to obtain his initial support 
for the Reform Bill a deal was struck. Graham appears to have played a 
crucial role, agreeing to allow a naval warship, designed by Symonds, to 
be laid down in a government yard. The vessel, eventually built at 
Woolwich, was the frigate Vernon. [451 
That Symonds went on to achieve the post of Surveyor General was 
probably a result of the continuing reform crisis. Portland, together 
with his connections in the Commons, might easily be lost and to ensure 
continued support, it appears to have been necessary to bestow a further 
favour upon the Duke's protege. This view has support in the early 
announcement of Symonds's appointment. Although the principal officers 
were not to take office until June, the name of the new Surveyor was 
announced in February 1832. Given the controversy It created, made more 
certain by the dismissal of Seppings, it seemed an ill-advised move. With 
the Navy bill yet to be passed, it ensured the Opposition were given a 
very public platform from which to make their critical observations. For 
this reason, it would have made political sense to delay the announcement. 
That Graham chose not to would sugEpst the existence of a far more 
pressing motive. 
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On appointment to the post of Surveyor, Symonds received, in common 
with the four other principal officers, a set of the 'Skeleton 
Instructions'. These confirmed the changed areas of responsibility that 
have already been discussed. Yet, as indicated, the Surveyor still had a 
role in the design of ships. This is confirmed under the first head 
of the specific part of the instructions where Symonds was informed that 
one of his duties would be 'to prepare drawings of such ships and vessels 
as may be ordered to be buiW. Lambert, in his book -The Last Sailing 
Battle Fleet' (1991) makes the assertion that Symonds had no such role. 
According to Lambert's view, the Surveyor 'was not appointed to design 
ships, and the fact that he was merely an amateur served to confuse the 
issue'. [ 461 To support this statement, Lambert makes reference to the 
-Skeleton Instructions' but studiously avoids mentioning the first 
paragraph of these instructions. Given the previously quoted wording, ýto 
prepare drawings' which is followed by a corollary contained in the 
second paragraph that he was 'to offer such remarks [to the Board of 
Admiralty] and explanations either on his own drafts or others, it is 
hard to follow LamberCs reasoning. 
While the Surveyor had a distinctly altered role, a point 
highlighted by Lambert, he was still a designer. Indeed, Graham himself 
confirms this when, in the House of Commons, he describes the role of the 
Surveyor General 'pretty much as now'. [471 In other words, upon 
appointment, Symonds would take up much the same duties as once possessed 
by Seppings. In fact, it would be difficult for the Surveyor General to 
be anything other than a designer, when the new postholder's only claim to 
fame was in producing drawings for new styled warships. 
That the Surveycr also had wicbr responsibilities for the dockyards 
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is clearly demonstrated by these same instructions. The f if th paragraph 
detailed his duties with regard to management, giving to the Surveyor 
General duties that would at one time have been more frequently perfcrmed 
by the Navy Comptroller: 
He is to visit the dockyards occasionally 
with the sanction of the Board and inform 
himself on all points connected with the 
duties of the several offices and in what 
manner they are executed, of the mode in 
which their superintendence is exercised, 
of the distribution of the workmen and in 
particular of the classification of the 
shipwrights or their division in gangs to 
see that they are so classed according to 
their respective abilities as to be most 
benef ici ally employed ... 
[481 
The third paragraph informed him of the duties he was to perform as 
regards the purchase and ordering of dockyard stores. He was 
To submit for the consideration of the Board 
the nature and dimensions of Timber for 
shipbuilding and of spars for masts and yards 
and the quantities of each that may be 
advisable to purchase in each year after due 
consultation with the superintending lord 
as to the classes of ships likely to be 
employed and with the Storekeeper General 
not only with regard to timber but also as to 
the nature and quantity of every kind of 
shipbuilding material that may be required 
[491 
As the Board's advisor on all dockyard matters, the Surveyor General was 
to become 
thoroughly acquainted with the state of the 
several works connected with the building or 
repair of ships that are carrying on in the 
yards and to suggest for the Board's 
consideration to which of them it may be most 
advisable ... to give preference. [501 
Other paragraphs contained within the Surveyoros Instructions concentrated 
Upon re-iterating some of the points which appeared in the general 
Section, with several of them reminding him that he was not to issue any 
Epneral. orders, to direct much of his correspondence through the Board and 
to 'advise and consult' with the, Lord of the Admiralty ýwho shall be 
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appointed to superintend the department placed under his charge'. [49] So 
far ignored were a number of highly specific points, mainly dealing with 
the need for economy, but these will be addressed at a more appropriate 
moment. 
With the post of Surveycr General established it had been 
determined by the already much-quoted policy document of December 1831 
that the holder should be supervised by the senior lord of the Admiralty. 
Not surprisingly, this particular commissioner was always chosen from 
among the ranks of the most distinguished and experienced sea going 
officers, with the then post-holder being Admiral Sir Thomas Masterman 
Hardy. As now, he was a household name, the only officer of rank present 
at all three of Nelson's great victories. Neither he, nor his successors 
to this post, were chosen for their theoretical knowledge of design. 
Instead, it was believed that a seagoing officer with a depth of 
experience would be able to correct any failings within the Surveyor 
General's conclusions as to the best design for a new ship. Furthermore, 
this belief in the value of experience was also extended to the running of 
the dockyards, where it was assumed that senior naval lords would be 
similarly adept in countering any false assumptions on the part of the 
Surveyor. 
As for the remaining four principal officers, there was little or no 
controversy associated with their particular appointments. This is not 
really surprising. All four were former Navy and Victualling 
Commissioners with three of them appointed during preceding Tory 
administrations. Even the exception, John Thomas Briggs, had long 
associations with Somerset House, having held the post of Assistant 
Secretary to the Victualling Board for over twenty years. As a result, 
crc)ker and Byam Martin, the two individuals most likely to mount an 
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attack, would have been criticising their own colleagues. Furthermore, 
they would then have been faced with the possible charge of having 
sanctioned the appointment of individuals who, by their own admission, 
were found to be wanting. Finally, such an attack might have paved the 
way for a longer and more protracted public examination of unsanctioned 
amounts of expenditure undertaken by the two Boards during the preceding 
decades. 
Undoubtedly, when considering the five principal officer posts, 
Graham considered the Accountant-General to be the most important of the 
three primarily concerned with book keeping. For this reason he chose to 
appoint Briggs to this post, a man in whom Graham appears to have had 
absolute conf idence. As noted, Briggs could already boast a long term 
connection with the civilian departments, having been appointed Assistant 
Secretary to the Victualling Board in 1809. However, this was not the 
sum total of his experience. Between 1806 and 1809 he had been secretary 
to the Commission for Revising and Digesting the Civil Affairs of the Navy 
in which capacity, according to Laughton, 'he was the virtual author of 
the voluminous reports issued' during this period. [511 At some point, 
Briggs' skills were brought to the attention of Graham, with Briggs 
appointed the First Lord's private secretary upon the new administration 
arriving in office. [52] However, within a fortnight, Briggs underwent a 
further move, being placed on the Victualling Board as Accountant 
General. [531 To facilitate this move, one of the most senior and aged 
members of the Board, Sir Isaac Woolley, had been encouraged to retire on 
the promise of a pension. [541 
It seems likely that between the period of the Whigs taking office 
and the abolition of the civilian boards, both Graham and Briggs worked 
closely together. As Accountant General for Victualling, Briggs was 
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well placed to provide the varicus papers that Graham used to 
highlight the shortcomings of the Victualling Board. In addition, Briggs 
was also responsible for providing a range of carefully statemented 
accounts that allowed for the setting of accurate estimates. As an 
indication of Graham's feelings, the First Lcrd noted Briggsý ýskill as an 
accountant' to be superior to that of Dundas. [551 
The duties of the Accountant General, as set out in the 'Skeleton 
Instructions' were defined as that of keeping all books and accounts 
connected with the receipt and expenditure of the navy, including those 
relating to the Victualling, Medical and Marine establishments. In 
addition, he was responsible for seeing that all accounts were examined 
and supported by proper vouchers, that all stores supplied were in 
conformity with the terms of contract and the preparation of payment of 
claims made by the Paymaster General. [56] The Accountant General was not 
empowered to go beyond the simple recording of expenditure, the payment of 
bills and the examination of accounts. The widening of his authority 
might well have proved an additional bonus. There would have been 
distinct advantages if he had been allowed a watching brief over actual 
expenditure as compared with approved estimates. Indeed, it was a 
necessary alteration to his duties and one that was not to 
be permitted 
for thirty-seven years. [571 
It was for the purpose of supervising the work of the Accountant 
r, eneral that a sixth member of the Board of Admiralty was created. The new 
position was to be held by a lay lord, with Henry Labouchere the first to 
take up the appointmentJ 581 Labcuchere was not an experienced accountant 
having achieved a Classics degree at Oxford while expressing an interest 
in the law. (591 Furthermore, upon entering the House of Commons in June 
1826, he directed his attention neither to financial matters nor to the 
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navy. That he was to be offered a post at the Board of Admiralty is 
probably explained by certain external factors which were often associated 
with government patronage. Apart from Labouchere being a supporter of 
Whig interests, it cannot be without importance that his father, Peter 
Caesar Labouchere, was a partner in the financial hcuse cf Hope of 
Amsterdam and had married into the Baring family. [60] 
Turning to the post of Storekeeper General we move into the domain 
of the powerful Dundas family. Despite the fact that Lord Melville, then 
senicr member of the Dundas family, had been fcrced to vacate the post of 
First Lord, others in his family remained well situated. His second son, 
initially given the post of Depu ty-Comp troller, took up the appointment of 
Storekeeper General upon the abolition of the civilian boards. In 
addition, Melville's ycungest son, George Melville, was already on the 
Board of Admiralty, having been appointed second naval lord upon the 
change of administration. More intriguing was that the ycunger Dundas, by 
virtue of his position on the Board of Admiralty, was made responsible for 
supervising the wcrk of his elder brother. [61] 
Melville was, indeed, careful to ensure the survival of his two 
sons. While Robert, a successful naval officer and Whig MP was fairly 
secure, the older son might well have lost his position upon the change of 
administration. Indeed, it is not impossible that some kind of deal was 
struck. Certainly Graham and Melville were on intimate terms and a 
private arrangement was not beyond the realms of possibility. If so, then 
ensuing events would suggest that it ran upon the lines Of Melville 
agreeing not to criticise the administration, receiving, in return, the 
promise of advancement for his elder son. Despite his being a likely 
critic, Melville never once attacked the reforms, failing even to put in 
an appearence during debates in the upper house upon the Civil Departments 
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bill. In addition, the Whigs would not have been adverse to allow some of 
their patronage to end up in the hands of the Dundas family for, in 
return, they might reap the benefit of the parliamentary votes that 
helville managed through his considerable connections. 
As Storekeeper General, George Dundas had responsibility for the 
ordering and maintaining of a sufficient stock of stores to be held in the 
dockyards. These stores, which encompassed all necessary materials for the 
building, repair and maintenance of warships, included everything from 
huge pieces of oak timber through to items minute by comparison such as 
candles and pintles. However, these supplies did not include victuals, 
this being within the province of the Comptroller of Victualling. 
Furthermore, it was not the Storekeeper General's task to make the payment 
of the accounts submitted upon the supply of these items, this being the 
duty of the Accountant General. 
once the stores arrived in the dockyards, it was the Storekeeper's 
task to ensure that they were properly stored and legitimately used. To 
this end he was expected regularly to visit the dockyards for the purpose 
of inspecting the state of the storehouses 'to see that they are kept 
clean, the stores well and conveniently arranged and the room properly 
ventilated. ý Howevert it was unlikely that the Storekeeper would be a 
regular visitor to the dockyards as most of his work was confined to book 
keeping. In particular, he received regular accounts from the dockyards 
which indicated not only Othe exact state of the stores' but also the 
amounts issued from the storehouses. From these, a ledger of stores was 
compiled and it was made possible to see that they were being properly 
used. A further element to this procedure was the conducting of 
occasional surveys ýto ascertain whether the actual remains agree with the 
balances as they appear in the ledaero. [621 
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The Stacekeeper General's responsibility for stores was simply 
restricted to their use within dockyards. It was also extended to the 
ships on which they might be used. To this end, the 'Skele ton 
Instructions' directed him to 'examine all demands for stores from HM 
ships 00 and to take care that the establishment is not 
exceeded. ý Furthermore, under the fifth head he was informed that it was 
his duty 'to represent to the Board any irregularity cr deficiencies that 
he may discover in the captain: s or commander's store acccunts. '[63] 
Within the instructions laid down, nothing was said about 
controlling the quality of stores supplied. As regards delivery, this was 
in the hands of dockyard officers, these being informed that they were to 
attend deliveries and accept nothing that was sub-standard. In the past, 
goods delivered into the yards had been the subject of abuse, with 
merchants sometimes bribing officers in order to ensure acceptance of 
goods of poor or unusable quality. The rigorous surveying of materials 
upon delivery at the dockyards was not inappropriate. However, the 
Storekeeper General could hardly be expected to be present at every yard 
whenever items were to be delivered. Far more useful, would have been a 
general inspection of stores received, with a survey of items so as to 
ensure that sub-standard items had not somehow slipped into the dockyards. 
Furthermore, no thought was given to achieving an improvement in 
the quality and nature of supplies. It was not impossible that 
alternative and better raw materials existed than those already in use. 
Thus, hemp from a part of the world other than the Baltic or alternative 
timbers might have proved advantageous. While such alternatives were 
occasionally examined, there was no established mechanism, it often being 
lef t tc) well meaning individuals using their own initiative. Far more 
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sensible would have been for the Storekeeper to have been called upon to 
have set up such a mechanism with rewards available for those responsible 
for a successfully introduced innovation. 
The post of comptroller of Victualling was filled by James Meek, a 
fcrmer member of the Victualling Board. He was to be supervised by the 
third naval lord. In June 1832 this was Captain Samuel Brooke Pechell, 
whose particular naval interest was that of gunnery. Indeed, Pechell had 
been responsible for producing, in 1812, what Laughton described as a 
valuable pamphlet on the subject and entitled 'Observations Upon the 
Defective Equipment of Ships Guns'. [64] 
The duties of the Comptroller of Victualling may be briefly 
described as that of 'providing, issuing and duly accounting for the whole 
of the provisions of the Navy ... convict service, transport 
service and foreign stations. [65] Most of his work was devoted to book 
keeping, with much of his attention given to examining the accounts of the 
various stores together with those of ships' pursers. Any discrepancies 
found were to be reported to the third sea lord. The exception to this 
book work was the requirement that he be present at the examination of 
stores purchased by sample, taking 'care that proper officers conversant 
with the different species' should also be present. 
[661 
The f if th of the principal officer posts was that of Physician of 
the Navy, with this position given to Dr William Burnett, one of the two 
medical commissioners who had sat on the Victualling Board. It was 
directed that he should be supervised by the fourth naval lord who was, at 
that time, the Hon George Barrington. A naval man who had reached the 
rank of captain in 1826, Barringtorrs own position on the Board of 
Admiralty was as a result of family connections. Through marriage with 
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Caroline Grey, the third daughter of, Earl Grey, he was the Prime 
, 
Minister's son-in-law. 
From the general instructions given to Dr Burnett it was clear 
that, as Naval Physician, his new post differed little from the former. 
The single greatest alteration was that Burnett had now to report directly 
'to 
a member of the Board of Admiralty rather than to his collegues on the 
Victualling Board. Furthermore, he now had no one of equal status with 
whom he could share the burden of work. On the other hand, Barrington was 
as little versed in medical matters as those (apart from the second 
medical commissioner) who had once made up the Victualling Board while a 
steady reduction in the size of the Navy meant that it was now easier for 
the work to be undertaken by just one individual. 
As with the post of medical commissioner, Burnett was charged with 
having responsibilty for 'all medical stores and medicines and medical 
instruments and duly account for the same'. [671 To undertake this side of 
his work, the post holder had to undertake a good deal of book work. In 
particular, he had to examine both the accounts and journals of all naval 
surgeons and to prepare statements for the Board of the average annual 
consumption. This latter was necessary for the preparation of estimates 
to be laid before Parliament. However, unlike those other principal 
officers Involved in book keeping, his own non-accountancy skills were of 
equal importance. As Physician of the Navy he had to carry cut medical 
examinations upon all invalided officers. In addition, he was to report 
to the Board upon aU candidates applying for the post of assistant 
surgeon while it was upon his advice that the Admiralty appointed surgeons 
to HM ships. Another aspect of his work was that of examining all samples 
of medical supplies. Finally, he had to carry out regular tours of 
inspection of all shore-based medical facilities, these not only including 
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the large naval hospitals at Portsmouth, Chatham and Plymouth but the 
smaller surgeries in both the dockyards and marine barracks. 
4.4 The Outstation Superintendents 
Apart from extensive changes to the central administering offices 
in London, the Navy Civil Departments Bill also heralded changes to those 
appointed to supervise the outstations: the naval hospitals, dock and 
victualling yards. A simple reading of the Act, as regards these more 
localised areas of management, would seem to imply minimal changes. In 
fact, the only alteration to the system explicitly stated in legislative 
form was that the cut station commissioners would cease to exist, replaced 
by new post holders who would be known as 'superintendents. The Act then 
went on to specify that these new off ioers would perform the same duties 
as the commissioners they were replacing: 
such Superintendents from Time to Time to 
be appointed shall have full Power and 
Authority to do, execute, and perform all 
and every the Duties, Matters and Things 
which by any Act or Acts of Parliament now 
in force any Commissioner of the Navy or 
Victualling resident at any Naval or Victualling 
Yard or Establishment ... 
[6%1 
The abolition of the title commissioner was, in fact, a much more 
important move than the Act impliedL Those in the dockyards holding this 
title were much more than mere supervisors of the cut-stations as they 
were also members of the Navy Board itself. As such, continuance of the 
title commissioner would have been meaningless, referring only to a body 
that had now ceased to exist. But there was more to this move than the 
simple up-dating of the title to keep abreast of administrative changes 
elsewhere. The introduction of the new title also meant that all those 
individuals styled as commissioners would now cease to hold office. In 
turn, this meant that the Whig administration, in one sweep, cculd replace 
those existing off Ice holders with individuals of their own choice. 
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TotaUy omitted from the Act was one more important factor: the 
newly appointed superintendents were to retain naval rank. Like the 
former commissioners, they were to be drawn from serving naval officers, 
but unlike commissioners they were not to lose their seniority. For this, 
there were sound reasons. Those who had been appointed, frequently found 
their authority undermined when working with those of naval rank, the 
latter sometimes countermandering their instructions. The point is ably 
made in the already frequently quoted policy document of December 1831: 
They should have a Commission from the 
Admiralty, giving them authority afloat, 
according to their rank as on full Pay - 
thus preventing the improper interference 
of junior officers in commission, of which 
the Civil Servants in the Dock Yards have 
too frequently complained - their rank should 
not be stopped but they should proceed by 
seniority to the Flag, as if serving at sea 
0 I&d 
To legalise this particular point and also to establish the salaries to be 
paid to the various selected offices an application was made by the 
Admiralty to the King in Council. After requesting authorisation for the 
appointment of various officers to the superintendent posts, the order, 
which was approved, continued in the following terms: 
0 and that it may be further 
authorised to assign to each said 
superintendent such duties and to give 
them such instructions as the service over 
which they are respectively appointed may 
appear to us to require and as it appears 
that it may be conducive to the better 
discipline and management of Your Majesty's 
Dock Yards and other naval establishments 
if the said superintendents 
were put in commission. by whicý 
; he; would 
be able to exercise a more extended and 
complete authority ... [ 7tJ 
Finally, the Order laid down the salaries to be paid to each officer. 
These were set at the same levels as those of their predecessors, with 
each of the superintendents of the dockyards 
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granted a salary of 1000 a year with the 
exception of the Superintendent at Portsmouth 
Dock Yard to whom we would recommend a salary 
of 1100 per year as at present negotiated by 
the Commissioner of that Dock Yard the said 
sums to include all the pay and allowances 
which a flag or pendant would give to such of 
the superintendents who may be put in commiss- 
ion ... 
[7-1 
As regards the superintendents of th6 VictuaUing Yards, they were to be 
allowed 'the salary of eight hundred pcunds a year'. [72J 
At this point in time, no opportunity was taken to amend the duties 
of the Superintendent as compared with those issued to his predecesors. 
Detailed instructions had already been laid down in the second report of 
the Commissioners for Revising and Digesting the Civil Affairs of the 
Navy, with these brought into force during the immediate post-war period. 
Clearly, members of the Admiralty were not unhappy with these 
instructions, merely concerned that they should be enforced. Thus, one of 
the injunctions placed upon the Surveyor General was that he should 
ýinform himself on all points connected with the duties of the several 
offices and in what manner they are executed. -[ 73cl The Comptroller of 
Victualling was not, as it happens, given specific instructions for the 
purpose of ensuring that the superintendents of the victualling yards also 
carried out their duties. However, it was pointed out that he had a 
similar role to the Storekeeper General who was told to Inspect 
storehouses in the dockyards. It must therefore be assumed that, in the 
case of the Comptroller of Victualling, the requirement was implicit. 
some minor alterations were, from time to time, neoessary for the 
purpose of dovetailing earlier instructions into the new arrangements. 
These mainly came in the form of individual letters indicating procedural 
changes. To the superintendents of the victualling establishments, for 
example, John Barrow was instructed to inform them of the following: 
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In making arrangements for carrying into 
execution the measures authorized by the 
recent Act of Parliament abolishing the Navy 
and Victualling Board it has been deemed 
expedient to confide to the Comptroller of 
Victualling under the directions of My Lords 
Commissioners of the Admiralty, the duty of 
providing Supplies and Provisions and other 
Stores for the different Branches of Service 
entrusted to his care, and of distributing them 
to the several Victualling Establishments at 
home and abroad; and as in the execution of this 
highly important duty it shall become necessary 
that he shall corm spond with you, and convey to 
you from time to time such arranEr-ments as are 
requisite for carrying their Lordships intentions 
into effect I have received their Lordships commands 
to signify their directions to you to pay the same 
regard and attention to all communications addressed 
to you by him relative to this Branch of the 
service as if they proceeded direct from themselves. 
[7j, j 
The superintendents of the dockyards also received separate 
instructions informing them of some important changes in routine. most of 
these related to correspondence. On 6 June, immediately prior to the 
appointment of the new superintendents, those in charge of the dockyards 
were informed that all letters relating to naval service were no longer to 
be addressed to the Navy or Victualling Office. Instead, they were to be 
addressed to the Secretary of the Admiralty. If this correspondence 
related to accounts however, such letters were to have 'printed In the 
lower corner of the cover one of the following words: Surveyor, 
Accountant, Storekeeper, Comptroller of Victualling or Physician of the 
Navy. '[ TS) To this, a slight amendment was made on 11 June, with the 
superintendent informed that they were to place correspondence for the 
five principal officers 'in separate covers. -[7Q 
Not surprisingly, with the opportunity arising of making so many 
new appointments, the government took the opportunity of retiring some of 
the older commissioners and appointing, in their place, aspiring officers 
of an acceptable political persuasion. As a result, a number of 
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Whig supporters were placed in offices that would not normally have been 
available at this time. The dockyard commissioners at Portsmouth, 
Devonport and Chatham, were all dismissed and replaced by new 
superintendents. However, not all existing appointees were relieved of 
office. John Hill, Commissioner at Deptford yard since 1820 was retained 
as was Captain Henry Garrett at the Royal Clarence Victual-ling Yard, 
Portsmouth. Of the more interesting new appointments, those of John 
Chambers White to Portsmouth dockyard and Phipps Hornby to Plymouth 
victualling yard and naval hospital are psrticularly worthy of mention. 
Both had strong Whig connections, White through his marriaEp to the 
daughter of Admiral Fanshawe (a one time favourite of the Earl of St 
Vincent) while Phipps Homby was the brother-in-law of Lord Derby. As it 
happens, Hornby had once had a very promising naval career, having gained 
his captaincy in 1810 following a mere thirteen years of service. 
However, he had clearly fallen cut of favour with the Tory controlled 
Board of Admiralty, having failed to find any employment after 1822. Good 
fortune returned upon the elevation of Graham to the Admiralty. The 
Derbys were one of the families to whom Graham wished to return earlier 
favours, included the support of the 12th Earl during Craham's first bid 
to gain a parliamentary seat. Furthermore, Grahamýs own political 
fortunes were to become closely tied with that of the future 14th Earl, 
the two both resigning office in 1834 and going on to serve under Peel. 
Thus, it is hardly surprising that Phipps Hornby, related as he was to the 
Derby family, should be promoted cut of unemployment by Graham. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
THE CREATION OF A MYTH 
5.1 Introduction 
The refcrms overseen by Sir James Graham during the time he served 
under Earl Grey as First Lord of the Admiralty have jr-nerally been 
regarded as a success. Criticisms have, on occasions, been levelled at 
certain aspects of the package, but such remarks have done little to 
damage the overall impression. 
That Graham achieved something seemingly beyond reproach first 
becomes clear when consideration is given to the attitude of contemporary 
politicians. Admittedly, the likes of Croker and Byam Martin had given 
the Navy Civil Departments Act a rough ride through Parliament, but this 
had only to be expected. In paving the way for the introduction of the 
reforms, Graham had teen highly critical of the earlier administration, 
with both Croker and Martin supposedly culpable foc a good many of the 
proclaimed failings. 
On the other hand, the various changes brought about by the Act had 
been given the full sanction of the governing coalition. Furthermore, 
such support had not been restricted merely to mainstream moderates, but 
had also included the radical wing. Thus, Wadeýs 'Extraordinary Black 
BooV of 1832 carried the declaration that, 
Sir James [Graham] by improvements in the civil 
administration of the navy, and reduction In the 
estimates nearly to the amount of a million, has 
almost silenced Mr Hume, and set a splendid 
example to the heads of departments. [Il 
Once the reforms had been established, they not only continued to 
retain the support of radicals such as Joseph Hume, but also acquired a 
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cross party allegiance. FdUowing the brief re-emergenoe of a Tory 
government in 1834, Lord Ashley, in presenting the annual naval estimates 
to the lower hcuse, felt constrained to state that the present good 
management, which party loyalty led him to claim had been started by 
Wellington, 
... had 
been followed up most successfully 
by the rt. hon. Baronet, the member for Cumber- 
land [Graham], who had introduced a spirit of 
economy into every branch of this part of the 
public service, and who at the time of his 
quitting office, had left the department over 
which, he presided, in the most effective state. [2] 
That Ashley should so freely make such a declaration was probably not 
unconnected with Graham's change of loyalties. Sooa to be recruited into 
the senior echelons of the Tory party, Ashley was not inclined to 
undermine the work of his one time opponent. 
In fact the change of party loyalties on the part of the former 
First Lord, with Graham working closely with Peel from about 1837 onwards, 
might go sane way to explain why so few parliamentarians ever questioned 
the general benefits of the series of reforms imposed upon the civil 
departments during Graham's period of office. Neither Whig nor Tory 
politicians would have felt greatly inclined to offer anything more than 
limited criticism for it could easily reflect upon themselves. After all, 
it had been a Whig administration that had overseen the reforms while an 
attack by the Tories would only result in the standing of their new 
leading front bencher consequently diminished in the eyes of the public. 
outside of Parliament there was also a general acceptance that the 
refcrms had proven a success. In his published memoirs of 1847, John 
Barrow had little hesitation in placing his seal of approval upon the navy 
reforms, 
on the whole, I can venture to say with 
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great confidence, and after the experience 
of f if teen years since the plan was put 
into operation, under half-a-dozen Boards 
of Admiralty, Whig and Tory, that it has 
been completely successful in all its 
parts ... [31 
Barrow, it need hardly be added, was far from impartial in this matter. 
As Second Secretary under Graham he had been consulted on a number of 
pertinent matters, with many of his own ideas incorporated into the 
general reform package. To attack the reforms would have been an 
admission that he had, at this earlier stage, been wrong. But this is not 
to deny a certain importance to Barrow's writings. The product of a highly 
respected individual, they played a further part in the creation of a 
V-, neral myth that Graham's refcrms were definitely beyond reproach. Many 
of those who later went into print were either influenced by Barrow's 
point of view or chose to quote him extensively. Even at the end of the 
century, when many of the original tenets of Graham-s reforms had been 
largely overhauled, commentators upon the workings of the Admiralty were 
still taking the line laid down by Barrow. In 1896, fcrmer First Lord 
Vesey Hamilton, in producing a monograph upon the workings of the 
departments of the navy, chose to quote Barrow's acclamation of the 
reforms as positive proof of their success before adding his own view 
tha t, 
-* he merit of the rearganisation effected ýy 
Sir itames Graham is not to be estimated by the 
pecuniary saving it made possible, but by the fact 
that it struck at the root of abuses of long and 
slow growth which endanýpred our naval efficiency. 
[41 
In the following year, John Henry Briggs, a junior clerk of the Admiralty 
during the reform period, wrote an account of the various administrations 
unchr which he served. Of relevance is this passage, 
The system laid down by Sir James Graham has 
proved to be not only sound in theory, tut to 
have worked successfully when put to the test 
of practical experience. [51 
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Although Briggs did not overtly rely upon Barrow, his evidence is equally 
suspect. As the son of Sir John Thomas Briggs, the Accountant-General 
appointed by Graham, he may well have had a desire to defend the reforms, 
aware that his father had enjoyed a consultative role. Many of the 
changes that affected the accountancy side of the departments came about 
as a result of his father's suggestions. Nor should it be forgotten that 
this same Sir John Thomas Briggs, had been one of Graham's f avcuri tes, 
receiving three promotions during the first twenty-one months of Graham's 
arrival at the Admiralty. [61 
However, by the latter part of the century, despite the comments of 
Briggs and Hamilton, the system as laid down by Graham had already shown 
itself to be badly flawed. At the time of the Russian War, the Admiralty 
commissioners had been unable to devote sufficient time to strategy while 
the individual departments were dearly overworked. To help solve the 
latter problem, a separate Transport Board was temporarily established. 
However, no attempt was made to rectify the f irst of these two problems. 
Should a reference be made to Croker's attack upon the Navy Civil 
Departments Bill during its second reading, then it is clear that he, 
for one, would not have been surprised that such problems should have 
surf aced. At that time he had, with prescience, declared, 
we ought to take care how we overloaded the 
public servants, lest, when the real time 
of difficulty arrived, it should be found 
that they broke down under the weight imposed 
upon them ... [71 
Despite the emergence of clear evidence that Croker's earlier prediction 
was now a fact, the years following the Russian War saw little undertaken 
to rectify matters. Admittedly, a limited degme of rationalizatioa took 
place, tut this would not really have helped the Admiralty handle a future 
war. Primarilyý these changes resulted in both the Surveycr-General and 
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Accountant-General being accorded greater powers while a separate 
contracts and purchasing branch was established. This had little effect 
upon the supreme problem, that of the overloading of the board with a mass 
of detail. As a result, those experienced in matters primarily concerned 
with seamanship and strategy were perpetually called upon to adjudicate 
upon the complexities of dockyard management, food nutrition and medicine. 
Croker had also been aware that this was likely to be the result of 
Graham's reforms. In that same parliamentary speech he went on to ask, 
What was to become of the natural occupation 
of these naval officers? They would be 
wearied with the details of duties they could 
not understand, and incapacitated by fatigue 
and confusion, for those which they did. [8] 
Another of the problems that gained some attention was that of the 
limited powers accorded the First Lord during board meetings. This came 
under careful consideration during the late-1860s, with the then current 
First Lord, Hugh Childers, successfully seeking an Order-in-Ccuncil to 
strengthen those powers. [91 Prior to the introduction of the order, the 
First Lord could only assume a position of authority, unable to draw upon 
any documents that verified his seniority. While Graham, through 
forcefulness of character, had easily overridden his colleagues, others 
had been less fortunate. Furthermore, with decisions often reached as a 
result of general discussion held either during board meetings or In 
private, it was not always clear where responsibility lay. Although 
croker, drawing on his own experience of board meetings, had not fully 
drawn attention to the issue, he did pursue the related matter of Graham 
insisting upon two lords of the Admiralty signing all orders and accounts, 
so, when the objects of the Lord who presided 
over the Stcres were to be carried into 
effect, he must say to the medical Lord, or 
any other Lord who might be at hand, and who 
would know nothing about stores or accounts, 
or any department but his own, "HcUo! come, 
put your name to this order. " [101 
Although many of the problems that related to the reformed 
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Admiralty system were now apparently recognised, the dominant belief 
that Graham had achieved a remarkably successful series of reforms 
remained in force. Neither Briggs nor Hamilton, as shown, were overtly 
critical, with the latter merely seeing Childers* reforms as part of an 
essential evolutionary process. First to dwell, in detail, upon the very 
real problems that had been inherent within the introduced changes was Sir 
Oswyn Murray, Permanent Secretary to the Board between 1917 and 1936. 
Shortly after retirement he produced a history of the Admiralty which was 
published in ýMarineros Mirrorojll] In giving consideration to Graham's 
reforms, he devoted considerable attention to the question of 
responsibility and the powers vested in the First Lord. Although, in 
doing so, he gave no consideration to the extensive additional duties 
that so hindered Board members. Indeed, he seems to have seen the 
imposition of detail upon the Admiralty as a positive merit, or at least 
this is the impression given by his statement relating to Graham's reforms 
that 
* it became the duty and honour of ýhe* 
Board of Admiralty, to swallow the 
Navy Board as the inferior Board. [121 
Despite this recognition that Graham's reforms were not entirely 
satisfactory, the earlier myth continued. Both of Graham's twentieth 
century biographies are free of any criticism when it comes to discussing 
the naval reforms. Erickson, writing in 1952, felt comfortable in 
stating, 
Perhaps the greatest achievement of Graham 
as First Lord was his reform of the civil 
departments of the Navy ... [131 
Similarlyp in 1967, Ward, without alerting his readers to any of the 
problems subsequently encountered, simply wrote, 
The Admiralty thus took over the duties of the 
civil administration, generally with success. [141 
However, this is not to say that the Problems encountered during that 
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mid-ýP-ntury period have been completely ignored by more recent historians. 
An interesting account of Grahamýs second period at the Admiralty, 
which also encompassed the first year of the Russian War, is given by C. I. 
Hamilton in the Historical Journal. He felt that the British navy's 
failure to achieve anything beyond the mediocre, related primarily to the 
excessive burdens placed upon each individual commissioner, so preventing 
consideration of wider issues: 
It is hard not to believe that the naval war 
would have been better planned if there had 
been some sort of permanent body whose task 
it was to consider tactics and strategy. [151 
Following publication of Hamilton's paper came Rodger's mcre general 
acccunt of the Admiralty. There are signs that he was influenced by 
Hamilton's research, fcr he also directs himself to the board-s inability 
to consider general strategy, 
The burden was very great and growing all the 
time. A relentless flow of administrative 
questions, many of them detailed, came before 
the Board and claimed its attention. The 
larger questions of policy and strategy which 
the First Lord and his principal naval advisers 
were especially charged with were at first 
neglected, and then forgotten. [16] 
Nor did Rodger neglect the second major problem that had created concern 
following the adoption of the reforms, 
Graham Intended that the Board should provide 
a mechanism for mutual discussion and 
information without impairing individual 
responsibility. It is possible that the 
scheme might have worked if the volume of 
business had remained very small ... [171 
Where consideration has been given to Graham's naval reforms, it 
has Invariably been directed to the abolition of tha inferior boards and 
the assumption of their duties by the Board of Admiralty. Relatively 
little attention has been given to others areas of the package such as 
management of the dock and victualling yards, financial planning and the 
implemented economies. From a careful analysis of the additional reforms 
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it will be shown that these can also be seen as generating serious 
problems. Indeed, when consideration is given to all the reforms that 
Graham introduced, then the entire programme can be seen as nothing less 
than disastrous. As a result of these refcrms, the Board of Admiralty was 
unable to perfcrm efficiently, the dockyards entered into a period of 
chaos and financial management was more a creature of fiction than fact. 
Yet none of this need have occurred. It has already been shown 
that Croker, in his attack upon the civil departments bill during its 
second reading, clearly predicted the outcome. If Graham had simply been 
prepared to enter into an open and free discussion with those his 
administration had ejected, then he would soon have been apprised of the 
harmful effects that his reforms were likely to have. But this did not 
happen. Graham was, at this time, highly suspicious of all those loyal to 
the opposition, trusting to his own judgement. This, in many respects, 
was nothing less than supreme arrogance. In pursuing his own ideas, he 
was discarding a whole generation of expert naval administrators. 
A second factor in this process was Graham's Position as regards 
Earl Grey. Having been given a Cabinet post, much against public 
expectations, he would have been little inclined to introduce any system 
of which the Prime Minister disapproved. For his part, Earl Grey was 
determined to see an end to the civil departments and appears to have 
presented Graham with an outline plan. Grey's experience of naval 
affairs, restricted to a seven month period as First Lord$ certainly did 
not make him an expert. However, having entrusted his plan to Graham, he 
did not even choose to give thought to the likely implications. As a 
result, an inexperienced politician, working in semi-isolation, foisted 
upon this major government department a scheme of administration 
that was close to being unworkable. For the Admiralty, therefore, many 
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of the subsequent decades were characterised by a quest for solutions to 
overcome the numerous problems created by Graham's reforms. 
5.2 Consolidation and Simplification 
Fcc Earl Grey, consolidation of the civil departments was at the 
very heart of the refcrms imposed upon the navy's administrative structure 
upon the accession of his government in 1830. The premier's interests, 
occupied as they were by the Great Refcrm Bill, appear to have broadened 
little beyond this single requirement. Admittedly, he probably imposed 
upon his First Lord a scheme that had already been mapped cut by st 
Vincent, but once Graham showed a willingness to pursue this scheme, then 
Grey appears to have taken little further interest. Matters of detail, 
therefore, were left to the First Lord to oversee. 
Graham undoubtedly viewed this as an advantage. It was an area in 
which his real skills lay. He was not one to initiate the dream but one 
who would make sure it worked. On points of detail, Graham was very much 
in his element, noted for the bludgeoning of his colleagies into 
submission over various minor points by the presentation of facts which 
were thoroughly researched. Marx, in later years, described him as one of 
peel-s bureaucrats, while the 'Morning Chronicle saw him as a busy body. 
[181 Neither remark was designed to be flattering. 
In matters of refcming the civil administration of the navy, the 
detail to which Graham directed himself was that of furthering the process 
of simplification that would follow upon the adoption of a more jpneral 
plan of consclidation. While Graham was involved in the process, care 
must be taken not to exag@erate his role. As a newly appointed First 
Lord, he did not know the civil departments sufficiently well to 
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mastermind all of the changes. Furthermore, he had a great many tasks in 
hand, not least of which was that same over riding pr&-occupation with the 
Reform Bill that concerned all other government ministers. Fcr this 
reason, Barrows declaration as regards his own considerable involvement 
in the creation of the adopted arrangements, and previously discussed, 
must be taken at face value. [191 Most likely, Barrow indicated which 
branches could be reduced or amalgamated, with Graham ensuring that such 
proposals were politically acceptable. No doubt, the two of them 
frequently discussed the issue but the final product reflects a mind that 
was thoroughly briefed in the workings of the civilian departments. 
Grahamýs influence, therefore, would have been that of direction. 
It was he who would have instructed Barrow to use this opportunity not 
only to consolidate but also overhaul and streamline the entire 
administrative structure. It was also a process that Graham would 
undoubtedly have liked to have seen furthered in all other government 
departments. In Parliament, for instance, during the first reading of the 
civil departments bill, Graham stated that he held unity and simplicity 
-to be the very essence and life of public service. '[201 
In making such a declaration, Graham showed that his views, in at 
least this respect, closely resembled certain conclusions reached by the 
Finance Committee which had reported In 1828. Established during the 
previous year, this committee had examined the principles and details of 
expenditure in the Army, Navy and Ordnance. Graham had been a member of 
the committee, the first prestigious appointment to which he could lay 
claim. As a member of parliament of only three years standing, it seems 
unlikely that he was a major contributor to its conclusions. [ 211 However, 
he himself took on board the Committee's views, with his 'unity and 
simplicity- belief, closely reflecting the Finance Committee's similarly 
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held principle that was declared in the following terms: 
**' the Committee confidently expect that 
some departments, or branches of departments, 
will be found to admit of being so consolidated 
as to relieve the public service from the 
disadvantages which arise from their having been 
constituted at a period when the principles of 
banking were unknown ... 
[221 
It should also be noted, with reference to the Finance Committee, 
that the varicus other objectives pursued by Graham during this period 
also followed upon the principles laid down by that Committee. But given 
that the minutes of evidence presented to that Committee no longer appear 
to exist, then it is impossible to say just how the committee went abcut 
reaching its conclusions. While it is a point of only passing interest, 
the person or persons responsible clearly had some influence, together 
with St Vincent, Grey, Barrow and Graham, upon the nature of the refcrms 
introduced by the Navy Civil Departments bill. 
In turning to the question of effectiveness, it would have been 
difficult for the introduced reforms not to have met with at least some 
degree of success. Naval administration, as it existed prior to the 
election of the Whigshad a complexity that would have been difficult to 
rival. The simple operation of commanding a warship to sea required not 
only a policy decision at the highest level but the co-operation of four 
separate boards: Admiralty, Navy, Victual-ling and Ordnance. In turn, the 
commissioners of each of these boards had to correspond separately with 
their own junior officers, awaiting their replies before giving a likely 
date for undertaking their part in preparing the designated ship for sea 
service. Never were those locally placed representatives allowed to 
correspond among themselves, having to direct themselves only through 
their immediate superiors. Thus, simple consolidation of the civil 
departments within the Admiralty brought an immediate end to much 
unnecessary delay and letter writing. 
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However, consolidation and simplification, as described in the 
report of the Finance Committee, would seem to imply something more than 
the simple abolition of the two boards. Within each of the attendant 
offices there were numerous branches which, in themselves, might also be 
simplified. Bringing about, as it would, the additional advantage of 
reducing overall government expenditure, it was an area to which Graham 
must have given much thought. After all, his greatest personal 
achievement in parliament, prior to his Cabinet appointment, had been 
based on criticising unnecessary expenditure on the part of the previous 
government. As regards the branches that should be scaled down or reduced 
and those which ought to replace them, these matters were properly left to 
Barrow. 
Central to the entire reform package was the replacement of the 
former commissioners of the Navy and Victualling boards by principal 
off icers. This not only ensured that the Board of Admiralty had full 
control of the civil departments but had the additional advantage of 
allowing savings to be made in payment of salaries. Whereas the thirteen 
commissioners received annually 
112,400, the combined income of the f ive 
principal officers totalled 
t5OOO. Admittedly, the difference of 17,400 
was by no means the amount saved, as all of the commissioners whose 
services were no longer required, each now received a pension based on 
their years of service. This particular payment, which amounted to 
approximately 
14,500 
per annum, has to be offset against that savedL 
Furthermore, for reasons explained elsewhere, a sixth junior lord was 
added to the Board of Admiralty, his annual salary Of 
f1000 per year 
further reducing the amount savedL 
Nevertheless, when it is consicbred that those pensioned 
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would, in time, have been eligible to a pension, then it is clear that the 
savings made, in this particular area, were not inconsiderable. But this 
did not prevent some criticism being levelled at Graham, the sugErestion 
made that further savings could have been achieved. In the debate on 
naval estimates in 1834, Ruthven speaking before the Supply Committee, 
claimed that the addition of a sixth member to the Board of Admiralty had 
been unnecessary. He also called for a reduction in salary paid to the 
First Lord. [231 
Such demands were easy to make, particularly from one such as 
Ruthven who was unfamiliar with the workings of the civil departments. 
There was little amiss with his claim that Graham-s salary might be 
reduced. All government ministers, at this time, were drawn from among 
the ranks of the wealthy, and did not look upon the payments they received 
as a pre-requisite for taking office. [24] Methven's other claim however, 
would have proved more difficult to substantiate. It must be assumed, as 
no explanation accompanied the criticism, that Methven expected the First 
Lord to oversee one of the principal officers. This could only have been 
achieved if Graham, and his successors, reduced the amount of time they 
devoted to their respective areas of duty. In other words, the First Lord 
would have had to make fewer appearances in Parliament, attend Cabinet 
meetings less of ten or devote less time to co-ordinating the work of the 
junior members of the Board. [251 
Moving away from the higher echelons of naval administration, 
consolidation of the civil departments also allowed savings to be made in 
salaries paid to the clerical staff. Once again, numbers employed could 
be substantially reduced, although any savings had to be offset by an 
increase in the number of pensions paid out. To begin with, some 
consideration should be given to George Smith and Marshal Clifton Waller: 
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secretaries to the Navy and Victualling Boards. Neither was offered an 
alternative post, with George Smith only a year or two from natural 
retirement. Combined, their salaries amounted to 12,200 with Smith 
receiving a pension of ý, 020 while Clifton Walle (as a result of fewer 
years service and a smaller annual salary) received -ý660. As a result, 
the immediate saving that resulted from the abolition of the two posts was 
t564 per annum. However, In view of SmIthos imminent retirement, which 
would almost certainly have occurred within the next two years, then a 
greater saving can be considered to have taken place. At such time he 
would have been entitled to a similar pension with a new secretary having 
also to be appointed. While Smith, for his part, was not particularly 
unhappy with the arrangement, it proved less than suitable for Clifton 
Walle . He could potentially have worked far another ten years and would 
then have been entitled to a pension of 
4833. To assause his 
difficulties, for he had a young and sizeable family to support, the 
pension awarded to him had been slightly enhanced. [261 
Much more impressive were the savings that resulted from the 
dismissal of forty-seven clerks: 23 belonging to the Navy Office, 14 from 
the Victualling Office and 10 from the Navy Pay Office. This resulted in 
a reduction in payment of annual salaries of f22,026 and an immediate 
increase in pensions of tL1,153. Those dismissed, in all but two cases, 
had been employed within the naval service for twenty years or more, and 
would soon have been eligible for superannuation. Indeed, 55% of that 
number were within five years of automatic retirement, if it is considered 
that naval clerks rarely worked for more than forty years. 
Yet, when assessing actual savings to the naval service, it might 
be noted that 89% of those dismissed clerks reoeived enhanced pensions. 
These were the clerks who had worked intermediate years between periods 
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used for the reckoning of a pension. Since the introduction of 
superannuation for clerks, pensions were paid at the rate of one-twelf th 
of the final salary for every f Ive years of service following the first 
ten years. A clerk who had worked 39 years received, therefore, 
nine-twelfths of his final salary and would only be eligible for 
ten-twelf ths If he worked Into his fortieth year. On this occasion the 
Admiralty, having first gained the Treasury's sanction, put forward a 
request to the King In council, that any intermediate years might also be 
considered reckonable. This same request also covered the case of Clifton 
Waller together with one of the former navy commissioners. The rough 
draf t of this proposed order was prepared towards the end of July 1832 and 
gave supporting reasons as to why the request was thought necessary. It 
first listed the numbers of dismissed clerks before going on to state 
that, 
as all these clerks have been deprived of their 
situations, not from any neglect of duty or 
misconduct of any kind but from abolition of 
office, for the convenience of the Public Service, 
we would most humbly submit for ycar Majesty's 
most gracious approval that the rule of granting 
superannuation wholly in accordance with the 
Superannuation Act, which in fact does not 
contemplate reduction or abolition of office, 
should not be applied in the cases above, but 
taken only as a guide, and that the number of 
Intermediate years between any of the two periods 
mentioned In the said acts, should be allowed to 
reckon as so much time served and the fractioned 
part of those years estimated in calculating the 
retired allowances of the several clerks who have, 
by the change of system, been deprived of their 
off ices ... [271 
It then included a separate request relating to Clifton Waller and former 
Navy Commissioner J. D. Thompson, pointing out that the Lords of the 
Treasury had already sanctioned, 
that Mr Thomson be allowed a retiring pension 
of 1750 per annum instead of t666 which his 
service strictly calculating would orAly entitle 
him and Mr Clifton to a pension of JSW per 
annum Instead of *3. [281 
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While forty-seven clerks were dismissed from naval service, a total 
of 158 were retainedL For the most part they continued within the same 
branch of the service and undertook similar duties to those which they had 
previously undertaken. The most noticeable difference was that the branch 
in which they now served was encompassed within a differently named 
department and headed by a principal officer and not a commissioner. As 
for the exact number of clerks attached to each department, these were as 
follows: 
Navy Surveycr 03 
Accountant General 88 
Storekeeper General 24 
Comptroller of Victualling 34 
Physician of Navy 09 
In addition, there were 47 clerks belonging to the Navy Pay Office and who 
had been transferred to the Treasury. [29] 
Despite the retention of such a seemingly high number of clerks, it 
soon became clear that a number of departments were under a great deal of 
strain. From the accounting branches, in particular, there were frequent 
complaints that they could not check and dispose of the accounts as fast 
as they might wish. In order to process matters more quickly, many of the 
surviving clerks had to be expensively employed in working extra hours. 
By 1837 it had been necessary to employ an extra twelve clerks, a move 
that would have been unnecessary if fewer experienced clerks had not been 
dismissed in the first place. [30] 
Other departments under pressure were those of the Surveyor and 
Comptroller of Victualling. Within the ViCtualling department, the 
Comptroller was desirous of making numerous important changes within his 
department. However, in June 1834 he felt forced to admit that the 
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preparatory work for such changes was impossible to undertake because of 
the necessity of -transacting current business-. [311 The implication 
being that there were only sufficient numbers for any immediate work, with 
no spare clerks available. As with the accounting departments, 
considerable overtime was being given, eventually amounting to regular 
stints of three hours per day for each clerk. [32] By 1842, five extra 
clerks had been added to this department, with another added in 1845. [33] 
As for the Surveyor's department, Symonds was writing to Hardy, as early 
as July 1833, of the press of work in his off ice 'consequent on the 
establishment of a clear system of classifying the masts and yards. '[34] 
A further clerk had been added to this department by 1837. [35] 
The increase in the number of clerks, combined with increasing 
overtime, was soon reflected in the estimates. Whereas the financial year 
1831/2, the last full year of the two inferior boards, had seen the 
combined estimated expenditure upon administering offices belonging to the 
Admiralty, Navy and Victualling to have been ý119,714 this had been 
dramatically reduced tofl04,551 for the 1834/5 financial year. [36] 
From the foregoing, certain conclusions can be reached as to the 
success of this area of consideration: consolidation and simplification. 
Certainly, consolidation was carried through, with the Board of Admiralty 
gaining direct control over the civil departments. Yet, the claimed 
financial savings were clearly limited, with the re-arranged branches 
suffering a period of inefficiency as a result of severe cuts in the 
numbers of clerks employed. In particular, as has been demonstrated, 
large numbers of clerks had to be used in extraocdinary amounts of 
overtime, their financial remuneration consequently greater than would 
have been the case if more clerks had been retained in the first place. 
indeed, the high level of savings that were recorded in 1833 were 
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completely wiped out within the next five years, with the costs of running 
the civil departments standing at more or less the same amount in 1841 as 
had been the case ten years earlier. [371 
5.3 A Board of Detail 
Pricr to the abolition of the civilian boards, the Commissioners of 
the Admiralty had possessed a general superintending role over all matters 
connected with naval affairs. In the wcrds of the Commissioners on Fees, 
The Business of the Board of Admiralty is to 
consider and determine upon all Matters 
relative to Your Majesty's Navy, and 
Departments thereunto belonging: to give 
Directions for the Performance of all 
Services that may be required, either in Civil 
or Naval Branches thereof; to sign, by themselves 
or by their Secretaries, all Orders necessary 
for carrying their Directions into Execution; 
and generally to superintend and direct the whole 
Naval and Marine Establishments of Great 
Britain. [381 
This, in effect, meant that the Board of Admiralty devoted most of 
its attention to the wider issues of running the navy. In particular, the 
professional lcrds were expected to advise the First Lard on matters of 
strategy, the number and type of vessels that shculd be made available in 
any one year tcgether with the size and location of the varicus suppcrt 
facilities. Once these decisions had been taken, attention cculd be given 
to budget requirements and preparation of the estimates. A great many 
additional matters were referred to the Admiralty Commissioners, but the 
existence of the inferior boards meant that the majority of these might be 
referred either to the navy or victualling commissioners. Thus, matters 
connected with pay and pensions of both seamen and civilian wcrkers, hire 
of transports, condition and progress of works at the cutstations 
(including hospitals), appointments of artisans and clerks were among 
matters to which the Admiralty commissioners might give only limited 
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attention. Only when these same issues became of mcre general concern was 
it necessary fcr members of the supericr board to give them full 
attention. 
However, with the passing of the Navy Civil Departments Act, much 
of this changed. While the Board of Admiralty did not lose any of its 
former duties, it now took on all those tasks once performed by the navy 
and victualling commissioners. Admittedly, the every dayaide of such 
duties was to be handled by the newly appointed principal officers, but 
all decisions were to be taken by this single remaining board. Thus every 
routine matter requiring a decision was now brcught directly before 
the Admiralty commissioners, inevitably resulting in prolonged 
discussion, increased paper work and less time for those matters to which 
the Board had previcusly directed time. Graham, for his part, had 
blandly claimed, during the second reading of the bill, that members of 
the on-rent Board of Admiralty, 
were all of opinion that, by the direct control 
which the proposed plan would give the Admiralty 
over the Subordinate Departments, its labours 
would not be increased, but diminished. [39] 
In making this declaration, Graham 
stated unequivocally to the House, that he 
introduced this measure with the unanimous 
consent of all his colleagues at the Admiralty, 
given after they had had f if teen months 
experience in the toils of officej 401 
As to how it would lead to saving in time, this was subsequently 
explained, with Graham going on to claim, 
that a large part of their [the Board of 
Admiralty-sl present occupation arose from 
the confusion produced by the erratic 
motions of the Navy and Victualling Boards, 
and he acccrdingly expected that when this 
san-ce of employment was cut off (for the 
present arrangement seemed to provide, that 
the various Boards shculd make wcrk for each 
other), that the Admiralty wculd have 
sufficient time to attend to the increase in 
W, A 
duty that waild be thrown on them by this 
planj 411 
But if Graham genuinely believed this, then he greatly misunderstood the 
nature of the work performed by the inferior boards. Much of the routine 
work was never referred to the Admiralty. Once a decision had been taken 
as to the amount of money available, it was the commissioners of the 
inferior boards who determined on the ships that would be repaired, the 
quantity and quality of supplies to be ordered, negotiated with 
contractors and oversaw the verification of vouchers and accounts, wages 
paid and pensions to be allowed. Thus, in reply to Grahamos rather 
startling claim, William Douglas, a former Admiralty Commissioner and 
member of the Council under the Lord High Admiral, briefly indicated the 
extent of the work that would now fall upon the Board of Admiralty. He 
then went on to emphasize the particular problems attached to the matter 
of naval stores: 
Fcr the future, all contracts for the supply 
of the Navy were to be effected by the 
Admiralty Board; but when the extent of those 
contracts were reflected on, and how 
complicated and multifarious they were, he 
must confess that he looked at any such 
proposition as that of confiding them to the 
Board of Admiralty to be totally impracticable, 
and likely to produce the wcrst results. [421 
Douglas then went on to remind the House that, 
the principal object contemplated in 
instituting that Board was, to have an 
efficient controlling power connected with 
the Ministry over the whole of the naval 
service, so as to render it effective to all 
branches, and easily applicable to any 
service ... 
[431 
In his opiniont and as a result of the increased load placed upon it, the 
]Board -would speedily find itself overwhelmed with a mass of business'. [441 
Members of the opposition who spoke against the bill were not 
necessarily arguing fcr a retention of the 
infericr boards. They were 
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genuinely concerned that there would be a very real increase in the work 
expected to be undertaken by the Admiralty commissioners, so making it 
impossible for the Board to work efficiently. Yet, at the same time, they 
also recognised the need for change. Many of those who had previously 
served on the Board of Admiralty had themselves witnessed the 
difficulties of imposing commands upon an intransigent Navy Board. For 
this reason, rather than completely rejecting Graham's argument, those on 
the opposition benches were now favouring the scheme put forward by Sir 
George Clerk in 1828. [451 At that time he had suggested the establishment 
of a single subordinate body that would possess a limited degree of 
executive authority. Among those now taking this line was J. W. Croker. 
As with the Board that Graham headed, he could also speak with a degree of 
experience. However, unlike the f if teen months of which the First Lord 
had spoken, Croker could claim twenty-one years 'experience in the toil of 
office'. For this reason, if for no other, his views should not have been 
so readily dismissed. 
Perhaps, in some respects, damage to the Admiralty's administrative 
machinery was worse than these opposition speakers predicted. The new 
scheme, once implemented, gave the appeazAnce of being wcrkable and, for 
this reason, remained unchanged for a number of decades. In part this 
resulted from the continuance of the long period of peace and the 
consequent reduction in the pressures that might at other times be placed 
on the navy. In turn, the Admiralty commissioners fell easily into the 
routine demanded of them, becoming less aware of the lack of attention 
given to overall planning. Thus, the system to which Croker, Clerk and 
Douglas rightly objected, became the accepted ncrm. The minor reforms 
that were introduced were designed not to dismantle a flawed system but to 
ensure its survival. 
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An early indication that all was not going acording to plan, can be 
gleaned by reference to the increase rather than diminution of 
correspondence directed to the Admiralty. According to Barrow, who 
unwittingly provides the evidence in his memoirs, the secretary 
revealed that there was a 33% growth in letters received and despatched 
from the Admiralty daring the period 1827 to 1833. [46] Graham, as has 
already been noted, believed the opposite would take place. 
As for the extraordinary amount of detail now attended to by 
commissioners, this was highlighted by evidence presented in 1836 to the 
Royal Commission of Inquiry that examined the civil administration of 
the Army. At the time, thought was being given to reforming the Army's 
administrative structure, with some individuals favcuring a scheme similar 
to that introduced by Graham at the Admiralty. Among those giving 
evidence was John Barrow. He was asked to comment upon the individual 
duties of the five superintending lords. While it is not necessary to 
reporoduce his answer in full, it is worth taking a look at statements he 
made relating to the First Sea Lord. As the senior professional lord on 
the Board, he was constantly called upon to advise the First Lord while 
overseeing all matters relating to the Fleet. At the same time, and 
as a result of the reforms, he was also supposed to attend Somerset House 
three days a week to superintend the work of the Surveyor of the Navy. 
While Barrow, at no time, suggested that these duties were excessive, it 
is difficult to see how the then First Sea Lord, Charles Adams, 
efficiently carried out these varied tasks. Such a suspicion is enhanced 
by Barrow-s description of his supervisory role: 
when a ship ordered to be fitted cut for a 
particular service, Sir Charles Adam has the 
charge of seeing that she is properly fitted; 
he consults with the Surveyor of the Navy how 
ships shall be distributed to the different 
ports, or in the different docks, and bow the 
artificers shall be distributed upon them, in 
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order to bring them forward in succession, or 
simultaneously just as they may be wanted. 
Sir Charles arranges with the surveyor the mode 
in which ships shall be stowed as to their 
holds, and fitted and stored as to their 
provisions, &c., and what quantity of powder 
they shall take, what guns they shall carry, 
and so onj 471 
While some matters certainly fell into the correct province of a senior 
naval lord, others would have been much more effectively dealt with by the 
Surveyor in consultation with other members of his own department. In 
particular, the Surveyor was best qualified to deal with the distribution 
'of artificers, the appropriate use of docks and the stowing of ships. on 
the other hand, while the First Sea Lord should correctly have an interest 
in ordnance, his thoughts wculd be best directed to the introduction of 
new and better guns rather than the determining the quantity of powder and 
guns on a particular ship at a particular port. 
Possibly the most surprising revelation presented by Barrow to the 
Commission of Inquiry was that of the trivial detail that had now to be 
brought before the Board. A reference to the Admiralty minutes books soon 
confirms this, with the commissioners frequently having to determine 
matters relating to pension claimants, the state of footpaths adjoining 
naval property and the rights of parishioners to use a newly constructed 
dockyard chapel. [481 However, Barrow's example is far more effective in 
proving the point, for it more clearly demonstrates how little real power 
was delegated away from the Board. The instance given, is hypothetical in 
nature and concerns the questioning of an account submitted to the 
accountant-general's office, 
'*. the captain 
[of a warship] goes into 
a foreign port and finds himself short of a 
little rope, and he is obliged to buy it; he gives 
an order to the purser to go and bly it; whatever 
he purchases must be attested by two respectable 
merchants of the place that it is purchased at 
proper prices: the captain is authorized to do 
this, but then it may become a question whether, 
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in the first place it was necessary, and, next, 
whether it should te allowed or not, and that is 
decided by the Board of Admiralty and not by the 
accountant general ... [ 491 
In giving this example, Barrow was merely clarifying the state of 
affairs as it then existed. He was certainly not criticising the system, 
but at least one of those listening to this statement felt the need to 
question the Boar(rs involvement in such a seemingly trivial matter. 
Barrow was therefore asked whether such detail did not lead to 'a great 
accumulation of business'. Barrow was fairly candid in his reply, 
So we have, a vast deal; but it is thought 
better that these things should be kept 
with the Board than allow the superintendents 
or clerks to settle matters of this kind. A 
Lord of the Admiralty would do it if it was 
no great extent, and he would put his initials 
to show that he had done it ... [501 
A few years later a subsequent First Lcrd did choose to draw 
attention to the complexities of detail that he felt to be overbndening 
the Admiralty commissioners. This was in 1841 when the Earl of Minto, 
then retiring from office, wrote a memorandum on the subject. He pointed 
out that 
The labour at present required from the Lcrds 
to enable them to conduct the business 
satisfactcrily is very greatly beyond the 
degree of exertion to be generally fcund 
or expected ... 
[511 
Despite this observation, he neither questioned the supervisory role of 
the commissioners nor the nature of business brought before the Board. In 
his words, the existing system was necessary so as to ensure 'efficient 
direction or control' over the subordinate departments. To reduce the 
amount of work performed by individual commissioners, Minto proposed that 
an additional member of the Board shculd be appointed. Upon this person 
ýwould devolve the superintendence of the dockyards, and the Surveyor of 
the Navy, and some portion of the stcres'. [521 As Minto explained, this 
would allow the senior sea lord to be relieved of the excess of work 
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placed upon his shoulders, so allowing him to give greater attention 
'to the proper duties' of his particular office. [531 In the event, 
Mintors recommendation was not pursued, although in later years the 
problem was tackled in a slightly different way, the Surveyor elevated to 
the Board and so no longer requiring superintendence. 
It was when called upon to operate under the pressures of war that 
those opposed to Graham's administrative refcrms expected them to be 
placed under such excessive pressures that the system would simply 
collapse. Croker had certainly suggested this during the second reading 
of Graham's bill [541 while Byam Martin had also made a similar point, 
The very beginning of a war (I wish Sir J. 
Graham may be the First Lord of the Admiralty 
when it takes place) will convince the 
Admiralty that they are utterly helpless 
without the assistance of an inferior department 
to attend to all the detail and drudgery of the 
duties of the civil branch of the service. The 
Admiralty will have quite enough to do to give a 
sort of general supervision over the inferior 
department, and to attend to all the general 
directing duties which belong to them with 
reference to the fleets in all quarters of the 
globe. [ 551 
It was not for some twenty-two years that the system was called upon to 
operate under such conditions. By that time, Graham's reforms were firmly 
entrenched into the constitutional mechanism with fewer people able to 
draw a direct comparison with what had gone before. As a resulto although 
the system proved inadequate, its entire removal was not to be 
contemplated nor were Graham's changes to be blamed in any way. 
]Furthermore, in comparison with the inept performance of the Army's own 
administrative machine, where the accumulation of the correct amount Of 
supplies in the most advantageous geographical location proved a near 
impossibility, the system cperated by the Admiralty was seen as something 
worth adopting on a wider scale. [56] 
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During the period of hostilities that lasted from 1854 to 1856 the 
Admiralty appeared to lack any definite war aim. Hamiltons analysis of 
the Baltic campaign of 1854 shows that a fleet under Napier was originally 
intended to blockade Russia's Baltic coastline. [571 However, lack of a 
distinct strategy and the failure of Graham, who had been re-appointed 
First Lord, to procure adequate advice, resulted in this campaign turning 
into a major onslaught upon entrenched coastal fortifications. In doing 
so, Graham found warships quite unsuited to this task. The existence of 
naval lords, unhampered by a myriad of administrative duties, would have 
al. lowed him to make better use of their considerable professional 
expertise. As Hamilton went on to state, 
by summing up the judgement of the majority 
of the older officers that battleships could 
not possibly face well-manned batteries, they 
could have made the First Lord somewhat less 
insistent on Napier leading his ships before 
Sweaborg. [ 551 
The general conclusion that Hamilton reaches is that Graham's reforms Of 
1832 were a backward step. He indicated that the Board of Admiralty, prior 
to the changes, might have had many faults and was often seen as a 
comfortable home for retired sailors, 
But if it had continued, this might have been 
its strength. Leisure gives at least an 
opportunity for self improvement, even if this 
is rarely taken. The demands of war might have 
turned an administrative luxury into a kind of 
planning body that was so badly needed. [591 
Modification of the system did take place in the years that 
followed the Russian War. In particular, attention was given to the 
problems of the senior naval lord having to supervise the rapidly 
expanding and technologically complex duties performed by the 
Surveycr-General. Initially however, the problem was made worse. By an 
Order-in-Council of 23 January 1860, the Surveyor's duties were 
considerably expanded, by his having been given enlarged powers as regards the 
management of the dockyards. In recognition of this, the SurveYcr-General 
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also took on a new title, from that date known as the Comptroller. 
Inevitably, this led to further attention being given to the proper 
supervision of his department by a naval lord. [601 Given, however, that 
no ordinary political appointee could possibly perform the job adequately, 
it was decided by Hugh Childers, First Lord between December 1868 and 
March 1871, that the Comptroller should be elevated to the Board itself. 
The result was that the Comptroller was constantly available to enhance 
the technological discussions that frequently arose, able to provide 
immediate answers to questions that might otherwise have caused undue 
delay in the furtherance of business. Furthermore, he now took on the 
supervisory duties once performed by the senior naval lord, able by his 
technical expertise to perform the task much more effectively. [61) 
Initially, the Comptroller-s elevation to the Board lasted for only 
three years, being returned to his previous status in 1872. At the time, 
much concern had been expressed at having a permanent non-political 
appointee on an otherwise politically chosen body. However, the success 
of the experiment Ied to a reversal of that earlier decision, with the 
Comptroller returned to the Board in 1882. [62] 
By this change, the senior naval lord could concentrate upon 
matters more closely concerned with the fleet. The remaining members of 
the Board, excluding the First Sea Lord, retained their superviscry roles, 
although with the creation of many new departments, they were no longer 
restricted to the overseeing of a single principal officer. The 
Controller had under his authority the directors of the dockyards, naval 
construction, naval ordnance and stores together with Engineer-in-Chief 
and Expense Accounts Branch while the Junior Sea Lord supervised the 
directors Of Transports, Medical Departments, Victualling and Stores as 
well as the Chaplain of the Fleet and Intelligence Department. In 
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addition, there was the Civil Lord who oversaw the Directors of Works and 
the Director of Greenwich Hospital with a Financial Secretary supervising 
the Accountant General together with all departments having a financial 
involvement. As for the First Lord, he continued to have overall 
responsibility for all naval business, his powers including those of 
initiative and veto. [631 
However, none of this got anywhere near to solving the far more 
important problem of preventing excessive amounts of detail throttling the 
Board's ability to plan a coherent naval policy. Indeed, if anything, the 
problem was getting worse. Having to absorb the tremendous technical 
advances of the age combined with a consequent growth in the size of the 
civilian work force (both manual and clerical), the Board became even more 
stretched than ever. As Rodger pointed out in his general history of the 
Admiralty, 
By 1896 nearly one f if th of all government 
expenditure went on the Navy. A quarter of 
a million people worked for or in the 
Service, or in industries which directly 
depended on it, which was 2.25 per cent of 
the total work force of the country. The 
Admiralty built and maintained an enormous 
fleet, it specified, designed and often 
manufactured every variety of stores from 
chamber pots to torpedoes. It fed, clothed 
and supervised its officers and men from 
boyhood to the grave, and to a considerable 
extent their wives and children with them. 
In an age when the state hardly impinged on 
the affairs of most of its citizens, and was 
only beginning to interfere in the economic 
life of the nation, the Admiralty represented 
a complete society, and a welfare state half 
a century before the state itself assumed the 
rde. [641 
The solution was not to come until the midst of World War One when 
the mass of administrative detail having to be undertaken by the Board was 
clearly having an effect upon the conduct of the war. The 
failure to secure a clear cut victory at Jutland, the disastrous 
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Dardanelles campaign and the horrendous merchant shipping losses can be 
traced back to a lack of any system to provide clear planning at the 
highest level. Marder, in his much acclaimed study of the navy during the 
first two decades of the 20th century, devotes considerable attention to 
this issue. He begins by pointing out that the Admiralty was il-l-equipped 
to plan operations due to 'excessive centralization'. [65] Ma t ters 
were made no better by the Board of Admiralty not only undertaking the 
work once performed by the civilian boards but also having the 'exclusive 
control of operations-. According to Admiral Dewar, a member of the 
Admiralty staff between July 1917 and February 1918, and quoted 
extensively by Marder, members of the Board, 
instead of confining their attention to important 
questions of policy and the general direction of 
affairs, they immersed themselves in a flood of 
routine and current business, much of which could 
have been decided without reference to the 
Admiralty. [661 
In fact, the situation was so bad that one national newspaper felt it 
necessary to alert the public to the dangers inherent In the existing 
system. On 30 April 1917, the Daily Mail informed its readers that the 
present Board was 'a collection of heads of departments all so fully 
occupied with departmental work that they have no time for hard thinking 
that is required in war'. [67] Admiral Sir Herbert William, described by 
Marder as the intellectual leader of a group of junior officers known as 
the 'Young Turks of the Grand Fleet', felt that the Board had too much to 
do and was concerned with 'inconsequential little matters', and the junior 
lords were too immersed in their own work for efficient command of the 
war. [681 William felt that the Board should be reconstituted with a 
supreme Board brought into existence, 'this to be free of administrative 
chores and able to devote itself to broad lines of strategy. [69] It was a 
suggestion that the Tory opponents to Graham's original reforms might well 
have approved. 
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It was the appointment of Sir Eric Geddes to the post of First Sea 
Lord in July 1917 that heralded the all-essential change that was to 
solve this particular problem as created by the 1832 abolition of the 
civilian boards. [701 Having taken up an earlier appointment to the post 
of Controller, Geddes already had an understanding of the workings of the 
Admiralty with an even clearer understanding of the changes that he felt 
necessary. In September he produced a paper in which he indicated that 
the Board was too large to retain proper control over policy. To 
achieve this objective, he divided the Board into two separate committees: 
operations and Maintenance. The former (which consisted of the First Sea 
Lord, Deputy First Sea Lord, Fifth Sea Lord [responsible for the air 
service] and Deputy Assistant chiefs of Naval Staff) was responsible 
for directing policy and operation of the fleet. The Maintenance 
Committee on the other hand (made up of the Second, Third and Fourth Sea 
Lords together with the Controller, Civil Lord and Financial Secretary) 
took responsibility for the Navy's material needs and so performed a task 
similar to that once undertaken by the long since abolished inferior 
boards. It was a point that was not lost upon Marder, 
to sum up, under the reforms of May 1917, 
the Admiralty organization reverted to a 
modified form of the pre-1832 system. It 
was divided more distinctly into two sides, 
operations and Administration, restoring 
what had been lost in the 1832 reforms. [711 
Following a period of no less than eighty-f ive years, recognition 
had finally been given to the views of Croker and those other fcrmer naval 
administratcrs who had spoken against the original bill. At that time 
they had pressed the need fcr a separate committee to take responsibility 
for the civilian departments and this had now come about. During those 
intervening years the manufacture and supply side of the navy had so 
dominated the Board, that direction and paicy had taken second place. 
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During those eighty-f ive years, and as a direct result, the navy had 
performed dismally during the Russian War and come close to defeat during 
the Great War. On both occasions, the material side of the navy had been 
in good order and ready to take on the enemy. In this respect the Board 
had done well - it could not have done otherwise. Yet the placement of 
these materials, and whether they were best suited for the war in hand, 
were the areas in which the Admiralty constantly under-performed. With 
renewed direction coming about as a result of Geddes reforms, the navy 
went on to play its full part in ultimately bringing an end to the war 
that had been proclaimed as ending all wars. 
5.4 The Principle of Individual Responsibility 
According to John Barrow, when writing his later 'Memoirs, the 
reforms of the naval department introduced in 1832 'hinged on two words-. 
These words, he declared, were 'individual responsibility'. While there 
can be little doubt that the principle to which he alluded was of 
importance, it is also the case that Barrow was guilty of exaggeration. 
The purpose of the reforms, the matter upon which they really 'hinged', 
was that of giving the Admiralty, as a board, absolute authority in all 
matters relating to the administration of the navy. That individual 
responsibility featured was a result of a need to ensure that the 
introduced reforms would work as well as possible. There was, in other 
words, little point in abolishing the two civilian boards if the 
administrative structure that superseded them was, in i tself 
fundamentally flawed. 
Returning, for a moment, to Barrowos statement, it is possible to 
see why he should credit this one principle with the importance that he 
considered it to have held. He had been charged, as already noted, with 
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producing the detailed arrangements that would underpin the entire reform 
package. His concern was neither that of consolidating the Admiralty and 
civilian boards nor determining where executive power should lie. All 
this had been done for him and was probably based on an idea first worked 
cut by St Vincent and then adopted by Grey. Instead, Barrow was entirely 
concerned with the internal running of each branch. In working upon a 
scheme that would meet with general approval, Barrow had been informed 
that it must encompass the principle of individual responsibility. 
Assuming, therefore, this to have been the case, then it is also easy to 
see why Barrow, unconcerned with the wider issue of consolidation, should 
credit this particular principle with such overriding importance. 
That Graham, as First Lord, and the man charged with overseeing the 
introduction of the scheme in its entirety, held individual responsibility 
to be of importance cannot be denied. In the Supply Committee of the 
House of Commons, during the debate on the Navy Estimates, Graham 
indicated his belief that individual responsibility was 'the best security 
which the public had fcr the good conduct of its servanW. [721 
Furthermore, during the committee stage of the Civil Departments bill he 
indicated that the proposed reforms were designed to enforce this one 
principle 'as completely as it could possibly be enforced. ' [731 
Yet the Civil Departments bill, despite Craham's declared 
commitment to individual responsibility, both on the occasions quoted and 
at other times, was not as complete in this area as it might have 
been. [7 41 Certainly, it did not enforce the principle 'as completely as 
it could possibly be enforced', since it failed to bestow upon those 
individuals in executive authority a clear and unarguable responsibility 
for decisions taken. The Act, as introduced, merely declared the former 
authority of the navy and victualling commissioners -to be transferred to 
the Commissioners for executing the Office of Lord High Admiral'. It 
made no mention of individual responsibility and even insisted that all 
'Authorities, Duties, Matters and Things' to be executed by the Board 
should only be 'valid and effectual' if 'executed or performed by two or 
more of the said commissioners of the Admiralty. [751 In other words, all 
commissioners should act in concert, unable to take decisions unless 
supported by another, and therefore bereft of individual responsibility. 
As for the way of overcoming this, that of having the commissioners acting 
as a board of advice and the First Lord taking responsibility for all 
decisions, this too was precluded. According to the Letters Patent, by 
which all members of the Board were appointed, and continued to be 
appointed for several more decades, the First Lord had no greater 
authority than any other member of the Board. [76] 
it is with the philosopher Jeremy Bentham that the principle of 
individual responsibility is most closely associated. In a series of 
essays that eventually culminated in his 'Constitutional Code-, Bentham 
laid down a series of rules for the exercise of good managp-ment. [771 
Applicable to both government and joint stock enterprises alike, they 
encompassed not only individual responsibility and general management 
practice but also the style of architecture, modes of work and the size of 
work force that was best suited to efficient management. As regards the 
principle of individual responsibility, its main advantage, so Bentham 
claimed, was that it encouraged maximum exertion. [781 
over the years, an increasing number of decision makers came into 
contact with Bentham's ideas, adapting and developing them to their own 
needs. Among them, so it can be argued, were St Vincent and Grey, the two 
individuals most hostile to the continued existence of the Navy Board. 
Neither, however, were committed Benthamites. [791 Both chose to accept 
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only the principle of individual responsibility. That they did so, 
according to Chester in his study of the English administrative system, 
relates back to an intriguing experiment that was conducted within the 
royal dockyards. [801 In 1796, Samuel Bentham, younger brother of the 
philosopher, was appointed to the post of Inspectcr-General of Naval 
Works. This was a short-lived office and one that was established by 
the Admiralty as a result of their increasing belief that the Navy Board 
was not keeping pace with their own needs. To this end, they directed 
Samuel Bentham to consider all matters which related to 
the improvement of the building, fitting cut and 
arming of ... ships and vessels as well as 
what may conduce to the better navigating and 
victualling of them: the construction of docks, 
slips, basins, jetties and other works subservient 
to the construction and equipment of the ships and 
vessels; together with the due choice, preservation 
and economical employment of the several stores and 
provisions made use of in the navy. [81] 
Although Jeremy Bentham had yet publicly to express an interest in the 
value of individual responsibility, it was a principle to which his 
ycung-,, r brother was already fervently committed. This was apparent in the 
way he ran the office to which he had been appointed. According to morrisS 
Bentham emphasized that though furnished 
with assistants ... he was the only 
person responsible fcr every part of the 
business and that, as his reports were not 
countersigned by his assistants, they could 
not cover his errors nor screen him from 
responsibility. [821 
Among the schemes that Samuel Bentham pioneered during this period was the 
appointment of a timber master to each of the royal dor-kyards. [831 The 
duties of this new officer were those of receiving and inspecting newly 
arrived timber, ensuring its proper storage and overseeing the later use 
of this commodity. In producing a set of instructions for the new 
officer, Samuel Bentham included the solemn warning that 'the blame of any 
bad management (though it may appear to arise from [his subordinatesol 
neglect or unskilfulness) will always fall heavily upon him; more 
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especially if he should have omitted any opportunity of bringing to light 
their misconduct. 1841 
Although, in later years the timber master was to become a clear 
asset to the management structure of the dockyards, these appointments 
initially created a serious problem. In particular, the timber masters 
rejected large quantities of timber before it entered the yards, claiming 
it to be quite useless for the needs of shipbuilding. Some doubt exists as 
to whether such amounts should have been rejected, the Navy Board taking 
the view that the timber masters were simply over-cautious. Moreover, 
if timber continued to be rejected with such regularity, then those 
responsible for the supply of timber would cease to enter into future 
contracts. Consequently, in October 1801, the Navy Board directed 'that 
justice may be done to the merchants as well as the publie. [851 That 
the timber masters had been so cautious, so it was suggested by one group 
of contractors in a letter to the Navy Board, was a result of the 
fierceness with which the principle of individual responsibility appeared 
to be enforced. It was pointed out that the timber masters 'consider 
themselves responsible even to the loss of their situation for the 
receipts of any timber which might be found to have any defect at a future 
distant period in the opinion of another persono. [86] 
Fcr his part, St Vincent lost faith in neither the timber masters 
nor the principle of individual responsibility. Believing, as his 
correspondence shows, that the dockyards were nothing less than dens of 
comptiono he was not surprised by the large quantity of timber rejected. 
Ncr would he listen to the pleas of the merchants and the commissioners of 
the Navy Board. He was convinced that in earlier years quantities Of 
sub-standard timber had been allowed into the yards either thrcugh 
laxness on the part of dockyard officers or as a result of bribery. In 
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either case, the timber masters held responsible for the receipt of all 
timber, would eventually fcrce the contractors to supply timber of 
adequate quality. As a result, it is not surprising, that St Vincent 
continued to adhere to the principle of individual responsibility, 
converting Grey to its value in any future reform programme that might be 
instituted. [871 
While this early experiment in the royal dockyards had convinced at 
least two Whig parliamentarians of the value of individual responsibility, 
others were to join forces in the years that followed. Finer, in his 
essay on the transmission of Benthamite ideas, identifies three processes: 
irradiation, suscitation and permeation. The gist of his argument Is that 
through discussion and other forms of consciousness raising, many of the 
ideas common to the apparently small group of Benthamites were transferred 
to a large proportion of the nation's leaders. [88] Few of them, as 
previously indicated, accepted all of Bentham's ideas, taking on board 
only those with which they felt most comfortable. In this respect, Craham 
is a case in point. While in opposition he was noted for his fierce 
attacks on government expenditure and mis-management. For this reason, he 
was likely to look favourably upon some of the general ideas expounded by 
Bentham. However, instead of accepting them as part of a completely 
integrated system, he appears to have adopted a much more pragmatic 
approach. As with many contemporary politicians, he occasionally 
picked out Benthamite principles as and when he felt they might best 
apply. [891 
That individual responsibility had become Ir-nerally accepted some 
thirty years after that first experiment in the royal dockyards can be 
shown by way of reference both to the first report of the Unance 
Committee of 1828 and its subsequent adoption by the Navy Board during the 
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following year. The Finance Committee, of which it will be remembered that 
Graham was a member, proclaimed itself to be fully in favour of the 
principle. In that first report it was stated 
The Committee are of opinion that where there 
is a collective responsibility, each individual 
is disposed to consider himself as in a great 
degree relieved from personal responsibility; 
but that where there is individual responsibility, 
no such feeling can exist; responsibility is then 
brought home to each individual, and is a constant 
motive to render him faithful in the discharge of 
his public duty. [90] 
As an indication of its value attention was drawn to the Ordnance 
Department where it was pointed cut that each member of the Board was 
solely responsible for one area of administration. Here, 
the advantage of a prompt and consistent administration 
is secured by a personal responsibility, on the other 
the tendency which there always is, when power is 
vested in a single person, to abuse it, is effectually 
restrained by the continued checks of the controlling 
authority of the Board and Master General. [91] 
To a certain extent, individual responsibility, as practised by the 
Ordnance Board must be considered a rather spurious example. It was 
certainly true that members of the Board each had a separate and distinct 
duty but it was also the case that all important matters were brought 
before the entire Board for a collective decision. Confirming this was 
the report of a Parliamentary Committee of 1837: 
The whole of the Business is distributed amongst 
the three Board Officers of the Ordnance, namely 
the Surveyor-General, the Clerk of the Ordnance, 
and the Principal Storekeeper. Each of these has 
his own separate and distinct duties; but, as all 
acts are done in the name and authority of the 
Board, all important questions are brought before 
it, and every member of it is expected to have a 
general knowledge of the business transacted in 
each separate division. [921 
Seen in these terms there was surprisingly little difference between 
methods used at the Ordnance Board and that practised by the Navy and 
Victualling Boards prior to the introduction of the committee system in 
1796. As will be seen by reference back to chapter one of the thesis, 
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each commissioner of the navy0s civilian boards had authority over 
specif ic areas of administration with all important decisions 
collectively taken at board meetings. 
Following the report of the Finance Committee, attention was given 
to the introduction of individual responsibility into the existing 
administrative framework of the naval departments. First to receive 
attention was the Navy Board, with the committee system disassembled in 
1829 and replaced by a body of titled commissioners, each having 
responsibility over his own department. Once again, as with the Ordnance, 
they met together as a general board. However, unlike the system 
that had prevailed prior to 1796 they could now be held responsible for 
any mistakes within their own department. It appears that nothing 
specific was placed on paper, although Byam Martin has left his own notes 
of a conversation with Lord Melville. On the occasion of that 
conversation, Byam Martin was informed 'that each commissioner should 
himself execute and so far be responsible for the duties of his own 
branch, instead of there being left as before, in the management of the 
Secretaries of the Committees or Chief Clerk. ý[93] 
It was within three years of the introduction of the new procedure 
that the navy's two remaining civilian boards were abolished. At that 
time, the Navy and Victualling commissioners were operating under two 
entirely different systems. Whereas the navy commissioners were working a 
system of limited individual responsibility, the victualling commissioners 
were still operating the older Committee system. In both cases, upon the 
appointment of principal officers, each of whom was to be held 
responsible for the department he headed, the move towards full individual 
responsibility was clearly furthered. However, as already noted, the 
Board of Admiralty, itself, despite Graham holding the post of First Lord, 
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was characterised by a decidedly collective form of responsibility. 
Of course, it could be argued that the First Lord was really ýfirst 
among equals' and was, therefore, ultimately responsible for all decisions 
taken. In fact, Graham himself took this view, seeing it as entrenched by 
historical usage. [941 Yet such an argument was not easy to sustain. 
Apart from the existence of Letters Patent denying the First Lord 
supremacy, it has also to be remembered that many of the junior lords 
were, themselves, powerful individuals. The Civil Departments Act, for 
instance, allowed four of them to be Members of Parliament while the 
senior naval lord had a natural degree of authority that resulted from his 
normally exalted service career. Serving with Graham, for instance, was 
Sir Thomas Hardy: a national hero, and one whose name was better known 
than that of the First Lord. It could not have been easy for Graham to 
overrule the views of such a personality. [951 A further factor operating 
within the Board of Admiralty, and encouraging a more collectivist 
approach, was that other than the First Lord and senior naval lord, none 
of the other members of the Board had their own private room. Instead, 
they were expected to conduct business in a common room, a factor that 
militated against individual decision making or confidentiality. 
Fundamentally, of course, it was very much to do with character. 
Those with a strong personality, and it appears that Graham was one of 
these, had little difficulty in ruling the Board. On the other hand, 
those of weak character would not find it so easy. A Select Committee of 
1861, which looked into the workings of the Board, found that at least one of 
Graham's successors had not found mastery of the Board an easy task. Sir 
John pakington, First Lord between 1858-9 and 1866-79 indicated that his 
supremacy had been questioned by some of his more able collegues. 
Pakington further informed members of the Select Committee that there was 
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ýa want and an absence on the part of any one member of the Board of that 
sense of individual responsibility' upon which he considered 'the 
satisfactory conduct of public business mainly depends'[961 
In order to ensure that individual responsibility existed in 
something more than name only, some radical changes were introduced by 
H. C. E. Childers shortly after his appointment to the office of First Lord 
in 1868. Giving thought to the undeclared authority of the office he now 
held, Childers not only sought an order-in-council that would enhance his 
position as head of the board, but wculd also sweep away many aspects of 
collective decision making as handed down by Graham. The changes, which 
came before council in January 1869, made it clear that the First Lord 
was responsible 'to Your Majesty and Parliament for all the business of 
the Admiralty'. As for the navy and civil members of the Board, they were 
to 'act as his assistants'. [ 971 A further aspect of the order-irr-ccuncil 
was the dividing of the business of the Board into three principal 
branches and the elevation of the Controller (formerly the 
Surveycr-General) to the post of Third Naval Lord. As such he now became 
a full member of the Board. In making these changes it also allowed the 
Board to see a reduction in membership, the Board now consisting of the 
First Lord, First Naval Lord, Third Naval Lord and Controller, the Junior 
Naval Lord and the Civil Lord. In addition, there were also the two 
secretaries who were now designated the Parliamentary Secretary (formerly 
First Secretary) and the Permanent Secretary (formerly the Second 
secretary). The three areas of responsibility, as laid down by the order 
in council, were set out as follows: 
A. The First Naval Lord to be resPOnsible 
to the First Lord of the Admiralty of so 
much of the business as related to the 
"Personnel" of the Navy, and fcr the 
movement and conditioa of Your Majesty-s 
Fleet. The Junicr Naval Lcrd to assist 
the First Naval Lord in the division of 
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the business. 
B. The Contoller of the Navy being, as 
we have proposed the Third Lord, to 
be responsible to the First Lord of the 
Admiralty for the administration of such 
business as relates to the "Material" of 
Your Majesty's Navy i. e. to the building 
and repairing of ships, to guns, and to 
naval stores. 
C. The Parliamentary Secretary to be 
responsible to the First Lord of the 
Admiralty for the "Finance" of the 
Departments, and the Civil Lord to act as 
an Assistant to the Secretary. [981 
Athough not sanctioned by the crder in council, for it was a matter of 
internal procedure, Childers also brought an end to the daily meetings of 
the Board. Instead, each of the three senior naval lords were to report 
individually to the First Lcrd, so ensuring an end to common discussion 
and jointly taken decisions. Further encouraging this move to 
individualism was that of each naval lord now having his own private 
office and ceasing to work in a shared common area. 
Childers gave an explanation of these changes to Parliament shortly 
af ter the order had been sanctioned. In particular, he pointed out that 
under the new arrangement 'the business of the Admiralty is conducted in 
the same manner as in the other principal departments of 
Government'. [991 This however, was disputed by H. T. Carry, a former Tcry 
First Lord, 
He [Corry] had always been of opinion that, 
in consequence of special circumstances 
connected with naval administration, it was 
impossible to conduct the business of the 
Admiralty in the same manner as that which 
was applicable to other Departments of the 
Government. [1001 
The reason, he went on to state, was that whereas in departments such as 
the Treasury the head of that department, namely the ChanO-Mor, was well 
acquainted with the tusiness, this was not the case with the First Lcrd, 
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It was not going too far to say that the 
First Lord could hardly be acquainted with 
one-ninth of the details that had to be 
dealt with at the Admiralty. [1011 
For this reason he needed advice from the junior lords and the arrangement 
of the Board had once allowed for this. One aspect of the reforms that 
caused Corry particular misgivings was that of allowing the Controller 
the direct ear of the First Lord, 
As a rule, the Controller of the Navy was 
thoroughly conversant with the details of 
the business in which he was engaged; and 
when, as a Lord of the Admiralty, he made 
a proposal to the civilian First Lord, who 
would probably have a very superficial 
knowledge of the subject, the latter wculd 
be completely in his hands. His subordinates 
wculd be merely nominal, for the First Lord 
would have to deal with him without the 
assistance of anything like a Board .. . 
[102] 
Referring to the system as it had previously existed, Corry explained that 
questions relating to the design of ships would certainly have been 
settled by the First Lord, but at that time he had the benefit of hearing 
the views of several competent naval officers. Under the chanEp, Corry 
was afraid that the Controller, 'being a permanent officer and 
consequently without recent naval experience, was apt to get into grooves, 
and those grooves might not be in a direction leading to the best 
results-11031 
While Childers' refoms had created a structure that allowed 
for the adoption of individual responsibility, some of the more radical 
aspects of his reforms were removed. In 1871, soon after his 
appointment to the office of First Lord, George J. Goschen chose to modify 
the system. He reintroduced the practice of daily Board meetings while 
also removing the Controller from the Board. However, a subsequent 
order in council confirmed the First Lord as 'responsible to Your Majesty 
and parliament for all the business of the Admiralty' and that all members 
287 
of the Board 'responsible to the First Lcrd of the Admiralty' for the 
administration of business. [1041 Althcugh the Controller was no lonjr-r a 
member of the Board, he was still to be responsible to the First Lord 
for the administration of so much business 
as relates to the material of Your Majesty's 
Navy. The Controller to have the same right 
to attend the Board and toexplain his views 
whenever the First Lord shall submit to the 
Board for his opinion, Designs for ships cr 
any other matters emanating from the 
Controller's department. [1051 
However, in not continuing the Controller as a member of the Board, yet in 
allowing his frequent attendance at meetings, it was soon recognised to be 
a rather absurd situation. The only obj(tion to his being a member of 
the Board was at a time when the Board had ceased having regularly 
meetings - but this was no longer the case. To regularise the state of 
affairs, a further order in council was introduced in 1882, this 
reintroducing the Controller as a full member of the Board: 
** the officer filling the post of ýontroller 
of Your Majesty's Navy should, 
daring such period as may from time to 
time be sanctioned by Your Majesty's 
letters patent, notwithstanding the said 
order in council, be appointed to be an 
additional Navy Lord of the Admiralty, 
and daring such time an additional civil 
lord of the Admiralty may be appointed, 
who shall possess special mechanical and 
engineering knowledge, as well as administ- 
rative expertise to assis the Controller in 
the Administration of the Material of Your 
Majesty's Navy. [1061 
In effect, therefore, the principles upon which Barrow had claimed 
the original reforms had hinged and Graham regarded to be of great 
importance, were now enforced in a format that was both workable and 
meaningEul. The First Lord, who no longer held sway through force of 
character, had a position of power codified by crder-in--(=ncil. That 
of 1869 had paved the way, confirmed by the warding Of a second order 
presented to the council in March 1871. A further step, taken in 1871 and 
by then no more than a formality, was alteration to the Letters Patent 
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which appointed the various members of the Board. These were now 
re-worded so as to confirm the authority of the First Lord. Wi th these 
various changes therefore, the Board of Admiralty was transferred from a 
body of individuals which appeared to require some sort of collective 
agreement to one in which the First Lord was responsible for all decisions 
and the junior members constituted a board of advice. 
5.5 Financial Accountability 
Pricr to the abolition of the civil departments, Graham had 
introduced a series of reforms that were aimed at bringing about greater 
financial accountability. In particular, he was concerned at the process 
by which those who managed the civil departments treated the various items 
voted by Parliament as a general sum available to the credit of the naval 
service. Although defended by Byam Martin and others as being an 
unavoidable expediency, considering it an impossibility ae", ately to 
predict forthcoming expenditure, Graham disagreed. He saw this method of 
accounting as a simple misappropriation of public funds, reinforcing this 
view with detailed references to items of expenditure that had not even 
been brought to the attention of Parliament. [1071 
To ensure that the wishes of Parliament were to be more closely 
adhered to in the future was not conditional upon the introduction of new 
legislation. All that was required was a simple willingness on the part 
of administrators to work within the terms of existing legislation - 
namely the appropriation acts. Yet Graham felt that the form in which the 
estimates were presented to parliament were, in themselves, a crucial (and 
undesirable) element of the prevailing system. The composition of many 
of the votes was often confusing, with unrelated items combined toir-ther 
for convenience. Worse still, the estimates showed no breakdown between 
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the navy and victualling departments, with the commissioners of the 
victualling board never in possession of the precise sum available for the 
purchase of victuals and medicine. Thus, Graham regarded it of 
considerable importance for the estimates to be presented in a new 
format. As introduced in February 1831, they were divided into twenty-one 
separate heads, these clearly relating to distinct areas of 
expendi ture. [ 1081 
Of equal importance were two other chanýras introduced by Graham 
during this period. The first of these concerned a change to the 
financial year, with naval accounts to run from the twelve months that 
began in April instead of January. A major reason for this, so Graham 
explained, was to give Parliament more time to discuss the estimates. As 
it stood, naval estimates were usually presented to the lower house after 
the year had started, forcing the legislature to agree to expenditure that 
had already taken place. [1091 In addition, Graham also announced that in 
the November that followed the ending of each financial year a balance 
sheet would be placed before the House 'in which would be specifically 
placed under each head the actual expenditure of the Navy and Victualling 
Boardsý. Upon the eventual abolition of these two boards, the 
presentation of a balance sheet was retained, enforced by the same Act of 
Parliament that was responsible for reforming the civil departments. The 
wording of the Act left little room for any later administratoc to attempt 
to confuse the members of the house by re-formulating the balance sheet in 
a way that differed from the original estimates. According to Section 30 
of the Act, the account of expenditure was to 
be formatted "under the 
several Heads of Naval Service, as expressed in the Appropriation Act or 
Acts for that Year'. [1101 
The Naval Civil Departments Act, while confirming that the 
290 
principle of presenting a balance sheet would be retained, also introduced 
-a further element to the overall package of greater financial 
-accountability. The Board of Audit, previously holding rather limited 
powers, was now required to examine the accounts and vouchers for naval 
expenditure, comparing these with the votes and estimates. Having 
completed this task, the Commissioners of this Board were to 'certify 
thereon as to the correctness of the said account as compared with the 
vouchers, and noting under each Head whether the Expenditure has exceeded 
or fallen short of the sum voted by Parliament for the naval service of 
that year .. -[1111 
Yet, in reality, all these changes were little more than cosmetic. 
Despite Grahamýs stated desire to bring about greater financial 
accountability within the naval departments, he achieved very little. At 
best, perhaps, he created a system that was little more than a minor 
improvement over that which already existed. Furthermore, it is 
difficult to understand how Graham could believe that a change in the way 
these estimates were presented could affect members in quite the way he 
believed. In the debate held before the Supply Committee on 25 February 
1831, he stated himself to be fully confident 
that if the House would pass it, insist upon 
this estimate being drawn in the same way for 
the future, and then, in every subsequent 
year, compare the items, and demand how each 
individual sum had been expended, every Hon. 
Gentleman would be able henceforth to understand 
the Navy Estimates, which was more, he believed, 
than many hon. Gentlemen could say he had been 
able to do in former years. [1121 
But whether it was Graham's inexperience, or mere wishful thinking, a 
simple change In the way the estimates were presented was unlikely to make 
any real difference. Factcrs such as those of time and individual 
willingness, ability and experience to tackle such matters were also 
required. The Hcuse contained few members with the single-mindedness of a 
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Joseph Hume or the thcroughness in financial matters of a James Graham. 
Until something was done that would make it easier for members to direct 
their attentions to naval expenditure, then there could be no real 
improvement. 
Turning, for a moment, to the way the Estimates were presented, it 
will be possible to make this point clearer. Upon the changing of the 
financial year, it now became essential that the planned expenditure of 
the navy departments should be approved prior to the beginning of April. 
However, these same estimates were only placed on the table of the House 
once the new session of Parliament had begun in mid-January. Because of 
this, members of the house had only about eight weeks to read and 
familiarise themselves with a highly technical forty-five page document 
that contained in excess of 1000 items. If the object had been to allow 
members merely to peruse its contents, then this was not impossible. 
However, if the object was to read, assimilate, make comparisons and 
knowledgeably question certain aspects of the following year's costings, 
then difficulties clearly abounded. According to Cobbett, who spoke on 
this matter during the debate on the naval estimates in 1834, members of 
the house 'had hardly time to look at the estimates before they were 
called upon to vote. In his own case, unless he had 
done something on the Sabbath, he could 
not have read through all the items, and 
he should think himself guilty of a great 
crime if he voted away the money of the 
people, without proper time to look at 
all of them. [ 1131 
Cobbett also made an additional point of some substance. He pointed cut 
that the timing of the Estimates debate was far from appropriate. He felt 
it shculd only come after an agreement had been reached upon the matter of 
a taxation policy. Admittedly, during the debate of February 1834, he 
was directing himself to the whole issue of government expenditure and the 
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collection of money, but the general thrust of his argument was clearly 
relevant to the governmentýs presentation of the naval estimates. 
Acr-ording to Cobbett, 
it was well known that a motion was to be 
made for the repeal of the Malt-tax, and 
he trusted that the landowners waild show, 
that they understood their own interest, by 
insisting upon the repeal of that tax; but 
how could the House call upon Ministers to 
take off the Malt-tax, if they voted 
establishments which cculd not be supported 
without the produce of the tax? [1141 
Cobbe tt then went on to add, 
The old-fashioned mode of doing business was 
to consider the grievances of the country 
before voting the supplies; now, however, 
the practice was reversed, - the supplies were 
granted f irst, and the grievances of the 
people talked of af terwards. [ 1151 
It was also the case that, by scheduling the estimates debate into 
a contracted period of about two months, time available for discussion of 
issues was sometimes forcibly curtailed. With the Hcuse not returning 
until mid-January, following a two month recess, it was frequently the 
case that matters of pressing national import might have arisen during the 
interim. If this did happen, then it was not unusual for a debate on the 
naval estimates to be pushed back to the end of March. On such occasions, 
a lot of potential contributors might be muted by the governmentos 
insistence that the issue should be dealt with quickly. After all, the 
navy estimates were not the only financial question that had to be 
settled. In addition, this same protracted period was reserved for 
discussion upon the estimates of other government departments together 
with matters pertaining to revenue. Indeed, within the first year of 
Grahamos completed package coming into force, this very situation 
occurred. Rather than devote time to the navy estimates, the Hcuse turned 
its attention to the far more pressing question of Ireland, with the naval 
estimates for 1833 not discussed until 12 March. As the paips of Hansard 
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show, the resulting discussions were brief to the point of absurdity. 
To achieve the necessary parliamentary time while encouraging a 
more detailed consideration of the estimates, Graham might well have 
considered use of a standing committee. It was certainly the procedure 
adopted in a number of other countries, a point brought to the attention 
of the Admiralty commissioners at the beginning of 1833. This was the 
result of a report, produced by Accountant General Thomas Briggs, 
following a fact finding visit to France during the preceding year. On 
that occasion he had examined various aspects of the French naval 
administration, identifying a number of features that might usefully be 
applied to Britain. of the use of committees by the French lower chamber, 
Briggs noted that, upon the naval estimates being first drawn up, they 
were submitted to a number of specialist committees, each examining a 
separate area of financial expenditure. Subsequently, the chairman of 
each committee submitted a report to the lower chamber, and it was this 
report that formed the basis of any discussion or debate within the lower 
house as a whole. A printed copy of Briggs's report may be found at the 
Public Record office, located with a collection of general papers relating 
to the internal administration of the Admiralty during this period. 
Although one of several identical copies, It Is of peculiar interest 
because of a series of comments placed in the margin. The originator of 
these notes cannot be definitely identified, but the location of the 
document indicates him to have been an admiralty commissioner. As such, 
they provide an indication, in a blunt and clear form, the feelings of at 
least one high ranking member of the Admiralty. Regarding the reference to 
the French use of specialist committees, the writer makes this somewhat 
revealing remark, 'God forbid this practice should be introduced into cur 
chambers. What (sic) caAd committees tell what was or was not necessary 
- suppose Joseph Hume chairman! ' [1161 
294 
Within a few years of the Admiralty receiving Briggs's report, 
members of the British legislature were also putting the case for a select 
committee. Not surprisingly, the prime mover was the dreaded Joseph Hume. 
On this occasion Graham, who was no longer a member of the government, was 
able to put his own views on record as to the use of committees on such 
occasions. Surprisingly, given his own reputation for careful scrutiny of 
Parliamentary accounts, mainly gained during his earlier years in 
opposition, the former First Lord was against the idea. Ins tead, he 
declared himself to be in favour of the naval estimates being brought 
before a Committee of the Whole House. In giving a reason, he 
suggested that, 
... if he wished the 
details passed slightly 
over - if he wished to conceal a job, to exclude 
the public from all knowledge of the mode in which 
the estimates were prepared, and the efficiency of 
the person by whom they were submitted, by far the 
most likely method of effecting those ends would be 
to have the estimates referred to a Select Committee 
upstairs. [1171 
Yet, in making this statement, Graham was surely ignoring the fact that 
the committee would not only be able to concentrate on points of detail 
but a subsequent report would be produced. This, in turn, would be 
submitted to Parliament, with any aggrieved member of the committee able 
to draw his grievances to the attention of Parliament in a debate upon the 
committees report. This simple fact would alone annul GrahWs belief In 
the committee could hide matters from public gaze; similarly, Graham 
reminded the House that upon such a committee 'the executive Government 
supported by a majority, must practically exercise a commanding 
i nfluence. [ 1181 
The precise issue that had prompted Hume to raise the possibility 
of having the naval estimates sent to a select committee was his belief 
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that the estimates presented in that year were concealing far more than 
they revealed. In an opening speech, he pointed cut that the estimates, 
did not show the number of off icers required 
in any particular branch of the marine service. 
He could not obtain from them the number of 
Colonels, Lieu tenant-Colonels, and other officers 
employed. [ 119] 
Illustrating the problem, he referred to a previously moved Return, 
By that Return, which was dated the 7th June 
1834, he found that the number of officers 
in the naval service at that date was 5,300, 
of whom only 460 were on full pay, yet during 
the year it appeared that there was considerable 
promotion within the navy. Now he thought that 
the House ought to have the opportunity of 
knowing why there were so many promotions from 
day to day, while there were nearly 4000 
pensioners, very many of whom would willingly 
serve. [12D] 
In conclusion, Hume pointed cut that the legislature of several other 
ccuntries, including Belgium and the U. S. A., made use cf committees when 
examining the estimates for the Navy, Army and Ordnance. [1211 
Another who favaired the use of committees was Sir Henry Parne-U. 
Again, he brought attention to the lack of detail included in the naval 
estimates and made reference to the estimates laid before the French 
chamber. In the latter case, so he indicated, they were far more 
detailed, consisting of 'no less than f if teen different chapters, 
occupying 140 pages embracing every species of infcrmationý. As for the 
problems of continuing to debate the estimates before a committee of the 
whole house, Parnell said 
it was impossible for the House generally, 
and especially for new Members to do justice 
to their constituents in sifting the 
multifarious details ... while it would 
greatly contribute to the satisfactory 
arrangement of the r-neral business, and more 
particularly with reference to matters of 
expense, if the rule was laid down and the 
practice established of referring the estimates 
to a Committee up stairs. [1221 
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A. Ithcugh Hume's criginal motion received the support of 66 members of the 
lower house, it was defeated by 14 votes. [123] 
Graham had also made considerable claims for the value of 
submitting to Parliament a final balance sheet of naval expenditure. This 
was intended to prevent under spent votes being used to support other 
areas that were overspending while also bringing to an end all forms of 
unauthorised expenditure. Although, once again, an improvement on the 
system whereby Parliament had absolutely no check on how the naval 
departments were using the monies voted, it had many shortcomings. Among 
them was a simple lack of Parliamentary time. By not, once again, 
transferring the balance sheet to a committee, there was simply not enough 
time to do justice to the information given. Furthermore, such a 
committee, with a chairman whose expertise might increase with each 
passing year, would have the advantage in creating at least one more 
expert in examining these annuaUy presented f igures. 
But this was only one of many problems associated with the 
submitted balance sheets. Their very briefness was a further problem. What 
were members to make of the immense sums spent on dockyard wages? In the 
estimates as presented, they were merely informed: 
Expendi ture, 
f775,488. 
Grants, including appropriation, in 
aid of supplementary estimates, t752,457. [1241 
To this shculd be added the failure of the submitted balance sheets to 
produce a complete picture for any one year with amounts between differing 
years often confused. As a result, when submitted to Parliament it was 
extremely difficult to relate the given information to the amcunts 
appropriated some 18 months earlier. As an example, it is wacth making 
reference to the amounts voted for half pay. According to the vote for 
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the financial year beginning April 1833 it was stated 'that a sum not 
exceeding 1785,507 16s 4d be granted to His Majesty to defray the charge 
of Half-pay to Naval Officers for one year, to 31st March 1833-. [1251 The 
wording is both precise and clear and leaves little room for 
misinterpretation, yet in reality the navy did not adhere to this scheme 
of things. Instead, the customary practice was retained, with payments 
being mach for amounts due for the last quarter of every financial year 
out of the vote for the subsequent year. Consequently, only 75% of the 
sum voted fcr half-pay related to the year which it supposedly covered. 
In this instance, it was clear that if Graham had ge, -nuinely wished 
Parliament to receive true statements of the expenditure of money strictly 
according to the purposes and for the periods in which it was voted, then 
it would have been necessary to discontinue the practice of voting money 
as if sufficient to pay the half-pay up to the end of the previous 
financial year. [1261 
This was not the only example of the balance sheet failing to 
produce a complete picture. A similar problem existed as to the wages 
of seamen. Once voted, this amount was applied to pay the arrears of 
ships that might have been at sea for periods of two or three years In 
additiont every ship's company was kept six months in arrears, resulting 
In pay voted for the current year being paid out of amounts that were not 
to be voted until the following year. As the principles upon which the 
estimates were framed were based upon the wages of the officers and men 
composing the number actually voted for that year, then it was only by 
chance that the sum voted in the estimates would match the amcunt paid 
ou t. [ 1271 
With regard to victualling and stores, a similar problem existed in 
that ships serving on foreign stations were often returning with accounts 
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that were several months old. However, a much greater problem, that of 
making payments for all stores on 60 day vouchers was discontinued from 
1831 onwards. It was part of Graham's general reform package and showed 
that he was aware of the difficulties accruing from allowing payments for 
services in one financial year to be paid in another. If the 60 day 
vouchers had not been replaced by ready money vouchers, then victualling 
payments during the first two months of any new financial year would have 
been dominated by purchases made during the previous year. [128] 
Aware, as he might have been, of the problem, Graham never pursued 
it sufficiently to eliminate it mcre generally. In his report on the 
French administrative system, Briggs brought the commissioners- attentions 
to the matter, indicating that the French had a much more regular 
practice: 
The money is in all cases voted to meet the 
actual expenditure for the period mentioned 
in the vote, and both the expenditure and the 
accounts of such expenditure accord with the 
votes in all instances, except such deviations 
as will of course occasionally arise. [1291 
While in matters of pensions and half pay, regularisation was relatively 
easy. As for the paying of wages to those serving on ships abroad, this 
was solved in a somewhat novel way. According to Briggs, every ship's 
book was made up to the end of the financial year, whether the crew was 
paid or not, 
If not paid, (owing to the ship being abroad, 
for instance, ) the amount due upon the books 
so made up, is paid over to the fund at the 
Hospital of Invalids, called "Caisse des Gen 
de Mer, " where it remains for two years, liable 
to the claims of the Officers and Seamen, after 
which, whatever remains unclaimed is 
appropriated ... 
[130] 
Fcr the most part, those serving on the Board of Admiralty could 
not see any real necessity for the regularising of accounts. Partly this 
resulted from a lack of knowledge and general interest in accountancy but 
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the majority were not particularly interested in making an examination of 
the accounts clearer to members of the legislature. To confirm this, it 
is wcrth making reference to the comments placed upon Briggs printed copy 
of his report into the French administration of the navy. Here, the 
anonymcus writer confirms a lack of knowledge on matters of accountancy 
when, with regard to the payments of half-pay one quarter in arrears, he 
freely admits 'this is quite beyond my comprehension' and as for the half 
pay not covering the year for which it was voted, he notes that 'this 
appears to be stating a difficulty where none existso. Quite simply, the 
writer did not understand, nor chose to try and understand, the principles 
involved. Finally, it is clear that he had little sympathy with those who 
questioned naval expenditure, he felt they 'contend themselves with, often 
unreasonably, endeavouring to cut down the estimateso. [131] 
With regard to matters so far considered, it might well be claimed 
that Graham was at least true to the principles he had pursued prior to 
coming into office. So far, reforms discussed in this section, were at 
least moves that were designed to bring about greater accountability. 
That they failed to live up to their expectations could be put down to the 
novelty of the experiment undertaken. Previously, governments had taken 
little interest in ensuring the accountability of public funds, with 
Graham working in something of a vacuum. For this reason, the First Lord 
had no way of realising that, unless he adopted a number of far more 
radical proposals, then the cause of financial accountability before 
parliament would make no real advance. However, this argument totally 
falls when consideration is given to the matter of obtaining parliamentary 
sanction for expenditure allowed for in the original vote contained within 
the Appropriation Act to be exceeded. 
In 1831, Graham had made it quite clear that he waad strictly 
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adhere to each head as voted in the estimates. If however, there should 
be an amcunt required for any item which was in excess of the vote, he 
stated that it was his intention to apply to the House for its sanction. 
Given the recent revelations that both the Navy and Victualling Boards had 
found little cause to inform parliament of how they were using public 
funds, then this was an extremely important issue. [132] Yet Graham failed 
to remain faithful to his original statement. No reference to the 
principle was made in the Navy Civil Departments Act, Graham thus failing 
to ensure that future administrations would be bound by this important 
principle. Even more serious was Graham's own blatant disregard of this 
same principle. In November 1833, when the first balance sheet was 
submitted to Parliament, it was revealed that Graham had allowed 
expenditure on 13 cut of 29 heads to exceed that which had been sanctioned 
by the Appropriation Act for the financial year 1831-2. [133] Furthermore, 
no request had been laid before Parliament to permit the additional 
payments. Not surprisingly, therefore, subsequent naval administrations 
freely exceeded the original vote. Indeed, in 1841, when Peel's 
government was asked to defend a range of over-spent votes, they used the 
example of excesses in Graham's first balance sheet as the foundation of 
their defence. In presenting the estimates, which also required a sum to 
be set aside to cover the shortfall of the previous year, it was simply 
stated that the government was following 'in the steps of the right hon. 
Baronet the father of naval reform. 11341 
Of course, examination of naval accounts was not simply placed in 
the hands of Parliament. Craham had also increased the powers of the 
public auditor, with all naval department expenses and receipts submitted 
to the Board of Audit. Carried out on a daily basis, two clerks from the 
Audit Office were in regular attendance at Somerset House. This procedure 
was considered preferable to an end of year audit, as the latter would 
301 
have necessitated the retention of something in excess of 50,000 vouchers, 
all of them having to be set aside for future scrutiny. The task of the 
auditors was not only to examine these vouchers and check them against 
ledger entries but also to ensure that they were signed by the Accountant 
General and approved by his superintending Icrd. [135] While this might 
well serve a useful purpose, ensuring that all monetary transactions were 
properly carried out, it did little to prevent the navy departments 
exceeding their votes or applying the money elsewhere. While the auditors 
matched each item of expenditure under the head upon which they were 
voted, they could not prevent unauthorised payments. Their only power was 
to comment upon the fact and then include such remarks in the report that 
was, together with the completed balance sheet, submitted to Parliament. 
This weakness of the public auditor was not helped by a similar 
limitation of power placed upon the Accountant General. He, too, was a 
mere book keeper, with duties limited to the examination of accounts, 
recording expenditure and paying bills. Yet he, more than any other 
individual within the offices of the navy, could have undertaken financial 
control. Instead of simply duplicating much of the work of the auditýrs, 
he could have had a more general authority over expenditure and estimates. 
Furthermore, he could have used the accounts in his possession to report 
to the Board on any material variance taking place between sums paid and 
the estimated prices. With regard to the dock and victualling yards, he 
could have perfcmed another important duty, that of establishing levels 
of efficiency. To do this, he need only have reported on the costs of 
differing manufacturing operations, so determining the most efficient and 
cost effective method. Yet, as the situation stood, nobody was carrying 
out such duties, with departments allowed to prepare their estimates 
unrestrained by the need for either cost effectiveness or any other form 
of financial control. 
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Briggs, judging by sane of the proposals that accompanied his 
report on the French administrative system, certainly saw the advantage of 
placing the Accountant General in a more commanding position. However, 
Graham and other lords of the Admiralty, believed such a move to be far 
too radical. Instead, Briggs had to contend himself with undertaking a 
series of much more limited reforms. These, over the following months and 
years, were to see the implementation of a uniform method of accounting 
(including the full adoption of double entry book keeping) and a greater 
use of local auditing, thus reducing the amount of paper work that passed 
through Somerset House. As for an increase in the powers of the 
Accountant General, this was not to be brought about until later in the 
century. From 1869, the holder of this post was given powers to criticise 
naval accounts followed, in 1879, by something approaching effective 
financial control. [1361 From that time onwards, the Accountant-General 
became involved in all questions of expenditure, his department 
responsible for scrutinizing all proposals that required a financial 
outlay. 
5.6 The Outstations 
In abolishing the Navy Board, the Admiralty acquired undisputed 
authority over the running of the dockyards, victualling yards and naval 
hospitals. These were the establishments in which the majority of the 
civilian workforce was employed and, from this point onwards, will be 
collectively referred to as the outstations. The importance of this 
increase in Admiralty authority cannot be underestimated. It was 
certainly of gceat historical importance, control of the cutstations 
having been at the heart of numerous disputes that had once taken place 
between the Admiralty and the inferior boards. In particular, the 
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confrontation that had occurred while St Vincent was First Lord, was very 
much a dockyard related affair. In that dispute, and as an indication of 
its seriousness, the two boards ceased all forms of verbal contact, 
communicating only in writing. As a result, a whole host of additional 
problems were soon created. However, a more detailed examination of these 
particular difficulties has already taken place. 
Regarding, Graham's attempt to create a rationalization of 
authority, this was only one small aspect of the overall reform package. 
He was particularly concerned at the high cost of maintaining these 
outstations which, between them, absorbed approximately 40% of the annual 
naval budget. Furthermore, the shielding of these establishments by the 
aggressively protective inferior boards had prevented earlier governments 
imposing the type of economies that might otherwise have been expected. 
Even the recent Tory administration, which had successfully pruned most 
areas of government expenditure, had found it near impossible to achieve 
the full range of cut-backs that had been planned for the naval 
outstations. Thus, with the removal of the Navy and Victualling boards, 
it was Graham's intention that the outstations should become subject to 
extensive economies. Partly, so he believed, this could be brought about 
by a reduction in numbers employed, but much could also be achieved by 
cutting down on wastefulness and improving overall levels of efficiency. 
Given the importance of the outstations within terms of the overall 
programme, it is surprising that more attention was not given to the means 
by which the Board of Admiralty should impose the power it now 
possessed. While Graham, for his part, frequently re-iterated a belief in 
uniformity and simplicity of manaýpment, he singularly failed to ensure 
that such would be the case with regard to this important area of naval 
administration. Authority for the dockyards was hopelessly divided 
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between four of the five appointed principal officers. Furthermore, with 
each of these overseen by a separate superintending lord, then eight 
inividuals were collectively responsible for the management of these 
yards. In such a situation where no one, apart from the overworked First 
Lord, had a general co-crdinating role, it is difficulty to see how any 
form of uniformity was to be achieved. Instead, one of these principal 
officers, most properly the Surveycr, should have possessed an overseeing 
role. To carry cut this task, he should have -been divested of the 
numerous (and overwhelming) specific duties accorded to him. These, in 
turn, could have been given to others. As overall co-ordinator therefore, 
both those appointed to carry cut the specific duties associated with the 
surveyor, together with the other principal officers, whose authority 
involved the dockyards, should have directly reported to him. In this way, 
many of the problems created by Graham, within this area, would have been 
removed. 
The following section, therefore, will elaborate upon this failure 
to implement the principles of unifcrmity and simplicity. Initial 
attention will be given to the dockyards, where the problem was most 
severe. However, neither the victual-ling yards nor the hospitals were 
free of such administrative failings, with a further area, that of 
co-ordinating the awarding cf cot racts and the purchase of supplies, 
creating a range of additional problems. 
a. Central Management of the Dockyards 
Of the principal officers referred to, the one most closely 
connected with the dockyards was the Surveycr-GeneraL Between the 
establishment of the new office in June 1832 and his retirement in 1847, 
this post was held by the controversial figure of William Symonds. In the 
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skeleton instructions issued to him, the new Surveyoc was informed that he 
was to be responsible for the design and building of all warships entering 
naval service while advising on all matters connected with the building 
and repair of naval vessels. In addition, it was to be expected that he 
would regularly visit each yard, ensuring that all officers correctly 
performed their duties, that the workforce was beneficially employed and 
individuals capable of perfaming the duties to which they were 
assigned. [1371 
Combined, and bearing in mind that there were seven home yards that 
employed in excess of 6000 men, these duties were too much for one man to 
perform. In essense, the Surveyor-General was expected to have extensive 
seafaring abilities, the qualities of a shipwright, the skills of a 
draftsman and the dexterity of a manager. Few individuals could claim all 
these and Symons was no exception. An able seaman and former naval 
captain his background proved adequate for some of these tasks but quite 
hopeless for others. 
Prior to the abolition of the Navy Board, these same tasks had been 
performed by three separate individuals: the Comptroller and two 
Surveyors. The former took responsibility for overall co-ordination of 
matters pertaining to the yards while taking a special interest in the 
performance of duties of both yard officers and the workforce. As for the 
two Surveyors, the senior post holder directed himself towards the design 
of ships together with building and repair work, with the second Surveyor 
undertaking frequent inspections of each of the seven home yards. Not 
surprisingly, with these various duties having now devolved on one 
individua4 some of them were neglected. In particular, Symonds was no 
longer in a position to inspect each of the yards on an annual basis, 
resulting in a failure to detect more obvious infractions within the 
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yards. [1381 
The other principal officers who shared responsibility for the 
dockyards were the Storekeeper-General, the Physician of the Navy and the 
Accountant-General. The former was in charge of all stores held within 
the dockyards. These consisted both of materials used in the actual 
construction of ships (such as timbers) and items that would be taken on 
board immediately before the ship sailed (anchors, lanterns, buckets &tc). 
For the most part it was left to the Storekeeper-General to determine the 
precise amounts that might be ordered in any one year, this based on an 
annual statement of stores drawn up for this purpose. However, when it 
came to the ordering of timbers he was expected to confer with the 
Surveyor. As indicated by the Skeleton Instructions, such consultation was 
only to be carried cut through a superintending lord of the Admiralty. 
Appointed to the off ice of Stcrekeeper-General in June 1832 was 
Robert Dundas. As former Storekeeper to the Navy Board, he brought a 
wealth of experience to the new office. However, his book keeping 
abilities were not considered to be one of his greatest strengths, this 
resulting in his failure to Improve upon a number of weaknesses within the 
department he oversaw. [139] Furthermore, a number of clerks in that 
department were also limited in these same skills, many of them unable to 
use such basics of accountancy as double entry book keeping. It was the 
existence of these sorts of problems within the department that resulted in 
a slowness and lack of preciseness with regard to many of their dealings. 
In particular, as noted in one repcrt, the dockyards often suffered from 
sudden shortages of essential materials. That this should happen was a 
simple result of poor book keeping, the accounts frequently showing the 
storehouses to be better stocked than was often the case. Should the 
department have been mcre efficient, with an annual stocktaking to verify 
the accounts, then such a problem wculd not have arisen. Similarly, the 
use of stores, once they left the storehouses, provided another example of 
a failure within the system. Issued by one department for use by another, 
attention to economy was non-existent. The Surveyor had little interest 
in making savings, for it was not his task to draw up the estimates, while 
the Storekeeper had no influence upon the use of these same items once 
they left the storehouses. 
The third principal officer with a dockyard connection was the 
Physician of the Navy. Appointed to this post in June 1832 was Dr William 
Burnett, one of two medical commissioners who had served on the 
Victualling Board. Although the bulk of his duties focused upon the 
seagoing navy and the various share-based hospitals, a small amount of his 
time had to be devoted to the small surgeries that existed within each 
dockyard. It was Burnett's responsibility to recommend to the Admiralty 
those who might best serve as dockyard surgeons while also ensuring that 
those surgeries were adequately supplied. Once a year, Burnett was 
expected to visit these surgeries, a duty that he combined with a 
lengthier visit to any nearby naval hospital. According to the original 
instructions issued, Burnett was not expected to contract directly for 
naval supplies, having to inform the storekeeper of likely needs for the 
coming year. [1401 However, as a result of the specialist nature of most 
of these items, Burnett had successfully argued that this duty could be 
best carried out by himself direct. [141] 
Fina. Uy, reference must be made to the Acccuntant-General. He was 
charged with all books and accounts belonging to the dockyards it being 
his duty to ensure that all entries tallied with vouchers issued for 
payment. Once this had been satisfactorily proven then he consented to 
the release of cash payments to those who had either supplied materials to 
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however, that he possessed no influence over the estimates nor had any 
other form of economic control, then his position within the 
administrative structure made little sense. Instead, a far more useful 
arranEgment would have been that of integrating his office into that 
headed by the Storekeeper-General. The individual appointed to the post 
was John Thomas Briggs. Formerly, Briggs had been Accountant-General of 
the Victualling Board and possessed considerable financial skins. 
Indeed, Graham considered him to be a much better accountant than Dundas 
and was not to be disappointed in his choice. Over the following two 
decades, Briggs introduced numerous improvements while insisting that 
double entry book keeping shculd be used throughcut. [142] 
Althaigh these four principal officers were all involved in 
administering the yards, lack of an overall co-(rdinator prevented a 
general uniformity of management. This might have been eased if the 
various officers had been encouraged to hold joint discussions. Yet this 
is something that Graham went cut of his way to prevent. The 
instructions, and this has been mentioned already, laid down that the 
principal officers were not to meet together independently of a 
superintending lord. For this, there were reasons. The Whigs, aware of 
the power once possessed by the Navy and Victualling boards, wished to 
prevent any similar board or committee emerging. That this was unlikely, 
given the differing terms by which these officers were appointed, seems to 
have escaped Graham's notice. Insteadp each principal officer was to work 
in isolation, reporting only to the Admiralty lord placed above him. [1431 
Of course, it wculd not be difficult to argue that the Board, 
itself, caAd have carried out that vital role of co-odination. But, in 
reality, this was just not possible. Far a start, the varicus 
superintending lcrds did not have the necessary time. All of them had 
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other Admiralty duties, while most of them were holders of parliamentary 
seats and generally active in supporting the government of the day. In 
addition, given that they were all appointed on a limited tenure, none of 
them had the possibility of gaining the necessary experience effectively 
to carry out such a role. Indeed, there are numerous examples of the 
superintending lords failing to understand the duties that they did 
perform. A case in point concerns the detailed report on French 
methods of accounting. The various marginal notes written by a member of 
the Board show a considerable prejudice against the whole accounting 
profession. Furthermore, it is a prejudice based on ignorance. 
Throughout, the writer demonstrates his failure to understand the 
principles behind the various suggestions made by Briggs, even dismissing 
the importance of closing the dockyard acounts at the end of each 
financial year. [1441 
In the first few decades that followed upon the implementation of 
the refcrms, the problems of limited managerial co-cperation with regard 
to the dockyards went largely unnoticed. Instead, attention was directed 
to that of easing the excessive work load that had been placed on the 
shoulders of the Surveycr. Gradually, as the years went by, John Edye, 
the chief clerk, took on a greater burden. From being a mere clerk, Edye 
soon became the unofficial assistant surveyor, his right to this post 
confirmed in 1839. [1451 However, problems still remained. The overall 
burden of wcrk was still beyond that of two individuals while there was no 
clear delineation of duties. 
Further attention was given to the matter upon the resignation of 
Symons in 1848. As well as appointing Sir Baldwin Walker his successor, 
it was also decided that two assistant surveyors shculd be now placed in 
office. For this latter Purpose, John Edye was retained with Isaac Watts 
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filling the newly created third post. Both Edye and Watts had been 
trained as draftsmen, with Watts having graduated from the School of Naval 
Architecture at Pcrtsmouth. Given, therefore, that both the assistant 
surveyors had such qualities, while Walker had been drawn from the ranks 
of serving naval officers, then it was becoming clearer as to where the 
precise lines of duty might lie. [1461 In fact, upon Walker's appointment, 
Lord Auckland, then First Lord, chose to give a clearer definition of 
their duties. Disregarding the earlier 'Skeleton Instructions', he 
informed Walker that he was not to be principally involved in preparing 
ýthe detailed lines of ships and vessels ordered to be built'. Instead, 
this was to be left to his two assistants. As an experienced naval 
officer, Walker was however to comment upon the plans produced by the two 
assistants. Such comments were then to be passed on to the Board of 
Admiralty for a final decision. [1471 
With the design aspect taken cut of his hands, the Surveycr was to 
concentrate far more upon the dockyards. As laid down by Lord Auckland, 
the principal duties of the newly appointed Surveycr were -to take the 
general superintendence of the material of the navy; to prepare and submit 
to the Board a programme of the wcrk for the next year, and to fix the 
yards with reference to the artificers and stores in which it can best be 
executed'. [148] In keeping with these duties, the value of making 
regular inspections of the yards was now emphasised, with Walker expected 
to visit each dockyard annually. Under Symons, such inspections had 
become less frequent, the first appointed Surveyor-General feeling it 
incumbent upon him to remain, whenever possible, centred upon London. The 
appointment of two assistant surveyors now meant that, at all times, one 
cr other wculd always be available to remain in London for the 
purpose of receiving and replying to correspondence. 
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Thus, within a period of only sixteen years, matters had come full 
circle. Prior to the Whig reforms of the naval departments, three 
officers had been collectively responsible for managing the duties given 
to the Surveyor-General. Graham, in his excessive zeal for economy, had 
forced one individual to carry cut the work of all three. The result, as 
any one could easily have predicted, was a much over-worked 
Surveyor-General. With the appointment, in 1848, of one Surveyor and two 
assistants, the damage to the administrative structure had been repaired. 
once more, three individuals were undertaking work that seemingly required 
three individuals. The only element missing, and this was not to be 
corrected for two decades, was the co-ordinating role once performed by 
the Navy Comptroller. 
As regards the appointment of Sir Baldwin Walker to the post of 
Surveyor, this did beg the question as to his ability to perform the 
tasks now expected of the holder of that post. A large body of opinion 
held the view that only a dockyard shipwright could possibly undertake 
this work. Certainly, at the time of Symonds appointment, there was 
considerable surprise at the elevation of a naval man to such an important 
civil office. Again, this question came to the fore upon the appointment 
of Walker. Among those who expressed disapproval was J. S. Tucker. He was 
the son of St Vincent's former private secretary, Joseph Tucker. As noted 
elsewhere, the Tuckers: had long been involved in the civilian 
administration of the navy, with J. S. Tucker representing a further 
generation of interest. His disapproval of Walker's appointment came In 
the fcrm of an open letter addressed to Auckland's successor, Sir F. T. 
Baring. In particular, Tucker concentrated upon the lack of managerial 
skills possessed by one who had only held command on a King's warship, 
**, he is to interfere with gangs of 
shipwrights at their wcrk, not because he is 
conversant with the work of gangs of 
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filling the newly created third post. Both Edye and Watts had been 
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Lord Auckland, then First Lord, chose to give a clearer def ini tion of 
their duties. Disregarding the earlier 'Skeleton Instructions', he 
informed Walker that he was not to be principally involved in preparing 
ýthe detailed lines of ships and vessels ordered to be built'. Instead, 
this was to be left to his two assistants. As an experienced naval 
officer, Walker was however to comment upon the plans produced by the two 
assistants. Such comments were then to be passed on to the Board of 
Admiralty for a final decision. [1471 
With the design aspect taken cut of his hands, the Surveyor was to 
concentrate far more upon the dockyards. As laid down by Lord Auckland, 
the principal duties of the newly appointed Surveyor were 'to take the 
general superintendence of the material of the navy; to prepare and submit 
to the Board a programme of the work for the next year, and to fix the 
yards with reference to the artificers and stores in which it can best be 
execu ted. [ 1481 In keeping with these duties, the value of making 
regular inspections of the yards was now emphasised, with Walker expected 
to visit each dockyard annually. Under Symons, such inspections had 
become less frequent, the first appointed Surveyor-General feeling it 
incumbent upon him to remain, whenever possible, centred upon London. The 
appointment of two assistant surveyors now meant that, at an times, one 
or other would always be available to remain in London for the 
purpose of receiving and replying to correspondence. 
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Thus, within a period of only sixteen years, matters had come full 
circle. Prior to the Whig reforms of the naval departments, three 
officers had been collectively responsible for managing the duties given 
to the Surveyor-Ceneral. Craham, in his excessive zeal for economy, had 
forced one individual to carry cut the work of all three. The result, as 
any one could easily have predicted, was a much over-worked 
Surveyor-Ceneral. With the appointment, in 1848, of one Surveyor and two 
assistants, the damage to the administrative structure had been repaired. 
once more, three individuals were undertaking work that seemingly required 
three individuals. The only element missing, and this was not to be 
corrected for two decades, was the co-ordinating role once performed by 
the Navy Comptroller. 
As regards the appointment of Sir Baldwin Walker to the post of 
Surveyor, this did beg the question as to his ability to perform the 
tasks now expected of the holder of that post. A large body of opinion 
held the view that only a dockyard shipwright could possibly undertake 
this work. Certainly, at the time of Symonds appointment, there was 
considerable surprise at the elevation of a naval man to such an important 
civil office. Again, this question came to the fore upon the appointment 
of Walker. Among those who expressed disapproval was J. S. Tucker. He was 
the son of St Vincent's former private secretary, Joseph Tucker. As noted 
elsewhere, the Tuckers had long been involved in the civilian 
administration of the navy, with J. S. Tucker representing a further 
generation of interest. His disapproval of Walkees appointment came in 
the form of an open letter addressed to Auckland's successor, Sir F. T. 
Baring. In particular, Tucker concentrated upon the lack of managerial 
skills possessed by me who had only held command on a King's warship, 
he is to interfere with gangs of ; 
hipw*rights at their work, not because he is 
conversant with the work of gangs of 
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shipwrights, but because he skillfully 
knows when to give the command to seamen, 
"hands, make sail! " or "hands, reef topsails! " 
[1491 
While more will yet be said on this particular matter, suffice it 
here to point cut that Tucker might not have been far from the truth. 
Certainly, as regards Symonds, his period of overseeing the dockyard 
workforce left many deep scars. Among the changes he introduced was a 
disastrous scheme for classifying the workforce. Similar, in many 
respects, to that in operation on board naval ships of war, it created a 
less than harmonious working atmosphere within the yards. Many of the 
younger artisans, dissatisfied with their treatment, chose to seek 
employment elsewhere. Although, in his autobiography, Symonds claims the 
scheme as a success, he neglects to mention that, within eight years of 
its introduction, it had been completely abandoned. [1501 
Returning to the problems created by having several different 
officers responsible for varying aspects of dockyard management, this was 
partly addressed in 1860. In that year, the Surveycr-General was given 
increased powers and received the new title of Controller. Nine years 
later he was given a seat on the Board of Admiralty and his 
responsibilities once again increased. Instead of overseeing just one 
aspect of the yards, he was now responsible for all areas of construction 
(this resembling his previous duties) together with stores and ordnance. 
Admittedly, the appointment of the Controller to the Board was, on that 
occasion, short lived. His place on the Board was taken away in 1872, 
only to be returned in 1882. On that occasion, his duties were again 
expanded, the former Surveyor now charged with a wide range of civiian 
branches that included design and construction, naval armament, dockyard 
administration and work, naval stores and dockyard expense accounts. 
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In this final change, the disastrous reforms introduced by Graham 
were totally expunged. Apart from anything else, the former office once 
headed by the Surveyor was now appropritely manned. Indeed, it had been 
divided into two separate departments, that of Construction and Dockyards. 
Each was headed by a separate Director who also had his own assistants. 
b. Central Management of the Victual-ling Yards and Naval Hospitals 
In creating a new system fcr the centralized management cf the 
outstations, Graham had pursued the simple expedien1c of abolishing the 
boards and reducing the number of managers in senior administrative 
pos it ions. In most other respects, he chose to retain the same 
infrastructure. As shown with the dockyards, the resulting system was a 
complete failure. These yards had previously been managed by the 
commissioners of the Navy Board working in concert. By removing this 
board, Graham had destroyed the only body responsible for co, -ordination 
of activities. In respect of the victualling yards and hospitals, 
where a similar expediency of abolishing the co-ordinating body and 
reducing the number of managers was also followed, damage to the 
administrative structure, although severe, was not as critical as that of 
the dockyards. 
With abolition of the inferior boards, the management of the 
dockyards had been parcelled out among four separate principal officers, 
This was not the case with the victualling yards and hospitals. Instead, 
each of these sets of establishments received one dedicated manager. In 
the case of the victualling yards this was the Comptroller of Victualling 
while for the hospitals it was the Physician-General. In both cases, the 
appointed managers (or principal officers), James Meek and Dr William 
Burnett respectively, had been members of the Victualling Board 
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immediately prior to its abolition. Because of this, the ill co-, ordinated 
arrangement of the dockyards was not duplicated in any way. Both Meek and 
Burnett had total responsibility for the outstations that fell within 
their province. In their respective instructions, both principal officers 
were informed that they were responsible for undertaking regular tours of 
inspection, ensuring that those who were employed carried out their 
proper duties and that the stores were correctly used. Both officers were 
responsible for the ordering of stores and ascertaining that they were of 
the correct quality once they had arrived. In addition, both Meek and 
Burnett were required to keep their own accounts. Finally, as an addition 
to his work of overseeing the victualling yards, Meek was also responsible 
for the procurement of all transports used by the Amy, Navy and convict 
service. 
The extensiveness of these duties did however, create one very 
marked problem: both were overworked. Once again Graham, in creating this 
new system, had taken the matter of economy to extremes. The Victualling 
Board, which previously undertook all these duties, had consisted of seven 
commissioners. Now, two principal officers were asked to undertake duties 
once performed by three times their number. Indeed, as regards Meek, the 
situation was slightly worse, for five cut of those seven commissioners 
had originally undertaken the duties he was now given, while Burnett was 
undertaking the work of only two medical commissioners. As an indication 
of the difficulties that these two officers would now confront, it is 
useful to make brief reference to how some of these duties had been 
performed by the Victualling Board. To begin with, the work of 
inspecting the outstations was considered sufficiently burdensome as to be 
given over to two separate individuals. of those appointed to the 
Victualling Board, one commissioner was responsible for inspecting the 
yards and a medical commissioner for inspecting the hospitals. 
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Furthermore, the supplying of hospitals was shared by two commissioners; 
the overseeing of accounts was the work of a committee of three while the 
ordering and control of stores was also the work of a similar sized 
comm i t, tee. 
Not surprisinglyt the two commissioners were soon overwhelmed. 
Although neither were ill-prepared to work hard, the sheer vastness of 
their duties meant that much was pushed to one side. In particular, 
visitation and inspections of the outstations were considerably curtailed, 
with both officers always believing it to be essential that they should 
return to London as quickly as possible. In the case of the victualling 
yards, the more distant establishments of Partsmcuth and Plymouth were 
soon being inspected on a bi-annual rather than annual basis. Frequent 
delays in the completion of office work and the replying to letters 
from the yard commissioners were a further symptom of the immense demands 
now placed upon the shoulders of these two officers. 
However, the real test for the new system came with Britain's entry 
into the war with Russia. Graham had created a system in the midst of 
long period of peace. His economies were designed solely to reflect the 
situation then in existence. While this might have been acceptable in 
other departments of state, the navy needed to be treated differently. At 
all times it had to be ready for war. To this end, it was necessary 
that those who administered the navy were not, during times of peace, so 
completely overstretched that they could not meet conditions of hostility. 
Yet, in mid-Victoriari Britain this was the situation that Graham 
created. Neither the ViCtualling Commissioner nor his medical counterpart 
(who in 1848 was re-titled Director of Hedical Services) was in a position 
in undertake any expansion to their duties. 
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As could so easily have been predicted, the Commissioner of 
VictuaIling was the hardest pressed. Responsible, as he was, both 
for the victualling yards and the procurement of transports, he was soon 
unable to achieve either in a satisfactory manner. The latter, in 
particular, took up most of his time. Even so, the procurement 
arrangements completely broke down, leading to this duty being taken out 
of the hands of the Controller of Victualling. Fcr the remainder of the 
wartime period, procurement of transports was overseen by a specially 
fcrmed board, with the separate post of Directcr of Transports 
subsequently created. 
There can be little doubt that should Graham have been desirous of 
both keeping the work load of the principal officers in check while 
improving the overall administrative arrangement, then this could well 
have been achieved through the creation of a principal officer responsible 
for purchasing and contracts. This alteration to arrangements did, in 
fact, come about in 1869 when a separate department of purchasing was 
created. This not only took responsibility for the purchase of all 
victualling and medical stores but also all materials destined for the 
dockyards. It meant that the whole system was standardized with the 
officers previously undertaking such duties in a position to give 
attention to the proper storage and use of stores. 
Earlier attention to such a reform should really have been one of 
Graham's priorities. Instead, by an adaptation of the existing system, he 
created three purchasing officers. Each of them, through the removal of 
the co--crdinating boards and the strictures placed upon joint meetings, 
were totally Isolated from one another. Furthermore, they were 
undertaking duties for which they were not particularly experienced and 
which took them away from the main duties of their office. The result was 
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a less than satifactory arrangement fcr the purchase of naval stores. To 
begin with, there was no uniformity in the conditions of contract while 
the individLial principal officers sometimes competed against one another 
upon the open market for the same items of stores. 
However, the simple creation of a sixth officer responsible for 
purchasing and contracts might, in itself, have proven a backward step 
unless the post holder was given more freedom to meet with his colleagues. 
After all, he could do nothing until those responsible for the determining 
of stores had first informed him of either their needs or likely needs. 
only then could he enter into the open market for the purpose of 
initiating orders. 
C. Localised Management 
Turning to the localised management of the outstations, the Navy 
Civil Departments Act proved only to be a starting point. In fact, the 
Act itself imposed only one immediate change, replacing the existing 
commissioners of the dock and victualling yards with superintendents. The 
Act then went on to explain that these new off icers would perform the same 
duties as the commissioners they were replacing, 
such superintendents from Time to Time to 
be appointed shall have full power and 
Authcrity to do, execute, and perfcrm all 
and every the Duties, Matters and Things 
which by any Act cr Acts of Parliament now 
in force any Commissioner of the Navy or 
Victualling resident at any Naval or 
Victualling Yard or Establishment, or at 
any Naval Hospital, at Home or Abroad, is 
authorized or required to do. [1511 
The abolition of the title commissioner was, in fact, a much more 
important move than the Act would seem to imply. Those in the dockyards 
holding this title had been much more than mere supervisors of these 
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particular outstations. They had also been members of the Navy Board. As 
such, continuance of the title commissioner would have been meaningless, 
referring only to a body that had now ceased to exist. But there was more 
to this move than the simple up-dating of the title to keep abreast of 
administrative changes elsewhere. The introduction of the new title also 
meant that all those individuals styled commissioner (be they in the 
dockyards, victualling yards or hospitals) would now cease to hold office. 
In turn, this meant that the Whig administration, in one sweep, could 
replace those existing off ice holders with individuals of their own 
choice. 
Totally omitted from the Act was one more important factor: the 
newly appointed superintendents were to retain naval rank. Like the 
former commissioners, they were to be drawn from the ranks of serving 
naval officers, but unlike commissioners they were not to lose their 
senicri ty. Fcr this, there were sound reasons. Those who had been 
appointed frequently found their authority undermined when working with 
those of naval rank, the latter sometimes ccuntermandering their 
instructions. The point is ably made in the already frequently quoted 
policy document of December 1831: 
They should have a Commission from the 
Admiralty, giving them authority afloatq 
according to their rank as on full Pay - 
thus preventing the improper interference of 
junior officers in commission, of which the 
Civil Servants in the Dock Yards have too 
frequently complained - their rank should not 
be stopped but they should proceed by seniority 
to the Flag, as if serving at sea ... 
[1521 
To legalise this particular point and also to establish the salaries to be 
paid to the various selected officers an application was made by the 
Admiralty to the King in Council. Af ter requesting authorisation for the 
appointment of various officers to the superintendent posts, the order 
which was approved, continued in the following terms: 
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*.. and that it may be further authorised 
to assign to each said superintendent such 
duties and to give them such instructions as 
the service over which they are respectively 
appointed may appear to us to require and as 
it appears that it may be conducive to the 
better discipline and management of Your Majesty0s 
Dock Yards and other naval establishments if 
the said superintendents ... were pu t In 
commission by which they wculd be able to 
exercise a more extended and complete 
authority ... [1531 
As advantagecus as this change might have been, neither the Act 
itself, nor any related alterations to the system, attempted to correct 
other aspects of the complex and inefficient management structure existing 
within the yards. Something, in fact, could have been done to increase 
the powers of the newly installed superintendents. As it stood, before 
they could issue instructions they had to refer all matters to the Board 
of Admiralty. Not surprisingly, this caused frequent delays in the 
overall progress of works. 
Also a problem and one that could have been tackled was that of the 
managerial disunity that existed at the level immediately below that of 
superintendent. This was particalarly marked within the dockyards. 
Despite the fact that all. workers in these yards had, as their objective, 
a series of inter-related tasks leading either to the construction or 
repair of warships, there were three different managerial chains that 
artificially divided the workforce. Heading these chains were the Master 
Shipwright, Master Attendant and Storekeeper. The f irst of these had 
authority only over those workers involved in the repair and building of 
ships when in the yard while the Master Attendant had authority over these 
same vessels when afloat. This, in itself, seems of little significance 
until it is realised how it affected the workforce. While certain groups 
of shipwrights, caulkers and labourers came under the authority of the 
Master Shipwright others, of this same class, came under the Master 
32D 
Attendant. The division between a ship in dock or in harbour was fairly 
artificial as frequently the same sort of repairs were required regardless 
of the amount of water under her keel. Finally, the Storekeeper, whose 
province was the storehcuses, also had to use large numbers of labcurers 
to transport the stores around the yard as well as specialist tradesmen, 
such as shipwrights and caulkers, for the actual issuing of stores. 
A further problem with this system related to the dry docking of 
newly arrived warships. Considerable co-operation was needed between the 
Master Attendant's office and that of the Master Shipwright, for those 
employed under the former would be responsible for bringing the vessel 
into dock while those of the Master Shipwright's department would take 
charge of the vessel only when it was securely inside the dock. 
Similarly, there had to be an agreement over the undocking and launching 
of newly built vessels. Finally, of course, consultation with the 
Storekeeper had to take place, it being impossible to build or repair a 
ship without adequate materials. 
Pricr to the introduction of these new reforms, the old system, 
despite its complexities, had worked reasonably well. Everyday, the 
superior officers of the yard had met, under the supervision of the 
commissioner, 'at a certain hour ... to hear the orders read, and 
consult together upon the orders of the day. '[154] However, from July 
1833 onwards, as a result of the issuing of a new set of instructions to 
all off ioers of the yard, these meetings were to cease being of a 
consultative nature. Instead, the superintendent was merely to read the 
orders of the day as received from the Admiralty, with the officers 
immediately despatched for the purpose of disseminating ýto their 
respective subordinates all such directions as it shall be found necessary 
to give them. '[1551 
1411 
In bringing to an end the consultative nature of these meetings, 
the dockyard superior officers, as with the principal officers at Somerset 
House, found themselves in isolation. Unable to share their problems with 
each othert they were forced to approach the superintendent as 
individuals, communicating with him in private. As was noted by Bromley, 
a senior clerk of the Admiralty who had been commanded by Lord Auckland to 
examine into the workings of the dockyards in 1846, these meetings not 
only prevented the superior officers from working in concert, but created 
ýpetty jealousiesamong those same off icers. [156] 
i 
A further retrograde step created by the issued instruction of 1833 
was the ending of the regular daily meetings that once took place between 
the superior and inferior officers of the yard. The issued instructions, 
in the section directed to the Superintendent informed him that these 
officers were ýon no account to assemble them [the inferior officers of 
their departments] at their off ices, as has been the practice to the great 
interruption of their superintending duties. '[1571 This, as was later 
noted by Bromley, was greatly detrimental to the yards, the inferior 
officers unable to benefit from -the concurrent judgement of the executive 
officers. 11581 Furthermore, so Bromley noted, 
According to the system at present pursued 
at some yards, the foremen do not see the 
Master Shipwright for days together, but 
receive their instructions from him on a 
slip of paper! [1591 
One final point, also connected with the issued instructions of 
1833, was that they arrived in the yard in book form. It appears that 
each yard was limited in the number received, with only the superior 
officers taking possession of a copy. As a result, the various assistants 
and inferior officers had to make what arrangements they could for 
ascertaining their duties under the new regime. Clearly, many were 
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unsuccessful. Leastways, there are several reports post dating 1833 that 
indicate that many were quite unfamiliar with their duties. As Bromley 
pointed out, all that was really required was that these instructions be 
divided 'so that each officer might be furnished with that part of them 
that relates to his own particular duties. '[1601 
Moving down the chain of command within the dockyards, another 
series of reforms resulted in the introduction in June 1833 of a new group 
of officers known as inspectors. Each was to be placed over a division of 
thirty workers and would take responsibility for inspecting the quality of 
work performed. They stood mid-way between foremen and leadingmen. 
Foremen provided more general supervision and were usually placed over 
groups of sixty workers while leadingmen worked among much smalle groups 
and were charged with correcting any shcrtcomings pointed out to them by 
the leadingmen. [1611 
The introduction of inspectors into the chain of management was as 
a result of a new work scheme by which all workers were to be paid a basic 
day wage. Prior to this change, most gcoups of workers were paid piece 
rates. These, when applied to the dockyard, were known as task and job 
work, the former referring to work on warships under construction and the 
latter to ships being repaired. Although working by task and job had been 
the norm since the mid-18th century, it had come under increasing 
criticism. From the beginning there had been the fear that the quality of 
day work had been sacrificed, with workers rushing to complete their tasks 
to secure higher earnings. Furthermore, the complex scheme by which 
various components of the work in hand (particularly when ships were under 
repair) were broken down for purposes of financial remuneration, meant 
additional groups of administrators had to be employed. Known as 
measurers, they were constantly employed in estimating the exact amounts 
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of wcrk undertaken, with each man employed by task or Job having his 
subsequent payment dependent on their findings. [1621 
In fact, it was excessive numbers employed in dockyard management 
that had caught the attention of the politically radical compilers of 'The 
Black Book', 
The expenditure in the Royal Dock-yards 
and arsenals is most lavish in storekeepers, 
clerks, chaplains, surgeons, measurers, 
master-attendant, master-shipwright and 
others, many of whom are apparently kept 
up for mutual superintendence, and forming 
a gradation of office and multiplication 
of expense wholly unnecessary. Not a single 
trade is carried on without a master; there 
is a master-smith, bricklayer, sail-maker, 
rigger, rope-maker, painter and others 
.. *[ 1631 
yet, in removing that tier of supervisors known as measurers, no real 
reduction in the number of inferior officers was achieved. This was 
because those who had been appointed as measurers also carried out a 
number of additional supervisory duties, reporting on any shortcomings to 
the foremen of the yard. The discontinuance of measurers, therefore, 
created a reduction in overall supervision, with members of the Board of 
Admiralty deciding upon the creation of inspectors. Many of those 
formerly appointed measurers, were among those who found themselves 
elevated to this new supervisory echelon. 
However, if more notice had been taken of an earlier report into 
the management structure of the yards, then a very real saving in costs 
might well have been achieved. This report, emanating from within the 
Admiralty and dating from November 1831, indicated that the lowest tier of 
supervisors, that of leadingmen, provided little real benefit: 
99. and although every tenth Workman is 
called a Leadingman, and if a shipwright is 
allowed 2s 6d a Week extra, he is not held 
responsible for the rest nor is he relieved 
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from the performance of his full share of 
labcur. [1641 
In stating this, the report then went on to suggest that this level of 
management be abolished and that supervision be carried cut by full time 
administrators who were to be known as inspectors. As already observed, 
inspectors were subsequently introduced but, quite illogically, leadingmen 
were also retained. Thus, any potential saving was 
immediately 
jettisonedL[1651 
That a major change in work methods operating within the yards was 
contemplated was clearly communicated to Symonds upon his first taking up 
the post of Surveycc-Ceneral. In his set of the 'Skeleton Instructions' 
he was informed that he was, 
immediately to examine and report on the 
present system of task and job and 
compare the result of it with work done by 
day pay, stating his opinion which of the 
two under all circumstances appears to be 
conducive to efficiency and economy 
supposing his opinion on those of the 
Master Shipwrights and their Assistants 
where they agree and when they may be at 
variance assigning the grounds on which he 
differs from them and reporting the results 
of the investigation to the Board. [166] 
By April 1833, the Admiralty, possibly as a result of Symonds' initial. 
report, had broadened their objectives. No longer were they merely 
questioning the continuanoe of task work, but the whole ethos by which 
those in the yard were paid. Members of the Board of Admiralty had now 
discovered that the shipwrights, who normally worked in gangs of 20 or 30, 
were paid not as individuals but as members of the gangs to which they 
belonged. The hardest working shipwright, when any of these gangs was 
employed on task work or job, would automatically be subsidising members 
of the same gang who were either unable or unwilling to work at the same 
level of industriousness. To this end, therefore, Symonds was now 
instructed to prepare 
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a more regular and uniform system of labor 
than has hitherto prevailed ... and 
so arranged that each man may reap the 
benefit of his skill and industry, and not 
be called upon to contribute any portion of 
his Earnings to the less active and more 
incapable workmen. [1671 
The &=eyor was faced with no easy task. He could not simply propose a 
return to day pay, the original means of paying dockyard workers prior to 
the introduction of task and j ob. This was recognised as being 
seriously flawed with those employed by day inclined to work at a slow and 
effortless pace. If such a scheme was to be re-introduced, then it would 
be necessary to provich some form of insurance that would prevent a less 
productive work output. 
The solution that Symonds hit upon was that of classifying the 
workforce into one of two classes, with one class receiving a lower rate 
of pay than the other. Entry into the higher, or first class, would only 
be allocated to those artisans who had a proven record of enthusiasm and 
efficiency. Furthermore, those in the first class would only retain their 
exalted position by a continued high standard of industry. In all, so 
Symonds proposed, the first class would be composed of one-third of all 
artisans in each yard, the remainder restricted to the second. New 
entrants into the yard would also be placed in the second class, with all 
eligible for promotion once vacancies occurred. These proposals were 
subsequently circulated, with the superintendents and superior officers of 
the yard asked to comment. Most accepted the idea, but a number of them 
individually suggested the addition of a third class. This was 
subsequently accepted as a useful addition to Symonds' original scheme, 
with those allocated to this class to receive an even lower level of 
remuneration. As for its purpose, it was supposedly a punishment class 
and only for those who were considered to be warking with insufficient 
effort. As with the second class, movement to a higher level was always to 
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be possible. 
The Admiralty, in accepting Symonds' proposals, decided that it 
should also be imposed upon the victualling yards and hospitals. The 
result, was that in August 1833, the workers in both sets of outstations 
were shoaled into three classes. Despite the hopes held out for it, the 
scheme was not well received by the men themselves. To a certain extent 
this should not have surprised Board members. Any change in working 
conditions, particularly in the dockyards, had always brcught about a 
degree of hostility. However, something that must have given them cause 
for concern was that opposition to the scheme was not simply limited to 
those who received the least benefits. Those placed in the first class, 
and so receiving a not unreasonable guaranteed wage, were also unhappy 
with the new scheme. Indeed, they joined with other members of the 
workforce in mounting a campaign of opposition. 
This discontent with the scheme of classification lasted many 
years. Over the next seven years it was to be the main complaint voiced by 
the artisans and labourers of the yards, the bulk of them fully supporting 
a well co-cýdinated campaign of petitions and public meetings. The 
Admiralty, for its part, chose to resist this massive onslaught, believing 
that classification wculd eventually be acceptedL Howeverv with an 
increasing number of younger skilled workers deserting the yards, the 
Admiralty fcund itself under very real pressure to attend to this major 
grievance. In May 1840, as part of the on-going campaign to end 
classification, two shipwrights from each yard (together with thirteen 
members cf Parliament drawn from the dockyard towns) were allowed 
to put their point of view to the Admiralty. According to the Rochester 
Gazette, 'the deputation strongly protested against its [the scheme of 
classification] continuance'. [168] In particular, they drew the Board's 
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attention to the increasing numbers who were seeking work outside of the 
yards. One of the shipwrights from Portsmouth strongly urged an answer 
favourable to their demands, 
... as he represented a body of six 
hundred of excellent workmen as could be 
found; and added that he did not wish to 
hold cut anything in the shape of a threat, 
but he would tell his Lordship that 70 of 
them, and he was amongst the number, had 
resolved - unless something satisfactory 
was done - to quit the service, and they could 
at once obtain employment in a foreign 
country at double the rate of wages they were 
now receiving. [1691 
While the Admiralty might be able to resist the pressure created by 
petitions and public meetings, this was altogether different. They simply 
could not afford to see their most skilled workers continuing to leave the 
yards. As a result, the Admiralty announced in September of that year 
that the scheme of classification would be brought to an end. [170] 
In addition to the introduction of classification, other reforms 
directly affecting the wcrkfcree in all of the outstations were introduced 
during this same period. The most important of these established a new 
set of warking hours and a five day wcrking week; the ending of automatic 
pensions for retiring workers and a new scheme for the admission of 
apprentices. On the whole, each of these schemes caused some form of 
damage, whether it was that of lowering efficiency or further increasing 
the rise of hostility that the wcrkforce clearly felt towards those 
responsible for the introduction of so many unsettling changes. 
Fcr the wcrkforce, superannuation was one very positive advantage 
d employment in the naval outstations. Artisans, either employed within 
the dockyards for thirty years or incapacitated by injury directly 
resulting from their employment, were entitled to a pension. Originally, 
when these pensions were first established during the previous centuryq 
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the amount was not ungenercus. [1711 Varying in amount between trades, 
shipwrights and caulkers were entitled to 
125 per annum while the lesser 
trades such as joiners, sailmakers and riggers received 
f2O, t15 and 410 
respectivelyj 1721 This, in all cases, had represented 60% of the 
standard day wage. However, with no increase given to amounts received 
under superannuation - despite increases in the given day wage together 
with a general rise in the cost of living - the value of these pensions 
had declined quite considerably. By 1833, and the phasing out of the 
scheme, their value had fallen to about 30% of the then current day 
wage. [ 1731 
Surprisingly, the workforce was fairly muted in their condemnation 
of the Admiralty decision to end the payment of superannuation. The 
reasons for this are fairly simple to discern. First, and foremost, the 
decision was only to affect those entering the yards and hospitals from 1 
I May 1833. [174] Those already employed, including those soon in a position 
to claim the benefit, were not to have their future financial security 
threatened. Secondly, and coming within a few months of the announcement 
over superannuation, the workforce found themselves graded according to 
the new scheme of classification. This rapidly became an issue in which 
all other grievances paled into insignificance. However, the loss of 
superannuation was not forgotten. In the vast majority of petitions 
submitted on the issue of classification, the desire for a continuance of 
superannuation was invariably included. It was also an issue frequently 
alluded to in the public meetings and by the delegates allowed to address 
members of the Board of Admiralty either in the yards or in their London 
off ices. 
Given that the combined effect of low wages, the grievance over 
classification and the loss of pensions led to considerable difficulties 
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of recruitment, it was decided that superannuation should be re-introduced 
just six years after its removal. This decision was made easier by Graham 
no longer being First Lord and a change In the nature of the governing 
administration. With Melbourne at the head of a more traditional Whig 
administration and the Earl of Minto as First Lord, the practice of 
paternalism, as represented by pensions, was considered in a more 
favourable light. Thus, a perceived need to placate the workforce by the 
re-introduction of a scheme that would care for those who had given a life 
times service was seen as highly justifiable. After all, the leading 
Whigs of this administration ran estates where their own elderly would be 
similarly cared for. Graham, for his part, had not come from a 
traditional Whig background, did not hold such beliefs and had seen the 
end of superannuation as a means by which further governmental economies 
might be achieved. Furthermore, this truly Whig dominated Board went 
further than merely adopting the previcusly existing scheme. Aware that 
the amount to be claimed under superannuation had greatly fallen, it was 
decided that a number of increases were called for, with several 
orders-in-ccuncil overseeing such arrangements. [175] 
The new apprentice scheme introduced while Graham was at the Board 
of Admiralty was a further addition to the grievances of which the 
workforce complained. Under it, all apprentices entering the yards were 
bound to the government. Previously they had been bound to officers. 
However, actual instruction was carried cut by selected deserving workers 
termed instructors. It was they, rather than the officers who received, 
as their reward, part of the pay earned by an apprentice. This was a much 
sought after perquisite, but owing to the limited numbers of apprentices 
engaged, only a small number of artisans benefited. 
The objective behind the change was that of improving the quality 
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of apprentices entering the yards. It was felt that the instructors 
rarely had the ability to properly train the young boys with many of them, 
following their seven year period of indenture, unable to carry cut even 
some of the more basic skills of their chosen trade. Under the new 
scheme, which was introduced in November 1833, it was now the task of the 
various superior officers, leadingmen and foremen to ensure that proper 
instruction was given. Furthermore, each apprentice was to be subject to 
a quality report, in which he was to be assessed as regards his general 
conduct and attendance. Any apprentice, at the end of his seven years, 
could not expect automatic admission to the service if his conduct was 
open to question. 
The new system did have some clear advantages. Each apprentice was now 
guaranteed sane form of practical training rather than directed to 
undertake a series of menial tasks only vaguely related to the skins of 
the trade he was learning. On the other hand, theoretical training 
remained either weak or non-existent. No arrangements existed for the 
removal of dockyard apprentices to the classroom, leaving the youngsters 
unlikely to acquire anything more than a rudimentary understanding of 
mathematics, naval architecture and geometric principles. Even the 
dockyard shipwrights themselves appreciated this aspect of the problem and 
submitted frequent petitions requesting the establishment of sane form of 
school within each of the dockyards. The majority of these petitions 
favoured a voluntary school that would allow both apprentices and those 
who had served their indentures to attend. In order that it might not 
disrupt the normal routine of the yards, the suggested time of opening for 
this school was Saturday morning. [176] Among those in the official 
hierarchy, albeit in a lowly position, who supported the idea was John 
Edye. However, he was very much a lone voice, for both Graham and Symonds 
opposed such an arrangement. Symonds, somewhat illogically, claimed that 
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such a voluntary school, once established, would be seen as compulsory. 
Instead, he felt that those in the dockyard should obtain what knowledge 
they could free from the inducement of special favours: that attendance at 
such a school might bestow. [1771 
Once again, a very real improvement in the arrangement of the 
dockyards, had to await certain administrative changes. Giving the 
importance of providing apprentices with a broader background that only 
formal education could provide, the resultant delay was fairly short. In 
1842, as a result of the effort of Sir Sidney Herbert, First Secretary in 
Sir Robert Peel's administration, it was decided to institute day time 
schools in all of the dockyards. Established solely for apprentices, 
individuals undertaking their indentures were expected to attend the 
school for a part of each day. Here they studied a very broad curriculum 
that was designed to improve both their reading and arithmetical 
skills, with time set aside for prayer and religious teaching together 
with lessons in geography and history. 
A further element to theoretical training within the yards was the 
existence, up until 1832, of the School of Naval Architecture. This was 
officially established within the grounds of the naval dockyard at 
Portsmouth in 1811 for the purpose of training a 'superior' class of 
shipwrights. Those who entered the school, and the number eligible was 
restricted to twenty-four in any one year, undertook a formalised 
programme of education in all matters connected with the science of 
shipbuilding. In effect, the school was really an advanced academy, that 
concentrated upon a small elite group, chosen by examination, to provide 
the future designers and senior managers of the yards. once the 
apprentice, upon the completion of the normal period of seven years 
training, left the school he would enter into yard service as an 
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inspector. However, although his immediate entry Into the yard hierarchy 
was much higher than the 'ordinary' apprentice might attain, promotion 
from that point onwards was painfully slow. As much as anything, this 
resulted from a high degree of opposition from older shipwrights who 
resented this more youthful competition for the most prized positions. 
Dyson, in a study of British naval architects, sums up the situation in 
the following terms: 
The ex-apprentice of the old tradition had good 
cause to dislike the new men, and to fear that 
they would seriously injure his chances of 
promotion. They never did the manual work of the 
ordinary shipwright, (although they learned the 
use of the traditional adze and saw), they never 
worked as ordinary shipwrights ... and they 
had the promise at least on paper that ultimately 
the highest civilian professional offices would be 
filled from their ranks. [1781 
Dyson goes on to suggest that it was probably this rivalry that led to the 
suspension of recruitment to the school after 1822, although he accepts 
that firm documentary evidence is lacking. As a result, by the time of 
Graham's arrival at the Admiralty in 1830, the school was moribund: 
It is little wonder that, confronted with the 
spectacle of a school with no students (the 
last having left in 1829), he should take the 
advice of his senior full-time officials, who 
were and always had been hostile to the school, 
and close it officially. [1791 
In addition, Dyson further suggested that Graham was, 
no doubt supported in this action by his newly 
appointed Surveyor of the Navy, Captain 
William Symonds, the first naval officer in 
this post for many years, and a man with a 
reputation for scorn and ignorance of 
science. [ 1801 
However, in closing the school, Graham left the dockyards without any 
formalised means of providing theoretical training. A large number of 
those who later went on to obtain the more exalted positions both at 
Somerset House and within the dockyards were frequently graduates of the 
school. Indeed, one of the rising stars already mentioned as later 
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serving under Symonds, Isaac Watts, the third member of the Surveyor's 
office, was a graduate of the School of Naval Architecture. Having 
completed his apprenticeship in 182D, he immediately entered the dockyard 
at Portsmouth as an inspector. Following two decades of service, he was 
caUed to Somerset Hcuse where he was to remain for the rest of his 
career. on later becoming Chief Constructor, the first to hold that 
title, he went on to design Warri , the world's f irst ironclad 
battleship. 
Perhaps the only outstation reform in this period that could be 
considered as anything like a success was that of the introduction of a 
specialised police service. Established in 1834, it was responsible for 
all aspects of yard security. Prior to the setting up of this body, 
security in the yards had been in the hands of a specially appointed 
group. of workers. Known as warders, watchmen and roundsmen they had, 
since 1686, undertaken all of the basic duties necessary for the securing 
of the yards. While rounders undertook regular nightly patrols, watchmen 
remained on duty at various watch boxes and porters did duty on the gate 
during the day. The problem with this arrangement was that for most of 
them, this was not their main duty. Watchmen and rounders were drawn from 
yard laboarers, undertaking these night time daties in addition to their 
normal day. Although any single individual might only be called upon once 
or twice daring the week, the matter of fatigue cannot be ignored. 
Certainly, whenever inspections were carried out, it was not unusual to 
find at least one watchman asleep in his box. In addition to 
this, these watchmen and rounders might find themselves confronting their 
fellow workers when trying to prevent a misdemeanour. As such, this seems 
one possible reason why so few workers were apprehended for the vast 
quantities of items that were seemingly removed from the yards during this 
period. 
334 
As for the specialised force, this was kept distinctly separate 
from the workers in the various outstations. Provided with separate 
accommodation and distinctive uniforms, they were a relative efficient 
securi ty force. Their duties entailed not only nightly patrols, 
supporting the porter at the gate but also carrying out searches of 
premises near the yards that were suspected of harbouring stolen property. 
The establishments at each of the yards naturally varied according to the 
area of the site to be patrolled and the numbers employed. However, the 
new force at each establishment would be headed by one inspector. At 
Sheerness dockyard, for instance, there was one inspctor, three sergeants 
and thirty constables. Each of the constables received a weekly wage of 
nineteen shillings. 
This first specialised force within the outstation was however, to 
prove relatively short lived. Whereas the system of warders, watchmen and 
rounders survived intact for almost a century and a half, the new force 
lasted only until 1860. In that year it was superseded by a specially 
created branch of the Metropolitan Police. The reason for this change was 
not really a reflection upon the old body, but resulted from the emergence 
of new ideas in policing. The Metropolitan Police, a well organised and 
independent body, had shown that careful selection of recruits and 
attention to training had produced an efficient agency for reducing high 
levels of crime. In order that the naval dock and victualling yards 
should fully benefit from these same advances, it was decided that 
the Metropolitan Police should also take responsibility for the naval 
outstations. A number of those employed in the body previously 
responsible for policing the dockyards were allowed to join the new force, 
althcugh a large number of others were also dismissed on account of their 
age being beyond that found acceptable. 
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Despite the belief, held for many years, that Graham's reforms were 
a success, the evidence presented would not appear to support such a view. 
In virtually every area of outstation administration, where a change was 
made, these proved to be failing of quite catastrophic proportions. Each 
damaged the outstations in some way. Either they brought confusion to the 
existing managerial structure or undermined the morale of the workforce. 
Indeed, it could be argued that the resulting inefficiencies, were 
directly responsible for the poor state of the yards in the 1860s, 
resulting in considerable pressure to bring to an end government 
administration of such establishments, with all warship repair and 
construction work handed over to private yards. These, at the time, were 
felt to be much more efficient. 
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The various reforms of the navy's civilian departments, including 
abolition of the Navy and Victualling Boards, as undertaken by the Whigs 
during Graham's first tenure of office at the Admiralty, must be viewed as 
an unmitigated diaster. In various parliamentary speeches, the Whig First 
Lord claimed that the changes he had instituted would have a number of 
clear advantages of which he appears to have considered economic 
management, simplicity of structure, individual responsibility and 
effectual control to be the most important. [1] Yet, in each of these 
separate areas, the result can be seen as either abject failure or the 
crea ti on of severe problems in other areas of naval administration 
where none had previously existed. 
In chapter five, where the outcome of the reforms is considered in 
detail, it was shown that despite Graham's claims, the economic advantage 
gained by abolishing the civilian boards was negligible. Indeed, by 
1841, when the Whigs handed over the reins of power, the cost of running 
the navy's civilian administration was approximately the same as it had 
been prior to the introduction of those same reforms. In f act, the 
dismissal of so many clerks and senior officers., all with enhanced 
pensions, meant that the reforms actually produced the necessity of 
annually paying cut large sums of money earlier than would 
otherwise have been required. Furthermore, there was the additional 
expense of having to employ a number of new clerks upon the realization 
that the civil departments had been excessively pruned. [21 
As for simplification, this must be considered a spurious claim 
when the two unified managerial boards were replaced by five isolated 
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principal officers. Whereas the cut-going Boards had been responsible 
for co-ordinating the work of the naval hospitals, victualling and 
dockyards, this ceased to be the role of the principal officers. Unable 
to enter into discussion among themselves, they had to rely on the 
superintending Admiralty commissoners undertaking this wcrk on their 
behalf. From this point of view, the system was potentially more 
complex. The principal officers, were not present, when members of the 
Board were discussing any proposals they might have made. As a result, 
their ideas were put forward by those who rarely had great knowledge of 
the subjet under discussion and consequently were unable to defend the 
idea if it failed to meet with instant approval. Only if the principal 
officers had either been given a certain degree of executive authority, 
permission to meet together or able to be present at Board meetings, could 
the new system have been deemed simpler. 
As for individual responsibility, Graham frequently claimed that 
the reforms would enfwce the principle 'as completely as it could 
possibly be enforced'. [3] But, in reality, he oversaw the introduction of 
a system of administration that favoured only that of collective decison 
making. Admittedly, each member of the Board was initially given one area 
of responsibility as represented by the principal officer that he 
superintended, but this was as far as the principle strayed. The Civil 
Departments Act, itself, made no mention of individual responsibility, 
insisting that all 'Authorities, Duties, Matters and Things' to be 
executed by the Board should only be 'valid and effectual' if 'executed or 
performed by two cc more' commissoners of the Admiralty. [41 As for the 
powers of the First Lord who, in theory, might have been held responsible 
for all decisions taken, this was precluded by the Letters Patent that 
appointed the various commissioners. According to these, the First Lord 
had no greater authority than any other member of the Board. [51 
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Finally, there is the claim that the naval refcrms permitted the 
Admiralty effective control over the civilian7-run facilties. This, in 
point of fact, cannot be denied. By removing the intervening tier and 
denying the principal officers any form of power, then the Board of 
Admiralty had absolute control over naval hospitals, dock and 
victualling yards. Yet the resulting cost was unimaginably high. To 
maintain this authority, virtually every meeting of the Board was 
dominated by the the minutiae of running these increasingly complex 
establishments. No longer were those appointed to the Admiralty, whether 
naval officer or civilian, in a position to give proper attention to the 
real duties of the Board, that of strategy and planning. Resulting from 
this, was the navy's dismal performance in the Russian War and 
near-disaster in the First World War. 
While a clearly recognised. need had existed fcr a change in the 
means by which the civilian facilities of the navy were managed, the 
approach adopted by the Whigs was both heavy handed and unnecessary. To 
simply destroy everything that had gone before was also to wreak 
destruction upon an administrative framework that had the proven ability 
to work even when placed under extreme pressure. The effectiveness of the 
British navy during the twenty years of conflict that had finally 
culminated In the defeat of Napoleon was clear evidence of this simple 
fact. Throughout that period, the civilian administrators, and the system 
they oversaw, had never once failed in the essential task of allowing the 
world's largest and most formidable sea-going force to remain at sea. Nor 
should such a task be underestimated. While navy's of all other nations 
might count their ships in tens and twenties, the Royal Navy finally 
peaked at a force of over eight hundred vessels. [61 Furthermore, nearly 
two hundred of these were battleships and carried a complement of sailors 
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and officers that was in excess of five hundred. The logistics of keeping 
just one of these ships at sea, much less a combined fleet of thirty or 
more, almost defies the imagination. Finally, it might also be 
mentioned, these same ships were not simply restricted to home waters, 
the Navy and Victualling Boards having to establish facilities throughout 
the world for the repair, maintenance and supply of the ships with 
those same bases having responsibility for the care of the sick and 
wounded. 
No other civilian enterprise of comparable scale had ever 
previously existed. In every aspect of management, the civilian 
administrators of the navy were pioneers. At their peak, the civilian 
boards had at their disposal capital sums in excess of twenty minion 
pounds per year on top of the f ixed assets as represented by the 
numerous hospitals, dock and victualling yards that were located in every 
single one of the wcrld's inhabited continents. [71 As for numbers 
employed, the seven home dockyards combined shared a workforce of 15,500 
while the dockyard at Pcrtsmouth, admittedly the largest, was employing in 
excess of 4,000. [81 Outside of the navy's civilian support services, no 
employer could match such size. Pollard, in his survey of British 
industry during this period, refers to some of the cotton mills of 
Lancashire employing in excess of a thousand workers. [9] This, in turn, 
is supported by Fitton, who indicates Arkwright, in 1814, to have employed 
1,900 wcrk people in his various mills, with only three other employers 
exceeding 1,500. [101 At the same time, reference might be made to the 
employment of hand loom weavers. Bythell, refers to Dixons of Carlisle 
employing 3,571 weavers. However, these employees were not organised in 
anything other than individual production units scattered, in the case of 
Dixons, throughout the Bcrder counties and northern IrelanI[11] While 
considerable organisation was required to keep these wcrkers fujIT 
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employed, the problems generated were markedly different from those to 
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be confronted by the employment of a mass of workers on the same site. 
Furthermore, with regard to both cotton spinners and weavers, the 
employment of such large numbers was, during the early 19th, a fairly 
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recent development. In fact, both were the product of the mechanization 
ofmills, aprocess that had taken plaoe from about 1770 onwards: the 
'+t , ---tp t nat "t - 'ý' ", 1ý4-' _'-" --.; -. K, 'A 'ýý former working in those mills and the latter expanding in number so as to 
absorb the increased amount of spun cotton. [121 
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Because of the pioneering natureof the work undertaken by the 
navy's civilian boards, problems inevitably existed. No ground breaking 
crganisation can hope to get anything right first time. Yet, the sheer 
longevity of the navy's large scale civilian enterprise had ensured that 
many of the difficulties to be associated with large scale enterprises in 
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the public sector had long since been solved by the civilian boards. In 
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particular, diff iculties: over recruitment, training, retention and 
disciplining of labcur had all been overcome while considerable attention 
was given to the most effective ways of improving both accountancy and 
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accountability. As for the private sector, there is considerable evidence 
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that a number of large-scale companies, as a result of an inability to 
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successfully meet such difficulties, declined and failed as a result. In 
particular, reference can be made to various mining and canal 
companies. [131 
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In completely sweeping away the highly successful civilian boards, 
J 
Graham replaced them with an untried and ultimately unworkakble system. 
The Board of Admiralty, in having to take over the extensive 
responsibilities previously overseen by the civilian boards, was quite 
A, 
incapable maintaining these same high standards. Furthericreg"matters 
were made no bet ter by the severe reduction in- the numbers of clerks 
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employed and the loss of ten highly experienced civilian commissioners. 
To begin with however, this decline in efficiency was hardly noticed. The 
reforms had come in the midst of a period of peace and the demands placed 
on the civilian facilities were minimal. The only complaints heard 
resulted in the slowness of bringing accounts up-to-date and delays in 
replying to letters. [141 Only upon the outbreak of the Russian War did it 
become obvicas that Graham's system was not all that it should be. 
Shortly after the outbreak of the war it became necessary to form a new 
Transport Board while the supply side of the Navy was hard pressed in 
maintaing supplies to ships destined to operate in the relatively 
restricted geographical areas as represented by the Baltic and Black Seas. 
Nevertheless, despi te the success of the navy's civilian 
administrative structure, the Whig government that came to power in 1830 
was still entitled to think in terms of reforming the civil administration 
of the Navy. For one thing, the commissioners who sat on the 
civilian boards had become far too powerful. Difficult to remove from 
office, they were in the habit of openly defying the Admiralty, using a 
variety of ploys either to delay or completely prevent any change with 
which they did not agree. In the 18th century, and on several separate 
occasions, the supposedly inferior and subordinate civilian boards, chose 
not to implement direct Admiralty instructions. Invariably, they used a 
combination of prevarication and procrastination, safe in the 
knowledge that at some point a change in political fortunes would 
result in the removal of those who composed the superior board. Possibly, 
indeed, an opposition grouping wculd achieve actual power, with some of 
those appointed to the inferior Boards invariably owing allegiance 
(if not their original appointment) to the newly accredited government. 
At the very least, those appointed to the new Board of Admiralty, unable 
to compete with the wealth of experience possessed by the commissioners of 
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the infericr boards, would place to one side many of the unimplemented 
injunctions sought by their immediate predecessors. 
Admittedly, in the period that immediately preceded the return of a 
Whig government in 1830, the tension that had once existed between the 
Admiralty and the civilian boards had been removed. Primarily this 
resulted from the unusually long period in which one parliamentary 
grouping held off ice. As a result Melville, the longest serving of all 
First Lords, had been in a position to appoint a large number of those who 
served on the two inferior boards. Of particular importance, was that 
both Thomas Byam Martin and Chetwynd Stapylton, respectively chairmen of 
the Navy and Victualling Boards, were his appointees. As a result, there 
was a reduced liklihood of political friction. On the other hand, owing 
to the lengthy period of peace that also characterised these years, the 
commissioners of the inferior boards were opposed to the constant demands 
that they should reduce overall expenditure. Indeed, even Melville was 
unable to enforce his demand that numbers employed in the dockyards be 
reduced to 7,000. On top of this, and ably exposed by Graham in 
Parliament, was the mi&-use of public funds, whereby the commissioners of 
the two Boards had directed money to projects not approved by Parliament. 
Yet, complete abolition of the two remaining civilian boards was 
only one of several options open to the new government which took office 
under Earl Grey. Of particular importance was a proposal put forward by 
Cockburn in 1828 and subsequently given a public airing by Croker. This 
consisted of amalgamating the two remaining civilian boards and having 
this one single body completely under the control of the Admiralty. This 
latter, of course, could be simply achieved by changing the tems of 
appointment, with the civilian commissioners able to be removed by the 
First Lord if he should so choose. The result would have been a 
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much simplified system of administration that would also have dispensed 
with the worst aspects of a semi-independent body responsible for 
administering one half of the affairs of the Navy. The civilian 
administrators appointed to the new body would have been responsible for 
overseeing the day to day running of the outstations together with the 
other duties once performed by the inferior Boards, This, in turn, 
would leave the superior Board in a position where it could continue to 
concentrate upon forward planning and strategy. In fact, Cockburn's 
suggestion can be taken as one of gmat significance, for if introduced at 
that time it would have prevented the numerous difficulties subsequently 
encountered. Indeed, so commendable was this particular idea that a 
similar scheme was introduced by Geddes towards the end of World War One. 
This, as it happens, proved to be the final stepping stone in the long 
journey to cleanse naval administration of the various difficulties 
created by the reforms introduced by Graham between 1830 and 1834. 
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